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Abstract 
 
 
 
An assertion that psychotherapy is an independent science and a self-authority 
on human mind and behaviour has uprooted its connection with philosophy and 
religion. In practice, the scientist-practitioner model of psychotherapy, a seemingly 
dualistic model, prefers determinism of science to free will of choice in humans.  
In particular, the model does not see reason and emotion as co-conditioning 
causes of human behaviour and suffering within the interdependent aggregates of self, 
other, and environment. Instead, it argues for wrong reasoning as the cause of emotional 
suffering.  
In Western thought, such narrative began at the arrival of scripted language and 
abstract thought in Greek antiquity that has led psychotherapy to think ignorantly that 
emotions are un-reasonable therefore they are irrational. Only rational thinking can 
effectively remove un-reasonable emotions.  
This belief creates confusion between rational theory and rational method of 
studying change in emotion because of the belief that science cannot objectively 
measure emotions. As a result, rational epistemologies that are ignorant of moral and 
metaphysical issues in human experience have multiplied. These epistemologies not 
only construct an unchanging rational identity, but also uphold the status of permanent 
self-authority.  
Fortunately, recent developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience 
research have quashed such ideas of permanent self-identity and authority.   
 Buddhist theory of Interdependent Arising and Conditional Relations sees such 
identity and authority as arisen together with deluded emotional desires of greed and 
hatred.  
These desires co-condition interdependent states of personal feeling and 
perception (metaphysics), conceptual thinking and consciousness (epistemology) and 
formation of (moral) emotion and action within the context of self-other-environment 
matrix. Moral choices particularly highlight the intentional or the Aristotelian final 
cause of action derived from healthy desires by valued meaning makings and 
interpretations.   
  viii 
Theravada formulation aims to end unhealthy desires and develop the healthy 
ones within the matrix including the client-clinician-therapeutic environment contexts.  
Theravada treatment guides a tripartite approach of practicing empathic ethics, 
penetrating focus and reflective understanding, which integrates ecologically with 
Western rational analysis.  It also allows scientific method of studying change in 
emotion by applying the theory of defective desires. 
In addition, interdependent dimensions of thinking and feeling understood from 
Theravada perspective present a framework for developing theory and treatment of self 
disorders.    
Thus, Theravada treatment not only allows scientific method of studying change 
in emotion and provides an interdependent theory and treatment but also ecologically 
integrates with Western rational analysis. Moreover, Theravada approach offers an 
open framework for further development of theoretical and treatment models of 
psychopathology classified under Western nomenclature.   
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The madman is not the man who has lost reason. The 
madman is the man who has lost everything except his 
reason.   
Gilbert K Chesterton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The marvelous logic of the mad which seems to mock that 
of the logicians because it is exactly the same… The 
ultimate language of madness is that of reason.     
Michel Foucault 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction - The Quest 
 
Client:   I’ve been through all sorts of treatment, but   
    nothing has helped me. 
Clinician:  So, tell me what kind of treatment you have been  
    through? 
Client:   All kinds – tranquilizers, mood stabilisers, anti- 
    depressants, anti-psychotic, drugs for ADHD  
    (Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder),  
    Relaxation, CBT (Cognitive Behaviour Therapy),  
    Jungian analysis, Hypnosis, Anger Management,  
    Relationship Counselling, Rebirthing, you name it,  
    I’ve done it. 
Clinician:   Which aspects of these treatments help you, and  
    which aspects don’t? 
Client:   Each of them seemed to help a little in the    
    beginning, but none of them gave me a lasting  
    effect. 
Clinician:  How come?  
Client:  I don’t know, I followed them thoroughly, but I get the 
impression that they think I am either genetically 
vulnerable or in denial and resistant, or a combination of 
the lot. When I complained about it I was accused of 
blaming. I don’t know who’s blaming whom, but the 
psychologist keeps telling me that I am responsible for 
my behaviour and I have a choice. They give me the 
impression that I choose to be like that and that I don’t 
want to get out of my own self-deception. 
Clinician:  What do you think? 
Client:   I know in theory about interaction between your  
    genes and the environment, your upbringing and  
    current situation and all that psychological jargon,  
    but I think they are stuck, and I’m stuck as well. 
 
(Condensed reconstruction of a conversation between a client and a psychotherapist,  
  following the guidelines to keep the anonymity of the client) 
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The above conversation represents discontent and suffering by both client and 
clinician who try to restore and maintain their self-identity and independent authority 
but to no avail. The failure of such construction comes from modern and postmodern 
man trying to individuate himself from collective entities, to objectify and detach his 
daily experience into abstraction and to control his future. Berger (1966) calls such 
phenomena as the dilemmas of modern life that expand human power and enhance the 
uniqueness of an individual to cut away social ties and shared meaning that support 
them. The claim of an independent authority of the self-identity uproots his connection 
with language, culture, philosophy, and religion that teaches the individual how to relate 
to external powers of others and the environment. Having split away from religion, 
especially of all-powerful theistic practices and siding with physical science, 
psychotherapy sits awkwardly between determinism of science and free will of choice 
in humans. In philosophical terms, an over-emphasis on an epistemology of a rational 
self severs the metaphysics of emotional relationship with others and the environment in 
morally responsible ways that leads to suffering. Discontent and suffering of clients and 
clinicians echo Hillman’s (1992) cry: “We’ve a hundred years of psychotherapy but the 
world’s getting worse”. This cry also challenges the core of my thirty-year work with 
children, psychiatric patients, the handicapped, adolescents, alcoholics, drug addicts and 
the full range of criminal offenders. My current practice with offenders who do not fit in 
with a biopsychosocial model (Engel, 1980) has motivated my continued search for 
alternative ways to help clients live a harmonious community life.  
My interpretation is that psychotherapy endeavours to alleviate human suffering 
resulting from disharmony between the self, the other, and the environment. 
Psychology’s emphasis on abstract conceptual analysis, without a pre-conceptual 
observation as in Buddhist practices, of experiential feelings has split the self-
understanding away from an integrated connection with the other and the environment 
in context. In search of identity and authority, ‘immaterial’ psychology exclusively 
emulated the efficient causation of ‘material’ science and thus, split itself from the 
integrated whole of the self-other-environment matrix. This is the fundamental 
framework of my thesis highlighting how being ignorant, in the Buddhist sense, to 
understand the truth of transient duality between individual identity and the integrated 
whole has led psychotherapy to its own suffering. 
Two other related conditions that contributed to the project are my Buddhist 
cultural background and practice of psychotherapy in Western culture. The former was  
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paradoxically enriched by my pious father, who imposed his beliefs on the rest of his 
family. In reaction to this, I read critiques on Buddhist practices to separate folklore 
from the Buddhist teachings. My psychotherapy practice in the West originated from 
clinical psychology training at the University of Western Australia during the early to 
mid-1970s under Colombo Plan fellowship award. Clinical psychology bases 
professional training on the scientist-practitioner model, which is supposed to equip me 
for practice at any human service agency in the world. However, although the model 
seemingly interface science and practice together, it sides with the science and ignores 
the dual existence of science and religion in human life. As a result, the model applies 
scientific knowledge gained from laboratory psychology to clinical practice instead of 
combining this with the wisdom of lived human experience - emotion and reason in 
making meaning and values that are integral parts or the moral ethics of our lives. I have 
since realized that the model ignores the significance of moral ethics and choice guided 
by the essence of religion for living a content and harmonious life. The model merely 
puts side-by-side two opposing notions of deterministic science and the free will of 
humans with an ambiguous belief in dualism. Such a belief points to a history of 
unreconciled dualities between mind and matter, body and mind, free will of man and 
determinism of science and authority of the divine; in short, science and religion. To 
provide an overview of the present study, I shall outline the origins and status of the 
scientist-practitioner model in theory and practice to clarify the issue of free will and 
determinism in psychotherapy.  
 
Origin and Current Status of the Scientist-
Practitioner Model 
 
The origin of the scientist-practitioner model goes back to the Boulder 
conference on graduate education in clinical psychology in 1949 (Committee on 
training in clinical psychology, 1949; Raimy, 1950; see also Benjamin & Baker, 2000). 
However, the development of the model relates to education and training rather than the 
model of professional practice. It called for clinical psychologists to become both  
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scientists and practitioners.  It gave relatively little consideration to integrate science 
and practice in everyday clinical work. 
The scientist-practitioner model and notion of biological or psychological 
determinism versus the existence of free will generated rigorous debate at the recent 4
th 
International Conference on Philosophy and Psychiatry in 2000 (Callender, 2000; 
Gozzini, 2000; Greenspan, 2000; Heinz, 2000; Mordini, 2000; Sullivan, 2000; Vizioli, 
2000), as the model emphasises being "scientific" while recognising the inevitable 
practice of free will in psychotherapy.  
 Some practitioners (e.g. Pilgrim & Tratcher, 1992; Smail, 1996) have also 
questioned the validity of the scientist-practitioner model. Shapiro (1985) has been 
critical of insufficiently validated methods of assessment of treatment for all mental 
health domains.  Although his emphasis was on thinking and acting scientifically, 
Shapiro put priority of strategy over procedure.  Debate about the scientific background 
of the discipline has continued.  There has been a dispute between academic and clinical 
psychology regarding quantitative versus qualitative methodology (Reicher, 2000).  
Such debate continues between the applied and academic poles of psychology on 
whether the applied discipline could call itself 'scientific'. Corrie & Callaghan (2000) 
have warned there is a need to reformulate the model to incorporate complex 
understandings of the practice of science that goes beyond mere positivism. The 
suggestion emphasises practice-based research whereby the 'scientist' considers a 
critical realist perspective. A survey conducted by Kennedy & Llewellyn (2001) of 
clinical psychology trainers, trainees and practitioners in the UK, still widely supports 
the scientist-practitioner model with a high degree of responsiveness to the cultural and 
institutional context. 
In everyday practice, however, the model focuses on a 3rd
 person (the detached 
observer-clinician) conceptualisation to understand the direct embodied experience of 
the 1st person (client) suffering.  It misses how the client instigates his own suffering. 
The client’s suffering originates from not understanding the changing nature of all 
pleasant and unpleasant experiences. He desires to change from a current experience to 
an unchanging pleasant state, which only exists in concept. Thus, he splits away from 
his embodied experience in the preference for an idealised concept. Failure to learn 
from the direct experience leaves him “stuck” in a conceptual quagmire without leading 
him to any clue to experiential freedom. Similarly, the scientist-practitioner model fails 
to stay with and observe the client’s experience to the fullest extent while suspending  
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conceptualisation. Therefore, it explains away the client experience and uses strategies 
to manipulate the experience conceptually. This causes misunderstanding of 
interdependent development between direct experience and the linguistic expression of 
the first person client. As Jaynes (1976) argues, inventing written language has created 
mediating linguistic concepts including the concept of “Self”. The Self evaluates 
feelings with concepts to form a layered network of emotions and thoughts about 
emotions. Emotions and thoughts may be in conflict with each other in experiencing the 
world.  In the end, psychotherapy is not only a dialogue between clinician and client 
about these thoughts and emotions, but experiencing them and reflecting upon them to 
gain a wise perspective for resolution.  
It became apparent that the model I was trained in did not give me a better 
understanding of clients’ heightened emotional experiences or altered states of 
consciousness. I learned to use hypnosis in treating clients including alcoholics, and 
drug addicts to help overcome their “stuckness” in drug-induced altered states of 
conscious experience. Nevertheless, I was still “stuck” with my methods including 
dominant behavioural and cognitive-behavioural therapies as well as hypnosis. Such 
frustration created in me a desire to learn the various forms of psychotherapy that come 
under the four major schools of psychoanalytic, behavioural, humanistic-existential and 
transpersonal psychotherapy. Mahrer (2000) identified the impasse I faced as akin to the 
shackles of "foundational beliefs" (ideas and propositions), which these therapies 
assume as fundamental givens or truths.   
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Mahrer lists these foundational beliefs as being: 
 
 
•  Implicit and unspecified, e.g. there is no available authoritative 
list of formally stated foundational beliefs.  
•  Hidden in accepted phrases, common practices and inadvertent 
validation, e.g. common phrases as conditioned response, 
borderline disorders, or an anal stage of development.  
•  Embedded within an entrenched folk psychology, e.g. infantile 
experiences influence a person's entire life, abstract psychological 
processes such as your learning and memory exist as entities on 
their own.  
•  In the mindset of a single basic truth, e.g. human behaviour is 
entirely based on increasing pleasure and decreasing pain.  
•  Exceedingly well defended against critical analysis, e.g. 
Researchers demonstrate the truth of what they already belief is 
true, it is unfashionable and unwelcome to attack one's own 
foundational beliefs.  
•  Immunised by collectively accepting definitional truths, e.g. 
seeing the failure of the reinforcement principle as evidence of 
the absence of reinforcement rather than a disconfirmation of the 
law of the effect. 
 
 
A typical example of the foundational beliefs is the tendency of our mind to 
generalise and think of those conditioned in other disciplines as cultures. Jerome Kagan 
(1998b) provides the evidence that the Western mind has a passion to abstract processes 
that are free of all constraints. He suggests the first sign of erosion of belief in the unity 
of unconstrained processes came during the early 18
th century from the students of the 
more inductive science of medicine. By comparison with the more formal disciplines of 
mechanics and astronomy, the student of medicine realised that all statements are 
probabilistic. Therefore, the relationship between observed signs and invisible events 
was of primary interest. By the middle of the 19
th century, each method of observation 
yielded a different set of probabilities. Therefore, probabilistic methods weakened the 
passion for abstraction. This belief has not completely permeated the philosophy of the 
behavioural sciences today. 
He gives the famous controversy between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr on the 
nature of reality as an example for psychologists to follow. Einstein believed that reality 
consisted of substances whose properties were unaffected by their relationship with 
either observers. For Bohr, however, nature consisted of relationships between  
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substances. Therefore, no measurement could reveal an autonomous aspect of an event 
because every measurement was a relationship between substances. 
Kagan suspects that many psychologists, especially those who study human 
personality and emotions like psychotherapists, are friendly to Einstein’s position. The 
mind takes delight in inventing a name that implies that the family of events shares a 
core set of features that is preserved across diverse instantiations. Scientific theories 
must assume constructs that stand for presumed commonalities among related events. 
He warns, scholars must not assume, unless the evidence is strong, that these invented 
or interpreted constructs, most of which are impermanent, apply to agents and contexts 
that were not part of the original empirical foundation for the idea.  
He points out that psychologists have a habit of theorising about abstract 
processes that they think are unrelated to human languages by permitting many 
predicates to use with a variety of agents and objects. Most verbs can occur in 
syntactically correct sentences that contain animals, people, or inanimate objects in 
various situations. For instance, “Many students of emotion write about “fear” as if it 
were a single psychological-cum-physiological state, knowable through measurement of 
brain activity, peripheral physiological responses, self-report, facial expressions, or 
overt behaviours (Ekman, 1993a, Ekman, 1993b, Izard, 1997, LeDoux, 1994). An infant 
monkey’s distress calls following separation from its mother, a chick’s immobility to 
restriction of its movement, a rat’s increased heart rate to a conditioned stimulus that 
has been paired with shock, a nine-year-old child’s retreat from a stranger, and an 
adult’s reluctance to cross bridges are often treated as equivalent indices of the same 
fear state (see Ekman & Davidson 1994; Kagan, 1998b). The mind finds it difficult to 
reject a word that does not refer to something real in the world. Therefore, it accepts the 
assumption that a named process generalises broadly rather than narrowly. Perhaps, 
human mind strains toward generality that coincides with the dominant function of the 
left hemisphere in a human brain (Metcalf, Funnell & Gazzaniga, 1995). 
The next attachment I was “stuck” with is the dilemma of free will and 
determinism.  Psychotherapy relies on an unresolved belief in the exercise of free will, 
but the theories that guide the exercise are primarily deterministic. While 
psychoanalysis follows psychic determinism, biological and behavioural therapies 
adhere to genetic or environmental determinism.  On the other hand, humanistic and 
transpersonal psychologies take an extreme position of free will as the determining 
factor in psychotherapy. Rychlak (2000) argues that the major issue in psychology is to  
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treat humanity as mechanical rather than teleological or intentional.  He suggests that 
teleology needs further study in psychotherapy because it is a genuinely accurate 
portrayal of human beings. In addition, there is a pressing need for improvement in the 
ethico-moral realms of behaviour that the mechanical mode fails to capture. 
The call for teleologic psychotherapy challenges the “nothing but” reductionist 
ideology in biology, psychology, sociobiology and neuroscience.  Between the two 
World Wars, psychology went through a phase of asserting that the only thing about 
people that can be studied properly was their behaviour, and therefore theories about 
people must be theories of behaviour. In Dawkins’ (1976) sociobiology, the genes are 
described as “selfish” to such an extent that they will even lead some gene carriers to 
engage in life-sacrificing “altruistic” behaviour. According to Dawkins, Genes act 
“selfishly” to increase the number of copies of themselves. A crude analogy draws 
attention in the old joke: “A chicken is just an egg's way of making more eggs”. 
Dawkins is quick to point out that although our genes may influence us, we are not 
controlled by them. These words are used in a context where they do not properly 
belong, argues Midgley (1985). Even if one can be persuaded that the genes, by some 
chance, can make moral decisions before they act, this will be very different from 
conscious decisions (assuming that genes do not have diverse language, culture and 
decision-making processes) built on the history of human life that is built on the 
interdependence matrix of self, other and environment. 
Disturbing simplifications found in sociobiology (Bowker, 1995) include the 
lack of interest in how the phenotype develops from the genotype to imply that genetic 
survival constitutes the whole explanation of particular human qualities. Similar 
reductionist approaches are to be found in the fields of neuroscience and artificial 
intelligence. In neuroscience, Francis Crick’s (1994) The Astonishing Hypothesis made 
the assumption of how the brain processes that support visual perception led to our 
being aware of something to actually seeing it. This happens without being able to 
localise in the brain the processes that underpin conscious awareness. Such a grafting of 
the mind on to neuronal processes reduces everyone to “nothing but a pack of neurons”. 
It ignores the fact of how the brain shapes experience while experience also shapes our 
physical brains. The best neuroscientists and information theorists can offer is 
parallelism i.e. physical and mental phenomena co-exist or identity theory i.e. mental 
and physical phenomena are the same.  Their hope is that one day they will be able to 
understand the human mind and consciousness by the discovery of neural pathways and  
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cognitive schemata. Yet this hope is unlikely to be realised.  For instance, neuronal 
imaging techniques can only provide structural abnormalities or a cerebral blood flow 
of the brain, which may accompany disparate states of mind. So, the doctrine of 
parallelism continues. Similarly, 'identical' neurophysiological conditions cannot 
reproduce identical states of mind or the other way around. Thus, there is a remaining 
twofold problem of hypothesising: 
  
 
•  The immaterial mind emerging from material neuronal 
constellations and  
•  The near impossibility of verifying the existence of the mind 
without a neuronal circuit.  
   
 
Similarly, the idea that the human mind is nothing but a computer is another 
reductionist metaphysical assumption about people (Newell & Simon, 1972; Neisser, 
1967). In computers, software programs run on silicon chips. In humans, the mind runs 
on neurones or vice versa is impossible to prove. This is due to a desperate search for 
simple, elegant, and powerful theories in the human sciences. Searching for simple, 
elegant theories in the human sciences, though tempting, is usually a mistake. 
Finally, I face the characterisation of psychotherapy as an attempt to alter 
clients’ meanings.  Psychotherapy is said to be a process between two or more people 
leading to the reconstruction of old meanings and the creation of new ones (Rosen, 
1996).  In rebuilding a new meaning, psychotherapists typically referred to 
interpretations that clients placed on significant events of their lives.  Clients weave 
these interpretations together to form what therapists call a "narrative" or "story."  Many 
who characterise their positions as constructivists, narrativists, social constructionists or 
postmodernists (Neimeyer, 1995; Rosen, 1996) favour this way of conceptualising 
psychotherapy.  However, they are not talking about interpretation in general.  What 
they have in mind is evaluative interpretations.  After all, clients do not make only 
causal interpretations of what triggered their experience, but also interpret some life 
experiences as good and others as bad.  Such value judgments and moral dilemmas 
give birth to suffering.  This situation leads to what religions do best, that is, moral 
training.   
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After returning from teaching graduate clinical psychology course at the 
Loughborough University of Technology in England in 1981, I began to value the 
principles of spiritually based approaches like Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics 
Anonymous and the Grow Group for psychiatrically affected individuals. I started to 
translate their principles into my clinical practice. In addition, the experience of 
overcoming both physical and mental pain during a ten-day meditation retreat 
consolidated my interest in integrating the principles of meditation to psychotherapy. 
What struck me was the “stuckness” previously came from not seeing the 
interconnection and transitoriness of things in nature, and is the major cause of all 
suffering where human action is invariably involved.  
This gives me a clue for an integration of scientific method and religious 
practice on the grounds of their commonality and complementarity. Obviously, both 
methods deal with an interface between emotion and cognition in helping the client live 
a valued and meaningful life. 
 
The Need for an Integration of Psychotherapy 
and Religious Practice 
 
Before I outline the need for an integration of science and religious practices, it 
is relevant to examine briefly how the alleged conflict between science (to which the 
model is linked) and Christianity have issues of common.  
The legendary stories revolved around two key figures like Galileo Galilei and 
Charles Darwin. They challenged the religious authorities by asserting that the earth 
moves round the sun and that Homo sapiens have evolved from other species, 
respectively.  Neither of these ideas is central to Biblical theology nor to Christian 
doctrine (Watts, 1997, 126). Watts believes that it was not so much to challenge 
primarily the religion but to question humanity's view of placing human beings as 
central to the scheme of things.  
Regardless of the extent of power play between religion and science, they have 
much more in common than is often recognized. Science does not just collect data but 
interprets within a particular context or paradigm. In the words of Hanson (1958a,  
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1958b), “all data is theory-laden”. All scientific knowledge is, therefore, provisional and 
open to reinterpretation. Similarly, religious knowing is validated within a culturally 
dependent paradigm of intersubjectivity that is also subject to reinterpretation. The 
search for universal, permanent knowledge is no longer appropriate in a post-modern 
intellectual culture that recognizes that all knowledge is dependent on the subjectivity of 
the knower and on the cultural context. “Objectivity can just as well be based on a 
subjectivity that has trained itself to be disciplined and faithful to what it is studying 
(Watts, 1996, 18)”.  There are various models of disciplined subjectivity, including 
psychoanalysis, phenomenology, introspection, and the qualitative research methods of 
the social sciences such as participant observation. 
There is a complementary and interconnected relationship between 
psychotherapy and religion.  They both deal with the centrality of emotion and issues 
surrounding a variety of emotions.  For instance, religions teach that moral decisions 
cannot be derived without emotion, while psychology sees emotion as functional and 
even rational, rather than disruptive.  First, I shall outline the psychology of emotion, 
followed by the connection between emotion and religion.  Secondly, the adaptive 
function of emotion will be discussed.  Finally, I will discuss how methods employed in 
religious practices help manage and develop a variety of emotions creatively. 
  
The Psychology of Emotion  
 
As with other disciplines, psychology has a tendency to claim “primacy” for one 
area of psychology or another.  This is the case with William James’ claim that feelings 
arise from perceiving biological changes because of their fundamental association with 
emotions. Averill (1980a, 1980b) argues that emotions arise within the context of social 
assumption and convention and public language descriptions shape them.  Although 
such a stance is less reductionistic, it still claims that emotion as “nothing but” social 
construction.  Cognitive approaches take emotions such as anxiety or depression as 
related to processes of attention, memory (Williams et al., 1988) or thought processes 
and devise cognitive therapies (Beck et al., 1979).  While others may emphasise the 
systematic study of the emotional lexicon (Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1988) or 
computational model of emotion (Oatley, 1987), emotional reaction in general has  
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multiple components. These include appraisal processes, physiological reactions, 
subject in experience, thought processes and behaviour (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987). 
 
Emotion and Religion 
 
Schleiermacher (1821), a philosopher and theologian, saw feeling as the essence 
of religion.  William James (1902) put forward a similar position in a psychological 
form in his The Variety of Religious Experience, emphasising the centrality of feeling in 
religion.  He also advanced an argument concentrating on the feeling component that 
allows one to abstract out what is constant and culturally invariant in religion.  
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the public world reflects the private experience of 
individuals just as a private experience reflects the public world (Watts, 1997b, 248).  
Nothing stands as wholly public or private.  Feelings may be private in a limited sense 
and emotions may have an important social ingredient. If religion is a social and cultural 
phenomenon and feelings are private and individual then there will be a gulf between 
them. Moreover, James' notion of feelings as wholly non-cognitive as opposed to 
thoughts has been criticised (Lash, 1988, 46).  For James, emotions are merely 
interpretative consequences of bodily states. 
However, feelings can also be associated with cognitions that have 
“intentionality” in the sense of being about something in the world.  In addition, 
emotions are heterogeneous aside the difference between basic and secondary emotions 
(Stein & Oatley, 1992). Emotions are often transitory whereas religious faith is 
generally stable and enduring.  Stable emotional states are often referred to as moods 
rather than the emotions.  Long-term moods are often associated with a good deal of 
cognitive reflection.  For instance, depression seems to be maintained by rumination 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  However, this is not to be mistaken for the reductionist 
thesis that religion is nothing but emotion. 
 
Emotion and Reason in Adaptation 
 
Culturally, we see a dichotomy between emotion and rationality, leading us to 
believe that emotions are irrational and disruptive.  On the contrary, emotions are often 
functional and adaptive (De Sousa, 1987; Oatley, 1992; Watts, 1992). Emotions allow  
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people to evaluate situations very rapidly and to switch to more adaptive modes of 
responding.  Generally, in non-behavioural psychotherapy, the client is assisted to get in 
touch with his feelings to understand the value of emotional experience in producing 
psychological change.  However, emotions are not always rational and become an 
important feature of psychopathology.  One reason for this is that the appraisal of a 
situation is too distorted by maladaptive conceptual assumptions and excessive 
sensitivities.  Another factor that contributes to the rationality of emotion in 
psychological disorder is that the irrational emotions are often so prolonged. In fact, 
what distinguishes abnormal depression from simple unhappiness is the length of time 
that depression lasts.  The situation which triggered the depression may have long past 
and lost its authenticity but subsequently becomes a response not to the situation itself 
but to a maintaining stream of ruminations (Greenberg & Safran, 1987), that is, feeling 
response continues to reinforce the ruminating thoughts. 
There are two main schools of thought about the role of strong emotions in 
religious practices (Watts & Williams, 1988).  One views strong emotion as a landmark 
of a strong religious life. Emotional power is a theme that runs throughout the Hebrew 
Bible.  Ceremonial music, dance, and oratory have been important in contributing to 
collective religious experience.  The charismatic movement in contemporary 
Christianity similarly provides emotional excitement and religious inspiration. 
An alternative view puts an emphasis on calming the passions.  This approach 
can also be seen throughout the Hebrew Bible.  As the voice of Yahweh gradually 
becomes less easy to hear, it becomes necessary to be still and quiet to hear it (Jaynes, 
1976).  This emotionally required approach to religious experience is characteristic of 
Theravada Buddhist practice.  Emotional quietness can also be found in the Christian 
contemplative tradition (Augustine Baker [1657] 1964, 334).  
The third view, a mild asceticism, suggests refining the emotions and with 
greater emotional sensitivity rather than with the control of emotion.  Averill and 
Nunely (1992) argue against a policy of either unbridled expression of emotions or 
consistent expression of them.  Instead, they propose the possibility of using the 
emotions creatively and learning from them, cultivating what is currently known as 
“emotional intelligence” (Goleman, 1995).  However, the prevailing counselling culture 
of our time often does not distinguish sufficiently clearly between awareness of the 
emotion and expression of emotion.  
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An example of a sensitive insight of emotion without expression is the stance of 
the psychotherapist who uses emotional sensitivity cultivated through 
countertransference to help a client with awareness.  Strong expression of emotion may 
actually interfere with the subtleties of emotional awareness.  In fact, an epistemological 
analogue to religious knowing would be self-understanding or the empathic 
understanding of other people. Watt (1997) argues that the role of emotion in religious 
practices has a good deal in common with recent psychological views on emotion that 
underline their adaptive value rather than seeing them as a nuisance to be controlled. 
My arguments do not take an extreme stance of exciting or calming of strong 
feelings or creative refinement of passions, as a single method to adaptation. Neither do 
I take the position of combining the three. It is a methodology of the Middle Path, 
which observes the emotion ‘as it is’ in order to understand its nature and its roots in the 
production of suffering. In the world of concepts where linguistic reasoning dominates 
everything including management and control of individual, organization and 
international relations, splits within the discipline of psychology as well as the split 
between psychology and science require a new theory of knowledge. In addition, 
psychology needs a methodology that belongs to neither material science nor the 
humanities but to a third culture, that embraces both. “The Middle Path” practice taught 
by the Buddha, whether taken literally or metaphorically, inspires a reconciliation of 
such splits.   
Accordingly, arguments in chapter 2 examine the breakdown of the bicameral 
mind which is dominated by the linguistic brain and conceptually rational individual 
who labels the irrationality of emotions as madness. It also discusses the postmodern 
deconstruction of text, rationality and madness.  
Chapter 3 criticizes psychotherapy as a schizoid self that critically ignores 
metaphysical, epistemological and moral issues facing psychotherapy today. Problems 
with popular therapies and a Buddhist alternative are also discussed.  
Chapter 4 examines how suffering of the self arises from the Buddhist 
perspective of interdependent conditions, which co-condition each other simultaneously 
and successively. The theory of Interdependent Arising discusses how the structure and 
functions of the twelve human conditions interact and the theory of Conditional 
Relations explains the motivating principles behind the conditioning between these 
conditions.   
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Chapter 5 deals with the problems of self as a split subject and an eternal ego 
that diversifies itself into many selves. It also discusses the failure of psychotherapy to 
recognize an innate dual and ecological awareness of the feeling self. 
Chapter 6 addresses how the cognitive-affective split on understanding of self-
desire, and how Theravada treatment integrates both aspects with the emphasis on 
ethics. It also discusses how Postmodern and Feminist deal with the issue.  
Chapter 7 discusses desire as the cause of suffering, and how mental factors co-
condition the meaning of the desire.  
Chapter 8 examines the issues related to the cessation of suffering and an 
integrated formulation of Theravada treatment.  
Chapter 9 shows how the Buddhist Middle Path approach integrates with 
Western rational analysis in liberating the self from conditionality. 
Chapter 10 elaborates on implications for understanding and treatment of self 
disorders classified under Western nomenclature and suggests a two dimensional 
framework for the development of treatment models.   
Chapter 11 summarizes each chapter and draws conclusions to validate the main 
argument of the thesis.   
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Chapter 2 
 
From Bicameral Consciousness and 
Linguistic Rationality to Madness 
 
Physicist:      … and so we conclude an electron is a particle. 
Philosopher: But you also claim an electron is a wave 
Physicist:      Yes, it's also a wave. 
Philosopher: But surely, not if it's a particle. 
Physicist:      We say it's both wave and particle. 
Philosopher: But that's a contradiction, obviously. 
Physicist:      Are you saying it's neither wave nor particle?  
Philosopher: No, I'm asking what you mean by “it.” 
      (Hagen, 1995) 
 
This chapter reviews splitting of consciousness from primitive to postmodern 
times to show the reasons why the scientist-practitioner model does not see dual 
responsibility of reason and emotion as the cause of human suffering within the 
interdependent aggregates of self, other and environment as the above argument 
between philosopher and physicist illustrates. Philosophically speaking, the model does 
not see both reasoning that leads to theory of knowledge (epistemology) and emotions, 
which involves metaphysics of feelings and moral action. Instead, the model argues that 
wrong information processing of the individual including conceptual reasoning causes 
emotional suffering. It fails to see conscious emotional desire for certainty, stability, and 
unchanging truth, as a cause of, as well as a clue for, all our concerns. The question may 
arise as to how we come to be conscious. In Western thought, the story began at the 
arrival of language and abstract thought in Greek antiquity. Jayne’s (1976) argues that 
consciousness arises because of the evolutionary splitting of the bicameral mind. Thus, 
the dominant function of the right hemisphere of the brain that processes visual and 
auditory stimuli broke down as the speech function of the left hemisphere became more 
dominant.  This dominant function has shifted human ability from speaking to writing.  
As societies have shifted from oral to literal tradition, we have moved away from  
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organic hearing to the visual representation of communication with others. We 
individuated through the construction of self in relation to the other. The concept of self 
also changes the way we act, from the feelings of connection with others to how we 
differentiate ourselves against the desire and values of others through reasoning with 
words.  Thus, the power of abstract rationality becomes the criterion to judge individual 
responsibility, irrationality, and madness. The following themes describe the split 
described above: 
 
  
•  The breakdown of the bicameral mind – the arising of 
consciousness  
•  The shift from morality to literacy - the development of language 
from oral tradition of sequential narratives to written text as 
representation of timeless factual truth. 
•  Text, rationality and madness: modern interpretations 
•  Deconstruction of text, rational truth and madness 
 
Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind 
 
The search for a ‘rational’ meaning in life, which psychotherapy espouses, was 
thought to have begun with the discovery of consciousness and the breakdown of the 
bicameral mind a little less than 3000 years ago in Greece. According to Julian Jaynes 
(1976), the dominant function of the right hemisphere of the brain, which processes 
visual and auditory stimuli, broke down, as the speech function of the left-hemisphere 
became more dominant. Jaynes started as a comparative psychobiologist, charted 
evolving consciousness by studying learning and the brain function of various species, 
from protozoa to worms, reptiles, and cats. Nevertheless, he found the approach 
unsatisfactory and began examining consciousness through archaeological evidence, the 
earliest texts of human history, language, metaphor, and introspection. Jaynes proposed 
that ancient people from Mesopotamia and Peru could not “think” as we do today, and 
were therefore not self-conscious. They depended mainly on external sources of 
reference and acted according to their sense perception rather than from an articulated 
sense of self. Likewise, the ancient Greeks, unable to think for themselves, experienced 
auditory hallucinations – voices of gods. The voices they heard as in the Old Testament  
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or the Iliad – which, coming from the brain’s right hemisphere, told a person what to do 
in circumstances of novelty or stress. This ancient mentality has been called the 
"bicameral mind" (Jaynes, 1976). Jaynes hypothesizes the breakdown of this mind as 
the beginning of consciousness. 
Nevertheless, numerous arguments have been put forward to refute Jaynes' 
assertion (Assad & Shapiro, 1987; Block, 1981). For instance, Block (1981) contends 
that Jaynes confuses the phenomenon and the name or concept of the phenomenon. 
People were conscious before the concept of consciousness arrived in 1400 BC. Dennett 
(1986) has answered the “concepts do not equal phenomenon” argument. For instance, 
Hobbes’ concept of right and wrong as a moral phenomenon did not exist before the 
social contract among people, although right and wrong did. The arrival of certain 
concepts in part created the phenomenon including the concepts of right and wrong. It is 
not that animals have not noticed that they are doing things like cruel killing but that 
they lack the concepts of right and wrong. Only when a particular conceptual 
environment exists, do the phenomena of right and wrong and morality exist. Jaynes 
further states that the discipline of "history" arrived a few years before Herodotus, 
which does not mean that history did not exist before. Having history is a function of 
recognizing that fact. Lions and antelopes do not have history as humans do.  
Dennett argues:  
 
 
“consciousness predates the arrival of a certain set of concepts, then of 
course you have to have in your conceptual armamentarium the idea that 
concepts  themselves  can  be  preconscious,  that  they  do  not  require 
consciousness…Jaynes’ account of the origin of consciousness depends 
on the claim that an elaboration of a conceptual scheme under certain 
social  and  environmental  pressures  was  the  precondition  for  the 
emergence of consciousness as we know it…as he [Jaynes] puts it, “the 
bee has a concept of the flower,” but not a conscious concept…we might 
as well call [them] concepts, but if you don’t like it we can call them 
schmoncepts, concept-like things that you don’t have to be conscious to 
have (Dennett, 1986, 6) ”. 
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What Consciousness Is Not 
 
Jaynes states succinctly that consciousness is, firstly, not all of mentality. 
We  perform  various  perceptual  constancies  and  activities  such  as  sitting, 
walking or moving without full awareness unless we decide to be conscious of 
them  in  meditation.  For  instance,  size,  brightness,  colour  and  shape  are 
preserved by our nervous system under varying conditions of light, distance, 
angle or even our own moving about in which objects retain their same position. 
Such location constancy is done without introspective consciousness. Even in 
speaking,  the  role  of  consciousness  is  more  of  interpolative  than  a  constant 
companion  to  words.  The  speaker  does  not  consciously  enter  the  lexical 
storehouse  and  consciously  select  items  to  string  on  syntactical  structures. 
Instead, linguistic habit patterns take over intentions of certain meanings without 
further input from consciousness.  
First, Jaynes contends that consciousness is an analogue of external perception 
and so easily mistaken for perception. It maps onto sense perception almost as its 
template. Historically, Fechner (1860), a German psychophysicist studied Just-
Noticeable-Difference (JND) in stimulus intensity, pitch or brightness. Fechner 
mistakenly thought that he was studying the elements of consciousness and related the 
universe of mind and the universe of matter in the famous Weber-Fechner Law. Jaynes 
argues that if one concludes that all animals are conscious because they have sense 
perception, one has to go through the evolutionary tree to one-celled protozoa because 
they react to external stimuli. Even a one-celled plant like the alga chlamydomonas with 
its visual system can be regarded as analogous to humans and amoeboid white cells of 
the blood, since they sense bacteria and devour them. However, few would wish to 
defend what are ten thousand conscious beings per cubic millimetre of blood circulating 
around the vascular system. 
Second, consciousness is not a copy of experience. Jaynes (1976) demonstrates 
this simply by examining the absence of memories that one should have if 
consciousness did copy experience, as, for example, knowing what letters go with what 
numbers on the telephone.  Although we have stared at them thousands of times, most 
of us cannot remember.  
Third, consciousness is not necessary for learning through classical conditioning 
as well as operant conditioning in both animals and humans. Nevertheless, this is not to  
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mean that consciousness does not play a crucial role in deciding what to learn, making 
rules about something, and how to learn better, or consciously verbalizing a task. 
Fourth, consciousness is not necessary in thinking or reasoning. Jaynes (1976) 
cited an experiment conducted in 1901 by the Wurzburg School of Imageless Thought. 
In  this  experiment,  each  trained  subject  in  introspection  made  a  simple  judgment 
between  two  identical-looking  weights  as  to  which  was  the  heavier.  There  was  no 
conscious content for the actual judgment itself, except a mental set and determining 
preconscious tendency. 
Fifth, the location of consciousness is arbitrary. Descartes locates consciousness 
in the pineal gland in the brain (as did Locke and Hume) as a space inside the head. 
Jaynes (1976) calls it mind-space, a functional space that has no specific location. He 
says we use brains in riding bicycles, but no one thinks that the location of bicycle 
riding is inside our heads. 
In summary, consciousness is not all mentality, not necessary for sensation and 
perception. It is not a copy of experience or necessary for learning or even necessary for 
thinking and reasoning and has only an arbitrary and functional location. 
 
What Consciousness Is 
 
Consciousness is an analogue of the real world built up with a vocabulary or 
lexical field whose terms are all metaphors or analogues of behaviour in the physical 
world. Consciousness, like metaphor, uses a term for one thing to describe another, 
because  of  their  relationship  to  each  other  and  to  other  things  (Jaynes,  1976).  A 
consciousness involves at least two components: the metaphier and metaphrend (known 
in linguistics as the signifier and the signified). Consciousness is the known signifier 
operating on the less well known signified. For example, a person trying to solve a 
problem might say ‘I see the solution.’ ‘See’ is the signifier, drawn from the physical 
behaviour from the physical world that is applied to this otherwise inexpressible mental 
occurrence (solution), the signified. This physical behaviour in real space, which has 
been analogically taken over to describe mental behaviour in mind-space, is the primary 
feature  of  consciousness.  The  mind-space  is  where  the  individual  preconsciously 
introspects on. 
The question of who does the introspecting (seeing) relates to the second feature 
of consciousness. As the body with sense organs is to ‘physical seeing’, there develops  
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automatically  an  analogue  ‘I’  to  relate  to  this  ‘mental  seeing’  in  mind-space.  The 
analogue ‘I’ is not to be confused with the self, which is the object of consciousness in 
later development. The analogue ‘I’ is contentless, which Jaynes likens to Kant’s (1781, 
1929) transcendental ego. As the bodily ‘I’ can move about in its environment looking 
at this or that, so the analogue ‘I’ learns to ‘move about’ in mind-space concentrating on 
one thing or another.  
A third feature of consciousness is narratization. This feature is an analogue of 
our  physical  selves  moving  about  through  a  physical  world  with  its  spatial 
successiveness, which becomes the successiveness of time in mind-space in which we 
locate events of our lives. 
Other  features  of  consciousness  include  concentration,  the  inner  analogue  of 
external  perceptual  attention;  the  analogue  ‘Me’,  seeing  oneself  from  outside  as  a 
stranger;  suppression,  by  which  we  stop  being  conscious  of  annoying  thoughts,  the 
analogue of turning away from annoyances in the physical world; the analogue of how 
we  sense  only  one  aspect  of  a  thing  at  a  time  and  the  analogue  of  perceptual 
assimilation; and others. (Jaynes, 1986) concludes: 
 
 
…consciousness […] developed out of language means that everybody 
from Darwin on, including myself in earlier years, was wrong in trying 
to trace out the origin of consciousness biologically or 
neurophysiologically. It means we have to look at human history after 
language has evolved and ask when in history did an analog ‘I’ 
narratizing in a mind-space begin. (6) 
 
    
Jaynes  argues  that  language  is  less  than  5000  years  old,  which  means  that 
consciousness developed sometime between that date and the present. By 3000 BC, 
human beings learned to write. Hence, early writings should be looked at to see if there 
is evidence of an analogue ‘I’ narratizing in a mind-space. Hieroglyphics and cuneiform 
are difficult to translate when they refer to anything psychological. Jaynes recommends 
that a language with which we have some continuity is Greek (Jaynes, 1976). 
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The Shift from Orality to Literacy 
 
The evolution of written language may be viewed from philosophical, historical, 
anthropological, literary and linguistic perspectives for all cultures. Nevertheless, my 
discussion in general will be limited to Western culture because psychotherapy as a 
technology is the production of Western thought that highlights the dualistic splits. The 
most important shift was the development of a true alphabet, which allowed the ancient 
Greeks  to  record  a  full  range  of  spoken  language  (Havelock,  1963).  While  writing 
existed prior to the alphabet, its existence in the set of syllables is not transposable. The 
Mycenaean  Linear  B  language  appears  to  have  recorded  supplies  and  possessions 
successfully but was not used to represent human thought or experience until the Greek 
developed alphabets by modifying Phoenician letters at the end of the 8th century BC. 
The earliest Greek text of sufficient size is the Iliad and the philosophic explorations of 
Socrates and Plato during that period. Historically, linguistic tradition was inaugurated 
in ancient Greece by Plato (427-347 BC). His teacher Socrates (469-399 BC) refused to 
write down any of his thoughts on the grounds that thorough philosophy had to be 
living, between two people. Plato argued in favour of his teacher's views by writing in 
dialogue  -  the  Phaedra  -  recording  Socrates’  attack  on  writing.  According  to  Plato, 
words name concepts, ideas which themselves are abstractions, designating essences 
which a number of individuals have in common by virtue of which they are identified. 
For Plato, ideas are real and have eternal, unchanging truth. Plato's student, Aristotle 
(384-322  BC)  while  rejecting  Socrates’  horror  of  the  written  word,  agreed  that  the 
spoken word has priority over the written. They serve as historical proof of how the 
Western tradition prioritizes narration with the analogue ‘I’ in the mind-space which 
leads  to  how  people  in  the  West  perceive  themselves  in  the  world  today.  The 
introduction to the book, “The Discovery of the Mind”, states that European thinking 
begins  with  the  Greeks  by  referring  to  early  Greek  poetry  to  philosophy.  The 
availability of written language in and of itself creates a tremendous split or shift in the 
ability to conceptualise, while the ability to conceptualise has played a central role in 
opening the necessary cultural possibilities (Snell, 1953, 1960). Thus, the shift from oral 
tradition to linguistic transformation that took place between the 8th and 4th century BC 
in  ancient  Greece  has  pushed  Western  thought  towards  a  high  level  of  abstract 
rationality. Nevertheless, Damasio (1994), a neuroscientist, contends that the evolution  
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of consciousness may have extended even later than Jaynes has suggested. He maintains 
that Plato and Aristotle did not have a concept of consciousness in the same way as we 
do today (Damasio, 1999). Damasio believes that consciousness as we call it is only 
three and a half centuries old and has only come to the fore in the 20
th century. Even if 
Jaynes’ hypotheses of auditory hallucination by the Homeric man were refuted, the 
gradual development of the left-brained speech centres (generally for a right-handed 
person) has dominated. The linear speech has eradicated the inner “voices” of gods 
heard from the right-hemisphere of the brain. Jaynes claims that ancient people were not 
as fully conscious and self-aware as modern humans. Being unable to introspect, they 
experienced  their  own  higher  cognitive  functioning  as  auditory  hallucinations,  the 
voices of gods, actually heard as in the Old Testament or the Iliad which told the person 
what to do in circumstances of novelty or stress. Thus, the possible impact of language 
in mental processes within sociocultural  contexts of human experience seems  great. 
Again, the main thesis of Jaynes still holds strong, even if the Homeric man’s auditory 
hallucination hypothesis is rejected. Dennett (1986) maintains that if Jaynes’ thesis is to 
be recast using the computer analogy, it makes a lot of sense. The hardware of the 
human brain may be the same today as it was thousands of years ago, but a change in 
the organisation of our information processing which he calls a software revolution has 
to have come after language. This software characterisation of the mind does not leave a 
fossil record, but like the computer “printouts,” the evidence can be seen in ancient texts 
and artefacts (Dennett, 1986, 149-154). 
Thus, Jaynes’ hypotheses summarize four points. The first concerns the nature 
of consciousness that has arisen from the power of language to make metaphors and 
analogies. The second is the hypothesis of the bicameral mind as an early type of 
mentality. The third idea is that consciousness followed the bicameral mind. The fourth 
idea is the neurological model of the left hemisphere articulated in language the 
experience of the right hemisphere. 
 
From Identification with Others to Self Identity 
 
The shift from oral (the ear) to literal (the eye) preference appears to have 
silenced hearing the voices of heroes and gods. The epic poem, the Iliad
1 (believed to 
have been written or dictated by Homer between 750 and 700 BC shortly after the 
development of alphabets), is considered a transitional document. It uses story telling by  
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travelling bards in chronological sequence rather than timeless concepts (Parry, 1971). 
It tells the story of [moral] conflict in an event-oriented form and in chronologically 
order. Like modern day movie directors, poets of the oral tradition demanded, though 
not consciously asked, their audience to identify fully with the character rather than 
separating themselves as an individual. 
Nevertheless, a different approach to the oral poets began to arise by the end of 
the 5th century BC.  For instance, Plato, in The Republic, opposes this mimicking of 
orality. Plato’s ideal rids the society of the type of thinking that identifies with the 
performer and the poem. His ideas forewarn personality politics and polished speeches. 
He offers an independent soul
2 [see endnotes], which is capable of thinking about 
timeless objects instead of time-conditioned objects of the epic. The emergence of the 
autonomous and rational personality and the rejection of the “spell” of oral 
memorization appear to have taken place as Greek society was becoming literate.  
The Homeric men are so open to outside influences that the antithesis between 
self and not self does not exist in Homeric consciousness. They view their personal 
achievements as gifts from gods who help the worthy ones because they believed the 
gods control their behaviour. The heroes do not challenge the natural order of life and 
death, as individuals without differentiated selfhood, but give themselves fully to action 
and speech. Robbins argues that the evolution of a death-denying and death-resisting 
society came into being in the process of evolution from group consciousness to 
individual consciousness. The ancient Greeks believed that consciousness of the dead 
turns into individuation from the clan. These men do not see themselves as having 
separate personalities (Havelock, 1963), an articulated concept of self (Simon, 1987) or 
recognize the notion or experience of “character” (Snell, 1953, 1960). According to the 
hypotheses of Jaynes and others presented above, linguistic skills have advanced the 
Homeric man to an individual
3. 
By the beginning of the 4
th century, some Greeks were talking about their souls 
in a way that was abstract and individualized. They reflected on themselves as knowers 
of abstract principles, and this reflection seems to have its origins in part in the presence 
of some “thing” to reflect upon, namely, the written word on papyrus. This object of 
reflection appears to have led to the discovery of other objects of thought and other 
conceptualizations, and that they not only discover themselves as rational beings but 
also create an irrational side of themselves as object. Heraclitus speaks of man as his 
own demon and regards the ordinary people in society as victims of that dark side of  
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themselves (Snell, 1960). Thus, the duality of the rational and irrational self comes 
about as an artefact of our sense of individuality. 
 
Rational Individual versus Irrational Madness 
 
Before the sense of individuality was articulated as ‘the self,’ there appeared to 
be no labelling of madness regardless of strong emotional suffering.  It is not to be 
found in the Iliad. Despite the intensity of experienced emotions, the heroes do not “go 
mad” (Jaynes, 1976). The gods are alter egos instructing their favourites at crucial 
moments. A person hearing and seeing the gods in this manner might lead a modern 
psychiatrist to diagnose the perceiver as schizophrenic. However, talking to gods was 
common for Homeric men. They received divine guidance this way. Such act assumes 
part of responsible group consciousness comparable to the code of expressing great 
anger at threats to one's honour.  
Similarly, the notion of “madness” does not appear in the Odyssey except 
fleetingly on one occasion. Hesiod’s works also lack a concern with madness. For 
Hesiod, madness is caused by possession by a nymph and thus evil forces are seen as 
controlling man’s destiny (Simon, 1978). Even the lyric poets’ tremendous concern 
with personal emotion of love and their depiction of extreme cases of “love-sickness” 
does not qualify as madness per se. For instance, in the throes of jealousy, Sappho the 
lyrical poet experiences the profoundest of emotions: 
 
My silent tongue is broken, 
And a quick and subtle flame 
Runs up beneath my skin. 
I lose my sense of sight,  
hear only drumming in my ears. 
I drip old sweat,  
And a trembling chases all through me.  
I am greener than the pale grass 
And it seems to me that I am close to death. 
Still I must endure this. 
 
There is little concern for the issue of sanity and madness in ancient writings. 
The notion of madness only comes into being when Plato begins to define the irrational 
in contrast to the purely rational. Plato vigorously objects to the hypnotic process of 
mimesis in which the hearer takes on the characteristics of the poet and the poem. As a  
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forerunner of a new era in Greek thought in which men were considered to have both 
psyche and soul (Strathern, 1996), Plato's writings express his lifelong concern with the 
irrational in man. Plato distinguishes four types of “divine madness”: prophetic, ritual, 
poetic and erotic. The modern notion of madness belongs to the category of ritual 
madness as demonstrated by possession as in Ajax, Heracles, and Agave. Towards the 
end of his life, Plato tried to promote legislation against the irrational while at the same 
time attempting to solidify further the rational as master of the psyche, thereby 
reinforcing the split between the two. At this time, the sickness aspect of madness 
becomes salient, and he writes of men who believe they are gods, or that they can fly, 
that they should be kept at home under penalty of a fine. His idealism encouraged the 
labelling of madness and the insane who were to be shunned (Jaynes, 1976). 
Paradoxically, the transformation of consciousness in which Plato participated may 
have produced madness as one of its artefacts.  
It appears that these early philosophers endeavoured to legislate against the 
irrational as the politicians and prose-writers adopted this view, which organized Greek 
society and culture (Robbins, 1988, 917).  This situation set the stage for the Greek 
language to foster the emergence of science and philosophy (Snell, 1953, 1960). The 
old Greek culture crumbled in the face of the tremendous power of new rationality. 
“Group” or “forced-field” consciousness was suppressed and irrationality was 
considered madness (Dodds, 1960). In this excessively rational worldview of Plato, 
irrationality becomes the responsibility of an individual. The shared culture of heroes 
and the comforting and guiding voices of the gods are no longer available. Men no 
longer shared their consciousness; they had to make it on their own. 
  
Individuality, Rationality and Madness in Greek 
Literature 
  
As the individual emerged from the group or clan, individual madness in 
literature began to appear. Individualism becomes so prominent in Greek literature that, 
for the tragedians, many of whose great tragic figures are portrayed as mad
4. Sophocles' 
Oedipus Rex is most familiar to psychologists.  
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These plays demonstrate the difference between rationality and madness, which 
would have been impossible for Homer. In these post-Homeric tragedies, the painful 
conflict between rationality and madness are lived out by men and women who think of 
themselves as responsible individuals.  
In the 19
th and the 20
th centuries, many modern thinkers including Freud, Jung, 
and numerous modern psychotherapists have a fascination with Greek antiquity 
including its mythology and search for the root of human problems. These thinkers and 
therapists were concerned with the Western heritage of irrationality from the Greeks. 
The search for connection with our group consciousness through mythology is a search 
for the group we left behind as we have become literate.  
 
Text, Rationality and Madness: Modern 
Interpretations 
 
As language became an integral part of the rationality, the art of interpreting its 
meaning took on an important role for the ancient Greeks in the study of literature and 
ancient Biblical exegesis. The art of interpreting the text is known as hermeneutics
5. 
Nevertheless, hermeneutics as it developed historically from the classical to postmodern 
period comes with a mixed blessing. According to Paul Ricoeur (1974), one of the 
primary 20th century hermeneuts, the art of interpreting language can be traced back to 
Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias. In this classical work, hermeneutics is a general theory of 
human understanding. In post-classical Europe, after the disruption, which separated 
European thought from classical thought, pre-modern hermeneutics became a much 
narrower discipline. It was an exegetical, expository, interpretive process applied to 
written texts and in particular sacred texts. Medieval hermeneutics ascribed to the Bible 
four levels of meaning: literal, allegorical, tropological (moral), and anagogical 
(eschatological).  Although hermeneutics included theories of symbols, analogies, and 
signification, it was bound to exegetical praxis and remained so until the rise of 
modernity. The works of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Wilhelm Dilthey 
(1833-1911) have expanded beyond exegesis.   
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Schleiermacher, a theologian and philosopher, adapted hermeneutics as a 
distinctive humanistic and historical discipline, which, in effect, becomes a 
philosophical anthropology and a distinctive ‘psychology.’ Nevertheless, Dilthey 
contrasted various human science disciplines that dealt with Geisteswissenschaft, the 
science of “understanding” from the natural sciences, Naturwissenschaften, which are 
sciences of “explanation”. Hence, hermeneutics becomes the modernist’s ‘humanities’ 
methodology, broader than exegesis, though not a truly ‘general’ method and it remains 
distinct from the natural sciences.  
The blurring of boundaries between natural sciences and human sciences 
increased due to what Ihde (1998, 2006) calls “technologically constructed” products 
(of ‘Nature’). The newly constructed elements in the expanded table of elements now 
include entries that may or may not exist in nature. Similarly, the creation of ‘artificial’ 
molecules (polymers and plastics) which does not again, exist in nature. In addition, in 
the latest biotechnological sciences, the technique of inter-species DNA manipulation 
places human DNA into rats in a distinctly ‘unnatural’ construction. Latour (1993), in 
specifically challenging the nature/culture distinction which characterizes so much of 
modern thought, argues further that even a phenomenon as the ozone hole is precisely a 
“hybrid” which is simultaneously both cultural and natural. 
Ihde (1998, 2006) suggests that the postmodern hermeneutics of science can be a 
hermeneutics of the “thingly” which does not presuppose the nature/culture modern 
distinction. Instead, "thingly hermeneutics" focuses on the ‘construction’ of things 
which includes the things of science and not merely its history, cultural context or its 
sociology as they are retained in the modernist distinction of the social and natural 
sciences. Ihde is implicitly suggesting that if there is to be a hermeneutics of (natural) 
sciences, it must be a hermeneutics, which reverberates with the actual state of those 
sciences and not to what they have been at some earlier time. The mid-to-late 20th 
century application of the social or human sciences to the practices of the natural 
sciences is at its beginning. This set of disciplines, Ihde argues, is not yet fully 
hermeneutical. He sees an extended postmodern hermeneutics as swapping metaphors 
from modernists’ mechanical metaphors to linguistic or language metaphors. For 
example, the scientific tribal languages of the genetic and biotechnological sciences are 
full of metaphor. DNA is a ‘code’ that has a ‘communicative’ aspect between gene 
strands; genes ‘express’ themselves in various ways.    
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Postmodern hermeneutics replaces reductionistic simplicity with ‘systems’ and 
‘complexity’ factors. The death of hard determinism gives birth to ‘chaos’ and ‘fractals’ 
contexted within complex probabilistic calculations called probabilistic determinism. 
Computers and computer modelling allows investigators to deal with complexity and 
multifactorial aspects of a phenomenon. 
The contemporary philosophies of science will have inclusion, rather than a 
reduction of history, sociology, culture and gender factors. These factors will not be 
rhetoric but be inbuilt perspectives, which can only be expanded by multiperspectival 
inclusiveness (Ihde, 1998; 2006). 
In the philosophy of science, the positivistic pre-Kuhnian view of hypothetico-
deductive and propositional processes began to breakdown in the late 1950s. Kuhn’s 
(1962) introduction of historical development and concept of "paradigm shift" have 
instigated a whole series of interpretations of science. This re-interpretation of science 
informed the activities in the 1970s and 1980s of social scientists who were trained in 
phenomenologically oriented “social constructionist” theories. Richardson et al. (1999), 
for instance, state that the current state of psychotherapy requires re-envisioning from a 
dialogical/hermeneutical perspective, a position taken by most constructivists and 
cultural theorists. For these theorists, all there is to know about oneself and reality is 
socially constructed.  
In the middle of the 20th century, however, Husserlian phenomenology 
expanded hermeneutics from its traditional modernist position of viewing the 
hermeneutics of science as a cultural and historical phenomenon, to the so-called 
postmodern view developed by Martin Heidegger, Hans Georg Gadamer and Paul 
Ricoeur. Hermeneutics for these three European thinkers becomes ontological. Since 
ontology precedes epistemology, this development overturns the modernist 
epistemology. Nevertheless, there remain epistemological implications of a hermeneutic 
ontology. The blurring of the understanding/explanation distinction has been derived 
from (human) ontology, as Husserl argues that any special science must refer back to 
the Life world. In Heidegger, it is argued that scientific knowledge is the derivative of 
practical knowledge although Gadamer and Ricoeur make more indirect ontological 
claims than the previous thinkers do. The need for re-introducing hermeneutic ontology 
into the natural sciences was latent in relativistic sciences, which realized that the 
relative position of the observer must be taken into account in all measurements. 
Experiencing what of an object (noema), (Husserl, 1929, 1931a, 1931b, 1948 quoted in  
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Ihde (1998, 2006) has the how of experiencing it (noesis), known as ‘correlational 
poles’ (Ihde, 2006, 43) in phenomenological hermeneutics.  
Nonetheless, there is a tendency in Western psychology as a human science to 
split, obscure or minimize the significance of this correlation by focusing exclusively on 
the noematic focus or by minimizing the unique experiential variable that adds to any 
individual’s noetic focus. Put another way, the movement of the mind is what Husserl 
called intentionality, meaning ‘to stretch forth’, from its Latin origin (intendere), to 
interpret the world. In Husserlian psychology, the mind reaches out to the raw material 
reality and translates or defines it in some chosen way, as in the case of Jaynes’ (1976) 
Homeric man. As we cannot step out or “bracket” ourselves from the outside reality, 
phenomenologists believe that we can never have direct access to ultimate reality or see 
the “reality as it is”; therefore, conscious experience has to be bracketed. However, the 
Buddhists claim that “reality as it is” is witnessed in Vipassana meditation, which will 
be discussed later. 
Meanwhile,  structuralism  and  poststructuralism,  which  address  how  human 
intention and desire manifest themselves through the structure of language search for 
absolute  reality.  Evolved  from  Plato’s  deterministic  views,  Structuralism  claims  to 
discover a permanent structure beneath or behind things.  For structuralists, reality is 
composed not of things but of relationships not to the eternal essence but to others (or 
words) in contrast.  Hence, it is an underlying structure that determines the reality, and 
that  must  be  grasped  if  social  realities  are  to  be  understood.    Freud  was  strongly 
influenced by structuralism. In psychoanalysis, what appears in consciousness is often 
different  from  the  truth,  which  those  appearances  mask.    The  truth  can  only  be 
understood from the study of the structural organization of the unconscious mind.  For 
instance, the underlying structure of the conscious mind (ego) is unaware of the tension 
between  natural  animal  forces  (id)  and  the  forces  of  civilization  (superego).  
Nevertheless, psychoanalysis is incompatible with structuralism because psychoanalysis 
is historically oriented whereas structuralism is ahistorical.  However, what is lacking in 
Freudian language is the structuralists’ vocabulary.  
Agreeing  with  Plato  that  words  name  ideas,  but  not  their  relation  to  eternal 
essence,  the  most  influential  Swiss  structural  linguist  Ferdinand  de  Saussure  (1857-
1913) claimed that language is made up of “signs”. A sign is the combination of a 
“signifier” (a sound or a sound-image, like ‘kat’ in contrast to “fat”) and a “signified” 
(an idea or a concept, like any of several members of the family of “cat”). In language,  
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phonic differences distinguish one word from the other. He declared the arbitrariness of 
the  sign  to  mean  that  there  is  no  natural  connection  between  the  signifier  and  the 
signified. What the mind knows is the system of concepts generated by the arbitrary 
structures of language. The mind is, unlike what empiricists believe, a receptacle for 
sense input from which it constructs a picture of the world bit by bit. Nor is the mind 
merely a system of innate ideas, as the rationalists thought, that are activated by sense 
data.  The  mind,  as  a  system  of  operations,  generates  structures  of  similarities  and 
differences in terms of associative categories and temporal contiguity rules, and their 
relationships.  Saussure  replaces  the  reality  out  there  with  the  system  of  concepts 
generated by the arbitrary structure of language.    
Drawing parallels between cultures and Saussure’s system of linguistics Claude 
Levi-Strauss (1908- ), an anthropologist, set out to study the universal human truth at 
the level of structure by challenging the Western myth of “The Savage Mind” of so-
called primitive people. Consequently, “The Savage Mind” presumes the unity of the 
human race by studying the universal human logic in its purest unpolluted form. He 
demonstrates how indigenous people use logical types for classifications better than 
Westerners do on the same tasks, and how kinship and mutual obligations are like 
linguistic systems. Levi-Strauss also shows how totemism works as a social extension 
of the universal human capacity for thinking in terms of metaphor by allowing animals 
to stand for humans. Totemic animals are chosen not because they are good to eat, but 
they are “good to think”. For Levi-Strauss, it is not resemblances but the differences, 
which resemble each other. Mind has to mediate the opposing characteristics of 
animals. This explains the commonality of tricksters and jokers in “primitive” mythical 
systems. Myth, he explains, functions like linguistics. It reveals the structure of the 
mind. Therefore, the basic units of myths, their unique characteristics and rule must be 
studied. The structural study of the artefacts of the mind reveals a relatively faithful 
reflection of the structure of reality.  Like Freud, Levi-Strauss holds that behind the 
manifest content of the myth there must be a hidden, latent message that contains an 
unconscious contradictory wish, like opposing itself to nature as well as the desire to be 
one with it. He attempted to solve an unsolvable contradiction between nature and 
culture in the Greek myth of Oedipus of Rex by overlaying messages, concluding that 
dilemmas are real contradictions of human existence and myths are inevitable human 
tragedy.  Levi-Strauss maintains that cultural phenomena should be treated as “signs”. 
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Deconstruction of Text, Rationality and Madness 
 
Moving away from the  stable, unitary form of  Plato, Roland Barthes  (1915-
1980), sees only pluralities. He attacks the voice of the dominant social forces and 
institutions that generate the myth of rules, mores, and moral codes as nature’s way or 
God’s way. To him, a myth is a form of discourse that tries to make cultural norms 
appear as facts of nature. His notion of myth is closely related to the Marxist concept of 
‘ideology’,  a  form  of  (unconscious)  political  propaganda  that  is  presented  as  fact. 
Barthes  radicalizes  Saussurean  linguistics  by  declaring  that  there  is  no  essence,  no 
human nature, not even facts, but only signs and systems of encoding and decoding 
signs. In myths, the sign itself becomes a signifier in a new system of meaning, creating 
a second-order semiological system. For instance, the original sign of ‘passionified’ 
roses (from the result of signifier – roses, and signified – passion) becomes a signifier 
and  empties  its  meaning.  The  new  sign  in  mythical  semiological  systems  says 
something like product consumption and expenditure of money as romantic obligation 
(from  the  result  of  signifier  –  passionified  roses,  and  signified  –  Valentine’s  Day). 
Therefore, the original sign has been expropriated and alienated from its user. The true 
meaning  of  the  original  sign  is  distorted  by  being  emptied  of  its  history.  Barthes’ 
semiological  analyses  of  wrestling  matches,  advertisement  for  soap  powder  and 
detergents,  toys,  strip  tease  and  plastic  and  so  forth,  demonstrates  that  no  cultural 
phenomenon is too small to escape ideological contamination. For instance, wrestling 
matches give the audience not the passion they want, but the image of passion. He 
separates  the  “authors”  who  like  producing  signifying  words  and  leaving  signified 
meanings to the readers, from the “writers” who drive a single meaning to achieve a 
single moral, political, and practical goal. This dichotomy shows the intention of the 
“author” to act as a catalyst as opposed to a prescriptive “writer” who wants the reader 
to move from a fixed position of meaning. Barthes’ preference for plurality in meaning 
shows that literature is not the bearer of any fixed or final meaning but a critique of 
meaning which can be seen as anti-theological and anti-God. His talk about “the death 
of  the  author”  which  encourages  “the  birth  of  the  reader”  to  make  meaning(s)  for 
himself, is most relevant to psychotherapy.  
Nevertheless, a slippage of plurality of all meaning or no meaning at all means 
becoming psychotic for psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) who also challenges  
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the  stability  of  Saussurean  linguistic  structure.  Saussure  sees  a  stable  relationship 
between  the  signifier  (sound  image)  and  the  signified  (concept).  Lacan  views  the 
meaning of signifiers in the relation to other signifiers. For him, a signifier not only 
signifies  another  signifier  like  in  a  linguistic  chain,  one  meaning  leads  to  others. 
Contextualization transforms signifiers by putting them in a new relationship with other 
signifiers. For instance, the last word or two in a sentence changes the meaning of other 
words retrospectively, like in most jokes. Nevertheless, signifiers ‘slide’, they refuse to 
remain stable. Relative to the signifier, the signified also slides. What makes the chains 
of signifiers alienate the subject is what Lacan calls the three registers of subjectivity: 
the “real”, the” imaginary” and the “symbolic”. The “real” is the experience of the thing 
rather than the unknowable thing-in-itself.  It is before  we attempt to represent with 
signs. The “imagery” register is not just full of images or fantasy though it is associated 
with illusion. It is a rough equivalent of everyday experience. The illusion is that of 
treating the symbolic register, whose function is to order everyday experience, as if it 
were real and natural. 
Lacan also extended two other terms - “Metaphor” and “Metonymy”, to explain 
unconscious defense mechanisms. Metaphor is the replacement of one idea or image 
with another or the collapsing of two images or ideas together, e.g., all the world is a 
stage; and all the men and women are merely  players. Metonymy is association by 
contiguity, i.e. the whole standing for the part or the part standing for the whole, e.g. a 
thousand sails (associate with ships) set out to sea. Lacan also means the connection by 
rhyme, sound, or even free association. He sees metaphor and metonymy as two main 
poles of language structured like the unconscious.  
Freud had claimed that the two main processes of unconscious thought were 
“condensation"  (e.g.  in  dreams  a  numbers  of  wished images  are  collapsed  into  one 
image and are thereby unrecognizable to the dreamer) and “displacement” (e.g. a wish 
is displaced from its original forbidden object onto another whose relation to the first is 
unrecognized by the subject). Freud gave an example of the woman who burns her 
lunch on the stove while reading a “Dear Jane” letter from her fiancé, and thereafter the 
smell of burnt food causes her a neurotic panic. Like Freud’s belief that symptoms and 
actions are literally trapped in the body, Lacan explains the psychotic symptom as a 
metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element. A part of one's 
body is misrecognised as a part of one's language and vice-versa, e.g. my body is made 
of glass. His goal in psychoanalysis is to restore the sovereign freedom displayed by  
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Humpty-Dumpty when he reminds Alice that after all he is the master of the signifier, 
even if he is not the master of the signified. 
For Lacan, madness is an extreme exaggeration of the dual process of being 
overwhelmed by the total control of the linguistic regime and resistance to gain one's 
freedom.  Hence,  his  most  famous  statement:  the  “unconscious  is  structured  like  a 
language”.  He  sees  language  as  the  site  of  the  unconscious,  as  biological  need  is 
alienated into language as desire, which by its linguistic nature is repressed and moves 
along metonymical and metaphorical chains. The signifier generates a whole symbolic 
world of prohibition, repression, alienation, and impossible desire. 
What we have seen so far is Lacan’s “stuckness” to Saussurean and Freudian 
dualistic rational schemes (conscious versus unconscious; signifier versus signified), 
though he does diverge from them in challenging and re-interpreting their concepts with 
linguistic  dualities.  For  instance,  Lacan  shows  that  unconscious  “wishes”  (wunsch; 
German),  derived  from  Freud’s  biology  of  innate  sexual  and  aggressive  drives,  are 
different from his separation of biological needs (though he does not deny the biological 
grounding  of  human  mind)  and  more  complex  linguistic  involvement  of  insatiable 
desires  (desir,  French)  that  are  in  a  state  of  eternal  lack.  Needs  are  represented  in 
language as demand which in semiology becomes desire through the symbolic registry. 
Demand is a demand for love, which is an insatiable desire. Another well-known phrase 
of Lacan is that “Desire is the desire of the other”, meaning that to desire is to desire to 
be desired. It is contagious and we desire what others desire and become rivals to the 
other because of the unachievable object of desire. It also means that because desire gets 
caught up in metonymical and metaphorical chains of language, it becomes public even 
though we do not always understand it. Although Lacan puts his finger on the pulse of 
human intention by pointing at the emotional origins of human suffering, he is “stuck” 
on his metaphoric or otherwise interpretation.  
This interpretation seems to be relevant only to: (a) the Victorian era of sexuality 
(b) the nuclear family relationship (c) the rigid binary systems of Saussure and Freudian 
mythological frameworks. For instance, Lacan re-interprets the penis as “the phallus” 
which  is  the  sign  of  distinction  between  sexes  and  the  wholeness  and  the  power 
wholeness would bestow. Therefore, the mother’s desire for the phallus is no longer due 
to “penis envy”. The infant desires the phallus and desires to be the phallus. The infant 
desires a perfect but impossible union with the mother. However, the father or his/His 
law (The Law of the Father is a signifier but not a person) prevents this. Thus, enters the  
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mythical “Oedipus”. Although his attempt to de-sex the “primal father” with the Name 
of the Father may relieve some feminists from the “anatomy is destiny” predicament, 
the constrictive and unchanging patriarchal symbolic order – the Law of the Father – 
still persists (Dor, 1998). 
Such power and control wielded by linguistic structure and interpretive reason is 
only to be exposed by Michel Foucault (1926-1984), a French cultural historian and 
philosopher  who  was  suspicious  of  all  encompassing  essential  theories  that  explain 
everything  in  terms  of  one  all-consuming  model.  Foucault  calls  the  whole  set  of 
Saussurean phonic and conventional relations constitutive of language and individual 
speech acts that activates as communicative discourse. For Foucault, discourse is not 
just meaningful noises. It is always linked with desire and power, but these links are 
masked like “wolves in sheep’s clothing”, if they are to manifest in language. He refutes 
Karl Marx’s assertion of language as ideology by arguing that discourse is not reducible 
to a power base independent of language; it is desire and power in action. He exposes 
the deceptive and wicked side of discourse in the history of each society that declares its 
regime of truth and that separates reason and unreason. This is done by using what he 
called the same (A) and the difference (not-A) to define “We” and to exclude “Others” 
binary oppositions (Fillingham, 1993). 
In the preface to his book, Madness and Civilization: a History of Insanity in the 
Age of Reason (1995), Foucault tells the story of no contraction (p. xiii) among the 
ancient Greeks. Before the separation between reason and unreason, the Greeks were 
still experiencing an undifferentiated unity. Logos is the Greek term for “reason” and 
for “word”, as in the first sentence of the book of John in the Bible: “In the beginning 
was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God”. As stated earlier 
in Jaynes’ (1976) argument, Homeric men listened to the words of their gods as a guide 
to life. The Homeric men communed with the madness in their soul by listening to its 
murmur  in  themselves  and  to  its  voice  in  others  (to  the  sometimes  unintelligible 
babbling  of  the  oracles,  and  to  the  wailing  and  the  shrieking  of  the  chorus  in  the 
tragedies). Socrates had a daemon within which he always yielded. He used the phrase 
“divine madness” to signify both the inspiration of the poets and that of the oracles of 
the gods in the temple. Reason and unreason were not isolated from each other because 
there was a “stammered” discourse between them. Unreason, madness, or unconscious 
was organized by development of “the other”.   
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Foucault illustrates how “the other” works according to what it signifies. In the 
middle Ages, the leper had been excluded as “the other”, but his physical exclusion was 
a form of ‘sacred’ inclusion because he was a religious signifier who signified a divine 
meaning.  Jesus  had  talked  to  them,  cured  them,  and  made  their  presence  part  of  a 
religious  morality.  This  situation  provided  a  “We”  relationship.  When  the  leper 
disappeared, this exclusionary/inclusionary structure was filled in by “the ship of fools” 
(chapter 1 of Madness and Civilization). The mad were placed on boats that sailed up 
and down the rivers of Europe. Food would be taken to the piers by the citizens when 
the boats passed through. The madman’s exclusion was also an inclusion because he 
also signified a religious meaning (knowledge) until people no longer understood the 
old Gothic symbolism. In the early 17
th century, a new knowledge stopped “the ship of 
fools”  and  hospitalized  them  together  with  the  poor,  unemployed,  the  criminal  and 
young men who squandered their fortunes. This was due to a moral judgment derived 
from  a  new  knowledge  regime  (episteme)  related  to  the  work  ethic.  The  cure  for 
madness and all these disabilities was work. This was nothing to do with medicine but a 
moral  and  juridical  imposition  of  “order”  and  “reason”.  In  fact,  the  17
th  and  18
th 
centuries saw madness as a return to animality. During this period in European history, 
animals were not seen as part of nature, but as anti-nature. The mad were seen behind 
bars like animals and even put on shows like animals. In this Age of Reason, madness 
was not only associated with animality but passion as well, though passion was not 
thought of directly as causing madness but the possibility of madness. The passions 
discharged themselves in images. Madness is not only giving up to images but is using 
the language and logic surrounding the image and acting on it. For instance, someone 
imagines that he is made of glass, and therefore he is fragile and he should not make 
any contact with any other person. He must remain motionless. The mad person makes 
logical  deductions.  The  logic  of  madness  is  the  same  as  the  logic  of  the  logicians. 
Foucault proves that the ultimate language of madness is that of reason.  
Therapy for madness was also based on logic in the 18
th century. Madness was a 
form of logical error like dreams that are considered as being of the same substance as 
madness.  Dreams represent nothingness (madness) as opposed to being (reason).  One 
of  the  treatments  for  madness  is  immersion  in  water,  which  also  represents  both  a 
religious conversion and a return to nature (the universal objective of a moral order).  It 
was feared that the asylum was a tainted place where evil was confined. These fearful 
thoughts were halfway between medicine and morality that were created by symbolic  
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registry based on the split between reason and unreason.  At the end of the 18th century, 
fear and desire merged to create dread as a fear of what one desires, and desire of what 
one fears from moral sanction.  Foucault contends that unreason is timeless recurrence 
and madness is historical artefact.  He borrowed the term "Dionysian" from Nietzsche 
to describe unreason or the unconscious as the frenzied ecstatic chaos to be found in the 
human heart. This is something ancient Greeks knew how to absorb and express for the 
sake of a healthy soul, because it comes from fear and desire. According to Foucault, 
the French Revolution created a dialogue between the desire of ‘love’ to hurt others 
(sadism) and the ‘death’ wish of hurting oneself (masochism).  He claims that Samuel 
Tuke in England and Philippe Pinel in France who liberated the mad from their chains 
with compassion and scientific rigour were false Messiahs.  The new asylums set up by 
Tuke and Pinel freed the mad from the moral guilt but they were obliged to respect 
patriarchal authority.  Tuke believed the mad had a need for self-esteem.  The new order 
in psychology was the ‘bourgeois’ nuclear family and work ethic.  It is no surprise that 
Freud restored dialogue with unreason by analyzing madness in terms of family values 
and  the  Victorian  obsession  with  sexuality,  namely  Oedipus,  incest,  and  patricide.  
Throughout  Western  history,  the  fear  of  unreason  has  resulted  in  military-like 
operations designed to isolate, keep watch over, and manage the antisocial nature of 
unreason.  Foucault considers art and madness as profoundly entwined although he sees 
art  as  not  "madness"  but  unreason.  Since  the  end  of  the  18th  century,  unreason  no 
longer  manifests  itself  except  in  the  work  of  Artaud  (whose  personal  account  of 
psychotic illness will be discussed in chapter 6).  Thus, madness according to Foucault 
is a socio-historical product created by each episteme as an inverted image of reason.   
Moreover,  discursive  practices  need  to  be  understood  within  the  context  of 
institutions and discourses both of which create power and are created by power. New 
kinds  of  desires  and  subjects  that  wield  the  power  are  no  longer  individuals  but 
institutions where everybody is involved. In fact, no one is a victim of power, because 
every act is power that gives no more freedom than the Saussurean model. According to 
Foucault,  contrary  to  the  view  that  power  represses  sexuality,  it  actually  produces 
sexuality. The Victorians’ obsession with sex parallels the current myth that is a true 
human nature, which needs to be expressed, and sexuality is part of that nature. The 
discussion of sexuality creates (reinforces) sexuality. In the Middle Ages, sex was about 
the body  and people  confessed in the confessional what they did with their bodies. 
However, in the 16
th and 17
th centuries, sexuality became psychological intention and  
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we needed more than confession but experts to put our sexuality into speech for self-
fulfillment.  Thus,  the  discourses  and  practices  that  meant  to  liberate  generated  the 
discourse of power that produces not only self-scrutiny, but also invented the human 
service professionals who produced a discourse of power that was meant to liberate 
sexuality. For Foucault, sexuality is a new historical product of a system of surveillance, 
control, and self-expression.  
Such a divisive power of reason constructed by language is only to be 
“deconstructed” by Jacques Derrida (1930-2004). Derrida deconstructs binary opposites 
that are dominant in Western thought, particularly the prejudice among linguists, 
anthropologists, and philosophers against writing as opposed to speech. As stated 
earlier, Plato noted Socrates' dislike of writing.  Aristotle, the star pupil of Plato, also 
wrote in his book, On Interpretation, that thoughts in the mind are those with which we 
are in direct contact. The spoken word is a sign of those ideas and the written word is 
merely a sign of a sign. Therefore, the written word is at the greatest distance from the 
immediate truth. Derrida argues that the bias is not just “Phonocentrism” – the 
privileging of spoken sound over script, but “Logocentrism” (meaning the ‘spoken 
word’ as well as ‘logic’) – prioritizing the spoken word over the written word. This 
means privileging an original meaning over its supposed repetition, just as a present 
meaning over an abstract one – an origin over a copy.  This is Platonic metaphysics in 
transcending the physical world, which is merely a world of copies, to return to and 
grasp an original world of eternal truth, which is always present. Derrida’s attack is not 
on the split in priority but on logic.  He demonstrates that there is no concept of writing 
that essentially distinguishes it from speaking. Both are signs, repeatable and relational 
in the Saussurean sense; there is no original essence, but there is in both cases a partial 
presence and a partial absence whether a word is thought, spoken, or written.  
Levi-Strauss’ guilt about introducing writing to the Nambikwara culture of the 
Amazon basin is unfounded because in Derrida’s view they already have signs and the 
Saussurean implication of hierarchy and its manipulation of power.   
Derrida argues that the system of cultural signs called “arche-writing” will 
always pre-exist both speech and writing in their normal “narrow” definitions.  He 
further deconstructs an attempt to depict the human mind as busy constructing 
categories of binary opposites like nature and culture, presence and absence, 
metaphysical and physical, mind and body, male and female, black and white, left and 
right, and life and death.  According to Derrida Western philosophy has depended on  
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metaphor and rhetoric to construct ‘origin’ and ‘derivations’ from ‘nothing.’ The 
‘nothing’ that preceded ‘creation’ is a conjurer’s trick, argues Derrida.  These constructs 
are not only categories, but a “Logocentric” (Logocentrism privileges reason) discourse 
as well.  Reason-centred reasoning privileges one of the two poles of necessary primary 
opposites. Derrida demonstrates that in all cases the prioritizing of one over the other 
displays mere cultural manipulations of power. Two major binary opposites dispensed 
with by Derrida are those of presence and absence and origin and supplement.  They 
take us back to the idea of the 'metaphysics of presence' and the search for absolute 
origin. Plato started with an attempt to trace language and meaning back to some 
absolute form, essence, and certain and unchanging truth to the medieval search for 
God. God’s absolute existence would have grounded all uncertainties of existence. 
Another would-be Cartesian search for the self – “I think therefore I am” – as the 
absolute foundation for all thought, or another would-be Rousseauian attempt to return 
to nature (immersion in water for treating madness). Yet another popular idea of the 
phenomenologists and existentialists is the belief in the absolute existence of the present 
moment as opposed to the lost past and the yet-to-come future.  All these notions 
assume that language can arrive at something fully present, a fullness of being or 
absolute origin.  
In fact, nothing is anywhere ever simply present or absent. Every moment is 
loaded with a no longer living past and at the same time pregnant with a future.  
Experience itself is a combination of a presence and absence.  Non-being is experienced 
as a part of being.  Language also is temporal.  Every act of speech in the present takes 
place through time and refers to past and present.  As Saussure points out, each sign has 
traces of all other signs, and they cannot be kept out even though they are not really 
there.  Meaning cannot be found at anyone place in language. It is diffused throughout 
the whole system of signs.  The difference among the signs makes meaning possible.  
Derrida says meaning is never present but is always deferred, hence his coining of a 
word – differance. The logic of differance is that no theory of language including 
Derrida’s own "Archie-writing" can work as a science, because it cannot step out of 
language and look back on it objectively. Phenomenologists have been aware of this 
predicament for a long time. In addition, the nature of language, even a word, generates 
infinite possibilities of meaning and interpretation exceeding the intention of the 
speaker. Moreover, metaphorical meaning cannot be kept out of the true meaning even 
if the speaker declares his intention of keeping it out.  Once language enters the public  
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arena, the speaker or writer loses control of it as it opens up new understandings or 
misunderstandings.  This is due to the nature of built-in instability in language that 
shows how rational, romantic, or postmodern philosophical first principles dismantle or 
deconstruct themselves.  Thus, deconstruction is not just the method of analysis or a 
way of reading texts; it is already working within texts.  Derrida has gone so far as to 
say that from the moment there is meaning there are nothing but signs and we only 
think in signs i.e. there are no signifiers in texts that can relate to any sort of ‘reality.’ 
When language (spoken or written) tries to deal with society or some other externality, 
signifiers slide into other signifiers without reaching a signified; they only reach 
meaning when working on some immediate, limited level. Nevertheless, there is no 
ultimate truth that can be arrived at through language. 
However, Deleuze and Guattari totally reject the notions of signifier and 
signified. They are opposed to Oedipal theory, structuralism, and hermeneutics. 
Moreover, the psychoanalyst’s attempt to interpret or “reproduce” the client’s 
unconscious by making certain links between signifiers to trace the existing structure 
(Oedipal triangle) or a Lacanian “transcendental signified” (phallus) is in opposition 
with their anti-oedipal, anti-structuralist and anti-hermeneutic writing. Nevertheless, 
Deleuze and Guattari use totalizing or signifying systems in order to deconstruct them.  
They show how Oedipus can be “deoedipalised” by using psychoanalysis as a foothold. 
Deleuze and Guattari use the metaphor of the tree (vertical) which dominates Western 
religious, social, and cultural life, in contrast with the rhizome (horizontal) to show how 
knowledge operates in the Western world. In this model, the vertical refers to a small 
idea – a seed or acorn – that takes root and sends up shoots. These shoots become a 
sturdy trunk, supported by the invisible but powerful root system, which feeds the tree; 
from this unified strong trunk come many branches and leaves. Everything that is tree is 
traceable back to a single point origin. Everything that is the tree is part of a coherent 
organic system, which has grown vertically, progressively and steadily. This is how all 
Western thought has worked and art, literature and culture has worked. On the other 
hand, a rhizome is a type of stem that expands underground horizontally, sending down 
roots, and pushing up shoots that arise and multiply not from a single core or trunk, but 
from a network that expands endlessly from any of its points. It has no definite 
structure, no formative unity, and is much harder to uproot. For instance, Australian 
couch grass continues to survive no matter how much of it is pulled out, since no part is 
the governing part of the organism. Another example of a rhizomatic structure is the  
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Internet, the World Wide Web. Unlike a spider’s web, the World Wide Web has no 
centre; no place that starts it, controls it, monitors it, or ends it. The web is the 
interconnection of billions of websites all over the world that exist only in hyperreality 
– in digital form, as images on a computer screen, and not in any material form. If any 
website was forced to close, the web would still exist and would still work the same 
way. “Becoming” is a crucial theme in the definition of the rhizome. Nothing or no 
meaning is in a state of permanence, but instead of transformation, constantly producing 
new modes of interpenetration and cross mapping that change in turn into something 
else.    
Deleuze and Guattari also use the language of desire, but their use of language 
radically differs from the psychoanalytic notion of desire, which is based on the 
acquisition of an object the mind lacks. Instead, they claim that desire is not lacking 
anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather like the Buddhists, the subject that is 
missing in desire or desire that lacks a fixed subject. There is no fixed subject unless 
there is repression (Deleuze 1983, 26). For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is a flow, a 
process, a constant becoming, and an opening to infinite possibilities. They maintain 
that certain orders or structures block the free flow of desire by artificially resurrecting 
all the old meanings of “States, nations and families” (Deleuze and Guattari 1972, 34). 
This is conditioned by the flow of two inevitable processes. One process sweeps away 
all fixed, fast-frozen relations and meanings, the stripping of halos, and a constant 
revolutionizing of production in a psychotic fashion called deterritorialization. In 
addition, the other describes a movement in which capitalism, to hold its relations of 
production and private property called reterritorialization. Lacan underlines the split 
between “conscious” and “unconscious” that occurs with the child’s entry into the 
“symbolic order”. By pointing out that repression takes place not only in the conscious 
but also in the unconscious, Lacan testifies to the “dictatorial” concept of the 
unconscious against which Deleuze and Guattari react.  Deleuze and Guattari promote 
the ‘schizo’ person whom they describe as, “a free man, irresponsible, solitary, and 
joyous. He can say and do something simple in his own name, without asking 
permission. His desire lacks nothing, a flux that overcomes barriers and codes, and a 
name that no longer designates any ego whatever.  The schizo person “has simply 
ceased being afraid of becoming mad. He experiences and lives himself as the sublime 
sickness that will no longer affect him” (Deleuze, 1983, 131). Lacan’s client is a split 
subject. The analyst’s concern is with a stable and unified self that distinguishes the  
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client from others, and, also places him above others. The client goes parallel with the 
analyst’s method of tracing meanings in the depths of his unconscious by establishing 
links between “floating signifiers”. The analyst is in the business of supplying the scarce 
commodity in demand. Lacan’s term and structure for manqué means lack and shortage, 
a scarcity of a certain commodity, which gives rise to desire and demand. Thus, the 
analyst becomes a representative of the dominant power structure. Deleuze and Guattari 
call this ‘arborescent systems (tree system) – “hierarchical systems with centers of 
significance and subjectification, central automata like organized memories…(in which) 
an element only receives information from a higher unit, and only receives a subjective 
affection along pre-established paths (Deleuze, 1987, 16). Their liberation of desire 
from a subject and a lacking object amounts to their liberation of the literary text from a 
subject and an object, in short, from authorial sovereignty as well as from meaning or 
closure. The text, like a rhizome, contains lines that are interrelated but decentred and 
made of plateaus, and is “a continuous, self-vibrating region of intensities whose 
development avoids any orientation towards a culmination point or external end” 
(Delueze, 1987, 11).  
Their thinking is in line with Barthes’ notion of the “Text” as an activity of 
production. According to Barthes, the Text cannot stop; its constitutive movement is 
that of cutting across (in particular, it can cut across the Work, several works)” (Barthes, 
1996, 162). The distinction Barthes makes between the Work and the Text corresponds 
to the distinction Deleuze and Guattari make between the root-tree (root-book) and the 
rhizome (rhizomorphic book). The former refers to the signifying and subjectifying 
book with organic unity and binary structure, and the latter to the book that is 
characterized by asignification, astructure, and multiplicities. The central important 
feature in Barthes’ theory is that it stands mid-way between the work of Lacan and 
Deleuze and Guattari. His signifier is definitely not the “transcendental signifier” of 
Lacan but he does not deny the existence of signifiers as Deleuze and Guattari do. 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of schizoanalysis rejects all kinds of overcoding systems 
and any idea of pre-traced destiny. They also emphasize the way in which 
psychoanalysis and linguistics strengthen their position in the universe and in people’s 
minds by dominating people’s conscious and unconscious from the early stages of their 
lives.  
Deleuze and Guattari use their theory of the map as a reaction to tracing in their 
attack on psychoanalysis and linguistics. Tracing constructs an unconscious and a  
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language closed upon itself. The map is open and connectible in all of its dimensions. It 
is detachable, reversible, and susceptible to constant modification. The tracing, 
however, organizes, stabilizes, and neutralizes the multiplicities according to the axes of 
significance and subjectification. It generates and structuralizes the rhizome, although 
the rhizome always has multiple entryways as opposed to the tracing, which always 
comes back “to the same” (Deleuze, 1987, 12). Deleuze and Guattari maintain that a 
language is never closed up upon itself, but decentred into other dimensions and other 
registers, not only linguistic but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive acts. 
Again, this ties in with Barthes’ notion of the Text as “a social space which leaves no 
language safe, outside, nor any subject of enunciation in position as judge, master, 
analyst, confessor, decoder” (Barthes 1996,164). Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
“Minor Literature”
6 as “the revolutionary conditions for every literature within the heart 
of great (or established) literature” is also in line with Barthes’ notion of the “Text” that 
does not stop at (good) Literature. The minor literature cannot contain within a 
hierarchy because it has a subversive force for the old classifications (Barthes, 1996, 
157).  
 
Conclusion 
 
It seems clear that consciousness as the Western tradition recognizes it today has 
evolved from the split between embodied experiential feelings and the cognitive rational 
thinking of the mind-body, whether we argue with evidence from archaeology, 
historical artefact, literature, or from a linguistic or cognitive neuroscience perspective. 
The development of written language in ancient Greece instigated heroes or the group 
(other) oriented people of the time to conceptualize emotions, thoughts and behaviour 
with a special reference to personal identity (self) and responsibility certainly enhanced 
the evolution of consciousness. The development of mental space to think with concepts 
has created rationality, which has become the main tool in interpreting written text 
about human experience. Such a linguistic shift has important implications for 21st 
century psychologists who hold diverse views on basic mental phenomena as 
consciousness, mental illness, self-esteem, virtues, personality, and many other matters. 
Although not all practitioners have the same theories of personality or of mental illness,  
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they share a deeper set of underlying assumptions called foundational beliefs. Our 
shared systems of construct (Kelly, 1955) constrain our abilities to theorize as 
availability of assumptive concepts limits theory production. The linguistic shift from 
oral to fully literate thought and language reveals the psychological restraints within 
which we operate. 
Misgivings of linguistic thinking even after the methods of deconstruction in 
postmodern theory are about the binary labelling of perception and experience. Rational 
concepts to define the irrational and mad cannot explain direct experience, thus creating 
the conflict between rationally transcended values, judgment, and experiential 
knowledge gained from embodied intuition and reflection. Thus, psychotherapy needs 
to address the conflict between linguistically derived notions of existence (ontology), 
knowledge (epistemology) and moral values (morality). As psychotherapy has not 
addressed these issues in an integrated manner (like the Buddhist approach has dealt 
with in chapter 8 and 9), it splits itself into schizoid states while featuring multiple 
personality or dissociated identity disorders with visible obsessions. The next chapter 
elaborates on how these metaphysical, epistemological, and moral issues of clinical 
realities have split psychotherapy into many schools of thought and how the Buddhist 
approach provides an alternative to this. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Psychotherapy as a "Schizoid Self" 
 
Kalamas
7: “…some monks and Brahmins, Venerable Sir, come to 
Kesaputta. They also expound and explain only their own 
doctrines; the doctrines of others they despise, revile, and pull 
to pieces. When we listen to them, Sir, we have doubt and 
wavering as to which of these worthy ones are speaking truth 
and which speak falsehood.” 
Buddha:  “It is proper for you, Kalamas, to doubt, to be uncertain; 
  In a doubtful matter, wavering does arise. Come, Kalamas. Do not go 
by revelation; do not go by tradition; do not go by hearsay; do not go 
on authority of sacred texts; do not go on the grounds of pure logics; 
do not go by a view that seems rational; do not go by reflecting on 
mere appearances; do not go along with a considered view because 
you agree with it; do not go along on the ground that the person is 
competent; do not go along because (thinking) the recluse is our 
teacher. Kalamas, when you know yourselves: these things are 
unwholesome, these things are blameworthy; these things are 
censured by the wise; and when undertaken and observed, these 
things lead to harm and ill, abandon them.” 
                    (AN 3:65)
   
 
  The above scenario illustrates how the disciples of the Buddha became confused 
as various Brahmins persuaded them with their epistemologies in the absence of 
integrated ontology and morality. The Buddha encouraged the disciples to hold a 
healthy scepticism of everything including his own teaching. However, he gives them a 
simple tool to validate these theories with, that is, “when undertaken and observed, 
these things lead to harm and ill, abandon them.” He integrates rational knowledge with 
the outcome of moral ethical behaviours to human suffering. This chapter demonstrates 
how splitting of epistemology from moral and ontological issues sets up static identity 
and authority of the self, thus causing a schizoid state in psychotherapy. 
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Philosophical Issues of Clinical Realities in 
Psychotherapy 
 
As linguistic concept of self dominates the role of authority in explaining human 
experience and behaviour rationally, various theories begin to conflict with each other. 
Consequently, clients experience psychological distress from value conflicts and 
collisions of divergent worldviews, which they have encountered at both personal and 
interpersonal levels. The client turns for help from psychotherapy, but the whole field of 
‘mental health’ is not in the best state of health. Although there are many postmodern 
and constructivist explorers, the psychotherapy profession as a whole still presents the 
world as a somewhat deceptive mask of scientific certainty. San Diego psychotherapists 
(O’Hara & Anderson, 1995) paint the following portrait of a client: 
 
Jerry feels overwhelmed, anxious, fragmented, and confused. He 
disagrees with people he used to agree with and aligns himself with 
people he used to argue with. He questions his sense of reality and 
frequently asks himself what it all means.  
He  has  had  all  kinds  of  therapeutic  and  growth  experiences: 
gestalt,  rebirthing,  Jungian  analysis,  holotropic  breathwork, 
bioenergetics, the Course in Miracles, twelve-step recovery groups, Zen 
meditation, and Ericksonian hypnosis. He has been to sweat lodges, to 
the Rajneesh ashram in Poona, to the Wicca festival in Devon. He is in 
analysis  again,  this  time  with  a  self-psychologist.  Although  he  is 
endlessly on the lookout for new ideas and experiences, he keeps saying 
that he wishes he could simplify his life. He talks about buying land in 
Oregon. He loves “Dances With Wolves.” 
Jerry  is  like  so  many  educated  professionals  who  come  in  for 
psychotherapy these days. But he is not quite the typical client: He is a 
well-established  psychotherapist.  He  conducts  stress-reduction 
workshops nationwide; his current foray into self-psychology analysis is 
another attempt to find some conceptual coherence for his own work - 
and, of course, for his life. (170-176) 
 
Jerry seems to be torn between the three worlds of the premodern, modern and 
the postmodern. O’Hara and Anderson comment that most of us slip back and forth like 
bilingual children between postmodern, constructivist modes of thought that regard 
reality as socially constructed, and modern, objective modes of thought. We cling to the 
hope that reality is nonhuman and it will be revealed with certainty by science, religion,  
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history or psychotherapy, while we hanker for imagined joys of the premodern. Jerry’s 
professional life has been spent pursuing the therapist’s equivalent of the Holy Grail: a 
universally true psychological theory and practice in which he can find his true self 
mirrored. All these approaches are so different and each of them claims to be true, yet 
the plurality of choices becomes a problem as serious as the problem that caused him to 
enter therapy in the first place. As indicated in chapter 2, postmodern deconstructions of 
text lead any client to a state of despair because there are too many realities, ideologies, 
identities, religions and so on to choose from the postmodern or poststructural 
supermarket. What is needed is to examine what the philosophical problems of 
psychotherapy are and how they might be addressed. Miller (1992) writes of this as: 
 
… a serious malady that afflicts the mental health professions themselves 
but that remains largely undiagnosed. The disorder requiring urgent 
treatment is the splitting of clinical theory from its historical and logical 
foundation in Western philosophy, the resulting inability to speak 
effectively about theoretical differences, and the fragmentation into rival 
professions and theoretically isolated “schools” of treatment. What is 
required as an antidote to this tendency toward a dogmatic, schismatic, 
and often cultist approach to clinical theory is the recognition of the 
philosophical nature of these theoretical disputes and the restoration of 
philosophical methods of analysis and dialogue to a central role in the 
development of clinical theory. This is what will be required to make 
genuine headway in understanding that particular form of human misery 
and suffering that is variously called behavior disorders, emotional 
disturbance, problems in living, or mental illness. (xvii) 
 
 
In fact, psychotherapy as a whole with its own conflicting theories and treatment 
methods both within and without suffer from a hyper-sensitive “schizoid split” (see 
Figure 10.1) with obsessive features and accompanying paradoxes, dilemmas and 
confusion. Psychotherapy does not like such a demoralizing diagnosis. Instead it builds 
a defence mechanism by setting up professional guilds that represent an objective body 
of knowledge and serve as gatekeepers in inventing, refining and enforcing licensing 
laws, a national register, standardized testing and treatment procedures approved by 
insurance companies, promotion of psychologists and psychiatrists as expert witnesses 
and profession-wide agreement to use categories described in the Diagnosis and 
Statistical Manual (DSM IV current) of Mental Disorders. These activities, while 
presumably making room for multiple approaches and keeping the other out, lend 
credibility to the practitioner and enable the profession to delineate what is inside and  
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what is outside the boundaries of psychological truth. Thomas Szasz (1960) and other 
critics have accused this system of being a power structure privileging the elite which 
maintains it. Others argue that the system, however flawed, is needed to protect the 
client against unscrupulous or incompetent practitioners. Therapists within the system 
are likely to believe this, although their competencies are challenged and they find 
themselves in terror when they do not understand or know what to do with the client’s 
situation. For some, when a therapeutic system happens to conflict with their own, they 
either live a life of lie, come to terms with it or adhere to a powerful system, at least to 
protect themselves from psychic chaos if not a bad reputation and livelihood. These run 
parallel within and between client, clinician and therapy make psychotherapy the very 
client who needs the treatment first. 
The crux of the problem in scientific psychotherapy did not come from the threat 
of poststructuralism and deconstructionists. It originates in psychology’s failure to 
reflect upon its own practices philosophically in both academic and clinical arenas. For 
instance, clinical psychology always experiences strain in balancing between the 
demands of a pure science and an applied profession. The problem of not seeing how 
basic science fails to meet the need of an applied profession and how the applied area of 
interest contributes to the basic knowledge of a science such as psychology widens the 
gap between experimental and professional psychology. Philosophical differences 
between these two psychologies, not merely caused by the influence of economic, social 
and political realities, cause the growing gap. Most therapists and clinicians tend to 
believe that philosophy has little to offer to clinical psychology and psychotherapy. The 
tendency of the practitioners is to avoid serious discussion of the fundamental 
assumptions related to their clinical practice. Even when they say that they are 
discussing philosophy, it is rarely philosophy but rather their biases and prejudices. One 
can see such a position with the positivist, for example, who would consider logical 
positivism as the only legitimate philosophy and belittle the philosophy found in 
humanistic psychology. 
  Miller (1992) identifies three ways in which clinical psychology avoids 
philosophical discourse, by practicing: (1) Theoretical preciousness, (2) Terminal 
philosophical ambivalence, and (3) Philosophy by fiat.   
Firstly, theoretical preciousness is the explicit and implicit belief that only one's 
own theoretical approach to psychotherapy (e.g. psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioural, 
person-centred, medical model, family systems and so on) is rational, coherent, and  
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true. Such theoretical preciousness is thought to be associated with the “cult of 
empiricism” (Toulmin, 1979) and “methodolatory” (Bakan, 1969). Such practices 
maintain that all crucial questions are empirical questions and that any method of 
arriving at the truth other than quantitatively controlled research is unacceptable. The 
split within the American Psychological Association in 1988 resulting in the formation 
of the American Psychological Society originated, for example, from the question 
concerning the nature of science and its relationship to practical knowledge. 
Secondly, the terminal philosophical ambivalence towards building a 
philosophical discourse makes psychology look like a teenager who has left home to 
prove his independence but not sure, whether he has resources to survive. Psychology 
recognizes inherent philosophical problems within the discipline but goes on to focus on 
technical problems of research or practice as if they can be addressed independently of 
philosophical issues.  
Thirdly, philosophy by fiat avoids philosophical dialogue in psychotherapy by 
importing a line of philosophical argument for each school of psychology to build a 
theory of therapy. Thus, the Behaviourists imported logical positivism and the 
Rogerians fostered Husserlian Phenomenology and Sartrean Existentialism, while the 
social systems, humanistic and psychoanalytic theorists have adopted hermeneutics as 
their philosophy. Although the shift from mechanistic to linguistic metaphors is 
currently popular, a philosophical position is put forward as an ideology; it is far from a 
philosophical dialogue. In fact, it implies that philosophy does not require a dialogue. 
For instance, Wolman (1965) argues as if the mid-20th century clinical psychology 
marches on without needing a philosophical dialogue. He writes as such in his classic 
textbook, The Handbook of Clinical Psychology, from a neopositivist tradition on the 
topic of “Clinical Psychology and the Philosophy of Science”. Wolman defends that 
theories always must go beyond the facts and that the facts of psychology must include 
introspective reports, individual behaviour, and social fields. Theories must be checked 
against the facts as determined by experimental methods, but clinical practice can only 
be learned or captured well by case study methods. He conceded that theories of 
personality and psychotherapy do represent different ethical values, but these 
differences cannot be resolved. Ethical positions are merely expressions of emotional 
reactions that cannot be justified through rational argument.  
However, his argument falls short of an invitation to a psychologist to enter 
philosophical discourse. One might be tempted to argue that because academic  
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psychology has begun to re-embrace philosophy, clinical psychology must do the same. 
However, if the problems of clinical psychology were treated as a subset of 
experimental psychology, it would be repeating the same mistake of making itself blind 
to clinical realities of the “basic stuff”, such as subjective experiences like embodied 
knowledge, behaviour, social systems, unconscious forces, neuronal pathways and so 
on. Clinical psychology needs to ask what its philosophical problems are and how they 
might be addressed.  
What is needed in psychotherapy is to establish a science of understanding as 
opposed to a science of explanation through which subjective meaning making that 
springs from emotional desire and values can be studied empirically in order that 
intentional (final) causation can be understood.  In order to establish a science of 
understanding the intentional causation, psychology needs to examine in some detail the 
metaphysical, epistemological, and moral issues. 
 
Metaphysical Problems of Psychotherapy 
   
The first fundamental philosophical problem of clinical psychology is 
metaphysical – conflicting models or “philosophies” of the existence of psychological 
reality, which is sometimes referred to as the problem and nature of human personality. 
Various schools of psychotherapy have different models of worldview (of personality 
determinants), description (of personality structure), causal processes (of personality 
dynamics), growth (of personality development), psychopathology (of personality 
problems), and psychotherapy (of personality change process). However, the “basic 
stuff” clinicians work with is subjective experience and neuronal dysfunction. These 
bring out metaphysical questions of how those elements differ in reality, how they relate 
to each other in the mind-body problem, whether they obey the law of causation (or 
conflict with the notion of free will and determinism) or whether they can be studied 
using the same method and criteria (epistemological problems). Everyday clinicians 
find these issues difficult to resolve with different theories of psychopathology and their 
treatment philosophies. 
  
  53 
Rationalist - Empiricist Dialectics: Plato to the Present 
 
In order to understand fully the philosophical problems in clinical psychology it 
is necessary to sketch the historical development of Western thought within a particular 
framework. The Western tradition began with the ancient Greeks and it was built on the 
construction of binary opposites and dualistic dichotomies. The history of various 
theories follows a dialectic process of thesis-antithesis-synthesis cycle, which revolves 
around the rationalism of Plato and empiricism of Aristotle. The original sources of our 
ideas for modern psychology and psychotherapy are represented by Plato’s notion that 
the mind resides within the brain, and the Aristotelian idea of the mind located within 
the heart. Their philosophies differ in the way they see the relationship between mind 
and body by emphasizing the introspection of abstract idea and the observation of 
physiological manifestation respectively.  
For Plato, reality does not reside in concrete objects but in the abstract ‘forms’ 
these objects represent. His idea of pure ‘forms’ has been described as an idealist or 
subjective view of reality. Physical reality is considered a shadow of mental reality at 
the universal level of thought. One reaches the truth not through the senses but through 
thoughts
8.  
In contrast, Aristotle believes that reality lies only in the concrete world of 
objects that our bodies sense. For Aristotle, reality is a unified whole existing in a single 
plane. The mind or soul does not exist in its own right but merely as an illusory by-
product of anatomical and physiological activity. The study of the mind and the study of 
the body are the same. We can understand the mind only by understanding the body
9.  
The Buddha (566-486 BC) who pre-existed approximately 139 and 182 years 
prior to Plato and Aristotle respectively views reality as an eternal concept expressed in 
neither abstract word nor empirical physical sensations manifested in physiological 
experience. He sees such notions as illusions. His view transcends both extremes of 
entangled linguistic narratives and ephemeral physical embodiment. The Middle Path 
view of the Buddha takes a non-attached stance from the neutral space-in-between and 
mindfully observes (emptied of words) embodied experience and linguistic meaning 
making, valuing, and interpretation. The emptied mind experiences the changing nature 
of sensations and words. In this state of awareness, the desire to make pleasant 
sensations last and eliminate unpleasant ones does not exist. Such a mind becomes 
equanimous and transcends beyond the disillusionment of adherence to physical  
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sensations and conceptual reasons. 
Dialectics of empiricism versus rationalism, nevertheless, continued to recycle 
in Europe throughout the early Christian era (200-450 AD), the Middle Ages (400-1300 
AD) and post Renaissance (1300-1600 AD) period. Descartes (1596-1656) found 
Plato’s certainty in pure thought, but not in the sense data. His formulation of mind-
body duality - the body consists of matter occupying space while the soul consists of a 
spiritual substance capable of thinking, divides clinicians into two camps, biological 
versus non-biological. Descartes gained support from continental rationalists, such as 
Leibniz (1646-1716) and Spinoza (1632-1677). With the growing success of natural 
sciences, however, empiricists such as Locke (1632-1704), Berkeley (1685-1753), and 
Hume (1711-1776) win back the Aristotelian position of knowledge that begins with the 
senses. On the other hand, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) attempts to synthesize the two 
with his “critical [rationalist] philosophy”. In late 18
th century, romanticists G.W.F. 
Hegel (1770-1831), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and Nietzsche (1844-1900) 
generally contended the good life as passionate and the life of reason as a life of 
pathetic impotence. 
Between late 19
th and early 20
th centuries, structuralism (based on binary 
abstract thought) led the psychology of Wundt (1832-1920) and its opposite, 
functionalism (based on function of physical brain) led William James (1842-1910) to 
pragmatism (instrumentalism). Against structuralism and pragmatism, radical 
Behaviourists – J. B. Watson (1878 -1958) and B. F. Skinner (1904 -1990) – reject 
mental content and mechanism. On the other hand, Gestaltists Max Wertheimer (1880-
1943), Kurt Koffka (1886-1941), and Wolfgang Kohler (1887-1967) argue for 
psychological phenomena as best understood by viewing them as organized wholes 
rather than breaking them down into pieces. Gestaltists arguments set the stage for 
cognitivists to synthesize analytic and holistic strategies. Computer simulation of 
cognitive processes, the structure and metabolic processes in the brain (Posner & 
Raichle, 1994) bears the reputation of cognitive revolution. Antithesis to computation 
model arrived in 1980s and 1990s in the name of “connectionism” which is to mimic 
thinking by computations in a network of neuron like elements. Nevertheless, social 
constructionists (of Platonic idea-driven position) like Gibson (1950; 1979), Greeno 
(1989), Leave (1988) and Scribner (1984) have presented a “situated action” model 
antithetical to cognitivist (of Aristotelian data-driven position) model of connectionism. 
However, the situationists do not allow room for the linguistic reasoning capacity of the  
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brain. Hence, an ordinary language philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) 
argues that language traps people and makes them think that they have to answer 
philosophical questions. Nevertheless, the underlying problem is that they are mistaking 
one context for another. He solves this issue by bringing the level of consciousness to 
the underlying problem. However, I would argue that awareness alone does not solve 
the client’s problem.  
Meanwhile, a number of antithetical theories that share Platonic-Aristotelian 
synthesis developed independently of one another, using a common term called 
‘system’. The content of system philosophies includes dialectical materialism, French 
structuralism, American cybernetics, information theory, and general system theory 
(Bertalanffy, 1968). System philosophy regards the world as consisting of systems at 
different levels of development. A system incorporates the interplay or interaction 
between the elements as well as the interaction between the whole system and the 
super-system into which the system enters as an element. The system theory stands 
close to the Buddhist notion of Interdependent Arising and Conditional Relations 
discussed in chapter 4. However, the Buddhist notion does not view the system as a 
“homeostasis” maintaining static entity. Buddhists view the system as “homeorhesis”
 
spirally evolving dynamic processes. Homeorhesis, derived from the Greek for “similar 
flow”, is a concept encompassing dynamical systems that return to a trajectory, as 
opposed to systems that return to a particular state, which is termed homeostasis. 
Claude Bernard conceptualized homeostasis or maintenance of a stable state whereas 
homeorhesis is a counterpoint indicating a situation of stable flow. The term 
homeostasis accompanies the related term chreod, meaning path-dependence and 
evolution, which is the trajectory to which the system tends to return (C.H. Waddington, 
1968). 
In therapy practice, the nature of reality, mind and body, brain and 
consciousness and the nature and pathology of human personality still elude 
understanding. In clinical psychology and psychotherapy, the fundamental debate 
instigated by Szasz’s (1960) charge in his book The Myth of Mental Illness remains, in 
part, a question of metaphysics. Among metaphysicians, there is a strong pull toward 
monism i.e. “everything is really mental” or “everything is really physical.” Such 
statements are monistic and reductionistic, as all aspects of life reduce themselves to 
one kind of substance. Realists are those who reject both idealism and materialism. 
However, clinicians must conceptualize “the reality” they have to work with in their  
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daily practice. Faced with such dilemmas, they explore the truth directly as a form of 
knowledge without asking the question of whether the content of reality is an 
experience or an idea. This exploration leads unanswered metaphysical questions to 
epistemological issues. 
 
Epistemological Problems in Psychotherapy 
 
The second fundamental problem in clinical psychology, the question of 
philosophy of science, has already been raised (Wolman, 1965). The question for the 
clinician is what kind of conscious knowledge over and above the scientist-practitioner 
model does he need to understand in order to provide effective, efficient, and equitable 
services to the client? It also raises the issue of how applied knowledge differs from and 
relates to pure science and how can they be integrated. Similarly, the question for the 
client could be that what kind of knowledge does he
10 need to learn over and above 
what he already knows (believes) in order to overcome his problems? These are 
epistemological questions related to the practice-oriented discipline of psychotherapy. 
Apart from sharing problems of philosophy of science with other disciplines including 
natural sciences, psychotherapy needs to develop a body of scientific knowledge based 
on practice-oriented research in dealing with the “basic stuff” mentioned earlier.   
Again, the search for criteria to distinguish between knowledge and truth from 
false beliefs brings about a Platonic versus Aristotelian (idealism versus materialism) 
split. Knowledge for Aristotle begins with sensory perception. There is a connection 
between the physical world of sensible objects and the mental world of abstract truths 
(Cornford, 1932). The mind depends upon the body for its existence and is an extension 
of the natural order of the universe. Aristotle believes that ideas are acquired through 
experience, and therefore theories without any connection to observations have little 
validity. Similarly, observational data without an organizing theoretical framework have 
little meaning and therefore are of little use. 
Plato’s views on knowledge lie at the opposite end of the dialectical continuum. 
He suggested a rational approach, using philosophical analysis, in order to understand 
the world and people’s relationship to it. His rationalistic notion is consistent with a 
dualistic view of the nature of body and mind. Knowledge is acquired through reason  
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and speculation about the ideal world, not about the corporeal world of the body. Plato 
believed that ideas are innate. Plato’s doctrine of forms suggests that knowledge be 
discovered through insight and self-examination. It is an ultimate form of reminiscence. 
People must discover what they know, but they do not know or remember that they 
know.   
Thus, rationalists in general are much less drawn to inductive logic and usually 
tend to use deductive methods based on general principles. They believe that truth is 
discovered via the powers of human reason and insight and never simply via observing 
the facts of the case. What people know to be true is a product of their power of logical 
‘coherent thought’. Therefore, it is the coherence theory of truth.  
By contrast, Aristotelian Empiricists believe that truth is derived from careful 
and systematic observation or experience of events taking place in the world. Truth is 
discovered when a person’s picture of reality and reality itself matches up. This is called 
the ‘correspondence theory’ of truth (Miller, 1992). 
The problem with the rationalist-empiricist dichotomy is that neither can give a 
very good account of each other’s paradigmatic case of knowing. There is also a built-in 
circularity to both criteria of truth
11.  
Frustration with the murkiness of such concepts and issues led 19
th century 
philosophers
12, experimental physiologists, physicists, and neurologists to investigate 
just how the brain and senses operated. They hoped to show a direct, lawful link 
between physiological variables and psychological experience and therefore put an end 
to the cyclical empiricist-rationalist argument. The experimental psychology works of 
Fechner and Wundt were examples of such attempts to solve the mind-body problem to 
end the rationalism versus empiricism debate.  
Thus, in psychology and psychotherapy, the knowledge schism between the bio-
behaviouralists and the system-oriented practitioners on one side, and psychodynamic 
and humanistic views on the other, has widened. Research-based psychologists hold on 
to an empiricist or pragmatic epistemology whereas clinicians who rely on clinical 
experience, intuition, and empathy are more aligned with the existential-
phenomenological position of the rationalists
13. 
 
Confusion between Theory and Method 
 
The problem clinical psychology has inherited, however, in dealing with the  
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“basic stuff” is not caused by adopting scientific method, because it contains the 
elements of both empiricism and rationalism. The scientific method is NOT the 
problem, but conceptualizing “causality” is the problem as it confuses epistemological 
issues. Rychlak (2000) argues that a theory unites meanings, which are framed as 
concepts or constructs that predicate each other to convey a certain point of view. A 
method, on the other hand, provides assurance that the theory is true or worth serious 
belief. He calls a cognitive or conceptual method that relies on commonsense 
plausibility, “procedural evidence”, and a research or experimental method in which the 
standard of control and predication as “validating evidence” is used to support beliefs 
(Rychlak, 1968, 75, 77). The wrong assumption frequently causes flaw in procedural 
evidence, while the affirming-the-consequent causes error in validating evidence. For 
instance, if a theory (A) that claims that people are manipulable without intention is 
true, then the experimental prediction (B) that they will increase the emission of certain 
operant responses when contingently reinforced to do so, will be empirically supported. 
This theoretical claim may be true, but certainty is not guaranteed no matter how many 
times the finding is cross-validated. Alternative explanations of the empirical data can 
and always will be possible. This issue has direct relevance to psychotherapy in 
understanding how people change, that is, the nature of causation in human behaviour.  
Aristotle (1952) identified and named four types of causes based on his survey 
of the theorizing of previous philosophers. According to Aristotle, there is a material 
cause, or substantial matter making up anything, (stone, flesh, liquid, etc.). There is the 
efficient cause, or the impetus that brings things or events about, forcing them to move, 
assemble, or otherwise take place (energy, gravity, power, etc.). There is the formal 
cause, which is a discernible pattern or shape that captures the meaningful essence of 
things or events (geometric patterns, physiognomies, logical progression, etc.). Last, 
there is the final cause or the reason (that for the sake of which) something exists or 
takes place (purposes, intention, etc.). Accounts relying on final causation are termed 
teleologies (from telos, the Greek word meaning, “end”), where a deity’s ends were 
presumably created to direct events. The resulting clash between science and religion 
during the Roman Inquisition took such an explanation totally out of science. Newton 
followed this restriction, so when he traced reality it was exclusively efficiently caused. 
British empiricists such as Locke, Hume, the Mills, and others help solidify this view of 
science usually termed mechanistic in contrast to teleological formulations of Aristotle.   
The Platonic pure form of rational objectivity has led psychology to emulate the  
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physical sciences' model of explanation previously considered as a value neutral 
approach. Psychology follows this approach and takes the position that values are 
subjective and thus cannot be measured objectively. In addition, psychology, in search 
of objectivity, has become “stuck” with Aristotle’s efficient causation, a model of linear 
cause commonly known as the billiard ball model. What psychology needs is the 
teleological model (final causation) that is generated by human desire, values, meaning, 
intentions, goals, and purposes. The question of whether emotional values and moral 
reasoning (moral issues) that are the basis of ‘human nature’ (metaphysical issues) can 
be studied objectively (epistemological issues) has caused psychotherapy to suffer from 
an aforementioned “schizoid personality” disorder. The scientists did not see the 
practitioners paying sufficient attention to the development of the knowledge base of 
their work.  In addition, the practitioners did not find the academics’ work on that 
knowledge base of much use as they have little understanding of the philosophical 
differences in the meaning of ‘knowledge’. Both sides turned this into a political power 
play.  
 Aristotle’s four causations were acceptable until 17
th century. Nevertheless, 
when in the late 19
th and 20
th centuries, psychology was fashioned as a science; it 
conformed to the Newtonian view promoted by the “Vienna Circle” to which Sigmund 
Freud belonged. However, Freud saw psychology as an interim level of explanation that 
could be systematically explored through self-observation. Thus, Freud’s eloquent 
arguments were never considered by positivistic reductionists as scientific. Nonetheless, 
psychology viewed material causation as acceptable as the physical substance of 
mechanical body (nervous system, foodstuff, etc.). Formal causation was implied in the 
patterning of habitual behaviour through conditioning, but in truth all such shaping of 
motion was viewed as being pushed along by an underlying efficient causation that 
continued to be “the” basic cause of things such as maladaptive behaviour that was dealt 
with in psychotherapy.   
The result of the Newtonian efficient-cause bias in psychology, as in stimulus-
response (The S-R) concept, leads to the fusing together of theory and method, which in 
turn has adversely affected the objectivity of empirical research. In psychotherapy, the 
belief in the efficient causation creates the confusion between rational theory (of 
treatment, which considers that only rational reasoning can “pushed away” irrational or 
unreasonable emotions) and rational (scientific) method of studying change in 
emotions. Consequently, psychology uses standard scientific research design to validate  
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theories using an independent variable (IV) manipulation and a prediction of observed 
changes in the dependent variable (DV). A formal cause ‘association’ as well as a final 
cause ‘intention’ to put a theory to the test is totally obscured by this efficient cause 
‘manipulation’.  Because the formal-final cause logic is forgotten, the S-R theoretical 
concept is understood as an efficient cause sequence of antecedent cause impelling a 
consequent effect. While researchers have been forced to accept the S-R concept in 
psychological research involving IV-DV sequence, the Newtonians are turning their 
method of proof into a metaphysical explanation of the universe (Burtt, 1955, 229, 243). 
Thus, the efficient cause bias represses humanistic theorizing in psychology.  
However, the influence of affective factors in learning and retention of learnable 
items has been shown to be independent of associative mechanism. Rychlak (2000) 
demonstrates that learning and retention is better for “liked” items than “disliked” items 
among normal subjects who have positive learning tasks and self-evaluation. In 
contrast, a better learning and retention of “disliked” items than “liked” items is evident 
among patients diagnosed with alcoholism, depression, and schizophrenia who have 
negative task and self evaluation. His response to the question of what causes the person 
to like or dislike some items is that it does not come from the efficient causation’s 
notion of the nature of task or self-evaluation, but from a voluntary, intentional, and 
freely willed choice and preference that influence learning behaviour. Slife et al. (1984) 
show the evidence that affective learning style move depressed patients from negative 
to positive over the course of successful psychotherapy. Such findings go against the 
Newtonian philosophy of science, and show the influence of affective assessment in 
learning and retention of learnable items independent of or in addition to associative 
mechanisms that have dominated psychology since the late 19
th century. If a method is 
so wound up into a theory of one side that the opponent theory can no longer be tested 
by it, then the philosophy of science must be involved in adjusting such a method. 
Fortunately, postmodern scientific explanations are replacing Newtonian 
efficient causation with formal causation. Patterns are what make the most sense at the 
greatly reduced subatomic levels, where events move about in fields rather than 
according to an antecedent propelling a consequent in efficient cause fashion. 
Postmodern science is accepting more than one theory accounting for the same 
empirical fact pattern. There is a growing recognition of the role played by the 
conceptualiser in the creation of knowledge. The reality studied by physics is also seen 
as a mental construct (Prigogine & Stenger, 1984, 225). The theoretical predication of  
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subject matter affirmed by a scientist from the very outset is a crucial ingredient of the 
findings eventually observed in the empirical research, that is, the researcher is a 
participator in, rather than an observer of, what is taking place in an experiment (Zukav, 
1979, 29). Scientists participate by constructing their research findings rather than 
merely sitting and looking at events in an intellectually disinterested Newtonian 
manner.  
This suggests a shift in the theoretical perspective taken by the scientist from a 
3
rd person perspective to a 1
st person point of view, in contrast with psychology’s 
Skinnerian and Pavlovian conditioners who are still pursuing the 3
rd person perspective. 
Scientists are acknowledging their theoretical hypotheses as framed by an identity, an 
“I” or “self” whose point of view must be taken into consideration to fully understand a 
scientific investigation. It appears that postmodern science is modelling psychotherapy 
to let go of Newtonian 3
rd person methodology. 
Moreover, in psychotherapy, one has to ‘step into someone else’s shoes’ to 
understand him teleologically. Once there, it is necessary to frame constructs in a formal 
and final causation fashion in order to understand why people do what they do and how 
they intentionally go about trying to fulfill their goals. This does not preclude the use of 
mechanistic behavioural therapies but the explanation for why they work does not have 
to be in terms of mechanistic efficient causation. Since an unsuccessful effort to salvage 
traditional conditioning theory, the definition of conditioning has been greatly 
broadened. For instance, Mackintosh, (1983) states: “the process whereby when an 
animal is exposed to certain relationships between events, representations of these 
events are formed, and associations established between them, with the consequence 
that the animal’s behaviour changes in certain specifiable ways” (p.20). Such a 
statement implies that the relationship between events (formal cause) could be known 
by the animal, and the forming of representations could involve some kind of plan 
because of which behaviour is intended (a final cause). 
For psychotherapy to maintain a practice-oriented scientific discipline, it needs a 
combined use of approaches articulated by Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Karl Popper 
(1959). Kuhn (1962) speaks of paradigms (formal cause) used by scientists which are 
predicated assumptions (final causes) that organize their theoretical understanding as 
they engage in empirical research. In contrast, Popper (1959) contends that good 
science involve putting ones theories continually to the test by attempting to falsify 
them or prove them wrong. The actual scientific revolution as Kuhn calls it takes place  
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fundamentally on the grounds of formal causation that is a changing pattern of belief, 
and the role of validating evidence.  In support of a revolutionary shift from a 
mechanistic model to a teleological model, Rychlak (1994) argues that human beings 
are and can be proven empirically or paradigmatically as teleological organisms: 
 
“When one works with people – seeing their lives through their 
conceptual eyes, struggling with them to help set things straight, looking 
for something better, including the spiritual – it is just plain silly to view 
them as being moved by meaningless impulsion of the billiard-ball 
(efficiently caused) variety. Life is fraught with hopeful aspirations, self-
delusions, plans not carried out, achievements to be proud of, 
misunderstandings, and empathic insights…Another reason…is more 
practical but equally important…modern civilization is facing serious 
ethico-moral cultural problems. Whatever one traces this to – drugs, one-
parent families, lack of rewarding jobs, ethnic prejudice, and so on – the 
fact is that there is…rapidly declining manners, morals, and character 
structures…because human beings are being pictured as machines, it is 
easy to assign fault to the efficient-cause forces that manipulate us into 
what we are. If psychologists are to help in rectifying this human 
degradation, they will first have to change their paradigmatic frame of 
reference. If people are machines…process does not render evaluation 
based on predicating value judgments and then behave for the sake of 
such commitments or lack of them. Teleological aspects of behaviour 
like this do not exist in the machine paradigm”. (Rychlak, 2000, 1131) 
 
Rychlak’s (2000) argument reinforces the view that psychotherapy should not 
accept a palliative ideology in psychology that is based on a mechanistic model. People 
as individuals or participating in political collectives have a purpose to fulfill, and 
psychotherapy is the proper context in which to examine such uniquely human 
characteristics. Thus, unsuccessful attempts in the 20
th century by pragmatism, 
existentialism, and Marxism, to integrate the dichotomy between empiricism and 
rationalism have not really caused the problem in dealing with the “basic stuff” in 
psychotherapy. Instead, these attempts have brought out the very important aspect of 
human action or moral dimension of human understanding. Nevertheless, the main 
epistemological problem is that of conceptualizing ‘causality’ and ‘choice’ when people 
face tough choices and moral dilemmas. They may see themselves as either free to 
decide their own actions or the products of forces beyond their control. These are 
morally related questions of free will and determinism. This is how epistemology 
questions moral philosophy, which is so central to the thought of Socrates, at the 
beginning of Western tradition.  
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Moral Problems in Psychotherapy 
 
The third fundamental philosophical problem of clinical psychology concerns 
the moral character of clinical psychology. However, theoreticians and practitioners 
have questioned whether psychotherapy is a moral undertaking from start to finish 
(Halleck, 1971; London, 1964; Margolis, 1966; Szasz, 1964) – the question of whether 
there can be a morally neutral science of psychopathology and therapy. Theorists as 
diverse as Freud (1933/1965) and Skinner (1974) have argued the nature of morality 
itself and fact-value dichotomy. Differences in value systems of these models face the 
question of ethical relativism versus ethical absolutism and the nature of moral 
reasoning. Moral philosophy naturally leads to social and political philosophy and 
therapy. The moral character of clinical practice and the moral conception of mental 
illness relate to the political character of the practice as well. The question of whether 
the clinician is working for the client or society (personal liberty versus social 
responsibility) becomes an unavoidable issue. There are more challenging questions 
relating to civil commitment like the right to suicide and the use of clinical procedure to 
subdue political opposition. The tasks of moral philosophy is to determine the 
prescriptive principles that should guide human conduct (normative ethics) and explore 
the descriptive nature of moral concepts and judgements (meta-ethics) in relation to 
clinical situations such as rights, duties, responsibility, good and bad, right and wrong, 
just and unjust.  
Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy has greatly influenced rational thinking in 
clinical psychology. His second book, The Critique of Practical Reason, discusses 
morality, human freedom, and the basic beliefs of any rational religion. In Kant’s 
scheme of moral philosophy, rationality is of prime importance. For him, morality is 
essentially a product of practical reason and consists of universal laws, or categorical 
imperatives. Kant rejects both the idea that morality may base its principles securely 
based on human feelings or “sentiments” and the idea that morals may differ from one 
society or one time to another. Morality is rational and objective because it is 
disinterested. A moral rule applies regardless of the interests, power, or stature of 
people to whom it applies. It represents the classic image of Justice as wearing a  
  64 
blindfold, thus being “blind” to individual interests and the identities of the people who 
stand before her.  
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1895) rejects Kant’s practical reason and insists, 
“Every passion has its own quantum of reason” (cited in Solomon, 1984). He 
distinguishes between the “Apollonian” (calm, rational) part of the person and the 
“Dionysian” (passionate) part and emphasizes that both passion and reason are 
necessary for a person. Similarly, Blaise Pascal, (1623-1662) who preceded Kant, de-
emphasized reason and stressed the importance of emotion by saying, “The heart has its 
reasons,” he wrote paradoxically, “which reason may not know” (cited in Solomon, 
1984). Both thinkers acknowledge that emotion involves a kind of rationality. However, 
neither Pascal nor Nietzsche gave guidelines on how to use reasons and emotions in 
applied and clinical settings. Albert Ellis’s (1994) Rational-Emotive therapy and 
Herbert and David Spiegel’s (1978) Apollonian and Dionysian personality in 
hypnotherapy incorporated the idea of reason-and-emotion (only from a cognitive 
perspective) into contemporary formulations of psychotherapy. 
In contemporary philosophy, it is argued that emotions are sometimes irrational. 
For example, a person may fall in love with an evil, malicious person, be angry with the 
wrong person, or fly into rage for very bad reasons. In addition, emotions are very often 
perfectly rational, as when one falls in love with the right person or gets angry with the 
right person at the right time for exactly the right reasons. However, if we can speak of 
“right” and “reasons” already indicates that emotions are be non-rational at all, but 
relatively intelligent human reactions in their own right. In addition, he states that there 
is the view of ethics and the good life as essentially calm and rational, careful and 
cautious calculation of the best means to the right ends, in a world in which things more 
or less “work out right” for most of us. On the other hand, there is the tragic view of 
ethics and the good life as sometimes reckless, passionate devotion to love, or God, or 
the future of society, or the conquest of injustice, which frequently ends in 
disappointment or disaster (Solomon, 1984, 50). 
Once again, such application makes the dialectical cycle of Plato’s ‘principles’ 
and Aristotle’s ‘empiricism’ apparent. In keeping with his universal and absolute 
principles of conduct, Plato’s deontological ethics attempt to preserve the conceptions 
of moral duty. These principles are justified through Kantian rational understanding of 
the ‘good’ or Moore’s (1903) idea of moral intuition. Intrinsic goodness of things 
regardless of consequences supports Kantian categorical imperatives to build  
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deontological theories. Duty tied itself to the idea that people should will only those acts 
that they would be comfortable with other people willing. 
In contrast, Aristotelian moral principles aim to maximize either individual or 
the social group’s happiness or pleasure. Aristotelian approaches emphasize that 
something is good only if it leads to good consequences. Following the footsteps of 
social Darwinism of the 19
th century Skinner’s behaviourism defined good as 
behaviour, which promotes the survival of the species. Skinner argues that values could 
be determined by observing which behaviours get reinforcement. According to Skinner, 
psychologists and social planners should be changing the reinforcement contingencies 
in Western society.  
This popular view in psychology was rejected by many on the grounds of what 
Moore (1873-1958) calls the ‘naturalistic fallacy’, the error of trying to derive an 
‘ought’ from an ‘is’. Moore claims that one cannot bridge the fact-value dichotomy. 
Should or ought to be the case will always be an open to question. Moore also talks 
about defining ethical principles before deciding about them from a meta-ethical 
perspective as well. For him, “good” refers to an irreducible quality of experience that 
people intuitively grasp but share with one another nonetheless. Stevenson (1950), an 
empirical-based ethical naturalist, strongly reacted against Moore by saying that ethical 
statements are not knowledge claims but the reports of what the person feels at a given 
time. This claim about the meaning of goodness and the nature of moral reasoning has 
led many philosophers to defend cognitive rationality as opposed to an emotive one in 
moral argument, although there is agreement about moral terms being not simply 
descriptive of reality (Hare 1963; Bair 1965; Toulmin 1958; and Rawls 1971). They see 
moral claims as prescriptive – prescribing ought to do or ought not to do actions. 
Central to moral reasoning is having ‘good reason’ for a decision and that there are 
criteria that people use to evaluate reasons for actions that go beyond simple subjective 
preferences. Miller (1992) gives an example that if beating children gives more pleasure 
to a group of parents than the amount of pain caused by the beatings to the children, one 
could still ask, “Is it right to beat children?”  
Both the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions have their own objective and 
subjective (relativistic) versions. Utilitarian might lead to a calculus of pleasure and 
pain that would qualify certain action as good or bad independent of the assessor. This 
kind of objective assessment depends on physical or subjective states of all people 
affected by the moral decision. On the other hand, egoistic hedonism would produce a  
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different standard of good for each ego, e.g., ‘If I don’t find pleasure in doing 
something, then it is bad for me; but if you do, then it is good for you.’ The ‘good 
reason’ cognitive rationalist also tends to deny that rational discourse alone can do 
moral reasoning. Hence, subjectivity enters the debate of universal moral reasoning.  
Consequently, different moral philosophies lead clinicians to different 
orientations. Humanistic approaches tend to adopt an intuitive-subjective view of moral 
values such that the individual must decide what is right or good. For example, the 
introspection and self-knowledge process moves the individual towards self-
actualization. Although subjective, self-actualization asserts a universal value; therefore, 
it is not relativistic. Hence, the humanistic view may run the risk of egoistic morality, 
which undermines social institutions. Nonetheless, other approaches risk encouraging 
extreme conformity and even political repression of independent thought or unorthodox 
behaviour in the guise of treatment e.g. the treatment of political dissidents as 
psychiatric cases in the former state of the Soviet Union.  
Problems persist in the morality of each individual, as our unique histories of 
causation from genes and bodies to minds and behaviour will always vary. Secondly, 
when we think about something we interpret it from various points of view. Our 
habitual tendency to associate one idea with another is also unpredictable. Even if our 
beliefs and habits reflect high rationality, the predictability of our actions still depends 
on our abilities and opportunities. We change according to constantly changing 
environment that influences our open system. So long as our powers of observations are 
limited and our capacity for concentration is finite, what goes on in and around us in 
ways that are difficult to anticipate shall continue to affect us (Fetzer, 1991). Our 
fixated desire for predictability runs into trouble when probabilistic causation has the 
effect of probabilistic outcome in behaviour. In addition, our almost total and single 
reliance on rationality for moral criticism has led us to divisions, dilemmas, and 
confusion. 
Dichotomies are aspects of consciousness, the task of which is to differentiate. 
Choices made by humans always involve moral judgment. Thus, a clinician or client 
may choose a particular theory and therapy but competing attractions from many 
theories and therapies distract them from making ‘right’ choices. Dilemma and 
confusion invariably occur when we have to make choices. Attraction to and rejection 
of therapies are responses to how much the chooser likes or dislikes certain features of 
the approach. The decision to follow through with a therapy depends on the emotional  
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desire of the person in a particular context. The strength of his desires may attract one 
approach and avoid another. These desires embody craving for and aversion against an 
idea, object, or action. Since perception and emotional desires depend on concept 
formation about the world and the way we develop knowledge, the moral concepts of 
good and bad or right and wrong evolves with the lived experience of the person. In 
attempting to process these issues, humans seek a foundation or standard to build on, to 
measure against, or to make judgment about the world they live in. This search for an 
eternal base of everything including existence itself that leads us to another cycle of 
dilemma and decision.  
Another problem with the rational search for a standard is the issue of 
subjectivity in psychotherapy where both client and therapist construct meaning. The 
question arises whether the presence of their meanings inhibits the scientific study of 
psychotherapy process and its outcome measurement. As mentioned in chapter 1, it has 
become increasingly popular with postmodern therapists to characterize psychotherapy 
in terms of meaning. Some see meaning as an obstacle to scientific studies because the 
traditional methods of science are not suitable to deal with the meanings and values that 
constitute “the basic stuff” of psychotherapy (Frank, 1991). In addition, the truth-value 
of a client’s interpretation is questioned (because the client's symptoms mean 
"irrational" to the therapist) while privileging therapist’s interpretation as appropriate, 
correct and objective.  
However, the truth or falsity of the causal belief is independent of what the 
client, therapist or anyone else believes, argues Erwin (2000). The client’s meanings by 
themselves do not pose any serious problem or create a difficulty for studying 
psychotherapy processes and outcomes in an objective scientific manner (Erwin, 2000, 
1134). One could that the correctness of the client’s interpretation is not clinically 
important. However, it is necessary to distinguish between a clinical point and an 
epistemological one. The therapist may believe that insight is important for a cure. 
Whether the client needs insight to cure his condition is an empirical question. Whether 
encouraging the client to accept the therapist’s unproven beliefs that will help or harm 
him, in the end, is also an empirical question, and scientific methods can investigate 
both questions. Postmodernist psychotherapy literature, however, objects to such 
objectivism which holds that the warranting of a proposition is logically independent of 
whether anyone believes it to be true or warranted (Gergen 1985; Polkinghorne, 1992). 
A softer view argues that the warrant comes down to intersubjective agreement or  
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“solidarity” (Rorty, 1991) in the community. In fact, both views do not concern 
themselves with meaning in psychotherapy. For instance, psychoanalysis exemplifies 
the common error of evidential standards, because the psychoanalytic community 
believes in outcome hypothesis without running controlled studies (Bachrach et al., 
1991, 873). 
Postmodernist philosophical and psychotherapy literature suffers the critique of 
failure to undermine an objectivist type of epistemology (Erwin, 1997, 1999a; Held, 
1995). Erwin (2000) holds that the client’s meaning and interpretation do not cause 
problems for an objective study or lack a truth-value, but the postmodernists’ notion of 
interpretation that poses the problem. The postmodernists are confused between causal 
interpretation and evaluative interpretations. Similar to the point stated earlier when 
discussing the confusion between theory and method in construing causation, the 
distinction here is that clients not only make causal interpretations of what happened to 
them, but they also interpret (e-valu-ate) some life experiences as good and others as 
bad. Such interpretation intricately interweaves with moral values, ethical feelings, and 
self-esteem. Moreover, the role values play in originating and maintaining the client’s 
problem entangles with the therapist’s causal theorizing that interferes with empirical 
investigations. Values are accessible to objective study of psychotherapy processes and 
outcome with solvable minor practical problems. For example, a problem-drinker may 
decide to become a moderate drinker, whereas the therapist may see this as an 
unrealistic goal.  
Erwin (2000) offers a ‘theory of defective desire’ for objective study of values as 
outcome. His model proposes a common value without having to appeal to various 
outcomes desired by schools of psychotherapy as intrinsically or extrinsically good. 
What the client desires takes the position of intrinsic desire, argues Erwin, while other 
desires represent instrumental desires. A desire becomes defective when its fulfillment 
provides no or little benefit to the client. By contrast, the outcome of a non-defective 
desire benefits the client. For example, if a client wants to be free from a severe 
depression and if no known reason exists to think the desire as defective, then one can 
believe that eliminating the depression will be beneficial to him. In contrast, if he wants 
to have a lower score on a test for depression out of the mistaken belief that such a 
result will coincide with a reduction in his depression, then that result will probably not 
benefit him. However, when these principles are applied they need to be judged by 
whether what the client desires is good or bad. Ultimately, says Erwin (2000), one must  
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appeal to the intuition of the client. He argues that if one were to strip ultimate appeals 
to people’s intuitions about their own welfare of “proven value”, and assuming there 
were no other way to warrant “evaluations of therapeutic outcomes”, then organic 
medicine would also have a serious problem. For example, it is good for someone to be 
cured of cancer and to be freed from excruciating pain. If we reject our intuition to 
value, psychotherapy can never aspire to become an evidence-based discipline; neither 
can organic medicine for the same reason. Hence, neither the problem posed by clients’ 
meanings nor the problem of evaluating therapeutic outcomes prevents the development 
of an evidence-based psychotherapy.  
This is in line with Theravada emphasis on ethical behaviours (sila) as part of 
the Buddhist tripartite practice, namely, sila, samadhi (absorptive stillness) and panna 
(reflective analysis and understanding).  
The following section briefly outlines how each school of psychotherapy deals 
with their metaphysical, epistemological, and moral problems in therapy. Although the 
narratives of each school reveal its own approach in dealing with these philosophical 
issues, none of them works with these problems in an integrated manner. The Buddhists 
see these issues as interdependent problems needing interdependent solution. Put simply 
in practical terms, these issues boil down to meaning making activities to uphold self-
integrity (personal meaning) and social responsibility (shared meaning) within the 
context of self-other-environment matrix. However, Western therapies split away from 
external authority of religion by emulating rational analysis of physical science to 
develop individualism, which emphasizes the virtues of independence and self-
authority, which seemingly free itself from government regulation in the pursuit of 
economic or social goals that take precedence over the interests of the state or social 
group. Obvious pitfalls of individualistic psychotherapies are that they ignore the needs 
of others and environment. Specifically, rational analytic therapies cannot produce 
formulas to treat unique evaluative meaning of each individual unless shared meaning 
or ethic of social group is systematically inculcated within the treatment regimen. 
Current psychotherapies concentrate on an internally focused private individual or 
family who feels alienated, empty, and lonely. The individual or the family does not feel 
genuinely connected with others in the community or with the environment. 
Objectification of emotions by rational analysis turns valued feelings into commodities 
one can manipulate and exchange with others to gain short-term satisfaction, just like  
  70 
“retail therapy” (shopping) to overcome depression. Such phenomena may be gleaned 
as we review various schools of psychotherapy below.  
 
Problems with Behavioural and Cognitive-Behavioural 
Approaches 
 
Most behavioural approaches fall within the scope of classical (Pavlov), operant 
(Skinner,) and cognitive learning principles (Bandura, 1969). Behavioural approaches to 
psychotherapy are guided by scientific conceptions of and research into human 
behaviour, commonly known as methodological behaviourism. However, Skinner’s 
radical behaviourism differs from methodological behaviourism in the sense that it 
views mental terms such as choosing, deciding, thinking, perceiving, wishing, feeling, 
and wanting as either shorthand for complex behaviour-environment interactions or 
labels for physiological processes that go on under the skin. Behaviourism is an 
alternative language or objectifying system that permits the behaviourist to say what is 
really meant and thus avoid the traps set by ordinary talk about the mind. It assumes that 
all psychological phenomena are determined and can be explained by laws of 
behaviour.  
Skinner believes mental events are epiphenomena that have no causal impact on 
behaviour. He denies that his position is a metaphysical one of reductive materialism 
that is he has never addressed the question whether mental events are distinct from 
physical ones. Skinner maintains that a scientific psychology must not and need not 
address mental events as long as it understands the contingencies of reinforcement. 
Skinner argues that what psychologists mean by mentalistic terms is really something 
about behaviour, and so the mental as separate realm of reality is unnecessary. 
Particularly when a psychologist tries to explain behaviour, that is, to give a causal 
explanation of behaviour, he must adhere to, Skinner believes, the conceptual 
framework of natural science and become fully integrated with biology.  
Epistemology or philosophy of science of Skinnerian Behaviourism is a 
knowledge that permits the prediction and control of behaviour. Because it is more 
objectivist than modern physics, Mahoney (1989) labels radical behaviourism scientistic 
rather than scientific. He finds methodological behaviourists more tolerant and 
accepting of non-experimental quantitative (correlational) research than the Skinnerians.     
  71 
Woolfolk and Richardson (1984) argue that behaviour therapy typifies what 
Habermas (1971) and Gadamer (1976) find most objectionable in modern culture. That 
is, a preference for technological solutions, overemphasis and dependence on rationality 
and amoral theorising. Values are not the business of science. Behavioural ideology is 
consistent with the ideology of individualism central to liberal Western democracies, 
which cannot confront the loss of community, meaning and purpose in life.  
Moral implications of behaviour therapy, after Skinner, are of ethical relativism. 
To avoid such a situation, Skinner re-issued the definition of “good” as that which 
promotes survival of the species or culture. Kitchener (1980a, 1980b) argues that such 
an ethic still has to decide what kind of society one thinks ought to survive. Because 
therapists are authorised to direct and control the therapy process, behaviour therapy can 
become self-serving and bolster the social-political status quo (Halleck, 1971). 
Although behavioural therapy and cognitive-behavioural approaches have a salutary 
effect on intellectually handicapped persons and dispossessed mental patients, its 
ambiguous ethical values are likely to support the prevailing values of the therapist’s 
culture, leaving the ethical dilemmas unresolved. Ellis’ philosophy of cure promotes 
two distinctive elements of antireligious hedonism consistent with “analytical attitude 
of modern therapies and detachment from the lottery of love and fortune that resembles 
the Stoic ideal of freedom from destructive passions in a life lived in accordance with 
nature” (Richardson et al, 1999, 68). However, Ellis’ version of detachment does not 
orient the person towards higher ethical realities.   
In sum, behavioural therapies in general do not directly deal with the ontology 
of desires, nor do they consistently integrate such ontology with moral and 
epistemological theories. It is evident without the need for further elaboration that 
behavioural approaches centrally focus on the removal or management of maladaptive 
behaviours or irrational cognitions. Unlike Buddhism, behavioural therapies do not 
place desires as causal conditions or ethical choice and valued personal meaning as the 
knowledge for change and freedom that are central to survival of the species and the 
culture.  
 
Problems with Humanistic-Existential Approaches 
 
Humanistic approaches base their therapy on Husserlian phenomenology of 
human experience, which holds the status of ontological existence. Again, theory of  
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phenomenology has been misconstrued as a method of research instead of a method of 
discovering preconditions conducive to psychological analysis (Jennings, 1986). 
Rogers’ analysis of the conditions of growth in therapy and the related work of Gendlin 
(1962) come closest to the Husserlian phenomenology. Roger’s client-centred theory 
focuses on individualism and defends its master value of self-actualization as fostering 
expression of the naturalistic prompting of an “organismic valuing process” (Rogers, 
1951).  
The problem with existential-phenomenological or humanistic approaches is 
their extreme position of non-determinism – human behaviour is not determined by the 
forces beyond its control. Although these approaches come from diverse philosophical 
schools, they share the legitimacy of introspective, empathic and intuitive knowledge, a 
deep concern with dehumanising technology and science. Symptoms are seen as a result 
of the individual living an inauthentic life of avoidance in dealing with anxiety, death 
and the responsibilities of choice in life. Humanistic approaches view relationship itself 
as the curative factor (May, 1979). The problem with this approach lies in the difficulty 
of verifying the empathic knowing of other people to the knowledge of others through 
observation and experiment. This is the ultimate problem of clinical knowledge. Carl 
Rogers’ solution was, like Michael Polanyi’s tacit knowledge, to collapse subjective 
and objective forms of knowing into one category of experience. Although Rogers’ 
attempt to reconcile phenomenological psychology with Skinner’s behaviourism on 
personality and psychotherapy (Wann, 1964), such an attempt has been criticised as 
neither possible nor desirable (Day, 1969). Rychlak (1961, 1981) argues that they are 
founded on opposing Lockian versus Kantian epistemologies and therefore are 
supplementary, while making reference to Aristotle’s four causations discussed earlier. 
Rychlack insists that psychologists cannot avoid the metaphysical and epistemological 
issues that divide psychology; otherwise, it will take away the psychological reality of 
human purpose and freedom.  
Humanists also argue on ethical and moral grounds as well.  In particular, 
existentialist like Yalom (1980) and social constructionist Gergen (1985) argue from 
moral relativism perspective. May, in opposition to Rogers’ positive growth potential, 
prefers a dynamic bipolar conceptualisation called daimonic in human nature i.e. the 
urge to affirm, assert, perpetuate and increase oneself. May objects to assigning etiology 
of evil to cultural factors, because it is people who create their own cultures. May 
suggests that Rogers inhibits the healthy independent expression in his clients by not  
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attending sufficiently to their aggressive, hateful, evil, feelings. Rogers acknowledges 
May’s suggestion. However, he insists that moral failure originates in social conditions. 
Unless people choose to eliminate evil, there is no solution. It seems apparent that there 
are internal tensions within and between Humanistic-Existential approaches. However, 
humanistic approaches gain more acceptances from public readership than from the 
scientific community.  
Thus, Humanistic-Existential approaches, unlike Behavioural views, take on 
extreme positions of non-deterministic humanism. While this stance creates an 
appealing status of free will and moral choices, it overlooks the unavoidable influence 
of the law of nature. Such a stance leads us to an absolute power position of self-
authority and control.  
 
Problems with Psychoanalytic Approaches 
 
The problem with psychoanalytic approaches began with Freud, who denied that 
psychoanalytic theory was value-laden. He insisted on psychic reality as being 
determined by causal forces and the laws of psychic functioning could be formulated 
and tested on the couch in much the same way as in a laboratory. Freud identified 
psychoanalysis with physical sciences and claimed it to be a value-neutral deterministic 
science, which was his major metaphysical problem. His dualistic theory of physical 
and psychic realities is linked by unconscious instincts, although how the physical 
becomes mental is still a mystery. The unconscious, which is the source of wishes, 
hopes and desires, is a purposeful force closely linked to the deterministic forces of 
natural sciences. However, the goal of psychoanalysis is to give freedom to people, to 
make choices rationally and to be free of irrational forces dominating their lives. 
Freud’s message is the doctrine of maturity through analytical attitude. He rejects 
religion as being part of cosmic order. Ego is considered as the seat of reason maturing 
out of being hammered in by a higher authority. As the maturity grows, ego as a 
manager of psyche gains prudently rational control over emotions. Again, this is based 
on idea of autonomous self or individualism. His successors like Jung, Adler, Otto 
Rank, Fromm, Kohut and Schafer also based their writings on self psychology of the 
individual. Clinically, Freud and psychoanalytic approaches head towards free will 
while their metatheses or metapsychologies are clearly deterministic.  
As for being a scientific method, psychoanalysis epistemology does not permit a  
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disconfirmation test of a scientific theory, because anything one says can be counted as 
supporting it. Popper (1959) argues that when one says, “I hate you”, it proves the basic 
aggressive drive, but if one says, “I don’t hate you”; it proves that the basic aggressive 
drive is so strong that one has to defend against or deny it. Moreover, Grunbaum (1984) 
critically examines Freud’s epistemological and logical positions and concludes that 
although Freud’s theories are testable by scientific hypotheses his research methods are 
systematically biased and unreliable (for a detailed, sustained and in-depth examination, 
see Grunbaum, 1984).  
In making meaning and interpretation, Habermas and Ricoeur have both 
declared Freud’s work to be consistent with, if not an exemplar of, hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur (1977) argues that Freud presented a mixed model of human motivation using 
both material and final causation, as in Aristotle’s four causations, which are necessary 
to build a theory of neurosis where the person in the self-alienated state of neurosis is 
reduced to a thing. On the other hand, interpretation by the analyst in psychoanalysis 
significantly differs from client’s meaning-making being advocated in the present study. 
Jean Laplanche (1996) argues that psychoanalysis is anti-hermeneutic. Laplanche 
succinctly defines hermeneutics as the reception, transposition or reading (of a text, a 
destiny, a Dasein), a process of reading clearly based on a prior pre-comprehension or 
proto-comprehension. Because psychoanalysis is based on replacing a missing link in 
the associative-dissociative chain, instead of a reconstructive synthesis, it is anti-
hermeneutic (for a detailed argument, see Laplanche, 1996). 
With regard to dealing with moral problems, self is considered as a moral agent. 
Chessick (1977) argues that an existential variant of psychoanalysis draws a parallel 
between Kant’s theories of the self and Kohut’s (1971) self-psychology. In the latter’s 
development, the self becomes a moral agent capable of initiating action, free from the 
determining forces alluded to by Freud. For Kohut, the self is a source of freedom, 
choice and responsibility. Kohut confirms the notion of individuation and independence 
through maturity and analytical rationality. In addition, Erickson (1963; 1976) 
reinforces the view of the liberal Western moral tradition emphasising that the power of 
human rationality increases the respect for the individual, lessens human suffering and 
encourages human freedom. This was the reason why psychoanalysis was not allowed 
in Nazi Germany, Communist Russia or the Eastern European bloc.  
Margolis (1966), who declares psychotherapy is a moral enterprise, argues that 
although psychoanalytic procedure may prohibit the therapist from moralising or giving  
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moral direction to the client, it does not distract itself from the moral context or impact 
of its theory.  
This is true with Fromm (1941) who considered interpersonal psychoanalysis to 
be promoting human freedom and relatedness. He does not see psychoanalysis not only 
as a technical set of procedures but committed to values as well. In addition, Alfred 
Adler’s notion of “social interest” as a transcendent goal and felt sense of the unity of 
all humanity is a self-conscious attempt to transcend aspects of modern individualism 
and reconnect with elements of a traditional sense of life. Similarly, Jung’s 
“individuation” endeavours to reach a condition of balance between ego and shadow 
within a larger Self grounded in timeless archetypes.  
However, Lacanian analysts usually hold the opposite view; that one should aim 
to increase one’s capacity to withstand the ambiguity, contradiction, and discontinuity. 
Thus, psychoanalysis approaches in general do not have a consistent view on dealing 
with metaphysical, epistemological and moral problems in an integrated manner.   
    
Problems with Systems Approaches 
 
General system theory is an attempt to unify the sciences by showing their 
interactions and finding a common language or set of concepts to describe disparate 
phenomena, a goal that is not very different from the early Vienna Circle. Adherents to 
systems theory approaches are, amongst others, the practitioners of social psychology, 
social psychiatry, social work, community psychology, clinical psychology and family 
therapy.  
Bateson’s (1972) work represents therapeutic application of systems theory. He 
collapses the issues of ontology and epistemology. Bateson argues that the way people 
construe reality becomes their reality. What people believe to be true and what is true 
are identical for humans. Bateson believes that incorrect ways of construing reality 
(epistemological error) lead to personal problems such as alcoholism and schizophrenia. 
However, this is problematic, as Bateson seems to be saying that reality is subjective, 
but his theory permits him to distinguish correct from incorrect views of that reality. 
Thus, epistemology is not only a basis for the discipline to define itself but also for each 
individual to define oneself. Although he rejects dualistic thinking on the mind-body 
question, systems theory is clearly deterministic in assuming that specific explanatory 
principles will be found that make the behaviour completely predictable. Bateson uses  
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the metaphor of the toilet flushing system to explain his theory, which works on the 
homeostasis of re-balance. However, human mind, unlike material imbalance, does not 
re-store itself to the previous state once affected by conflict or trauma. Instead, it moves 
on to another level that may spiral upward or downward in time depending on 
conditions. As state earlier, this is identified by British Biologist Waddington (1968) as 
“homeorhesis”.  
From a hermeneutics perspective, the moral implications of Bateson’s family 
systems theory lead to an extreme conformist or authoritarian form of clinical 
intervention. Erickson (1988) argues that Bateson’s system does not sufficiently address 
the clinical problems of domestic violence, child abuse and social inequality by 
avoiding assigning responsibility for these problems to individuals in the society, 
meaning that it is a conservative political ideology. Erickson believes that the moral 
consequences of the theory are more important than metaphysical speculation on the 
nature of ultimate reality.   
By insisting that all members of a social group be defined as part of a problem 
rather than blaming the weaker members or the victim, systems theory seems to endorse 
a social justice agenda for psychology. However, it seeks a mechanistic explanation of 
human behaviour and quantitative methodology; hence, it is likely to be identified with 
more conservative, repressive, moral and political agendas, which parallels with 
cognitive-behavioural approaches. Thus, the moral responsibility of the therapy based 
on the fact-value dichotomy will fall entirely upon the shoulder of the individual 
clinicians. 
 
Problems with Biological Approaches 
 
Increasingly, biological approaches have become popular in clinical practice 
since the advent of cognitive neuroscience and the split-brain research (Gazzaniga, 
1988). However, the scientific biological approach to clinical research and practice does 
not consider philosophical discourse as a useful exercise. Rudnick (1990) concludes that 
the biological psychiatry that has simplistically adopted a mechanistic conception from 
biology, which in turn borrowed it from the physico-chemical sciences, is not relevant 
to the psychobiological domain. Hence, biological psychiatry commits the fallacy of 
uncovering the necessary but not sufficient conditions of psychological disturbances i.e. 
biochemical disturbances. Thus, biological psychiatry follows the goals of biochemistry  
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and physiology, not its own true goals of psychobiology.  
Szasz (1960) argued that behaviour that is problematic for the clinician or client 
is labelled mental illness, which is an expression of conflicting moral values. Socially 
inappropriate or disturbing behaviour is a moral condition. A word’s use is its meaning, 
therefore “mental illness” means a “problem with living”, not a biological disorder or 
disease. To reduce this into a physiological disorder or illness is a logical error of 
turning “ought” into “is”, thus violating Moore’s (1903) fact-value distinction. By 
medicalizing the problem, psychiatry and clinical psychology not only avoid 
philosophical discourse, but also respond amorally to a moral dilemma that has the net 
effect of preserving the status quo. The biological approaches accumulate biological 
correlates as a philosophical argument for its own interpretation. 
In contrast, Kety (1974) identifies the antipsychiatry movement with 
prescientific thinking. In the 19
th century, the general paresis of insanity caused by 
syphilitic infection was thought of as a moral condition and the search for a physical 
cause was considered misguided by many intellectuals. Kety sidesteps Szasz’s point 
that the primary meaning of most psychiatric terms is a moral one.  
In 1985, Schacht and Spitzer engaged in a spirited debate as to whether the 3
rd 
edition of the Diagnosis and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM-III) was a 
diagnostic manual or a moral legislation with significant political content and 
implications. Spitzer, as a chairperson of the American Psychiatric Association 
committee responsible for the DSM-III, maintained that it was both a scientific and a 
political document. As a clinical psychologist, Schacht argued that the political and 
scientific use of the DSM-III was inseparable. Therefore, political and moral elements 
must be admitted to clinical theory in practice and issues discussed openly. 
Although a neutral monist like Karl Pribram (1971) argues that mental versus 
physical dichotomy breaks down at the subatomic level of quantum physics, the 
biological position suggests a neopositivist position of identical thesis (Feigl, 1967), i.e. 
that the mind and brain are really identical. Critics of the biological position depend on 
the hermeneutical view that facts and values are inseparably fused. Some biological 
schools define that the goals of therapy or mental health in terms of average biological 
functioning such as blood levels of norepinephrine and dopamine. Paradoxically, this 
invites a fusion of fact and values, paralleling naturalization (value-neutral) of ethics of 
behavioural psychologists and biological psychiatrists whose epistemology and 
metaphysics lean toward materialism, determinism, and empiricism.   
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A Buddhist Alternative – Theravada Treatment 
 
The Buddhist approach offers an alternative to extreme positions of liberal 
individualism and ego as the seat of reason that establishes moral authority as it matures 
and drives out irrational desires from one’s psyche. In fact, the Buddha dealt with the 
“basic stuff” of experience and suffering. He did not construct foundational theories on 
metaphysics. He remained silent on certain metaphysical questions on the grounds of 
not being conducive to liberation and responded to other questions with explicit 
explanations and with Socratic style questioning. He, however, did answer later in other 
suttas in response to questions by his attendant Ananda. In the Sangarava sutta there is 
a reference to three groups of thinkers: the traditionalists (anussavaka), the rationalists 
and metaphysicians (takki vimamsi) and the experientialists (dhammam abhinnaya) who 
have personal experience of higher knowledge and the Buddha says that he belongs to 
the third group (MN 100).  
Like existentialists, he was only interested in how one should live instead of 
how one can know.  His approach is pragmatic, contextual, and experiential. His well-
known statement is that he teaches only one thing and one thing alone, that is, suffering 
and the cessation of suffering. He taught only discourses and conditional codes of 
conduct to enhance the spiritual practice for the community of monks, nuns and lay 
practitioners. Only after his death, his disciples who are referred to as the “Theravadins” 
or "Early Buddhists", systematized his teachings into a third collection called 
Abhidhamma (Pali, lit. Higher Doctrine), which is a unique synthesis of Buddha’s 
philosophy, psychology and ethics.    
The Buddha teaches the metaphysical problems of mind-body, consciousness, 
and reality as interdependently arisen transitory phenomena. When conditions come 
together a phenomenon exists and when they do not it does not. When the body (rupa) 
experiences sensations or feelings (vedana) from within or without, perceptual 
discrimination (sanna) occurs through which concepts (sankhara) are formed and 
conscious (vinnana) mind is established. These conditions are known as the Five 
Groups of Grasping (Pancakhandhas). When one condition is present ‘other conditions’ 
are also present; if one condition is missing consciousness ‘as we know it’ is absent;  
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they arise simultaneously as well as successively in an interdependent fashion by 
reinforcing back and forth to give birth to a conscious phenomenon. They are not based 
on physical or psychological entities or substances, but are constantly changing 
networks of “rhizomes” (to borrow Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor) that proliferates 
phenomena after phenomena. Hence, they are not an enduring essence, pure form, or 
abstract reality, neither are they static concrete, inert material without life. The 
continuing flow of consciousness gives us the illusion of a permanent agency. Buddha 
as a ‘psychotherapist’ never developed a personality theory or classification of 
psychopathology, although people he had helped fit into Western psychiatric 
nomenclature (Poi, 1988). This lack of fixed developmental theories and classification 
of symptoms may be interpreted as part of cultural practice of the time. On the other 
hand, it may be viewed that the Buddha has the wisdom to know the uniqueness and 
complexity of how each human being creates his own psychology of suffering. 
As regards epistemology, Buddha embraced both styles of what the Western 
tradition would regard as Aristotelian sense perception (feeling) as well as the Platonic 
reflection (thinking) as factors leading to the interdependent arising of wise 
understanding as opposed to explanatory knowledge. In fact, Buddhist meditation is the 
focused watchfulness on the specious present (Abe, 1985) moment by ‘bracketing’ 
(Husserl, 1931) the experience of becoming (bhava) – the relationship between the 
mind and physical world until the limit of logic is understood. As his method of 
meditation enables him to see [Heidegger’s notion of] “being, nothingness, dread, death, 
etc. as they are”, Buddha is not avoidant of conceptualising their causality. He sees 
suffering as the result of the final (intentional) causation, but not caused by the 
confusion of being caught up in language games (Wittgenstein, 1965) of asking the 
wrong question or conceptual error alone, but by the proliferation of morally 
unwholesome emotions. Suffering can only be overcome by practicing wholesome 
moral behaviour together with meditation to release the metaphysical illusion of eternal 
existence and the skilful exercise of epistemological understanding. Thus, the Buddhist 
approach, unlike psychoanalysis for example, takes a clue from suffering as a turning 
point to change the tragic plot of a confused life into a romantic plot of freedom to life. 
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, through an overwhelming desire to be rational and scientific, 
psychotherapy’s emulation of Newtonian mechanics and efficient causation embedded 
in the scientist-practitioner model of psychotherapy has turned the discipline into a state 
with a psychotic split. Psychotherapy has become confused in thinking that the theory 
(conceptual rationality) and the rational method (through empirical data) of experiment 
to prove the theory are the same. Believing that philosophy has nothing to contribute to 
practice-oriented psychology, psychotherapy withdraws itself from philosophical 
dialogue. Consequently, it violates its own cherished value of helping clients choose 
according to their own free will. Instead, determinism has dominated the practice of 
psychotherapy through a strategic manipulation of clients’ thoughts and feelings 
believing that they are predictable mechanisms and it is the right and proper thing to do 
for the client’s own good.  
These ‘desires’ and ‘confusions’ have driven psychotherapy further away from 
dealing with metaphysical issues of reality in human perception. The desires and 
confusions also blind epistemological issues of how the knowledge of existence and 
concepts like the self, including psychotherapy as an agency, which always involves the 
other and the environment (both natural and contextual) may be understood. Moreover, 
they reject how to study empirically the moral issues of emotional values and moral 
reasoning.  
These delusions and withdrawal originate from an over-dependence on linguistic 
rationality that the physical sciences can afford to use in describing and explaining from 
a third person perspective. However, in psychotherapy, both therapist and client are 
interpretive beings (Taylor, 1964, 1985a; 1985b) and they need to know “where each of 
them is coming from”, in order to appreciate the first person perspective of experience.  
In addition, dialectic thinking in Western tradition leads to a binary theorizing. 
Most psychotherapists, even the like of Carl Rogers, are inclined to think that ‘tension’ 
between binary opposites is necessary for a creative solution. In reality, when multiple 
tensions arise simultaneously, clients are no longer creative, but become distraught 
because tension does not serve as a sufficient condition for creative solution. Similarly, 
psychotherapy cannot resolve its own tension between free will and determinism and 
yet it pretends to be value-free. Margolis (1989) who examines the issues of whether or  
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not psychotherapy is value-neutral finds that psychotherapy is a moral enterprise in two 
senses: as a professional practice, like any practice, it can be held up to moral review; as 
a moral enterprise, psychotherapy brings one potentially into conflict with community 
standards of morality. The problems that psychotherapy addresses are of a moral nature 
e.g. intra and interpersonal conflict, parental and marital responsibilities, sexual 
conduct, and so on. Psychotherapy's “ivory tower” stance splits itself from being in 
touch with “market place” peoples’ desires and values. Thus, psychotherapy loses its 
groundedness by thinking that it can treat human suffering without having to deal with 
the metaphysical existence of man who faces problems in dealing with his conceptual 
knowledge and moral emotions. In the next chapter, I shall use the Buddhist theory of 
Interdependent Arising and Theory of Conditional Relations to argue that every 
phenomenon is interdependently arisen from relevant conditions or relationships. When 
those causes and conditions do not come together, the phenomenon no longer exists. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Buddhist Theory of Interdependent 
Arising and Conditional Relations 
 
This chapter argues that believing in independence of any phenomenon and 
enduring self-authority is an illusion that splits us away from the existence of 
interdependent ecology of the self-other-environment matrix. Self-consciousness for the 
Buddhists is only one of the five groups of grasping or the five aggregates 
(pancakhandhas) that come together and emerge into conscious thinking self though it 
is a transient psychophysical personality. When any of the other four conditions are 
absent, the self as we know it is no longer present. When all five conditions co-arise, the 
phenomenon of personality re-emerges. In other words, when these conditions do not 
come together there is no self. However, this does not mean that there is nobody. The 
Buddha explains how the self forms, how it functions, and how it ends in what he calls 
“Interdependent Arising” or “Dependent Origination” (paticcasamuppada)
14. For him, 
"conditioned states" or phenomena (dhamma) arise dependent on other conditions. 
These conditions are the states that are efficacious in causing other states; they mutually 
co-condition one another, thus the conditioned states also represent or relate to the 
category of conditioning states. Bohm (1971) states that in order to deal with the 
problems raised by our inability to know all of the significant causal factors a 
distinction between immediate causes and conditions or background causes has evolved. 
For example, one might say that fertile soil and plenty of rainfall provide the general 
conditions or background needed for the growth of good of good crops. However, the 
immediate cause would be the planting of the appropriate seeds. The distinction 
between background and immediate causes and conditions, is, however, an abstraction 
useful for analyses but not strictly correct. 
For the Buddha, the conditioning states and the conditioned states link one 
another through the conditional energy or motivators in psychological terms or in 
Buddhist vocabulary "Forces of Conditional Relations" (paccaya)
15.   
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For the sake of clarity, this chapter presents the principle of Interdependent 
Arising and the Forces of Conditional Relations as two theories of viewing co-
conditionality. The former sets down a series of cause-effect relationship of twelve 
conditions
16 as links in mutual dependence to form a circle – the wheel of life. It 
describes the simple explanation of a certain state as being dependent on some other 
state. The Theory of Conditional Relations examines all relevant conditions or 
relationships or precise circumstances and forces that to produce the final phenomenon. 
This is a many-to-one relation. It discusses the specific causal efficacy of the conditions. 
Here, a combined exposition of both methods is necessary to demonstrate the 
Aristotelian notion of final causation of reciprocal conditions as opposed to efficient 
causation of a sequential nature, like the sinking of billiard balls. To illustrate the 
linkage between Buddhist psychology and its psychotherapeutic counterpart, this 
chapter outlines the Buddhist doctrines of Interdependent Arising and Conditional 
Relations and discusses its implication for psychotherapy with examples and 
interpretations.  
 
The Theory of Interdependent Arising 
(paticcasamuppada) 
 
The term “interdependent arising” is a Pali compound of paticca, meaning 
dependent on, and samuppada, arising, origination. However, there are other renderings 
such as “conditioned co-genesis” and “dependent co-arising”. The prefix ‘inter’ often 
conjures up the idea of ‘in between’ things or dynamic states, which is a more fitting 
concept. Therefore, I have chosen the term “interdependent arising”. The Principle of  
Interdependent Arising is central to Buddhist teachings. In numerous passages of the 
whole Pali Canon, the Buddha describes it as a natural law, a fundamental truth that 
exists independently of the arising of enlightened beings. The Buddha highlights that 
someone who understands “interdependent arising” has understood his teaching, and 
vice versa. 
Shortly after his enlightenment, the Buddha reflected and was reluctant to teach 
the principle of interdependent arising because of its complexity. The Scriptures state: 
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 Monks, the thought arose in me thus: ‘This truth which I have realized is 
profound, difficult to see, abstruse, calming, subtle, and not attainable 
through mere sophisticated logic. However, beings revel in attachment, 
take pleasure in attachment, and delight in attachment. For beings who 
thus revel, take pleasure, and delight in attachment, this is an extremely 
difficult thing to see: that is, law of conditionality, the principle of 
Interdependent Arising. Moreover, this also is an extremely difficult 
thing to see: the calming of all conditioning, the casting off all clinging, 
the abandoning of desire, dispassion, cessation, nibbana. If I were to 
give this teaching and my words were not understood, that would simply 
make for weariness and difficulty. (MN 26) 
  
 
This passage contains two teachings, the principle of Interdependent Arising and 
its cessation, Nibbana, stressing both their profundity and their importance within the 
Buddha’s concepts of enlightenment and teaching. Buddha states clearly that this is 
beyond words, ‘logos’, or rationality. This goes against the causation and cessation of 
suffering in the Western philosophical tradition based on conceptual reasoning 
(Hagberg, 2003).  
The principle of Interdependent Arising explains the causation and cessation of 
suffering at two levels. The first level describes the general principle, and the second 
specifies constituent conditions linked together in a chain.  
The Buddha exemplifies causation as a forward process of arising and cessation 
as backwards process of extinction. The forward process represents the second of The 
Four Noble Truths - the cause of suffering (dukkha samudaya) and the backwards 
process represents The Third Noble Truth - the cessation of suffering (dukkha nirodha). 
In the Samyutta Nikaya, the general principle of Interdependent Arising is 
explained thus: 
 
 
When this exists, that comes to be;  
With the arising of this, that arises;  
When this does not exist, that does not come to be;  
With the cessation of this, that ceases. (SN III 21; IV 37) 
   
  
 
This verse summarizes the conditional existence, arising, and cessation of all 
phenomena. The Buddha’s usage of demonstrative pronouns like “this” and “that”  
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avoids absolutism and represents transitoriness that refers to a present or a just 
happened event, action or time. Kalupahana (1999) has elaborately compared such 
usage by the Buddha and modern philosophers of language and science (67-71). The 
principle of Interdependent Arising is a complex subject that can be discussed from 
various perspectives and interpretations. As there are, exegeses and commentaries 
devoted exclusively to the subject, e.g.  Nanavira, (1987); Sumana, (1998); Daing, 
(1996).  
The present discussion will focus only on certain aspects relevant to 
psychotherapy. Govinda (1969) explains the principle of Interdependent Arising with 
clarity: “… our desire is in conflict with the laws of existence, and as we are not able to 
change these laws, the only thing that remains is to change our desire (53)”. He alludes 
to centripetal (contraction) and centrifugal (expansion) tendencies in life and nature. 
The former means unification or centralization and the latter differentiation or growth. 
If differential growth prevails over central unity, it results in disorganization, 
disintegration, chaos, and decay. In organic life, over-growth or hypertrophy leads to 
the final destruction of the organism such as cancer. In mental life, differential growth 
without unity toward the centre will lead to mental disorganization and insanity. 
However, physical or psychological over-centralization without expansion or 
differentiation also leads to stagnation and degeneration. Growth depends on the 
assimilation of material and mental nutriments. The faculty of centralization is the 
organizing force, which prevents the dissolution of the individual structure by a chaotic 
inundation of un-assimilable elements. It is the tendency to create a common centre of 
relations.  
When the common centre ‘I’ or ‘I’ tag (Lancaster, 1997), (will be elaborated in 
chapter 5), is in balance with the assimilable elements there is harmony. As soon as the 
‘I’ out grows its function and develops a hypertrophic ‘I’ consciousness which 
constructs an unchangeable entity, in contrast to the rest of the world, the inner balance 
is destroyed. The hypertrophied ‘I-dentity’ of the permanent ego ‘self’ distorts reality 
and creates disharmony. This disharmony is referred to as ‘ignorance’ or self-delusion. 
However, ignorance is not the primary cause of suffering, but a condition under which 
our present life develops, a condition that is responsible for our present state of 
consciousness. All other supporting conditions must be present for the phenomenon of 
suffering to emerge (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1 The Buddhist Theory of Interdependent Arising 
 
 
Interpreted in temporal terms, the cycle of Interdependent Arising covers three 
‘lifetimes’ – ignorance and volitional formations are in the initial lifetime; 
consciousness to becoming are in the middle lifetime; while birth and aging and death 
with sorrow, lamentation and so on are in the final lifetime. Taking the middle lifetime 
as the present one, the standard interpretation divides the whole cycle into two sets of 
causes and results: Ignorance and Volitional Formations as the past cause (blue 1-2); 
Consciousness, Body and Mind, Six Senses, Contact and Feeling as the present result 
(green); craving, clinging and becoming as the present cause (red), and birth, ageing and 
death, and sorrow, lamentation (purple 11-12), etc. as the future result.  
Because the relationship between the twelve links is interdependent, it is 
sometimes divided into three rounds to explain the whole cycle of Interdependent 
Arising. Thus, the Defilement Round (kilesa vatta) includes ignorance, craving, and 
clinging; the Action Round (kamma vatta) consists of Volitional Formations and 
becoming (rebirth conditioning action – kamma-bhava) and the Result Round (vipaka 
vatta) comprises body and mind, the six senses, contact, feeling, and consciousness.  
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Interpretations of Interdependent Arising 
 
Within the Buddhist canon, however, there are alternative interpretations to the 
theory of Interdependent Arising. In the Abhidhamma, for example, the principle of 
Interdependent Arising occurs in its entirety in one mind moment. The principle can be 
interpreted in a different light, giving a very different picture of the principle that is 
supported by scriptural and other sources. For instance, the sorrowless life of the 
Worthy One (arahat) arises in this present life. It is not necessary for him to die before 
realizing the cessation of birth, aging, and death, and thus sorrow, lamentation, pain, 
grief, and despair. These things can be overcome in this very lifetime (de Silva, 1996; 
Pandita, 1993). If the cycle can be clearly understood as, it operates in the present, it 
follows that as the time moves on, the past, and the future will be clearly understood, 
because they are all part of the one cycle. Linear linkages between the twelve conditions 
with examples are elaborated in the endnotes
17. However, the arising of these linkages 
occurs not only in one direction. Each condition is linked to the rest in interconnected 
and interdependent ways.  
Standard and alternative interpretations of the theory of Interdependent Arising 
usually portray the picture of a linear and cumulative process. Macy (1991) uses the 
system theory to interpret Interdependent Arising as a mutually co-conditioning system 
of homeostasis. However, spirally evolving nature of Interdependent Arising resembles 
a homeorhetic (Waddington, 1968) development. Verdue (1985) also attempts to 
explain the twelve links using the metaphor of a clock in which each hour tolls with, 
and because of, the still resounding echo of all the others. Nonetheless, it is not a 
cumulatively linear and unidirectional cause. Ignorance does not ‘cause’ Volitional 
Formations and Consciousness. Feeling is not the cause of Craving and still less is 
Craving the necessary result of Feeling. Hence, where there is Craving, there must also 
be Feeling. However, where there is Craving-producing Consciousness, there must also 
be ignorance. Every link can combine with another and whichever series of succession 
one chooses; only the emphasis changes but not the substance. Therefore, to say that 
‘Volitional Formations’ condition ‘Consciousness’ is as correct as ‘Consciousness’ 
conditions ‘Volitional Formations’ or ‘Craving’ conditions ‘Volitional Formations’, and 
so on. It is not a purely temporal or a purely logical causality, but a living, organic 
relationship, a simultaneous correlation, juxtaposition, and succession of all the links.  
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Each link represents the crosswise summation of all the others, and bears in itself its 
whole past as well as all the possibilities of its future (Govinda, 1969).  
Although the principle of Interdependent Arising appears like a linearly linked 
chain, the Buddha's simile of a wheel with the hub supporting twelve spokes also 
illustrates the interdependent arising of suffering as an all-in-one phenomenon. He 
unfolds the process of the abandoning of ignorance to the cessation of suffering in the 
reverse order as follows:   
  
•  With the complete abandoning of Ignorance, Volitional 
Formations cease; 
•  With the cessation of Volitional Formations, Consciousness 
ceases;  
•  With the cessation of Consciousness, Body and Mind cease; 
•  With the cessation of Body and Mind, the Six Senses cease; 
•  With cessation of the Six Senses, Contact ceases; 
•  With the cessation of Contact, Feeling ceases; 
•  With the cessation of Feeling, Craving ceases; 
•  With the cessation of Craving, Clinging ceases; 
•  With the cessation of Clinging, Becoming ceases; 
•  With the cessation of Becoming, Birth ceases; 
•  With the cessation of Birth;  
•  Ageing and Death, Sorrow, Lamentation, Pain, Grief and Despair 
cease. 
Thus is there a cessation to this whole mass of suffering. 
  
 
The causal development displayed by this progression is different from the 
pattern of Aristotelian efficient causation. Interdependent Arising involves the 
emergence of an effect out of its causal matrix. The relationship between the path and 
the goal belongs to a more complex order of causality. As stated, it is not an instance of 
simple, uni-directional causality moving forwards or backwards in a straight line. 
Rather, it is a species of teleological causes involving purpose, intelligence, and planned 
striving simultaneously projected towards and refracted from the aimed at effect in a 
reciprocal determination. In the workings of this relationship, not only does the path 
help the achievement of the goal, but the goal helps the path as well. From the outset as 
the envisaged aim of striving, the goal bends back to share in shaping the path. Starting 
from man’s awareness of the painful inadequacies of his existence, and his intuitive 
feeling towards a condition where these are allayed, the formula continues to trace back  
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and constantly check against the goal. The series of changes he must induce in his 
cognitive and emotional makeup bring the goal within his reach.  
The cessation process reveals a particular way of the path-to-goal relationship. 
The path leading to the attainment of the goal and the goal giving form and content, 
stand together in a reciprocal determination. Besides the forward thrust of the path, 
there is a basic feedback emanating from the goal, so that the goal generates the path, as 
in the relation between a guided missile and its mobile target. The missile does not 
reach its target merely through its own initial thrust and direction. It finds the target 
precisely because it is being controlled by signals the target is itself emitting.  
  
Interdependent Arising in Self and Society 
   
The principle of Interdependent Arising operates and applies to relationships 
within and between intrapersonal, interpersonal, societal, and natural environments. A 
simple example of interaction (adapted from Payutto, 1994) between two friends 
(person ‘A’ and person ‘B’) who have been pleasant to each other can demonstrate how 
the principle works. One day ‘A’ sees ‘B’ and approaches him with a friendly manner, 
but ‘B’ answers with silence and a sour expression. ‘A’ gets annoyed and stops talking 
to ‘B’.   
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This scenario plays out within the framework of Interdependent Arising: 
 
•  ‘A’ is ignorant of the true reason for ‘B’s’ grim face and sullenness. 
He fails to reflect on the matter wisely and discover the real reasons 
for ‘B’s’ behaviour, which may have nothing at all to do with his 
feelings for ‘A’ (Ignorance). 
•  As a result, ‘A’ continues to think and formulate theories in his mind. 
These theories give rise to doubt, anger, and resentment dependent 
on his particular temperament (Volitional Formations). 
•  Under the influence of these defilements, ‘A’ broods. He takes note 
of and interprets ‘B’s’ behaviour and actions by those previous 
impressions; the more he thinks about it, the surer he gets angry; 
‘B’s’ every gesture seems offensive (Consciousness). 
•  ‘A’s’ feelings, thoughts, moods, facial expressions and gestures, that 
is, the body and mind together, begin to take on the overall features 
of an angry or offended person, and begin to work under that 
consciousness (Body-Mind). 
•  ‘A’s’ body-mind state of anger or hurt primes his sense organs to 
receive information that relates to and is conditioned by such a state 
(Six Senses). 
•  The impingement on the sense organs will be of the activities or 
attributes of ‘B’ which seem particularly relative to the case, such as 
the frowning expressions, unfriendly gestures, and so on (Contact). 
•  Feelings, conditioned by sense contact, are of the unpleasant kind 
(Feeling). 
•  Craving for non-being (vibhava tanha) arises, the dislike or aversion 
for that offensive image, the desire for it to go away or to be 
destroyed (Craving). 
•  Clinging and obsessive thinking towards ‘B’s’ behaviour follows. 
‘A’ interprets ‘B’s’ behaviour as a direct challenge; sees ‘B’ as a 
disputant, and such a crisis demands a remedial action (Clinging). 
•  ‘A’s’ following behaviour falls under the influence of Clinging and 
his actions become those of an antagonist (Becoming). 
•  As the feeling of ill will becomes more obvious, it assumes an 
identity. The distinction between ‘me’ (self) and ‘him’ (other) 
becomes more distinct, the self emerges to respond to the situation 
(Birth). 
•  This ‘self’ or condition of polarity, evolves and flourishes, dependent 
on desires to appear tough, to preserve honour and pride, and to be 
the victor, all of which have their respective opposites, such as 
feelings of worthlessness, inferiority and failure. The absence of any 
guarantee of victory confronts the arisen sense of self. Even if he 
does win the victory he desires, there is no guarantee that ‘A’ will be 
able to preserve his supremacy for any length of time. He may not be 
the ‘tough victor’ he wants to be, but rather the loser, the weakling, 
the one who loses face. These possibilities of suffering play with 
‘A’s’ moods and produce stress, insecurity, and worry. They in turn 
feed ignorance, thus beginning a new round of the suffering cycle. 
Unhappiness of ‘A’ may cause more problems for himself and for 
others.   
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If he were to reverse this conditioning process, he would be advised to see his 
friend’s sullenness at its causes and conditions (yoniso-manasikara). For example, ‘B’ 
may have had a bad day, be in need of money or simply be depressed. If ‘A’ reflected 
this way, he might even move toward compassionate action and understanding. Even 
though the negative chain of events has been set in motion, mindfulness can still cut the 
chain at any point. For instance, if ‘A's’ sense contact leads him to see ‘B’s’ action in a 
negative way, ‘A’ could still set up mindfulness and gain a fresh understanding so he 
would not cling to but let go of weighty negative feelings.  
Before leaving this example, it is important to reiterate some main points. In real 
life, the complete cycle or chain of events occurs rapidly. Interdependence between the 
chains of events does not happen in sequential order. For instance, to make dijeridoo 
music, we need a dijeridoo, a player, vibration of his lips, making of sounds as he 
blows, and 'circular breathing' have to come together simultaneously and successively. 
These examples may not necessarily illustrate the subtlety of the principle. It may 
appear that the cycle only arises occasionally, that ignorance is a sporadic phenomenon, 
and the ordinary person may not spend a large amount of his life without the arising of 
ignorance at all. However, what needs to be said here is that for an unenlightened being, 
ignorance of varying degrees is behind every thought, action, and word. The basis of 
this ignorance is simply the perception that there is an existence of a separate 
(hypertrophied) self besides interdependent arising.  
The principle of Interdependent Arising describes the arising of social ills and 
their related effects on the natural environment together with personal suffering. From 
craving onwards, it diverges into a description of external events.  
To illustrate this point the Buddha says in Mahanidana Sutta to his disciple and 
attendant, Ananda, thus: 
  
 
In this way, Ananda, conditioned by feeling is craving, conditioned by 
craving is seeking, conditioned by seeking is gain, conditioned by gain is 
valuation, conditioned by valuation is fondness, conditioned by fondness 
is possessiveness, conditioned by possessiveness is ownership, 
conditioned by ownership is avarice, conditioned by avarice is guarding, 
conditioned by guarding and resulting from guarding are the taking up of 
the stick, the knife, contention, dispute, arguments, abuse, slander, and 
lying. Evil and unskillful actions of many kinds thus appear in profusion. 
(DN 15) 
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This sketching of mental processes shows how the origin of social problems and 
suffering lies within human defilements. Our experience depends on sensory 
impingement, which, in addition to existing internal factors such as perception, 
responds to social and environmental factors. Dependent on Feeling, Craving arises, 
resulting in the variation of human behaviour towards both other people and the world 
around them, within the restrictions specified by social or environmental circumstances. 
Human beings are not the only determinants of social or environmental development, 
but the natural environment also influences human beings and the society. They all 
constitute an interdependent process of relationship. In other words, these phenomena 
are the result of an interaction between three levels of existence: human beings, human 
society, and the universe of the natural environment, or in a phrase - the ‘self-other-
nature matrix’. The Buddha explains in discourses the development of events in human 
society, such as the arising of class structures as the result of the interaction between 
people and the environment around them. 
A section of the Agganna Sutta shows the sequence of social evolution in India 
at the time of Buddha:  
  
 
…people become lazy and begin to hoard rice which was previously 
plentiful and this becomes the preferred practice; people begin to hoard 
private supplies; unscrupulous people steal other’s shares to enlarge their 
own; censure, lying, punishment, and contention result; responsible 
people seeing the need for authority, appoint a king; some of the people, 
being disillusioned with society, decide to do away with evil actions and 
cultivate meditation practice. (DN 27) 
 
 
Some of these people live close to the city and study and write scriptures; they 
become the Brahmins. Those who have families continue to earn their living by various 
professions, they becoming the artisans. The remaining people being vulgar and inept 
become the commoners. From these groups a smaller group breaks off, renouncing 
tradition and household life and taking to the ‘homeless life.’ These become the 
samanas, mendicant monks. 
The aim of this sutta is to explain the arising of the various classes as the result 
of natural causes rather than caused by God. It is also to show that all people are equally 
capable of good and evil behaviour, and all receive results according to natural law; it  
  94 
follows that all beings are equally capable of attaining enlightenment if they practice 
dhamma correctly.  
Similarly, the Cakkavatti Sutta shows the arising of crime and social ills within 
society according to the following cause and effect sequence: 
  
 
‘The ruler’ does not share wealth among the poor; poverty abounds; theft 
abounds; the use of weapons abounds; killing and maiming abound; 
lying abounds; slander…sexual infidelity…abusive and frivolous 
speech…greed and hatred…wrong view; lust for what is wrong, greed, 
wrong teachings disrespect for parents, elders and religious persons, 
disrespect for position abound; longevity and appearance degenerate. 
(DN 26) 
  
 
The discourse addresses the social origins of personal and societal problems. In 
determining the etiological cause-and-effect of human existence and suffering, the 
principle of interdependent arising provides eight axes or templates to view and 
understand the conditions that interdependently support the delusive construction of 
self:  
 
 
•  The first axis conceptualizes ignorance and craving as two 
original causes, which bring life into the existential 
phenomenon of an individual and his suffering.  
•  Second, this phenomenon is reinforced by the view that 
there is suffering or discontent and the cause of discontent 
is craving.  
•  The third view outlines temporal circularity of cause and 
effect. Past causes result in present effects, which turn into 
present causes, which lead to future results.  
•  The fourth view reiterates the twelve, interdependent 
components or 'conditions' and how each interdepends on 
the other in giving rise to cause and effect, while it is 
impossible to say which component is the dominant or 
driving force. Each is both cause and effect. Together, they 
perpetuate an unending cycle of repeated life, suffering, 
and ‘rebirth.’  
•  The fifth view shows three main linkages: first, between 
Volitional Formations and Consciousness because 
Volitional or karma Formations give rise to Consciousness 
in the phenomenon of new birth; second, between 
Sensations and Craving because it is sensations that cause 
Craving due to the hedonic tone inherent in Sensations; 
third, between rebirth conditioning action (karma-bhava)  
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and birth because it is our deeds (karma) that bring about 
rebirth.  
•  The sixth view clarifies the circle of defilement (consisting 
of ignorance, craving and clinging) which interlocks with 
the circle of volitional activities (consisting of volitional 
formations and rebirth conditioning action) and the circle 
of results (consisting of consciousness, mind and body, six 
senses, contact, sensation, birth (rebirth process), old age 
(change) and death. The causal defilement circle and 
volitional circle give rise to the result circle. Using the 
components of the result circle, we create more causal 
defilement and volition. Just as one wave breaks on to the 
beach, countless others are forming out at sea; ready to 
follow one after another in an endless succession. So too is 
the circle of ignorance, action and result of existence and 
suffering.  
•  The seventh view shows that existence and suffering can 
be understood as comprising past, present and future 
periods. The past gives rise to present effects. Reaping 
what we sow, we are unable to meet the effect with 
equanimity. We react verbally or physically, or let our 
mind become lost in fantasies, by creating more causes. 
We allow present effects to become present causes that 
become a link to future effects.  
•  The eighth template expands the twelve links originally 
taught by the Buddha into twenty components. Thus, the 
five past causes are ignorance, craving, clinging, and 
rebirth conditioning action. They give rise to the five 
present effects, namely, consciousness, mind and body, six 
senses, contact and sensation. Again, we turn these five 
effects to create five present causes of craving, clinging, 
and rebirth conditioning action, ignorance, and volition. 
As a result, we reap in the future five effects, which are 
consciousness, mind and body, six senses, contact and 
sensation.  
 
 
In brief, the method of interdependent arising can be understood as being 
composed of (1) two original causes of ignorance and craving; (2) two truths of 
discontent and alleviation of discontent; (3) four main groups of past causes, present 
results, present causes and future results; (4) twelve components as originally taught by 
the Buddha; (5) three main links between volition and consciousness, sensation and 
craving, and rebirth conditioning action and birth; (6) three circles of defilement, action 
and result; (7) three periods of past, present and future, and (8) twenty components in 
four groups of five.  
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The Theory of Conditional Relations (Patthana) 
 
In contrast to the theory of Interdependent Arising, which deals only with the 
conditioning states, conditioned states, and the nature of their arising, the theory of 
“Conditional Relations” (patthana) elaborates on “conditioning forces”. A force (satti) 
is that which has the power to bring about or carry out an effect. Just as the hotness of 
chillies is inherent in the chillies, which cannot exist without it, so too the conditioning 
forces are inherent in the conditioning states, and cannot exist without them. All 
conditioning states have their particular force, and this force enables them to cause the 
arising of the conditioned states. Psychologically speaking they are motivating forces 
(conditions), which affect the conditioned states. These forces are contained within the 
twelve links stated in the principle of Interdependent Arising. In the language of 
quantum physics, Interdependent Arising would represent Particle while Conditional 
Relations Wave the light.  
The theory of Conditional Relation, expounded in the seventh book of the 
Abhidhamma, explains 24 motivational conditions that could be termed the Buddhist 
“relational theory” or “theory of conditioning”: 
 
 
        1. Root Relation  (hetupaccayo) 
        2. Object Relation  (arammanapaccayo) 
        3. Predominance  (adhipatipaccayo) 
        4. Proximity   (anantarapaccayo) 
        5. Contiguity  (samanantarapaccayo) 
        6. Co-arising  (sahajatipaccayo) 
        7. Coexistence  (annyamannyapaccayo) 
        8. Dependence  (nissayapaccayo) 
      *9. Inducement  (upanissayapaccayo) 
      *10. Pre-existence  (purejatapaccayo) 
      *11. Post-existence  (pacchajatapaccayo) 
      *12. Habitual Recurrence  (asevannapaccayo) 
        13. Action  (kammapaccayo) 
        14. Effect  (vipakapaccayo) 
        15. Food Relation  (aharapaccayo) 
        16. Potentiality  (indriyapaccayo) 
      #17. Absorption   (jahanapaccayo) 
      #18. Path  (maggapaccayo) 
        19. Association  (sampayuttapaccayo) 
        20. Dissociation  (vippayuttapaccayo) 
        21. Presence  (atthipaccayo) 
        22. Absence  (natthipaccayo)  
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        23. Disappearance   (vigatapaccayo) 
        24. Non-disappearance  (avigatapaccayo) 
 
*and # indicate grouped explanation. 
 
 
All schools of Buddhism regard 18 out of 24 conditions or relations in 
Theravada Buddhism as causal conditions. The next section defines, discusses, and 
elaborates some of these conditional relations by using examples to show their affinity 
with Western psychology.  
 
Root Relations (hetupaccayo) 
   
The theory of root relations refers to a condition where a conditioning state 
functions like a root by giving firmness and fixity to the conditioned states. The 
conditioned states of suffering (dukkha) can be traced back to three unwholesome 
(bitter) roots - greed, hatred, and delusion. Conversely, all wholesome states can be 
traced back to the three sweet roots, the opposite to the bitter ones (Brazier, 1995). They 
may be translated as generosity (non-greed), loving-kindness (non-hatred) and wisdom 
(non-delusion). However, the ordinary mind is obscured by defilements (kilesa) which 
result in the bitter roots, also known as ‘the three poisons’ of greed, hatred, and 
delusion. They are the roots of a thousand other defilements. The origins of these 
defilements may have survival value in the beginning where one needs to avoid a 
painful, unproductive environment, and to approach a pleasant productive context, and 
to have a feeling self in connection with others and environment. With the evolution of 
consciousness and language, human desires extend to the extreme degrees of binary 
opposites, where craving turns needs into wants, and wants into greed. Similarly, 
aversion turns annoyance into anger, and anger into hatred. Therefore, the disconnection 
between self-other-nature turns the self into a greedy, angry and selfish individual who 
in delusion clings to the ‘subconscious’ belief of a unified enduring self. These 
defilements block the individual from “insightful seeing of things as they really are” 
(vipassana). However, the dialectics of such unwholesome development guides some 
rare individuals to seek freedom from such imprisonment and see with clarity. The 
Buddha’s exposition of the three "bitter roots" and their opposites, the three "sweet 
roots" sets the framework for psychotherapy. The sweet or wholesome roots allude to 
positive forces (satti) in our daily lives and in therapy. Primarily, all mental states arise  
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from one or another of these roots. They are the prime conditioning factors of the cycle 
of suffering, the ‘perpetual wandering’ (samsara). The Buddha says the unfortunate 
outcomes of greed are mild but last a long time, those of hatred are severe but do not 
last so long, while those of the delusional self are both a severe and long-lasting 
experience. 
The therapeutic implication of the root relation theory is that one needs to find 
ways to convert the bitter roots into sweet ones. Most psychological distress shows a 
tendency to spontaneous remission and to some extent age may provide wisdom, 
however slow it may be, as one grows older. A Zen master likened this process to the 
maturing of a persimmon tree (Uchiyama 1993, cited in Brazier, 1995). A persimmon 
tree growing naturally produces bitter fruit. It does not begin to produce sweet fruit until 
it is about a hundred years old. To produce sweet persimmons sooner, the grower has to 
graft branches of very old trees on to younger trees. So also in psychotherapy, one needs 
to graft unconditional regard, empathy, and congruence, which parallel Buddhist loving-
kindness, compassion and wisdom in order to enhance the learning process.  
 
Object Relation (arammanapaccayo) 
 
The Buddhist theory of object relation describes a condition where a 
conditioning state (as object) causes the conditioned states to arise, taking it as their 
objects. The six classes of objects are the conditioning states in this relation, and the 
corresponding cittas and cetasikas (mind - synonymous with consciousness, and mental 
factors) are the conditioned states. In other words, all mental states are conditioned by 
the object, real or imagined, which holds their attention. Mind is that which recognizes 
objects. As the object is, so will be the mind, which clings to it. The Buddhist notion of 
object relation is concerned with all mental states that their objects define. For instance, 
when a magnet gets near iron, the magnet shakes as though desiring it; it moves itself 
forward and attaches to the iron firmly; in other cases, it attracts the iron. Therefore, the 
iron shakes itself, approaches the magnet, and attaches itself firmly to it. Similarly, 
mind and mental factors (cittas and cetasikas) not only attach themselves to objects, but 
also rise and cease every moment, while the objects remain present at the avenue of the 
six doors. This happens at the stage of mind and mental factors coming into existence 
within a personal identity. However, the mind of an enlightened person sees this clearly, 
whereas an unenlightened person’s perception is obscured.   
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The Buddhist theory parallels the Western theory of Object Relations developed 
by the successors to Sigmund Freud. Husserl (1929) cited in Legrand & Iacoboni (n.d.) 
sees that objects define consciousness, but consciousness also defines or ‘intends’ 
objects. Every consciousness of even a single object tacitly intends ("Volitional 
Formations" in Buddhist terms) a whole world through which perception becomes 
meaningful. We shape the objects we perceive with our personal agenda or intention. 
Thus, we condition the object. This personal agenda makes up our attachment to self. In 
Buddhist psychology, we hold this self as a pivotal object, which distorts the way we 
perceive all other objects. It may seem strange to think of ourselves as an object. We 
like to think that the self is the subject who perceives, rather than the object perceived. 
Buddhism asserts, however, that the self as perceiver is not something we can ever 
directly perceive, even though we hold many images of ourselves in mind. They are 
imaginary objects, not present. Our lives are full of images of objects, which are not 
present, and these influence us in most of our activities and distort our relation to the 
world. In a conversation with his attendant, Ananda, the Buddha points out the first step 
toward peace of mind is to rid ourselves of all the trouble caused in our head by things 
that are not actually happening.  
Object relation theory and root relation theory work together. The former shows 
how perception conditions feelings. The latter shows how the defilements condition 
perception. As we hold on to the conditioned concept of self, everything that we 
perceive will be distorted. We will perceive everything in accordance with such 
categories as ‘useful to me’, ‘not useful to me’, ‘pleasant for me’, ‘unpleasant for me’, 
and so on. In summary, object relation theory states that all mental states depend on the 
perception of an object. The objects may be real or imagined circumstances or 
abstractions. In particular, the construction of oneself as the most important object in 
our perceptual world acts as the root of all distortions. 
  
Predominance (adhipatipaccayo) 
 
Predominance theory states that predominant forces operate in our lives and our 
mentality. Dominant forces represent the efficient causation, because they exert 
influence over the effect. For instance, the six internal bases of cognition (eye, ear, nose, 
tongue, body, and mind) are related to the six forms of cognition. In addition, the 
dominance is of two kinds: objective dominance and coexistent dominance. The  
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objective dominance accounts for the impressions created by external objects on the 
mind. The external world presents us with various agreeable and disagreeable objects. 
These impressions determine largely the nature of our cognitions. Not only the 
impressions but also the nature of the sense organs themselves affects the character of 
the cognitions. However, apart from these objective presentations and the nature of the 
sense organs, there are certain motives that dominate our consciousness, which are said 
to arise along (coexistent) with consciousness. When we cherish something, it will 
dominate our perception. In the unenlightened mind, dominance is determined by the 
illusion of self and the defilements. However, the real dominating forces for both good 
and bad effects are intention, will, energy or effort, reason, and investigation, which are 
considered coexistent dominant conditions. This theory extends those of object and root 
relations where the object ‘self’ tends to dominate and distort. In the ultimate analysis, 
external objects appear to generate such mental concomitants. However, because of the 
dominating or overpowering influence of these motives, a distinction has been made 
between objective and coexistent dominance. 
So far, one can see how these three simple theories have a wide implication for 
psychotherapy. Object relation shows how all mental states depend upon the perception 
of objects, and particularly how the object of the self exerts a distorting influence; 
object relation also links to notions in psychoanalysis and phenomenology. Root 
relations show how attachment to objects can be reduced to the three bitter roots and 
their corresponding antidote that has implications for both the client and the clinician. 
Predominance theory demonstrates how the mind has resources by which the 
dominating effect of some objects may be overcome. 
 
Proximity and Contiguity (anantarapaccayo; 
samanantarapaccayo) 
 
These two associative conditions called proximity and contiguity are identical in 
meaning; they refer to the same relation from slightly different angles. Formally 
defined, proximity condition is a condition where one mental state, the conditioning 
state, causes another mental state, the conditioned state, to arise immediately after it has 
ceased, so no other mental state can intervene between them. Contiguity condition is a 
condition where the conditioning mental state causes the conditioned mental state to 
arise immediately after it has ceased, under the fixed order of the mental process. These  
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two conditions apply to the relationship between the mind and mental factors ceasing at 
any given moment and the mind and mental factors that arise in immediate succession. 
The mind and mental factors that arise immediately afterwards are the conditioned 
states. Consciousness flows in an unending stream of thoughts, feelings, images, and 
sensations. Each holds our attention briefly. Each mental impulse conditions those that 
immediately follow it and the impulses flow from one into another in a natural sequence 
according to their nature. As soon as we start in one direction, a whole sequence of 
impulses arises and flows on. A positive impulse sets up more of the same and similarly 
for negative impulses. These patterns agree with everyday experience. 
Western association theory describes a similar flow of consciousness. William 
James (1890) offers two theories similar to the one discussed here. James’ law of 
contiguity states that ‘objects once experienced together tend to become associated in 
the imagination, so that when one of them is thought of, the other is likely to be thought 
of also, in the same order of sequence or co-existence as before’ (561). The law of 
association states that ‘when two elementary brain processes have been active together 
or in immediate succession, one of them, on reoccurring, tends to propagate its 
excitement into the other’ (566). 
Similarly, Jung (1907) embarked on research into word association shortly after 
James. He used both laws to explain how an archetype is translated into a ‘complex.’ In 
Jung’s system, archetypes are the instinctive expectations we have of life, born out of 
the experience of our species over millennia, and complexes are the personal mental 
constructions we unconsciously hold which shape our individual lives. The more 
dominated by ‘complexes’ the mind is, the less open it is to new experience.  
In Buddhism, these complexes would be called ‘passions’ or powerful 
‘emotions’. However, the traditional languages of Buddhism, such as Pali, Sanskrit, and 
Tibetan, have no word for ‘‘emotion’’ as such. Although discrepant from the modern 
psychological research tradition that has isolated emotion as a distinct mental process 
that can be studied apart from other processes, the fact that there is no term in Buddhism 
for emotion is quite consistent with what scientists have come to learn about the 
anatomy of the brain. Every region in the brain that has been identified with some 
aspect of emotion has also been identified with aspects of cognition (e.g., Davidson & 
Irwin, 1999) (Ekman et al. 2005, 59-63).  
The extent to which we are dominated by passions is the measure of our 
madness. However, Buddhism differentiates wholesome emotions from unwholesome 
emotions by which an unenlightened mind is conditioned by association. Padmasiri de  
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Silva (1976) elaborates on unwholesome emotions. The Buddhist term that corresponds 
most closely to unwholesome or “destructive emotion"” is “kilesa” (Pali) or 
“Klesha” (Skt.), which is commonly translated as “mental affliction”. The Buddha 
taught that three basic kilesas are greed (passion or attachment), hatred (aggression or 
anger), and delusion (ignorance or delusion). The five kilesa are the three above plus 
pride and (envy or jealousy) (Goleman, 2004). As the kilesa habits develop, they blunt 
our awareness of immediate reality. They converge and sustain the passion of the self. 
The most difficult step in any attempt to change a mental habit is the first step, as the 
life process is self-reinforcing. Association is, however, not deterministic. As we have 
learned from the theory of predominance, we may use intention, will, energy or effort, 
reason, and investigation to develop positive associations rather than negative ones. 
With wisdom and mindfulness, we can transform bad associations into good ones.  
 
Co-arising and Co-existence (sahajatipaccayo; 
annyamannyapaccayo)  
 
These two theories refer to mutual coexistence. The theory of co-arising 
(sahajati) states that all elements of perpetual wandering (samsara), although seemingly 
separate and interactive, are actually part of one another, all arising together. Each part 
of the samsara conditions the other. The theory of co-dependence or reciprocity 
(annyamannya) states that these co-arising states are also coterminous. When one 
ceases, they all cease.  
In the co-arising theory, co-arising means that when a phenomenon arises it 
arises together with its effect. In other words, all causes and their effects arise 
simultaneously. Metaphors of the sun and a lamp are often used to illustrate this 
relation. When the sun rises, it rises together with its heat and light. In addition, when a 
candle is burning, it burns together with its heat and light. So also, this relating thing, in 
arising, arises together with a related effect. The sun, in the above example, is like each 
of the mental states; the sun’s heat is like the co-existing material quality, which is born 
of mind. The example of the candle should be understood in a similar way.  
In the theory of co-existence or reciprocity, not all relations are genetic or 
intrinsic. In many cases, it is possible to discern interdependence rather than genetic 
connection. Ledi Sayadaw (1846-1923) in The Buddhist Philosophy of Relations asserts 
that mental properties cannot arise without consciousness, because the function of  
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knowing is predominant among the function of contact and so forth of mental 
properties. In addition, consciousness cannot arise without the mental properties. This is 
compared to the relationship between two reeds that stand leaning against each other in 
support or three sticks depending on one another to form a tripod. The interdependence 
here does not mean genetic or intrinsic interrelation but, rather, mutual interdependence 
like the parts of a steel frame.  
 
Dependence (nissayapaccayo)  
   
The dependent cause describes the ground or basis for the existence of some 
other phenomenon. This relation is slightly different from co-arising and co-existence. 
For instance, the earth is the dependent cause or the basis on which a tree can grow. 
However, the earth does not arise with the tree, as in the co-arising, nor does the earth in 
its beginning depend on the tree for its existence, as in the coexistence or reciprocal 
cause. Buddhism underlines our good fortune in having a human body. This is the 
essential basis for enlightenment. Human embodied state is the only state in which one 
can gain full enlightenment. In Buddhist psychology, the six ‘doors’ (ayatana) of sense 
perception serve as dependence causes for the six forms of cognition (vinnana). 
Enlightenment can occur through any of these sense modes. Mind depends on body. 
The relation of body and mind has been a subject of endless debate in Western 
philosophy due to the belief in the idea of a soul capable of living independently of the 
body. The body-mind split has been a constant source of difficulty for Western thought. 
For instance, radical Behaviourism has tried to ignore the mind dimension almost 
altogether. However, Gendlin’s (1981) Focusing method is an exception in which he 
observes that successful psychotherapy clients attend to a distinct physical sensation of 
change.  
  
Support Theories (upanissayapaccayo; 
purejatapaccayo;   pacchajatapaccayo; 
asevannapaccayo)  
   
The first support theory is “inducement” by a powerful sufficing cause. 
According to the Patthana, there are three forms of sufficing. They are the objective  
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sufficing, the immediate sufficing, and the natural sufficing. The first is similar to the 
predominance theory of influence on the object. The second is similar to the theory of 
contiguity. The third explains faith that represents moral and spiritual development.  
The second support theory – “pre-existent or pre-nascent condition” - recognizes the 
prior existence of some phenomenon as a condition for the production of another 
phenomenon. Just as the sound of the violin only arises when it is played with a bow, 
and the sounding necessitates the pre-existence of both the violin strings and the bow, 
so also those (conscious) thoughts, which take part in the five-door processes, spring 
into being owing to the presentation of the five objects of sense at the five doors. 
Helping or supporting the arising of a thing by its prior existence is the function of this 
cause, such as the pre-existence of ignorance finally produces old age and death. 
Therefore, there is a time lag between the cause and the effect.  
The third support theory - "post-existent or post-nascent condition" - supports 
the continued sustenance of a phenomenon that has already come into existence. For 
example, a personality that has come into existence because of past causes requires 
continued sustenance in the future. If the four kinds of food – material food, contact, 
volition, and consciousness – do not feed this personality, it will not develop or 
continue to exist.   
The fourth support theory - "habitual-recurrence condition" - causes its resultant 
condition to accept its inspiration and grow with greater and greater proficiency, energy, 
and force. For instance, once a man develops thoughts of loving-kindness (metta), he 
will enable the same thoughts to develop with a greater degree of perfection later.  
This group of theories explain many phenomena. They refer to our ordinary life 
where we rely upon support and inducement. As unenlightened beings who are 
vulnerable to circumstances, we secure help through support of one another. Similarly, 
psychotherapy can help people through loving-kindness, unconditional regard, empathy 
and congruence. The Buddhist Middle Path guides the therapist in supporting the client 
until he can sustain himself. The therapist does this by being mindful of not giving up 
on the client too early or hanging on to the client when therapy is no longer necessary. 
 
Action (kammapaccayo)  
 
The theory of Action (kamma) refers to the particular function of the volitions. 
All deliberate actions of body, speech, and mind produce immediate effects in the life 
continuum, which are as if seeds stored for future germination. They will bear pleasant  
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or unpleasant fruit according to their nature when activated at some future time. The 
Abhidhamma distinguished two forms of kamma relations: the asynchronous and 
coexistent. For instance, a psychophysical personality that arises in this existence is due 
to the dispositions (sankhara) or volitions (cetana) of the past ‘life’. This is the 
asynchronous relation because the dispositions or the volitions belong to the past. On 
the other hand, there are certain thoughts, good or bad that arise with volitions. Such 
volitions relate to the thoughts by the coexistent kamma relation. According to Brazier 
(1995), kamma has five phases. First, there is the establishment of a general attitude to 
life. Second, there is the origin of kamma through specific volitional activity. Third, the 
effect of the kamma is not obvious during a latency period. The fourth phase is the re-
presentation of the kamma because of a trigger experience or simply through the 
passage of time. The re-presentation takes the form of perception of a possibility for 
further action presented to the mind in a literal or symbolic form (volitional formations). 
If this formation is ‘taken up’ (literally, upadana) or invested with new volition, a new 
kammic cycle sets in motion. In this way, the old kamma falls into its ‘effect condition.’ 
This phase is important to understand because most therapists misinterpret 
‘triggers’ for causes. For instance, if ‘A’ insults ‘B’, the insult does not cause anger. 
However, the insult simply acts as the trigger which brings up ‘B’s’ pre-existing 
vulnerability to anger to the surface. If ‘B’ wants to extinguish this anger, ‘B’ has to 
learn to recognize the true nature of things in situations of this kind. If ‘B’ does so, he 
may be able to let go of that anger. If he does not, he sets up the same kammic pattern 
all over again and is ready for the next trigger. 
Kamma, then, is a law of moral "cause and effect" which may produce an 
immediate or delayed effect depending on other supporting conditions. Self-will or 
volition produces kamma. It does not happen after death or does not rely on divine 
intervention. However, being ignorant of this law usually leads the client to blame 
others for the difficulties of his life, or he may feel that the blame belongs to him.  The 
client needs help to discover the interdependent nature of things in life for himself 
through insight. The therapist can create a non-threatening environment for the client 
conducive to examining his troublesome emotions like anger, jealousy, and ill will, and 
let go. Even the therapist who may have the insight into causal kammic conditions of the 
client has no executive power to change them. Like parenting a child, the best the 
therapist can do is create the best possible environment for the client, watch and help 
the client grow from experimenting with kamma. When he becomes enlightened 
through a gradual process, he will no longer produce kamma, but will still experience  
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the consequences of his past kamma.  
 
Effect (vipakapaccayo)  
 
The theory of Effect, like the Action theory, emphasizes the volitional aspect of 
kamma. It recognizes, like the asynchronous kamma relation, a time lag between the 
cause and the effect. Within this time lag, volition has four phases – the origin of 
volition (cetanavattha); continuance of volition (kammavattha); representation of 
volition (nimittavattha) and the result (vipakavattha). After the origin of volition ceases, 
its peculiar function (force) does not cease, but latently follows in a series of thoughts 
called the continuance of volition (kammavattha). After this series of thought, kamma 
projects representative mental images (nimttavattha). A person about to commit a 
violent act experiences this type of projection also. After the representation of volition 
has occurred, kamma completes its action and the result (vipakavattha) occurs. In other 
words, the process has reached fruition.  
  
Food Relation (aharapaccayo)  
 
The Food Relation theory states that we keep our conditioning going by feeding 
it. It follows from the theory of action (kamma). When we feel resentment and hatred, 
we feed it by looking for more evidence to feed the fire and scorch our lives. Similarly 
with greed, instead of seeing what it is doing to us, we indulge and encourage it. The 
Food theory explains the way we feed our conditioning with four material and 
immaterial nutriments: material food, contact, volition, and consciousness. Even though 
the four nutriments have the power to generate some effect, the primary function of 
food is to support or sustain what has already come into existence, such as ignorance. 
Not recognizing the ignorance, we choose to feed ourselves with greed, hatred, and 
delusion. The Buddha points out how the self feeds kamma and kamma feeds the self in 
a circular relationship.  
However, Western psychology sees the self as a static or fixed concept, which 
needs development in order to maintain a consistent positive esteem. In addition, it also 
ignores many different concepts and images of selves that we identify with in many 
social situations. However, Carl Rogers (1967) is an exception, who observes the self as 
follows:   
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Individuals move, I began to see, not from a fixity or homeostasis 
through change to a new fixity, though such a process is indeed possible. 
But much the more significant continuum is from fixity to changingness, 
from rigid structure to flow, from stasis to process (131). 
 
 
The goal of Buddhist psychology, which is in agreement with much of what 
Rogers says, is not establishing a strong and predictable self, but helping the individual 
to become flexible and responsive; a shift from stasis to process. As long as Western 
psychology feeds the notion of a static self, the client is likely to entangle with what the 
Buddhists call the delusion of eternal essence, the core causal condition. Western 
psychology also feeds on the misconception of ‘disorder’ and ‘damage.’ The ‘stuckness’ 
or 'frozenness" with anxiety, depression, obsession and psychotic experience is to do 
with conditions feeding the centripetal tendency, or what Brazier (1995) calls 
‘hyperorder’, rather than disorder. The suffering individual transfixes himself to the 
cycle of the conditioned states as if he is meditating on the wrong object of meditation. 
Another misconception is the ‘damaged self’ viewed by the clinician. In actuality, the 
client may be rigidly stuck or have a frozen view that he is damaged. In such a situation 
what is required is not repair but shifting the ‘stuckness’ or thawing the frozen entity. 
  
Potentialities (indriyapaccayo)  
 
The potentialities or faculties (indriya) such as faith or confidence (saddha), 
energy (viriya), mindfulness (sati), concentration (Samadhi), and wisdom or knowledge 
(panna) that control behaviour are conditions of great importance. The five faculties 
control or master their opposites. For example, faith (or confidence) controls lack of 
faith (doubt); energy controls laziness; mindfulness controls heedlessness; concentration 
controls distraction; and wisdom controls ignorance. The faculties can only really 
control their opposites when the factors of absorption intensify them. For instance, faith 
can only function as a controlling faculty when the presence of the three factors of 
absorption of interest, happiness, and one-pointedness strengthen it. Wisdom can only 
function effectively when it is strengthened by initial application, sustained application, 
and one-pointedness. These five absorptions strengthen and intensify the five 
controlling faculties so that the latter can function effectively to propel one toward  
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enlightenment. Similarly, the five controlling faculties strengthen the five absorptions. 
For instance, concentration strengthens interest and happiness. Thus, the relationship 
between the two sets of factors is one of reciprocal support and intensification.       
Although the five controlling faculties indispensably bring about the 
transformation from a doubtful, lethargic, heedless, distracted, and ignorant mode of 
being to an enlightened mode of being, they must be cultivated in a balanced way. What 
this means is that within the five controlling faculties there are factors that balance each 
other. For instance, faith and wisdom work as a reciprocal pair. If faith dominates 
wisdom, this results in a weakening of one's critical faculties, one's intellectual powers 
of analysis and investigation. If wisdom dominates faith, this diminishes confidence to 
the point of uncertainty and a lack of initial commitment to practice. Similarly, if energy 
dominates concentration, this leads to agitation, and if concentration dominates energy, 
this leads to sloth and torpor.      
Thus, faith, energy, concentration, and wisdom must be developed and 
maintained in balance, and the faculty that enables one to do this is mindfulness. 
Mindfulness, like a guard, ensures the proper reciprocal, balanced relationship between 
faith and wisdom, and between energy and concentration.        
An ordinary individual relies upon his sense, charms, and basic energy to get 
him through life. A mindful individual relies upon the five mental faculties. These 
faculties can help the client to rise above the vicissitudes of ordinary life and realize his 
fullest potential. This means that everyone has the potential for constructive 
engagement in life and the movement towards enlightenment.   
  
Absorption and Path (jhanapaccayo; maggapaccayo) 
 
The Theory of Absorption (jhana) refers to the process of concentration. The 
factors that allow the mind to continue concentration are such causes. The causes are 
initial application or absorption (vitakka), sustained application or absorption (vicara), 
pleasurable interest (piti), joy (somanassa), equanimity (upekkha) and one-pointedness 
(ekaggata). Initial application has the characteristic mark of directing the accompanying 
properties towards the object, and it, therefore, fixes the mind firmly to the object. 
Sustained application has the characteristic mark of reviewing the object repeatedly, and 
it attaches the mind firmly to the object. Pleasurable interest has the characteristic mark 
of creating interest in the object, and makes the mind happy and content with it. The 
three kinds of feeling, namely, joy, grief, and indifference, have the characteristic marks  
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of experiencing the object, and they fasten the mind on experiencing the essence of 
desirable, undesirable, and neutral objects. One-pointedness has the characteristic mark 
of concentration and it keeps the mind steadfastly fixed on the object.  
The Theory of Path (magga) explains the stages on the path to a goal as causal 
conditions because each stage has the power of clearing the ground and aiding the 
attainment of the succeeding stage. The function of jhana is to make the mind straight, 
steadfast and to sink into the meditation object. The function of magga is to lead the 
way of action intent (kammic volition) into the circle of existence, and developmental 
intent (bhavanic volition) is to lead the way out of the existence circle.  
 
Association (Sampayuttapaccayo)  
 
All categories of consciousness and mental properties mutually relate to each 
other by association. The association takes place in four ways by means of simultaneous 
arising or ceasing or associating under the condition of a single base or single object. It 
is meant, for example, that the consciousness of sight comes together with its seven 
mental properties so thoroughly that they are unitedly spoken of as sight. These eight 
mental states are no longer spoken of by their special names, for it is difficult to know 
them separately. The same explanation applies to the other classes of consciousness. 
  
Dissociation (vippayuttapaccayo)  
 
The relation of dissociation shows the coexistence or co-arising of a 
conditioning and a conditioned state in dissociation. The dissociation may be either 
mental or physical; therefore, the mental aids the physical and the physical the mental. 
The "mental" means the four mental aggregates, namely, sensation, perception, mental 
formations, and consciousness, and the "physical" means material qualities produced by 
mind. The simile of a curry illustrates this: The six tastes, namely tart, bitter, sweet, 
sour, salty, and acid, do not mix, and yet they support one another to give an agreeable 
taste in curry. Similarly, gold and jewels differentiate each other. Yet the gold makes 
the jewels more beautiful, and the jewels make the gold more attractive. The 
coexistence dissociation refutes the view of the idealists that material elements are mere 
projections of the mind. While explaining the interdependence of mental and physical 
phenomena, the Abhidhamma takes the realist standpoint by keeping them separate.   
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Presence (atthipaccayo)  
 
The earth can support plants to grow on it, because it is present. Parents can 
support and look after their children while they are present or living. Such a 
phenomenon – either pre-nascent or co-nascent – which through its presence is a 
condition for other phenomena to arise, is called ‘presence condition’ (Mon, 1995). 
 
Absence (natthipaccayo)  
 
The Absence theory highlights the dualistic aspect of the Presence theory. For 
example, the absence of light contributes to the appearance of darkness. Similarly, the 
dissolution of a consciousness and its concomitants creates the necessary ‘absence 
condition’ for the immediate arising of another consciousness and its concomitants. 
   
Disappearance and Non-Disappearance (vigatapaccayo, 
avigatapaccayo)  
 
The theories of Disappearance and Non-Disappearance defined themselves in the same 
way as the Absence and Presence theories. The formulation of these theories may have 
been prompted by the desire to eliminate the belief in the static reality, which may be 
implied by the theories of Absence and Presence. The theory of disappearance 
emphasizes gradual disappearance and the theory of non-disappearance avoids the static 
existence implied by the theory of presence.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In sum, all theories that come under the rubric of Interdependent Arising and 
Conditional Relations demonstrate the structure, principle, and functions involved in the 
evolving phenomena of suffering and the clue to liberation from suffering for all 
sentient beings. As mentioned earlier, the systems theory perspective (Macy, 1991)  
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explains the theory of Interdependent Arising. However, what is unique in this study is 
not the homeostatic aspect of the interdependent system (Bertalanffy, 1968), but the 
homeorhesis 
 (Waddington, 1968) - the arising of interdependent factors and their 
spiralling evolution. The twelve interdependent links and twenty-four motivational 
principles lay the framework for the explanation of how our strong desire for pleasant 
experience creates greed and aversion or hatred toward unpleasant experience, and 
conscious awareness of these experiences constructs a controlling permanent self-
authority. The next chapter unfolds how these desires manifest themselves in the 
construction of split selves that originate from ignorance of interdependent arising of 
self-feeling within an ecological process and the phenomenon of change (anicca). 
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Chapter 5 
 
Self as a Split Subject 
 
 
One of the obstacles of integration between Western thought and currently 
popular Buddhist teachings is the concept of non-self. This bases its premise on the 
misunderstanding that Buddha denies the existence of self. On the contrary, “nowhere is 
the reality of the self absolutely and explicitly denied… the anatta doctrine taught in the 
Nikayas has a relative value, not an absolute one… a lot of confusion has been created 
also by not distinguishing between the moral and the metaphysical self [italics, mine] 
and not realizing what is radically rejected in Nikayas is the self of the sakkayaditthi, 
that is to say, the self that is wrongly identified with the khandhas” (Perez-Remon, 
1980, 304). What the non-self refers to is things an unlearned man identifies with that 
are not the self and that he needs to liberate from without attachment. What the Buddha 
meant is to become a non-self person transcended from khandha factors, as he often 
repeated in suttas:  “this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self”, a formula that 
equivalently says, “I am beyond all this, my self transcends all this”.  
Another obstacle to integration is the idea of self as an essence, a stable 
unchanging concept. In addition, the theistic notion of the self is equal to a permanent 
unchanging soul in a changeable body. The Buddhist concept of impermanence (anicca) 
cannot reconcile with such a Western notion of permanent self.  
Finally, the self as an autonomous individual arises out of rational tradition in 
the West. With the two World Wars, the postmodern turn, and technology, the self has 
multiplied, hierarchicalized, information processed and disembodied. The Buddhists 
view each self-phenomenon as interdependently caused when all supporting conditions 
come together.  
Beside these differences, recent findings in developmental psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience bring together Buddhist and Western commonalities in 
ecological orientation of the self among infants, and the disunity and discontinuity of 
the self in cognition. 
Awareness of these differences and commonality between Western and Eastern 
thought appears to have had an ancient antecedent, which is relatively unknown among  
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Westerners. The first encounter between Buddhism and the West took place in 
Northwest India during the times of Alexander the Great (Mendis, 1993). In the 
Abhidhamma section of the three baskets of the Buddha’s teachings (tipitaka), an 
imaginative record of dialogues called ‘The Questions of King Milinda’ which is 
between a Bactrian Greek King Menander
18 (150 B.C.) and a Buddhist sage, Nagasena, 
is included as part of the Buddhist teachings. The encounter between the two great 
civilizations – Hellenistic Greece and Buddhist India – revolved around several issues 
including a special concern to the Greeks of the belief in a soul. The Buddhist notion of 
non-enduring self as well as the Western idea of individual or self-identity over time is 
important issues of concern for Western philosophy and psychotherapy exemplified by 
the following conversation: 
 
King Milinda:  How is your reverence known, and what sir, is 
your name? 
Sage Nagasena: O King, I am known as Nagasena but that is only 
a designation in common use, for no permanent 
individual can be found. 
King Milinda:  …now what is that Nagasena? Is it the hair? 
Sage Nagasena: I don’t say that, great king. 
King Milinda:  Is it then the nails, teeth, skin or other parts of 
the body? 
Sage Nagasena: Certainly not. 
King Milinda:  Or is it the body, or feelings, or perceptions, or 
formations, or consciousness? Is it all 
combined? Or is it something outside of them 
that is Nagasena?  
Sage Nagasena: It is none of these. 
King Milinda:  Then ask as I may, I can discover no Nagasena. 
Nagasena is an empty sound. Who is it I see 
before us? It is a falsehood that your reverence 
has spoken. 
Sage Nagasena: You sir,…how did you come here, by foot or in 
a chariot? 
King Milinda:  In a chariot, venerable sir. 
Sage Nagasena: Then, explain sir, what it is. Is it the axle? Or the 
wheels, or the chassis, or reins, or yoke that is 
the chariot? Is it all of these combined, or is it 
something apart from them? 
King Milinda:  It is none of these things, venerable sir. 
Sage Nagasena: Then, sir, this chariot is an empty sound. You 
spoke falsely when you said that you came here 
in a chariot. You are a great king of India Who 
are you afraid of that you speak an untruth? And 
he called upon Bactrian Greeks and the monks 
to bear witness: This King Milinda has said that 
he came here by a chariot but when asked ‘What  
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is it?’ he is unable to show it. Is it possible to 
approve of that? 
King Milinda:  Venerable sir, I have spoken the truth. It is 
because it has all these parts that it comes under 
the term chariot. 
Sage Nagasena: Very good, sir, your majesty has rightly grasped 
the meaning. Even so, it is because of the thirty-
two kinds of organic matter in a human body 
and the five aggregates of being that I come 
under the term Nagasena. As it was said by 
Sister Vajira in the Blessed One, ‘Just as it is by 
the existence of the various parts that the word 
“Chariot” is used, just so is it that when the 
aggregates of being are there we talk of a being.  
King Milinda:  Most wonderful, Nagasena, most extraordinary 
that you have solved this puzzle, difficult though 
it was. If the Buddha himself were here, he 
would approve of your reply. 
   
(Pesala, 1991; Mendis, 1993)  
 
Problems with the Concept of Self 
 
The above conversation not only illustrates the linguistic unpacking of the 
concept, “chariot”, in reasoning, but also enhancing the inherent belief in the enduring 
unity of the concept, that linguistic expression represents. Similarly, the concept of 
rational self not only differentiates its separateness from others and environment but 
also carries the enduring quality of the self. In addition, we adapt to live in harmony 
with them for our own survival.  Another feature of the self is that even though these 
experiences are unstable and changing from moment to moment, together with one's 
body, brain and mind, even after most body parts have been replaced we still feel the 
same self over time. A person may change his religion or tastes in music. He may 
declare that he is a different person since he has undergone psychotherapy. 
Alternatively, he may have had a sex change operation or completely lost his memory 
of all his family and friends. However, we are left with the problem of whether to think 
of him as the same person or a different person. He may acknowledge his physical and 
mental changes and yet he may endeavour to maintain the self he has known since he 
was able to reflect. This feeling is variously expressed as the unity and the continuity of 
self, the indivisibility of the person, and the essential or substantial self. The self claims  
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this core aspect of personality and of moral responsibility. These characteristics are 
considered as relatively stable emotional and attitudinal attributes that survive the 
vicissitudes of life. These attributes amount to a continuous psychological being - the 
conceptual self – whose identity is established and conveyed by this personality. Thus, 
the self-concept may be defined as a symbolic representation of personality based on 
reflective self-awareness.  
 
Anglo-European Thinkers’ Split Self  
 
Since the discovery of consciousness and the breakdown of the bicameral mind, 
as discussed in chapter 2, Homeric man of ancient Greece broke away from the group 
identity to establish a rational identity. The shift from auditory language to visual scripts 
helps define an everlasting metaphysical concept of the self. Chapter 2 explains how 
abstract rationality created madness, multiple truths and deconstruction. This section 
discusses how Anglo-European philosophers define the self and how the construction of 
single, multiple and hierarchical self(s) helps other unhealthy desires to co-create 
enormous psychological suffering. In addition, the section also discusses the 
commonalities between the Buddhist ecological notions and the findings of 
developmental and cognitive neuroscience research. 
Regarding metaphysical aspects of the self, John Locke (1632-1704), David 
Hume (1711-1776) and Thomas Reid (1710-1796)  like the Buddha, do not believe that 
the self has an essence. For instance, Locke defines the memory of persistent 
characteristics overtime as the self.  Hume also holds a similar non-essentialist view and 
sees the self as nothing but a bundle of sensations. Thomas Reid views the memory as 
unreliable and argues that sensation is not representational. We are directly aware of 
something – visible figure –, which does not represent something external (Hope, 
1984). He alludes to inseparability of the experience. Meanwhile, Kant (1724-1804), 
Hegel (1770-1831) and Karl Marx (1818-1883) are more concerned with the social-
ethical (in relation to the other) aspect of the individual self. Kant’s idea of the self is 
not empirical but transcendental. For Kant, the self acts by applying rules to organize 
our experience into a unity. Kant calls this notion of the self as a rule “the 
transcendental unity of apperception” (Kant, 1781, 108). Hegel (1770-1831) follows 
that individuals in history are significant only insofar as they contribute to movements 
far greater than they do –the individual acting out the universal imperatives as his own  
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content, i.e. the preservation of ethical life. Karl Marx (1818-1883), a student of Hegel, 
constructs self as a social activity and a social mind in its content as well as in its origin, 
i.e. the individual is a social being. In contrast, Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and Nietzsche 
(1844-1900) urge an end to collective identity and social roles in favour of renewed 
respect for the individual. Nietzsche (1844-1900), on the other hand, attacks what he 
calls a characteristic of “the herd”. To Nietzsche, morality is the herd-instinct in the 
individual (1882, 116).  
It is ironic that Western ideas of self from Plato and Aristotle to modern times 
have created the split between individuality and social self-identity. The idea of self 
becomes so individualistic that social identity runs in the face of the autonomous self. It 
is important to note that Socrates, Kant, Hegel, or Marx denied the individual, 
individual rights or individual respect. However, what they are denying is “vulgar 
individualism”, that denies all social relevance and social obligations. An antithesis to 
collective social identity comes from Heidegger (1889-1976), who after synthesizing 
the philosophy of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, urges us to take hold of ourselves as 
individuals and find our “authentic” selves. Heidegger makes a distinction between the 
self in everyday life as “they-self" and the “authentic self” that has taken hold of its own 
way. 
As a psychoanalyst, Freud (1856-1936) argues that guilt is a kind of self-
consciousness that is caught between the need for approval and recognition by others 
and the feeling that we must be ourselves. He believes the unconscious is alien to the 
conscious ego and split the self into three: id, ego, and super ego. If the id that seeks 
instinctual desires is to survive, it has to negotiate between its pleasure principles and 
society’s formidable powers of reality principle. Conscience or super ego provides the 
id with incomplete but permissible modes of expression through the ego’s usage of 
dreams, rites of passage, rituals, social institutions, humor, and slip of the tongue and so 
on. The ego has to serve three masters: the external world, the super ego, and the id. 
Now, the diverse aspects of the mind have to deal with the external world in order to 
maintain the self.  
Similarly, psychiatrist R. D. Laing (1927-1989) views the self as largely a social 
product. Our behaviours are conditioned and programmed by society, people, television, 
movies, friends, and schoolmates. And, soon we start to see a split developing in our 
thinking about ourselves. First, there is our conception of our own identity. Second, 
there is the identity that has been imposed upon us. The two pull us apart causing us  
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conflict and confusion until finally we find ourselves falling apart. Laing looks upon 
this as not only the basis of much of our everyday unhappiness but as the cause of some 
of our most serious psychological breakdowns as well. Laing describes what he calls 
“ontological insecurity” as just this split between our own awareness of ourselves and 
the awareness that is imposed upon us as an object of other people’s attention (Laing, 
1990). On the other hand, Sartre ((1905-1980) sees no set standards for self-identity, 
either for individuals or for people in general. He believes that existence comes before 
essence and we must begin from a subjective position. It is a matter of a person 
choosing what he thinks is worth doing. One follows the self-image in every action. His 
view reinforces American psychologist William James’ earlier work on self-esteem 
(Sartre, 1958).  
However, before elaborating on James’ influence on subsequent development of 
the concept of self that is the central focus of psychotherapy, his contemporaries like 
Dewey, Wittgenstein, and Freud should be noted as they developed further into 
pragmatic, linguistic, and scientific-oriented theories respectively.  
 
William James’ Split Self 
 
William James (1842-1910), an American physician turned psychologist, is 
content to accept that a person has as many social selves as there are persons who 
recognize him. Self-identity, for James, is socially constructed as well as corporeally 
defined. The fundamental aspect of the 'self of all other selves' for him is a kind of 
feeling – genuine physiological sensations that are utterly distinct from rational or 
cognitive operations. He cannot find or sense a spirit, but he is sure of the sensible 
occurrences within his body that seem to ground ‘this self of all the other selves. James’ 
thesis articulated two fundamental aspects of the self, the ‘I’ and the ‘Me’. For James, 
the ‘I’ am the knower in contrast to the ‘Me,’ which represents an empirical aggregate 
of things known about the self. It is the ‘Me’ that comes to be labelled the self-concept 
and receives major attention in self psychology. The ‘I-self’ is posited as a knower who 
is responsible for constructing the ‘Me-self.’ The knower is viewed as the subjective 
self because it organizes and interprets one’s experiences. The ‘Me’ is viewed as the 
objective or empirical self to the extent that it is the object of the I-self’s creation. James 
(1890) further splits the Me-self into three tiered constituents, namely the material self, 
the social self, and the spiritual self. At the bottom of the hierarchy is the material self  
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that subsumed the bodily self and one’s possessions that all one can call ‘mine’. The 
social self takes the next position consisting of those characteristics of the self 
recognized by others. The spiritual self is defined as an inner self comprising the 
individual’s thoughts, dispositions, moral judgment and so on which he considers to be 
the highest and more enduring aspects of the self for which a person ought to be willing 
to give up friends, fame and life itself. One may truly alienate from oneself, when one 
alters conscience, moral values, will, and purpose. After observing the multiple views of 
the social self, James extends the notion of social selves that may not speak with the 
same voice. James observed, “Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents 
and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his tough young friends” (1890, 
169).   
Multiplicity, on the other hand, can be harmonious as in the case where a man 
who is tender to his children is stern to his soldiers under his command. Alternatively, 
there can be a ‘discordant splitting’ if the individual is afraid to let one group of 
acquaintances witness his behaviour in a different setting. James views the ‘conflict of 
the different Me’s’ as incompatible with the potential roles a person might wish to adopt 
in adulthood. The rejection of particular roles or attributes does not damage a person’s 
self-esteem, the “average tone of self-feeling which each one of us carries about” (1890, 
171). 
The role of pretensions or aspirations was paramount in James’ theorizing of 
self-esteem. Self-esteem could not simply be reduced to the aggregate of perceived 
successes in life. Rather, self-esteem represented a ratio of successes to pretensions. 
Thus, if a person’s perceived successes were equal to, or greater than his or her 
pretensions for success, high self-esteem would result. Conversely, if pretensions 
exceeded successes, that is, if the person were unsuccessful in domains in which there 
were aspirations, he or she would suffer low self-esteem. Critical to this formulation is 
the assumption that lack of success in an area (e.g. Greek language for James) in which 
the person does not have pretensions will not damage self-esteem, because it is deemed 
unimportant and therefore can be discounted. Thus, both the presence and absence of 
pretensions figure heavily in James’ work. Many of James’ themes anticipate 
contemporary concerns and issues about the self. Each of these issues addressed by 
James has stimulated the diverse conceptualization of the self.  
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Diversification of the Self 
 
‘Me’ Self 
 
There has been increasing focus on the view that the Jamesian Me-self can be 
likened to a theory, which is constructed to organize the individual’s thinking about his 
or her relationship to the social world (Brim, 1976; Epstein, 1973, 1983, 1991; Kelly, 
1955; Sarbin, 1952). Whilst Kelly (1955) and Epstein (1973) consider self as a 
hierarchically split construct and self theory of response to a broad range of experiences 
respectively, Piagetians view self as  a developmentally changing espistemic self like 
James’ I-self (Beth & Piaget, 1966; Broughton, 1978). Piaget equates the self with 
universalized cognitive activity, which in turn, places emphasis on the I-self as knower. 
However, a careful analysis of the abilities and the limitations at each stage of cognitive 
development will reveal how the particular features of the I-self at each period 
necessarily dictate the very nature of the Me-self, the self-theory that can be 
constructed. As a result, the self-theory will look very different at different 
developmental stages. 
 
Real and Ideal Selves 
 
Closely linked to James’ distinction between perceived successes and aspirations 
is the split between how the person perceives the self to be in actuality and how he 
would like to be. Carl Rogers and his colleagues argued that the magnitude of disparity 
between the real and ideal self was a primary index of maladjustment (Rogers & 
Dymond, 1954; Higgins, 1990). Higgins (1990) predicts that different types of 
discrepancies produce different forms of psychological distress. Thus, discrepancies 
between the actual and ideal self produce dejection and related emotions (feeling 
dissatisfied, disappointed, discouraged, and sad). In contrast, discrepancies between the 
actual self and the self the person 'ought to become' produce agitation related emotions 
such as feeling worried, threatened or on edge. However, Zigler and his colleagues 
challenged Rogers’ assumptions and suggested an alternative framework (Achenbach &  
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Zigler, 1963; Glick & Zigler, 1986; Katz, Zigler & Zalk, 1975; Zigler, Balla & Watson, 
1972). In their view, discrepancies increase with age and increasing cognitive 
differentiation. A larger number of categories should increase the disparity between any 
two complex judgments including those of real and ideal self-images. Zigler and his 
colleagues argue that with increasing maturity the individual becomes better able to 
incorporate social demands, morals, and values. Because the person at a high level of 
development makes greater self-demands and is more often unable to fulfill them, he is 
likely to experience more guilt than someone at a lower level of development is. Closely 
related to the concept of real and ideal is another distinction between real and ‘possible’ 
selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Possible selves represent both the hoped-for, as well 
as dreaded selves, and function as incentives that clarify those selves that are to be 
approached as well as avoided. From this human potential perspective, it is most 
desirable to have a balance between both positive expected selves and negative feared 
selves. Another concept related to human potential called a ‘can-self’ was also 
introduced (Higgins, 1990). That is, adults did not report being bothered by real-ideal 
discrepancies if they felt that they had or could fulfill their potential (the ‘can-self’) but 
that their ideal was beyond their potential. Other findings also reveal that subjects (ages 
6-12) were most bothered by discrepancies between how they felt their parents 
evaluated them and what they felt their parents ideally wanted them to be (the parents’ 
perception of the child’s possible self). This finding alerts the complexity of self-
discrepancies and the many forms they may assume. It forces the researcher to look at 
the functional role of the self from a process-oriented perspective. 
 
True versus False Selves 
 
As a result of a proliferation of multiple selves during adolescence, many 
adolescents agonize about ‘which is the real me?’ From a developmental perspective, 
the distinction between the true and the false self appear to emerge in early adolescence 
(Broughton, 1981; Selman, 1980). Historically, the distinction between true and false 
self behaviour dates back to the 19
th century (Baumister, 1987). Baumister notes that the 
emphasis on the hidden part of the self was exacerbated by Victorian repressiveness and 
Freudianism. Horney (1950) described Self-alienation as an active movement against 
the real self, depersonalization, and depletion of energy. Freud’s revelations of the 
unconscious led to the conclusion that certain parts of the true self might not be 
accessible to the person himself. Bleiberg (1984) believed that false self behaviour  
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resulted from caregivers who did not validate the child’s true self, thus leading the 
infant to become alienated from his or her core self. For Winnicott (1958, 1965), 
mothers who are intrusively over-involved with their infant cause the child to develop a 
false-self based on compliance. The infant prematurely attunes to the demands of the 
parent and, as the result, loses touch with his or her own needs. Thus, the true self goes 
into hiding, as the child comes to suppress its expression. 
Social psychology literature offers a different perspective and that attempts to 
present the self in a manner that will impress or win acceptance of others motivate the 
false behaviour (Snyder, 1987). For example, high self-monitors are presumed to adjust 
their behaviour and thereby suppress their true self to gain the approval of others.  
In developmental literature, false self-behaviour is considered a dimension of 
role experimentation (Broughton, 1981; Selman, 1980). These are adolescents who 
experiment in playing with different selves around other people to see what it feels like. 
Moreover, the effect of level and conditionality of support from parents and peers on 
false self behaviour is mediated by hopelessness. Thus, the highest levels of false self 
behaviour are reported by those adolescents who receive conditional support. 
Adolescents at relatively low levels of false self behaviour lead themselves to feel 
hopeless about pleasing others that in turn causes them to suppress their true self as a 
potential means of garnering the desired support (Harter, 1996).  
 
Multiplied versus Unified Self 
 
While James contrasts the conflict of different Me’s, others place major 
emphasis on the integrated, united self (Allport, 1955, 1961; Epstein, 1973; Horney, 
1959; Jung, 1928; Lecky, 1945; Maslow, 1954.1961.1971; Rogers, 1950). For Allport, 
the self, “…includes all aspects of personality that makes for a sense of inward unity” 
(1955, 38). According to Allport (1955), many mental patients seem to suffer from what 
he terms the proliferation of unrelated sub-systems that defines the self. Rogers (1950) 
also describes patients who experience inconsistencies and partial disorganization of the 
self. For Maslow (1971), multiple personalities can best be described in terms of a 
failure of communication within the self-system.  
In contrast, social psychologists (Gergen, 1968; Mischel, 1968, 1973; Vallacher, 
1980) have argued for the multiple roles that people adopt. Gergen contends that the 
“popular notion of the self-concept is possibly ill-conceived” (1968, 306). He suggests  
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that people adjust their behaviour in accordance with the specific nature of the 
interpersonal relationship and its situational context. Consistency will not necessarily be 
expected or desirable across a relationship; in fact, it will most likely be damaging. 
Vallacher also asserts that different self-views with different roles represent 
differentiation rather than inconsistency. It is only when there is different self definition 
within a role, when a person feels he has been insensitive to a close friend that 
inconsistency is experienced.  
Multiple selves become problematic in mid-adolescence when opposing 
attributes within the self-portrait (e.g. outgoing with peers but shy on a date, or 
depressed with parents but cheerful with close friends) become contradictory. 
Adolescents have the conceptual tool to detect inconsistencies but do not have the 
ability to integrate such apparent contradictions. During late adolescence, however, 
opposing attributes are integrated into a compatible higher-order abstraction about the 
self. For example, cheerfulness and depression can be integrated into the higher-order 
abstraction of ‘moodiness’. Another strategy to reduce opposing attributes is by 
generalizing the desirability of behaving differently in different roles (Harter & 
Monsour, 1992). For example, older adolescents assert that it would not be normal to 
act the same way with everyone; you act one way with your friends and a different way 
with your parents, that’s the way it should be. 
Dennett (1992) gives the analogy of the self as a centre of gravity. He believes 
that the self is an artificial theoretical construction, just like our notion of the centre of 
gravity. It aids in predicting one another’s behaviour, but it is an over-simplified fiction. 
There is no single self, just as there is no thing that is gravity’s centre for any object or 
set of objects. We make up who we are and why we are doing what we are doing to a 
striking degree. Moreover, if we have not made something up explicitly in order to 
answer some query or other, then usually there is not a fact to the matter. What he 
means is that we are “autobiographical novelists”. Dennett argues that there is no self 
about which we can answer questions. Instead, there are multiple 'self-lets' about which 
we weave intriguing stories.  
 Multi-dimensional models of self as an antithesis to uni-dimensional or global 
models claim to explain the phenomenology of self-evaluation better. Nonetheless, the 
shift to a multidimensional focus should not preclude the existence and meaning of 
Jamesian global self-esteem or self-worth. Rosenberg (1979) argues that both global 
and constituent parts of the whole should be kept. Harter (1990) finds that the number  
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of domains that can be differentiated increases with development across the periods of 
early childhood, middle and late childhood, adolescence, and adulthood.  
Such a framework allows the resolution of tension between those who espouse a 
unified self and those who argue that differentiation across roles better describe the self-
system. Within the field of self psychology, there has been increasing zeal for models 
that specify how the self is differentiated without considering the processes through 
which differentiated selves organize and integrate (Harter, 1996). 
 
Hierarchical Selves 
 
Syntheses of uni-dimensional and multi-dimensional models of the self have 
naturally developed into what is known as hierarchical models. In hierarchical models, 
self-esteem or self-concept is placed at the apex and particular domains and sub-
domains are nested underneath. As stated earlier, James and Kelly (1955) have argued 
that the self is hierarchically organized into core constructs that are more critical to the 
maintenance of identity than are the more peripheral constructs. Of particular interest in 
these models are qualities such as moral self-approval (Epstein, 1973) and virtue 
(Coppersmith, 1967), which are positioned at a higher level than physical ability. What 
is important is the empirical support for James’ notion that successes in domains of 
importance are most predictive of self-esteem. Tesser (1988) and his colleagues have 
demonstrated, with adult subjects, that if a certain dimension is highly relevant to the 
person’s self-definition, performance judged to be inferior will threaten his or her sense 
of self-esteem (Tesser & Campbell, 1980). Comparison of correlations between self-
esteem and value domain rated important with those rated as unimportant shows that the 
domain of importance is the high predictor of self-esteem. Interestingly, research with 4 
to 55 year olds has shown that perceived physical appearance heads the list of predictors 
for high self-esteem. The next highest predictor was social acceptance together with 
academic performance, behavioural conduct and athletic competence (Harter, 1990). 
 
Information-Processing Self  
 
Meanwhile, cognitively oriented approach has evolved among investigators who 
have adopted information-processing models of the self. Markus (1980) proposed that 
the individual’s attempt to organize, summarize, or explain his or her own behaviour  
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will result in the formation of cognitive structures about the self that she terms ‘self-
schemata’. “Self-schemata are cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from 
past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related information 
contained in the individual’s social experience” (Markus, 1977, 64). Oyserman and 
Markus (1993) observe that, “They form the coordinates of the individual’s experiential 
world and the set of an individual’s self-schemas represent the core of the self-concept” 
(191). They go on to note that the individual plays an important agent role in designing 
the self, and authoring a coherent self-narrative, consistent with a focus on the more 
specific functions of the Jamesian I-self. 
  
Self as Symbolic Social Interactions 
 
In contrast to James’ notion, the symbolic interactionists emphasize the 
individual’s social interactions with others as a profound shaper of the self. The self is 
considered to be primarily a social construction crafted through linguistic exchanges 
(symbolic interactions) with others (Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1925, 1934). For Cooley, 
significant others constitute a social mirror into which the individual would gaze to 
detect their opinion toward him and incorporated into the self. Cooley’s self idea 
comprises three components: (1) the imagination of our appearance to the other person 
(2) the imagination of that person’s judgment of that appearance and (3) some sort of 
self-feeling, such as pride or shame. Cooley notes, “The thing that moves us to pride 
and shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, 
the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind” (1902, 153). Cooley paves 
the way for a developmental perspective on how the attitudes of others incorporate into 
the self. He observes that the mature person is not buffeted by the views of significant 
others, and that the person with “… balanced self-respect has stable ways of thinking 
about the image of self that cannot be upset by passing phases of praise or blame” (201). 
Cooley’s comments come closer to the Buddhist idea of ethical behaviour of ‘the self in 
process’ leading toward liberation. Mead elaborates on the themes identified by Cooley 
via the use of language. For Mead (1925), “We appear as selves in our conduct in so far 
as we ourselves take the attitude that others take toward us. We take the role of the 
‘generalized’ other. And in doing this we appear as social objects, as selves” (270). The 
‘generalized other’, therefore, implies that the individual is reacting to more than a set 
of specific others but the process through which more generalized attitudes toward the 
self are adopted. Mead focuses on Me-self defined more socially than Me-self put  
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forward by James. However, his I-self shares with the Jamesian ‘I’ that places emphasis 
on agency: “The ‘I’ gives the sense of freedom, of initiative” (Mead, 1934, 177), 
although it must act in consort with the Me-self.  
In both Cooley and Mead, the role and opinions of others plays as not only a 
feedback, but also a process, which creates generalized attitude toward the self. An 
enduring attitude about the self has implications for the stability of the self-concept. 
Historical scholars of the self, notably James and Mead, came to a similar conclusion on 
the two conceptually distinct but experientially intertwined aspects and meaningfully 
identified the self as the self as subject, and the self as object. Later researches to 
enhance the acquisition and development of this dualistic concept of the self come to 
the same conclusion, that is, that the ‘I’ continues to be defined as the active observer, 
and the ‘Me’ is the observed, the product of the process whereby attention is focused on 
the self (Dickstein, 1977; Lewis and Brook-Gunn, 1979; Wylie, 1974, 1979). 
 
Self as a Narrative  
 
This fascination with the self in the West, since the first emergence of modern 
science in the late 16
th century scientific period, the Reformation, and the 
Enlightenment era that declared the ‘death of God’ in the 19
th century by Nietzsche, has 
given birth to the deity of the ‘autonomous self’. Thus, man fulfilled his search for 
certainty from his position of insecurity. However, the celebration of autonomy also 
raises the inseparable fear of further uncertainty and meaninglessness. Knowing and 
understanding others without an external structure of communicative and ethical 
authority becomes impossible. Anthony Giddens (1991) gives an answer to this possible 
problem of isolation, alienation, and solipsism that not only reflexion constitutes the self 
but also language, which is social and public. Subjectivity derives from 
intersubjectivity. Language precedes the condition of self consciousness. Thus, 
autonomous or sufficient self of modernity is dethroned. A new determining force gains 
eminence - the language and discursive processes, which structure social interaction. 
The later position of Wittgenstein avoided the difficulty as well as in the more 
sophisticated versions of existentialist phenomenology. Self-consciousness has no 
primacy over the awareness of others, since language - which is intrinsically public – is 
the means of access to both. Intersubjectivity does not derive from subjectivity, but the 
other way round (Giddens, 1991, 51).  
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However, the linguistically constituted self opens up more unsettling questions. 
Incorporating Heidegger’s existential analysis, Gadamer and Dilthey stress the 
hermeneutic method of interpretive procedures as universal and all encompassing. Thus, 
language loses its pragmatic representational function, and becomes the very medium 
for the interpretative conceptualization of one’s self and one’s relation to the objective 
world. Gadamer (1975) writes, “being that can be understood is language” (432). 
Interpretation is the fundamental activity by which human beings realize their world (as 
text) and their being-in-the-world as (self-) interpretive subjects. Paul Ricouer (1974) 
puts it similarly: “there is no direct apprehension of the self by the self… but only by 
taking the long road of the interpretation of signs” (170). Derrida (1982) considered 
selfhood as the operation of endlessly mediated and deferred conceptual writing. The 
meaning of the human subject represents the ‘effect’ of difference – a  conflation of the 
ideas of deferral and difference – and the impossible attempt to bridge the gap between 
signifier and signified. Self is never separable from or directly available to linguistic 
appraisal.  
For Lacan (1977), a psycholanalyst, a sense of self that precedes linguistic 
formulation is inconceivable. Self-certainty is an illusory, misrecognized construct. The 
illusion of subjective agency is an effect of language, an effect, which paradoxically 
entails the loss of the subject in its objectification in a pre-existing system of 
signification. Self-scrutiny reveals not the presence of the autonomous self but its 
absence in the misrecognition of oneself as a unified self. In contemporary thought, the 
self is no longer understood as a pre-linguistic given, but as a linguistic construct. Kerby 
(1991) considers the self as the implied subject of self-referring utterances, constructed 
as ‘a result of discursive praxis rather than either a substantial entity having ontological 
priority over praxis or a self with epistemological priority, an originator of meaning.  
In other words, human beings are subjected by language and subjected to the 
ideological values, the systems of representations, repression, hierarchies, and 
stereotypes with which social language is imbued. Foucault (1973) offers human 
subjects as the ‘beings of language’ not in possession of pre-linguistic essentiality. 
Human interrelations and conceptions are fundamentally linguistic and symbolic in 
character. Here, postmodern scepticism and linguistic-constructivist thought postulating 
the ‘death of man’ finds itself supporting the Buddhist notion of non-eternal self.   
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Self as a Process 
 
With the ‘postmodern turn’, there has been a return of interest in process 
philosophy. Process philosophers like Whitehead (1929) and Bohm (1971, 1980) 
suggest how psychology might revise its view of selfhood. Both thinkers consider 
nature, including consciousness, as an organic process rather than as a mechanism. 
Meaning and feeling are gaining more emphasis than information and rationality as the 
metaphor of the mind. Bruner’s (1990) call for cultural meaning recommends that 
psychological inquiry start from the effort charged with feeling, which occurs in cultural 
contexts. The self means both a precondition of making this effort and a product of it. 
Selfhood is a process circulating meaning within and between a system involving 
physical, biological and psychological levels of order. Bohm places organic interchange 
of meaning between body and mind as a dialectical cause and as caused by the self. His 
emphasis on relation, process, and meaning parallels Whitehead. For Whitehead, 
selfhood cannot exclusively identify with cognitive mechanisms (Sperry & Henninger, 
1994). Mental life is an effort after an attempt to find meaning. The concept of self 
arises through making this effort within a cultural context. Selfhood is not a structure 
but a process in which biological, psychological, and cultural levels of order form an 
ecological system based on exchange of meaning. No level of this system has either 
ontological or explanatory priority, as Bateson, Maturana, Varela or Bohm, have in their 
different ways indicated in their treatments of the ecology of meaning (Pickering, 
1997). Pickering provides the metaphor of trying to understand a windmill by looking at 
the gears alone and ignoring how the whole system is animated by the wind. Cognitive 
mechanisms are not causal in and of themselves. They are animated by the flow of 
organic action in which experience and feeling participate. This flow is not an 
epiphenomenal or post hoc trace of cognitive mechanics. The principal guide to the flow 
of experience is feeling, not the cognitive mechanism of perception, memory or thought. 
All of them bind together in the total flow.  
Pickering (1997) elaborates his argument on two points: the postmodern turn in 
science and culture, and the postmodern turn toward plurality and eclecticism. By 
adopting natural science as a model, psychology found itself (though Husserl (1970) 
thought it to be inappropriate) not being able to explain anything significant about the 
world of lived experience. Moreover, by treating feeling and meaning as outside of 
nature, psychology had lost contact with its central phenomenon, the experience of  
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selfhood. Science has marginalized and downgraded "common-sense" realism. This 
view of the universe as the ‘endless hurrying of meaningless matter’ as Whitehead 
(1926, Ch. 3) puts it, rests on the categorical mistake of taking processes as objects. 
Science is not an isolated system with a uniquely privileged method, but one of many 
practices that have developed in different cultures at different times. Hence, it does not 
supersede other systems of knowledge and values but complements them.  
Cognitivism, which currently dominates Western psychology, unrealistically 
takes computation and rationality as the cores of mental life, when much more is found 
in experience, especially affective and intuitive thought. To treat mental life as arising 
from mechanistic operations independent of the situation within which they occur is to 
mistake a part of the system for the whole. Heidegger presents this as the result of 
decoupling science from human values. Although Cognitivism is prepared to consider 
consciousness as a legitimate scientific inquiry, it does not investigate the experience of 
consciousness directly. Rather, it explains it away by formal description of its vehicle 
and the mechanism. Hence, cognitivism shares the modernist phase of natural science 
with behaviourism by accounting for experience as a product of ‘something else.’ 
Embodiment of selfhood not only brings the methodological issues of 
combining scientific and phenomenological traditions, but ethical ones as well. No 
science is ethically neutral. From its political and social origins, science’s metaphysical 
foundations have intimately bound up with cultural assumptions and values. This is not 
to reject science but to approach it hermeneutically. Science is one of many ways of 
inquiring into reality that have developed in different cultures at different times. It has 
become clearer that science’s short-term achievement via certain methodologies is not 
sustainable in the long term. Science needs constraints that reflect human values. If 
science cannot understand interface between facts and values, biological and cultural 
diversity can be lost in pursuit of technology. To prevent such loss psychology needs to 
use the method that has intrinsically to do with human feelings and values. Investigating 
selfhood along these lines will bring more directly personal consequences than the 
currently practiced impersonal, neutral psychology. This does not mean that we drop 
everything that scientific psychology has achieved, but integrate with postmodern 
insight that personalities of those who practice science help shape it. Bohm (1988) 
proposed that postmodern science should not separate matter and consciousness, and 
should not, therefore, separate facts, meaning and value. Hence, postmodern psychology 
has to be necessarily post-cognitive. It requires psychology to have a more open,  
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inclusive and integrative worldview and to not treat meaning, value or experience as 
being outside of nature. 
 
Disembodied, Divided and Deconstructed Self 
 
The deconstruction of the rational, unified self concept also comes from clinical 
and laboratory evidence of disembodied and divided selves in neuroscience research.  
Such phenomena can lead to distracting and disturbing life experiences such as ‘The 
Disembodied Lady,’ a patient of neurologist Oliver Sacks (1985), who suffered from an 
acute polyneuritis that stripped her of all proprioception
19 - the unconscious perception 
of movement and spatial orientation arising from stimuli within the body itself even 
with one’s eyes shut. This patient could not sense her body at all, her very embodiment. 
Sacks underscores Wittgenstein's observation: “the aspects of things that are most 
important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to 
notice something because it is always before one’s eyes). The real foundations of this 
enquiry do not strike a man at all (cited in Robinson, 1998, 327).” What Wittgenstein 
writes about epistemology applies to the patient’s physiology and psychology, 
especially the common experience of the position and movements of the head, limbs 
and body in general that are perceived without the control of the visual system. The 
patient can no longer participate even at the level of sensation and her sense of self 
progressively changes and becomes increasingly meaningless to her. Deprived of all 
bodily sensations her sense of individuality degraded, as she has no feeling of an 
individuated body that is her own. Despite the patient’s own confusion and 
understandable distress even in the course of this extraordinary loss of self-sensation, 
she preserves her self-identity. The important function of the patient’s will and her body 
has made compensatory adjustments in the face of impossible odds. She says, “My 
body can’t “see” itself if it’s lost its eyes, right? So I have to watch it – be its eyes. 
Right?”  She has learned to operate everything through vision. She learned to walk, take 
public transport, and conduct the usual business of life with a great vigilance, which 
might break down if she has diverted her attention. Thus, if she was eating while she 
was talking, she would grip the knife and fork with painful force, but if there was any 
lessening of the painful pressure, she would drop them straightaway.  There was no in-
between modulation.   
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Although her feeling of disembodiment remains severe, this general feeling of 
deficiency in the egoistic sentiment of individuality has become less with 
accommodation and with the passage of time. She says, ‘I feel the wind on my arms and 
face, and then I know, faintly, I have arms and a face.’ Thus, her loss of proprioception 
has deprived her of her existential, epistemic basis and nothing she can do or think will 
alter this fact.  
However, if she were to suffer from memory deficit as in Wittgenstein’s 
reflection of a person who can only remember events from the odd days of the week 
rather than the even ones, one might ask whether she would have two self identities 
instead of having no self embodiment and thus no self-concept. Such a situation actually 
exists with the split-brain patient whose corpus callosum that adjoins the two 
hemispheres of the brain required surgical separation to relieve epilepsy. Parfit (1984) 
recognizes the relevance of such research to the overall question of mind/body 
reductionism and to the related question of self-identity and ‘person.’ Parfit’s thought 
experiment begins with his adopting the cognitive non-dominance of the two halves of 
his brain. He is able to devote each half to a divided problem set, but later uniting the 
two into a single stream of consciousness, he finds himself having two separate 
consciousnesses, each unaware of the other. This challenges the unity of consciousness 
as well as the Cartesian notion of a substantial self. Should brain transplantation become 
an available procedure, would it confirm the reductionist’s “nothing but” claim, i.e. two 
brains, therefore two selves? Recalling Wittgenstein’s reflection of a person with two 
distinct sets of memories, Wittgenstein remarks: 
 
 
“Are we bound to say that here two persons are inhabiting the same 
body? That is, is it right to say that there are, and wrong to say that there 
aren’t, or vice versa? Neither. For the ordinary use of the word ‘person’ 
is what one might call a composite use suitable under the ordinary 
circumstances…One might say in such a case that the term ‘personality’ 
hasn’t got one legitimate heir only”. (1958, 62) 
 
 
In support of Wittgenstein’s contention, Gillet (1998) argues that personal 
identity is not some disembodied Cartesian essence, but it depends on a fully integrated 
nervous system that has successfully recorded and processed the complex flow of 
information received in the course of actual living. Gillet reasons that reductionism fails  
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at the informational and experiential level and Parfit’s argument only holds at the 
linguistic abstraction level.   
However, Gazzaniga (1992) remains puzzled by his own findings on the 
generation of visual imagery in the brain. Findings from testing split-brain patients 
convinced Gazzaniga that visual imagery processes are not contained in the visual areas, 
as one would think. Some patients show tactically split but not visually split. These 
patients share visual information across hemispheres, but not information about what 
each hemisphere is touching. The left hemisphere cannot name the object in the left 
hand (out of sight). However, it would seem that if the patient has instruction to 
visualize what was in the left hand, and this information would then pass from one 
hemisphere to the other, then perhaps the patient could name what he touched. But in 
case after case Gazzaniga’s laboratory was unable to demonstrate such a transfer, 
suggesting that “visual imagery, as it exists in humans, is not a property of the actual 
visual system, but is a computation that takes place somewhere else, and remains 
disconnected from the processes of the other hemisphere.” (93). Thus, the brain is not 
only modularized but the boundaries for the modules are not drawn from where 
neuroscientists think. What Gazzaniga’s data point out is that language does not work as 
scientists normally expect. If the MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) evidence is 
definitive and visual imagery is located in the visual areas, then the patients are 
visualizing as instructed. But, they are still unable to vocalize what they see for some 
reason. Inadequacies in the way scientists characterize the brain modules needs 
explanation as they pertain to conscious experiences.  
Thus, disembodiment thoroughly challenged the unity of self belief. No matter 
how much the person wills it to integrate disembodied experience, they can only 
achieve the idea of unity artificially, not the actual experience of it. Conversely, split-
brain patients will interpret his or her involuntary behaviour by using a fabricated story 
in order to retain the integrity of the conscious ‘I’ (Gazzaniga, 1988). Thus, 
experimental evidence, real life and the clinical situation that produces epistemic 
contradictions witness the division of consciousness and multiple personalities.  
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Self as Ecological Awareness 
  
One revealing piece of evidence regarding the disunity of self as an enduring 
concept comes from developmental studies of newly born infants. The new born infants 
arrived to this world with already endowed and embodied ecological and interpersonal 
self-perception for survival and adaptation to the environment according to their 
evolutionary needs. This embodiment is synonymous with the Buddhist notion of non-
self where ecological sustainability is the primary experiential concern of an infant or an 
adult. Linguistic concepts of self, other, and environment are not necessary referencing 
tools for differentiation and adaptation. However, Edelman (1989) argues that the 
cognitive notion of self-identity requires a remembered self to re-construct a concept of 
self and psychological continuity. The remembered existence of the self, he asserts, is 
also intertwined with a ‘3
rd person’ evaluation of how one is judged by oneself or by 
others. As values and emotions are invariably involved in making judgments, cognitive 
evaluation may split itself off from emotional content. It is probable that the 
individual’s embodied awareness or ecological self-perception of co-existence with 
others and environment, and his tendency to maintain the balance could corrupt and turn 
into a desire for power and control.  
In other words, transformation of the embodied self into a symbolic 
representational self encourages dichotomies and binary opposites. Butterworth (2000) 
has pointed out that the reflective self is a later developed component of self when 
viewed from an ecological perspective. What the ecological approach is concerned with 
is whether antecedents of the self-concept may be observed in the ecological self-
perception and how development between the perceptual and conceptual levels of self 
awareness occurs. Butterworth (2000) puts it in the terminology of William James 
(1890) by asking whether there is evidence for an existential subject, the “I” or agent of 
activity in early infancy and for a categorical self, or the “me” as the object of my own 
awareness.  
The answer to these question comes from Neisser (1988), who made a 
distinction between five types of self knowledge which comprise aspects of a single and 
complex self system: (1) the Ecological self, which is directly perceived with respect to 
the physical environment. (2) the Interpersonal self, also directly perceived, but  
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depends on emotional and other species-typical forms of communication. (3) the 
Extended self, bases itself on memory and anticipation and implies a representation of 
self. (4) the Private self, which reflects knowledge that our conscious experiences are 
exclusively our own, also depends on representation. (5) the Conceptual Self, defined as 
a theory of self that bases itself on socio-cultural experience. From a developmental 
perspective, these levels did not fully explain how an individual situates the self in the 
world and how the self interrelate over time. In 1995, Neisser revised this theory of self 
into three developmental categories: the Ecological self, the Extended self, and the 
Evaluated self. As infants become increasingly aware of their immediate environment 
and themselves as participants in that environment, they form an “Ecological self”. 
Later, as they are better able to anticipate future action, remember behaviours and 
events from the past, and imagine objects not currently present, they develop an 
“Extended self”. Finally, as they begin to perceive themselves as social agents, they 
develop an “Evaluated self”. Neisser has defined some characteristics of the ecological 
self as perceived from infancy specifiable by objective information, which is kinetic and 
is available to several perceptual systems at once. Such primary consciousness (self 
awareness) is distinguishable from secondary consciousness (a higher order cognitive 
self consciousness) or reflective self awareness. Put simply, the ecological self is an 
object of one’s own proprioceptive perception and the reflective self is an object of 
one’s own cognitive representation, memory, and thought.  
The self as an object of one’s own perception since infancy goes against Piaget’s 
(1954, 1962) notion of adualistic confusion. The new born sees the world in 
undifferentiated form in their awareness. The Freudian account lacks a total 
differentiation at birth to proximal sensitivity (awareness of the kinesthetic qualities of 
the infant’s own body). Only later, the infant develops distal spatial sensitivity, as the 
infant becomes aware of himself as a totality, contained within an encompassing space. 
Adualistic assumption develops as the result of coordination of touch with vision and 
motor activity.  
 
Innate Dualistic Self  
 
In contrast, Thomas Reid’s (1764) theory of ‘natural dualism’ defines the self as 
an immediate knowledge by mind of an object different from any modification of its 
own (Baldwin, 1901). James Gibson (1987)’ who may have been influenced by Reid in  
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formulating his theory of direct perception, extended proprioception to include external 
feedback arising as a normal correlate of exploratory activity of perceptual systems. 
Through vision or audition as well as the muscles and joints one becomes aware of one 
own movement. Just as a bat may fly using echo-location to guide it, feedback from the 
visual environment may help the infant gain control of posture and hence be informative 
about the self. Proprioceptive information is available even to babies since perceptual 
systems are simultaneously proprioceptive and exteroceptive in the co-perception of the 
self and the environment.  
Natural dualism finds support from recent research with early infants. Infants 
demonstrate more than rudimentary differentiation between the self and the physical 
environment. Early infant studies - using the video-feedback the baby sees her own arm 
or leg movement, not directly, but over a TV monitor, either in correct perspective or 
reversed – show that very young babies prefer to view their movement on a TV monitor 
which corresponds with their own perspective and it is congruent with self-generated 
kinesthetic information (Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Van der Meer et al., 1995).  
Van der Meer et al. (1995) showed that a newborn baby would keep a weighted 
arm aloft when the limb was visible on a TV monitor but would allow the arm to drop 
when the camera showed the other, non-weighted arm. This achievement requires more 
than simple detection of a contingent relation between a kinesthetically specified limb 
motion and visual feedback. It requires perception of the correspondence between the 
kinesthetic output of one’s own limbs and the patterned visual feedback consistent with 
that motion. The embodied aspect of self constitutes perceiving the identity of 
patterning between kinesthetic and visual proprioceptive processes.  
Neisser (1988) argues that “We perceive as we act and that we act; often, our 
own actions constitute the very characteristics of the ecological self that we are 
simultaneously perceiving” (40). Foetuses as young as 12 weeks of age display complex 
sequences of activity including species specific facial expressions. Neonatal imitation 
studies of visual, auditory, and proprioceptive information reports some of these 
complex behaviors. Prenatal patterns of activity selectively lay down the mid-brain 
structures at the heart of the embodied action system.  
The action system has basic intentionality; it is not merely a mechanical reflex. 
For instance, hand-mouth coordination function in the newborn appears to have 
benefited from practice in utero (Butterworth, 1989b). The mouth seems to know it own 
hand and there is no necessity for visual guidance. Similar behaviours occur about 50  
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times per hour in the foetus from the 15
th week of gestational age before differentiation 
of the cortex in the foetus – a mid-brain organization function.  
Ramachandran et al. (1992) made the observation of adults who have had an 
arm amputated who experience phantom limbs when the mouth is touched. They 
conclude that Phantom limb phenomenon may arise because there is a pre-existing 
genetically determined aspect of the body scheme between hand-and-mouth 
coordination. In sum, the unity of perceptual experience exists from the outset, and that 
motor organization laid down in utero has long term implications for motor control even 
when some components of the body are missing.  
 
Innate Intersubjective Self 
 
Infants use proprioception provided by all perceptual systems especially visual 
aspects of proprioception as soon as it becomes available. Newborns show “innate 
intersubjectivity” and they distinguish between self and others from the outset. 
Evidence for what Stern (1985) called “affect attunement” and for sharing of affect such 
as synchrony of movements, vocalization and expressions of pleasure between two 
month old infants and their mothers has been shown by Murray and Trevarthen (1985). 
Trevarthen (1991) cited in Butterworth, 2000) argues that primary intersubjectivity is 
directly perceived in infants while secondary intersubjectivity is perceived through 
jointly constructed meaning that is achieved toward the end of the first year of the 
infant’s life. Contrary to the belief that infants being totally egocentric (i.e. lost in 
undifferentiated self), under carefully controlled studies, babies can find the target an 
adult (mother) is looking at. This phenomenon describes the arising of the ecological, 
geometric and representational mechanisms of joint attention during the first 18 months 
of life (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1992) cited in Butterworth, 2000). Also, paired 14 month 
olds check each other to make sure that their communication is effective (Franco, 
Perruchina & Butterworth, 1992) cited in Butterworth, 2000). 
Neisser (1988) defines the interpersonal self, as the self engaged in immediate 
and unreflective social interaction with another person, which exists in synchrony with 
inter-personal behaviours. Reciprocal gestures, emotions, and expressions of the partner 
confirm such intersubjectivity. The interpersonal aspect of self emerges into existence 
through the information created by these forms of early communication. Stern (1985) 
has described how a coordination of emotional experience between mother and baby  
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occurs in terms of the dynamics of emotional expression. Mother, in analogical fashion, 
matches the baby’s mood through the vitality of her own responses. She provides the 
baby with important information about specifically human emotions and conveys that 
she understands the child’s feelings. Such vitality effects may provide the essential 
human information for the self, which a ‘cold blooded’ cognitive analysis overlooks. As 
Stern (1993) suggests, it may be relatively easy to fake the cognitive aspects of 
interpersonal coordination, whereas affect, more than cognition, determines whether 
one engages with another human being. Therefore, feelings may occupy an important 
position in defining what makes a human self, rather than being merely a ghost in the 
bodily machine. Through such experiences, the baby comes to be aware of the variants 
and invariants (consistent experience) of the emotional relationship with the partner. 
The emotions form an invariant constellation of experienced feeling qualities that 
belong to the self, while interaction with others is the eliciting condition for such self-
specifying experience.  
The fundamental invariant to a core sense of self, in Stern’s (1985) view, comes 
from volition together with acquired skilled action. In addition, through proprioceptive 
feedback and predictable consequences, the infant gains information about the 
authorship of his own activity. He elaborate on the self as comprising four components: 
self-agency, i.e. the sense of authorship of one’s actions, self-coherence, i.e. the sense of 
being a physical whole with boundaries, self-affectivity, i.e. experiencing affect 
correlated with other experiences of self, and self-history, i.e. having the sense of 
enduring by noting the regularities in the flow of events. Perceptual systems provide the 
means to identify the consistent aspects of experience, which give rise to the 
remembered self. For Stern, the core sense of self is not a cognitive construct, nor a 
linguistic concept of self knowledge. It is the foundation in perception, action, and 
emotion for the more elaborate aspects of the self, which are yet to be developed. Fogel 
(1993) agrees that the core of self may identify itself at the intersection of various 
sources of information for self. However, he suggests that the self is “the dialogic 
relationship between the point of observation, the rest of the body and the perceptual 
flow field in which the body is immersed” (143). The roots of the dialogic self that give 
the distinction between the ‘I’ and the ‘Me,’ lie in the cooperation of self and the world, 
and the co-regulation of social encounters. In self-directed exploratory action, for 
example, the existential self (‘I’) specifies through touch an aspect of the categorical 
self (‘me’). Fogel argues that the process of self awareness is dialogic in the sense that 
there will always be self-specific feedback of different kinds. In social imitation, the self  
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perceives itself in relation to the other as an aspect of embodied cognition. Only at the 
end of infancy does the dialogic self becomes an aspect of the work of imagination. The 
dialogic self exists from the outset in the inherently relational information available to 
perception.  
Thus, the ecological self perception discloses many unexpected abilities of the 
babies. There is an emerging view of the origins of self as both a process and product of 
embodied perception, which lays the foundation for theories of the emergence of 
secondary or higher order self consciousness. 
 
Problems with Perception of Permanent Self 
 
Mirror self recognition has long been considered a diagnostic indicator for the 
emergence of a self concept as a permanent object. The technique is to show the child 
his own face on which a spot of rouge has been surreptitiously dabbed. Infants as young 
as 15 months (but usually 24 months) notice the anomaly in the mirror and remove the 
offending red dot from their own face. Babies of 10 months will notice the anomaly but 
fail to remove the rouge mark (Bertenthal & Fisher, 1978). Down’s syndrome children 
show delayed response on rouge removal until three to four years (Mans et al., 1978). 
Mirror self recognition (reflection in water in cultures without mirror) seems to be 
restricted to humans, chimpanzees (at about 8 years) and orangutans (age unknown), 
(Gallup, 1982). The task requires a combination of perceptual and cognitive abilities 
including detection of the mirror image, monitoring proprioceptive output, self 
identification by distinctive features, comprehension of the identity of the reflected 
image and attribution of the image to the self. 
Mirror self recognition occurs at about the same time as Piaget (1954) describes 
the child acquiring the concept of the permanent object. This includes the knowledge 
that objects continue to exist when unperceived and that they retain their unique identity 
over time. Thus, the infant acquires the concept of person permanence including the self 
concept. At the same time, the infant discovers the invariant properties of physical 
objects that are sufficient to account for mental uniqueness, although socio-emotional 
experiences are required for the development of personality (Hinde, 1997).   
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With the concept of the self as a permanent object, the child extent 
comprehension of his mirror image within the spatio-temporal dimension. Povinelli and 
Simon (1998) saw children aged three, four and five years on two successive occasions, 
separated by one week. On the first, preparatory visit, the experimenter (E) placed a 
sticker surreptitiously on the child’s head and a video recording was made of the child 
playing an unusual game. The (E) then removed the sticker so that its presence during 
the game was unknown to the child. One week later the (E) filmed the children again; 
playing a different game at a conspicuously different place, and once more, the (E) 
surreptitiously placed a sticker on the child’s head so that it was visible in the video 
recording. Testing then began and the children at each age saw the recording made of 
them one week previously, while the remainder saw the recording that had been made 
of them just three minutes before.  
The children aged four and five years who were tested with the video recording 
made just three minutes earlier reached to remove the sticker, thus demonstrating 
continuity of self over the three-minute gap. They would refer to the video image using 
the first person pronoun ‘me’ or by there own name. In contrast, three-year-olds often 
used third-person descriptions to state that the sticker was on ‘his’ or ‘her’ head, as if 
the brief delay was sufficient to disrupt the ability to attribute the video image to the 
self. The four-and five-year-old children who were tested with the video-recording 
made one week earlier made no attempt to remove the sticker, as if the transient 
anomaly in the appearance of the self of the distant past was understood to be irrelevant 
to the present self. Three-year-old children were as likely to attempt to remove the 
sticker, as they did not take into account the contextual information that showed them in 
the more distant past. Consequently, they treated both old and more recent video-image 
as equivalent. 
Although three-year-olds have no difficulty in identifying themselves in a 
mirror, they depend on spatio-temporal congruity between proprioceptive aspects of 
motor output and the video-image to attribute the image of the child with the sticker to 
the self. Povinelli (1995) suggests that they lack the ‘duplicated’ self which enables 
older children to connect ‘me experiencing now’ with ‘me experiencing then,’ even 
across small gaps in time. Povinelli and Simon (1998) suggest that three-year-olds 
cannot bridge the spatio-temporal gap of such a biographical self, which emerges at the 
age of four years. Although Fogel’s (1993) dialogic aspect of interpersonal self during 
mother-infant 'role switching play' takes place with three-year-olds, the cognitively  
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more demanding duplication perspective seems to be a late developing phenomenon, 
coming at about four years.  
It appears that the child of four years can simultaneously consider the present 
and immediately past state of the self. This duplication perspective corresponds to 
Neisser’s (1988) extended self, the private self and the self-concept that recognizes the 
self and the sense of being alone in one’s head and autobiographical memory. The 
duplication process not only comprises of the self as experienced now in relation to the 
remembered self, but it also depends on language or more precisely on symbolic 
representation. Hence, the cognitive or reflective self can be understood as a symbolic 
or conceptual aspect of self, whereas the ecological and interpersonal self can be 
understood as a non-symbolic aspect of experience. The autobiographical self requires a 
constant interplay between the ecological self and the symbolic, remembered aspect of 
self. This is the reason why the symbolic self can choose to ignore its own embodiment. 
The present author argues that this ‘ignore-ance’ of interplay with their embodiment is 
the key to understanding the three-year-olds inability to reproduce a duplicated self in 
two different periods and notice the change. The study also submits that our belief in a 
permanent self or a relative stability of personality derives from our desires and ability 
to use language and symbolically represents the consciousness of self.  
However, Lancaster (1997) uses what he calls the ‘I’ – tag model to show that 
the notion of enduring conscious self is the product of momentary mental processes. His 
model offers two benefits: First, it provides the opportunity for investigating the 
phenomenology of conscious experience from 1
st person methodology of disciplined 
introspection, the method that has lost its grip since propounded by Wundt in 1875. 
Secondly, it encourages the inquiry for investigating multiple and simultaneous 
processes of consciousness instead of linear mechanistic product. The model envisages 
‘I’ to be a cognitive representation, or schema, generated anew from moment to moment 
(Blakemore, 1987). It also incorporates agency and interpretation. The ‘I’ is postulated 
to be a product of the mind’s tendency to assign explanations and interpretations to 
elements of behaviour (Lancaster, 1991). An interpretative process is observed in split-
brain patients whose left hemisphere offers an explanation for the behaviour initiated by 
the right hemisphere (Gazzaniga, 1988). Gazzaniga’s accounts posit a specialized 
module of the left hemisphere, the interpreter that will take the behaviour at face value 
and fit the event into the large ongoing mental schema (belief system) that it has already 
constructed. Lancaster contends that a central feature of this ‘ongoing mental schema’ is 
‘I’. The ‘I’ is a hypothetical construction that brings a unified path to mental process.  
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Thus, the ‘I’ is a unified subject of perceptions, interpreter, and thinker of thoughts and 
instigator of actions. In Gazzaniga’s view, the hypothesis generated by the interpreter 
becomes the conscious belief of the subject. When, for example, the command ‘walk’ 
was flashed to the right hemisphere of a split-brain patient, the client got up and began 
walking. When asked why he was walking away from the testing area, the client replied, 
“I’m going into the house to get a Coke”. For Gazzaniga, this statement reflects the 
cause of the walking behaviour as construed to explain behaviour by the interpreter. The 
client believes his thirst to be the cause of his walking. The client believes that he makes 
the choice out of his own volition as the interpreter compulsively fabricates a causal 
structure within the individual’s experience.  
Thus, the output of the interpreter is the unified ‘I’ that is not a priori construct, 
rather a post hoc construction which gives the illusion of unitary control. It may be 
argued that for evolutionary reasons and everyday living the mind legitimizes the 
body’s behaviour to keep the integrity of the whole existence. Lancaster explains the 
unified ‘I’ by using the Buddhist Abhidhamma analysis stage of 17 mind moments 
called javana - an active stage of cognitive process that is considered to give rise to ‘full 
cognition’ and ‘the conceit of “I am”’. The ‘I’ in javana phase processes a habitual 
desire of craving or aversion to the sensory object.  
Lancaster (1997) further explains that an object familiar in experience will be 
accompanied repeatedly by a representation of ‘I’. The associative bond between the 
memory of the object and that of ‘I’ will be strong. This is the conceptual basis of the 
term ‘I’ tag. In the case of amnesia, for example, some disturbance has interfered with 
the system whereby the unified ‘I’ becomes associated with the memory of a perceived 
object. Future activation of the memory will not be associated with a sense of 
phenomenal personal engagement with that memory, which is the hallmark of implicit 
memory. With the Korsakoff clients, everything happens as though the various events 
of life, associated with each other in the mind, were incapable of integrating with the 
‘self’ itself (Claparede, 1995/1911). In the ‘I’-tag model, individual memories are not 
likely to be stored each with their own distinct ‘I’-tag. The ‘I’-tag for a given memory is 
a sub-set of what Baars refers to as the ‘self-system’. ‘Self is not in the first instance an 
object of knowledge; but it is contextual’ (Baars, 1988). The ‘I’-tag enables a context of 
personal reference to be built up in memory, which means that memories can be 
reflected upon without necessarily inducing direct action. This may be seen at all stages 
of the life cycle. They motivate childhood play, and adult explorations of their world. In 
Buddhism, detachment from the unified ‘I’ does not mean that the ‘I’ disappears. By not  
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identifying with the immediate self-reinforcing interpretation of events, a broader 
framework of causation and context is opened up. ‘I’ as a controlling element in the 
interfacing of sensory and thought events with memory is maintained.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The constructed self is rooted in our cultural conditioning whilst we have an 
innate sense of existence between self and other, which is changing, throughout our life 
span. In order to function effectively in daily life, humans have differentiated from each 
other with the development of linguistic rationality. Language gives us signs and 
symbols to represent our experiential reality. At the same time, language gives us the 
facility to remember our experience by means of symbolic labels. Through evocation of 
symbolic language, we can remember our experience as real as if they have not changed 
at all. However, the self concept as a cognitive schema and the illusion of perceptual 
constancy leads us to believe that there is a static unchanging self that underlies our 
existence. Confusion between static concept and dynamic experience has led to 
constructing multiple, diverse and hierarchical layered selves.  
Such finely constructed levels of selves and their thoughts and emotions not 
only cause conflict among themselves but also split away from the embodiment of the 
ecological feeling self that one experiences since birth. From the Buddhist perspective, 
construction of the eternal self emanated from the desire to integrate biological, 
psychological and sociological existence. In particular, social relationships not only 
condition the self to maximize pleasure and minimize pain for survival but also give 
opportunities to further enhance, eternalize and elaborate its desire. However, the 
phenomenon of disembodied and divided self discovered in cognitive neuroscience has 
demonstrated the disunity of self consciousness and momentariness of such an 
existence. Thus, the concept of self as a unified enduring entity is no longer sustainable. 
The difficulty that psychotherapy has faced for the last 100 years is evidently due to the 
mistaken epistemological belief in a unified self.  
The Western discovery of Buddhist psychology acknowledges the understanding 
that the so-called self concept only exists when the changing conditions of the Five 
Groups of Grasping (pancakhandhas) come together; it is just a process of conditionally 
arising and passing of psychophysical phenomena and that there is no enduring self as 
such. So also, we enhance, elaborate and eternalize both healthy and unhealthy desires.   
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The next chapter addresses the Western emphasis on cognition (thinking) of 
desire as opposed to the Buddhist emphasis on affect (feeling) as the Buddhists see the 
self as co-conditioning or co-arising of embodied desires. It also elaborates on the split 
in treatment of desires between Western and Buddhist approaches where the former 
ignores the importance of addressing the feeling-related social ethics, which the latter 
considers a core component in alleviating the self from suffering.    
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Chapter 6 
 
Cognitive-Affective Split on Understanding 
Self Desire 
 
Desire expresses its power through the creation of the self that craves pleasant 
experience and avert unpleasant experience. Desire creates its meaning through 
conceptualizing the perception of feelings on the body through internal dialogue called 
self-talk. In the Buddhist theory of Interdependent Arising, conditions such as feeling 
(vedana), craving (tanha) and clinging (upadana) in the twelve links work together 
within the context of the Five Aggregates or Group of Grasping (pancakhandhas). In 
particular, mental formations (sankharas) play a prominent roles in conceptualizing 
concomitant mental factors (cetasikas) or unhealthy self-talks (akusala cetasikas) that 
colour our minds (cittas). They represent desires that motivate us to take unwholesome 
actions leading to suffering. 
This chapter addresses the different emphasis on thinking and feeling in treating 
unhealthy desires between Buddhism and psychotherapy. It also elaborates on how 
Western traditions including feminist thinking define and deconstruct desire. Finally, it 
asserts the ignorance of psychology in not integrating feeling-related social ethics that 
the Buddhist psychology considers as a major component in liberating the self from 
suffering. 
 
Cognitive versus Affective Emphasis on Desire 
 
Psychotherapy and Buddhism differ in their understanding of emotional desire. 
While both approaches concur on the significance of self-talk as an identifiable  
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manifestation of desire and suffering, psychotherapy focuses its treatment on thinking, 
and Buddhism emphasizes its attention to feeling. Although each approach differs in its 
emphasis, both deal with all three aspects of human personality namely Cognition, 
Affect, and Behaviour. Psychotherapy views rational thinking as a way to connect with 
feeling and behaviour. The Buddhists, on the other hand, see sensation or feeling as a 
precursor to developing and labelling of emotions arising together with the other 
aggregates of perception, conception (thinking), consciousness, and the body.  
It is noteworthy to question why Western psychology, which studies all the five 
groups of grasping, does not integrate them together. One obvious reason is that all the 
aggregates manifest themselves through consciousness. Another reason links it to the 
historical struggle of psychology in seeking acceptance by scientific circles. The 
deductive and positivistic approach to psychology leads to linear causation concepts that 
brought its attention to the study of consciousness and its opposite, the unconscious, as 
an eloquent psychoanalytic writer, Sigmund Freud, has done. In addition, in favour of 
rationality and cognition, the Western tradition has largely neglected to study an 
important role played by emotions in wellness and pathology. Since the times of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), emotions carry a negative connotation as a source of 
irrationality. Emotions are not conducive to our ability to think, reason, perceive and 
understand things; they interfere with the development of good character, and as they 
are ethically undesirable states, we should eliminate them. They also interfere with calm 
and rational behaviour and cause psychological agitation, chaos, and impulsivity.  
However, as Nussbaum (1977) asserts, “Aristotle and the Hellenistic thinkers 
insist that human flourishing [eudaimonia, actualizing potentials and attaining 
happiness] cannot be achieved unless desire [emotion] and thought, as they are usually 
constructed within society, are considerably transformed … [and they] have shown 
compellingly and in detail how specific social conditions shape emotions, desire, and 
thought (11).” 
In modern times, the three founding fathers of modern study of emotion, 
namely Charles Darwin, William James, and Sigmund Freud have resurrected Emphasis 
on emotion. 
William James’s idea of feeling as bodily sensations, however, needs to 
differentiate from the Buddhist notion of feeling (vedana). James did not attempt to 
make any distinction between feelings and emotions as physiological sensations are 
necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of emotions. The present 
author contends that we can have two identical physiological and neural images of  
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different experiences, e.g. anger and excitement, but we may not be able to distinguish 
different psychological states between them. “The wealth of experimental evidence 
about the physiological aspects of emotion has yet to confirm the possibility of 
distinguishing emotions by reference to physiological evidence alone (Lyons, 15).” 
James ignores the cognitive aspect of emotions. He sees the sequence of emotions as 
perception of objects - the only cursory mention of the cognitive aspect, i.e. 
physiological arousal and feeling or subjective awareness of arousal. He talks as though 
objects are just exciting but ignores the larger cognitive schema or belief about them 
that causes the excitement. For James, the feeling of bodily symptoms imbues 
consciousness with an emotional quality; our feelings of bodily symptoms of emotions 
are caused by, but do not cause, the bodily symptoms of emotions; thus, the bodily 
symptoms of emotions cause the emotional quality of consciousness. For James, an 
emotion like anger is nothing but a particular (emotional) quality of consciousness. He 
takes a big jump from saying that bodily symptoms cause emotions to the position that 
bodily symptoms of emotions cause the emotional quality of consciousness. His 
identification of emotions with feeling lacks ‘causal depth’ (Padmasiri de Silva, 1992). 
As Gordon (1987) puts it another way, “… emotions come to be cut off, in large part, 
from the rich network of causal connections (92)”.  
Within the context of the five groups of grasping or existence (khandha), mental 
formations (sankhara) represent active (kammic) dispositional formations that feature 
the complexes of emotion. Concepts such as delusion (moha), wrong worldview (ditthi) 
and wrong belief in identifying with five groups of existence or ‘psychophysical 
personality belief’ (sakkayaditthi) provide a conceptual apparatus for discerning 
cognitive components in the formation of emotional desires. 
In the Western tradition, emotion represents as a mental item, like sensation. 
Everyday language treats feeling and emotion as the same experience. However, this 
kind of feeling theory, originally formulated by Descartes, does not explain emotion, if 
emotions are only accessible to introspection and how we all learn to speak of them 
more or less uniformly. In addition, we unreflectively assume the knowledge of others’ 
emotions and occasionally discover our own. Nevertheless, it is most Western thinkers 
view that it is not only possible for a person to be mistaken about the emotion one feels, 
but to have emotion without feeling. This alludes to conceptual nature of defining 
emotion. Such unfeeling conceptualized emotion may describe psychopaths who 
experience intense hatred but may be unable to understand the feeling except through 
witnessing the suffering of others by their actions.  
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William James persuasively argued that without ‘bodily symptoms’ 
(sensations) emotion would be merely detached observation. Perception of external 
events causes these physiological disturbances. We are sad because we cry, angry 
because we strike, rather than crying because we are sad or striking because we are 
angry. His, and other, physical or bodily-oriented versions of feeling theories fail to 
counter the argument caused by environmental conditions, including the ingestion of 
drugs, because they apply to situationally arisen emotion, not dispositional or lasting 
emotion, and in making emotions an involuntary process.  
For the Buddhists, feelings (vedana) that already contain hedonic tones initiate 
the development of affective-cognitive processes of mental formations (sankhara), 
which construct concepts, evaluate, and interpret meanings of feelings.  
Kalupahana’s (1987) attempt to integrate James’ notion of feeling with the 
Buddhist concept of emotion also limits total application, as feeling (vedana) is only 
one aspect of the Buddhist explanation of the five groups of grasping in interdependent 
arising. The role of the feelings and the cognitive factors are integral aspects of the 
Buddhist perspective on emotions. 
Buddhism, like Behaviourism
20, recognizes attraction (sarajjati) to agreeable 
objects and repulsion towards disagreeable objects (byapajjati). Thus, the individual 
develops like (anurodha) and dislike (virodha) in relation to a physical or mental object 
resulting in approaching the pleasure-giving object and avoiding the pain-producing 
object. In the Buddhist teaching of Interdependent Arising, feeling conditions craving 
and there is a close link between feeling and desire. Craving, as an excessive and 
unwholesome desire, conditions clinging. Clinging
 may be referred to as ‘over 
evaluation’ and an intensive attentional focus which signifies certain types of ‘object 
relations’ between subject and object, which can have an emotional aspect, such as to 
possess the object (greed), fighting against it (hatred), fleeing from it (fear) or to be 
obsessed with it in anticipation (anxiety and worry). Charles Taylor (1986) makes a 
distinction between ‘appetative’ emotions and ‘possessive’ emotions. The appetative 
emotions emphasize appetite, greed, craving, and the possessive emotions emphasize 
the elements of adhesiveness, fixation, clinging and so on. The Pali word tanha literally 
means ‘thirst’, like an unquenchable desire, which arises from time to time and is a 
never-ending process.  
Sumedho (1992) argues that feeling is not suffering, although suffering 
involves feeling. Desire does not cause suffering. It is clinging, grasping (upadana) or 
literally taking up desire that causes suffering. He emphasizes the notion of clinging,  
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adhesion, or attachment like Charles Taylor. However, desire is never faithful to its 
goal. This is like a fool drinking salty water to quench his thirst; the more he drinks, the 
more he feels that he needs (desires) to drink. Desire and consciously chosen acts may 
lead us to either suffering or liberation. If wholesome desires accompany wholesome 
acts, liberation will come to fruition. Unwholesome desires and actions perpetuate 
suffering. Hence, desires are neither bad nor unacceptable. According to Govinda 
(1969), the term ‘desire’ has lost its neutral character (in a moral sense) in the European 
translation of Buddhist literature, in which ‘desire’ has become an equivalent for tanha. 
A very important aspect of desire is our need to have a unique individual I-dentity that 
has a strong link with our concept of the self, one of the three forms of unwholesome 
craving. 
In Theravada Buddhist psychology, the springs of human behaviour found 
themselves to be in three wholesome desires or roots (kusala mula) and three 
unwholesome roots (akusala mula). They are the products of both cognition and affect. 
Of the unwholesome roots, Greed (lobha) generates ‘craving’ desires for sensuality 
(kama tanha) and self-preservation (bhavatanha) and such emotional attachments like 
lust, fear of loss, grief, and anxiety. In addition, Hatred (dosa) generates ‘aversive’ 
desires like anger, indignation, hatred, resentment, envy, self-hate (vibhavatanha), 
malice, etc. and Delusion (moha) generates confusion, some kinds of shame and guilt, 
inferiority feelings and conceit or “ego” on the mind. Wittimuny (1978) emphasizes the 
greater strength of the self: self-preservation (bhavatanha) and self-annihilation 
(vibhavatanha), as greater than craving for sense pleasure (kamatanha). Padmasiri de 
Silva (1979) elaborates that craving for self-preservation and self-annihilation are not 
really opposites, but the contrasting attitudes of being bound to craving - ambivalence 
and ambiguity to the process of becoming. Padmasiri de Silva (1979) elaborates: 
“…craving for self-preservation or craving for egoistic pursuit colour the emotions 
which have a competitive quality about them, the need to be unique, outshine others, the 
search for esteem, prestige and power as well as status…emotions related to qualities 
like vanity, arrogance and excessive anxiety could also turn out to be those with a very 
strong aggressive quality. Thus, the very forms of craving may get blended and 
regarding the craving for self-preservation and self-annihilation, they are not really 
opposites, but the contrasting attitudes of being bound to craving …attitudes of 
ambivalence and ambiguity to the process of becoming. In this manner, the framework 
of the threefold craving provides the base for the emergence of a rich variety of human 
emotions” (52-54). He clarifies that the emotions of shame and guilt often emerge as  
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blends of shame with anger, and guilt with fear. A good example of a blend of emotion 
would be jealousy. It is a blend of attachment to an object or a person, fear of loss, 
anger towards a rival, pride as a threat to prestige, and ambivalence as love and hatred 
of the beloved. While unwholesome roots generate conflict, incongruence and 
unfulfillment, their opposites, generosity (alobha), compassion (adosa) and wisdom 
(amoha), lead to freedom from suffering generating happiness and harmony with others 
and the world. 
Averill (1980) argues that cognitive self-attribution of emotion allows the 
individual to renounce, to a certain extent, the responsibility for the consequences of 
action. The dynamics of this process is, in some respects, similar to the dynamics 
underlying conversion reactions, the loss of sensation in certain parts of the body. 
Therefore, emotions are purposive. “They are in themselves strategic and even 
“political” as well… [However,] emotions do not just “happen” to us, as the whole 
language of “passion” and “being struck by” would suggest. They are…activities that 
we “do”… work for us, both individually and collectively…emotions can be said to be 
rational…emotions seek their own satisfaction, in anger, through vengeance, in hatred, 
through vanquishing, in love, through “possessing”. That is not to say that all emotions 
can be satisfied or have conditions of satisfaction. (Grief, for example, is an emotion 
with no such conditions of satisfaction, … even such emotions may have purpose or 
purposes not so much for the individual as for the group together (Solomon, 1997)”. 
Jean-Paul Sartre tells us that emotions are “magical transformations of the world”, by 
which he means that emotions are intentional and strategic ways of coping with 
“difficult” situations.  
In the Buddhist approach to conditional causality (interdependent arising), 
craving and clinging as the “movers-and-shakers” of emotional desire are more apparent 
than cognitive concepts of ‘desire’ and motivation in the Western tradition and in 
clinical psychology. A Latin word for emotion, “exmovere” explains that “ex”, means 
“out” and “movere”, “to move”. Together emotion means “to move us out” to action. 
Western philosophers like Aristotle, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Descartes have recognized 
the linkage between emotions and desire. For example, Aristotle’s Nichomachean 
Ethics show the close link between desire and emotion. The ethical evaluation of 
emotions in Aristotle often refers to desires as motivational states. The Buddhist moral 
critique of emotional desires also relates to their motivational base. The next chapter 
discusses both Aristotle’s idea of vices and the Buddhist notion of unhealthy mental 
concomitants to the desire.  
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Cognition and Emotion  
 
Cognitive theories of emotion, on the other hand, support the Buddhist 
theory of emotion by making the notions of cognition (vinnana), motivation 
(satti) and evaluation (sankhara) central to emotion. Cognitive theories vary as 
to whether emotions are cognitions, cause cognition, are caused by cognition, or 
are part of a motivational process, which causes us to apprehend things in 
certain ways and act accordingly. If there is a connection between knowledge 
and emotion, the emotions can be seen as a rational way of perceiving and 
interacting with the world, rather than the random, self-enclosed psychic or 
physical sensation. The assumption initiated by Plato that emotions distort or 
obscure the true way of seeing the world, because they conflict with reason, can 
be replaced by the view that they complement reason and open up the realm of 
moral, aesthetic, and religious values.  
Against this connection between emotion and knowledge, fear can still develop 
into phobia, and anger may still depend on a perceiver’s temperament rather than on its 
objective validity. Cognitive theories specify perceptual knowledge but do not stipulate 
the particular emotion that is felt. For example, two people may have the same 
perceptual discrimination of a situation and make the same response, yet each has a 
different emotional response. They may have realized that they both have been cheated 
and both take steps to remedy this, but one may feel angry, the other amused. This is 
because two different e-valu-ative interpretations have generated two different 
emotional meanings.   
It should be noted that the cognitive aspect of emotion as it is used in therapy 
indicates just an idea for the meaning of an emotion. It denotes the signal function of 
emotions or the message or information they contain. This is what psychoanalysis 
attempts to uncover. Nevertheless, for a cognitive theory of emotions it means that 
emotions are products of cognitive processes and are elicited by a complex cognitive 
appraisal of the significance of events for one’s well-being (Lazarus & Folkman, 1982). 
Cognitive appraisal is to “mediate the relationship between the person and the 
environment. The appraisal process gives rise to a particular emotion with greater or 
lesser intensity depending on how the relationship is evaluated with respect to the 
person’s well-being (Lazarus, 1982: 1021)”. Lazarus considers that even instinctual  
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fight or flight reactions probably have a cognitive component. In his view, cognitive 
appraisal is always involved in emotions, even in creatures phylogenetically far more 
primitive than humans are. 
 
Cognitivists versus Buddhists on Emotion 
 
Rational Emotive Therapy (RET) and Aaron Beck’s Cognitive therapy (CT) 
stipulate that emotional reactions tend to be conditioned by unrealistic evaluations that 
do not accord with reality. Cognitions that do not condition emotional reactions would 
thus be, based on realistic evaluations. However, the hedonistic tenor of Ellis’s overall 
philosophy indicates that realistic cognitions could condition what he would label 
“positive emotions” such as conjugal love and self-pride. Buddhists would consider 
them as reactions to ‘ignorance’ rather than positive emotions. Ellis’ understanding of 
the term ‘realistic’ does not preclude genuinely life-threatening situations, which may 
condition an emotional response. In one sense, Ellis goes further in stating that even 
negative emotions such as sorrow, regret, annoyance, and irritation stem largely from 
rational self-talking sentences. The implication is that rational belief can condition 
emotional disturbances. This signals a difference between RET and Buddhist concepts.  
In RET, it is also theoretically possible that someone could have an irrational 
worldview but still be happy and contented. In other words, irrational beliefs do not 
cause him to be disturbed but his happiness will be contingent upon environmental 
circumstances. From the Buddhist perspective of the impermanence and changeability 
of all phenomena, such happiness is highly contingent and an unstable state.  
RET also distinguishes between beliefs that describe needs and desires, and 
beliefs that constitute demands. The former that can result in disappointment, 
frustration, and sadness if unfulfilled, are considered normal. However, the latter that 
condition emotional responses such as anger are regarded as emotional disturbances. 
According to the RET, ‘desires’ enhance life because they produce creative tension. “I 
think that almost all wants, desires or preferences are appropriate, and very much help 
to make life worthwhile. Only the escalation of such wants into “needs” is inappropriate 
and had better be surrendered (Ellis, 78)”. RET claims to ameliorate emotional 
disturbances, but not emotional reactions that arise due to frustrated needs and desires. 
There is a major difference between RET and Buddhism. Buddhist psychology 
disputes the notion that emotional reactions conditioned by desires and wants are not 
disturbances. According to Buddhism, the emotional responses conditioned by  
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‘unhealthy’ desires are major problems for people. The Buddha confirmed the centrality 
of desire in the formation of emotional problems when he taught the Four Noble Truths 
to his five former companions after his enlightenment. 
 
Cognitive-Affective Bases of Emotion in Buddhism 
 
The Buddhist treatment of emotion shows both the cognitive as well as 
affective bases together with other factors like feelings, desires, thoughts, strong 
attentional focus, intentionality, somatic factors, and social contexts. With proclivities 
or inclinations (anusaya), affective tendencies of sensuous greed (kama-raga), anger 
(patigha), conceit (mana) are cited along with cognitive distortions of speculative 
opinion (ditthi), doubt (vicikiccha), ignorance (avijja), and craving for continued 
existence (bhavaraga). Cognitive aspects of taints, corruptions, biases, or influxes, 
desiring eternal existence (bhavasava), ‘wrong’ view (ditthasava), and ignorance 
(avijjasava) are predominantly cited along with sense-desire (kamasava). Among the 
five hindrances (nivaranas), the emotional aspects of sensuous desire (kamacchandha), 
ill will (vyapada), sloth, torpor (thina-middha), restlessness, and worry (uddhacca-
kukkicca) dominate, with the exception of doubt (vicikiccha), which has a slight 
cognitive stance.  
Similarly in clinging, the cognitive aspects of clinging to views (ditthupadana), 
clinging to mere rules and rituals (silabbatupadana), and personality belief 
(attavadupana) dominate, with the exception of sensuous clinging (kamupadana). 
Clinging or entanglement with personality belief helps explain narcissistic attachment to 
the body or infliction of torture on the body as a taint of self-hate. Cognitive distortions 
and a lack of insight involve deeper experiential and existential encounters with the 
concept of eternal self, fear of death and its inevitability. Concomitant mental factors or 
craving self-talks discussed in the next chapter involve both cognitive and affective 
bases. 
Buddhists treat emotions, at least, from three perspectives, namely logic of 
reason, ethical quality, and irrationality. If a person angers another person, the reason(s) 
for that anger is present. Whether its ethical quality is justifiable or not is another 
matter. From the Buddhist ethical logic of liberation, anger cannot be justified in any 
context. McCullagh (1990) exemplification of the irrationality of negative emotions 
accords with the Buddhist notion: “We fear that which we know is unlikely to happen;  
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we desire what we know we don’t need. We are angry at matters we know to be trivial; 
we yearn for what we know we can never have” (44).                                                                                                                      
 
Parallels and Parting Points between 
Psychotherapy and Buddhism 
 
A Buddhist parallel to the Western notion of emotion may be, nevertheless, 
construed when Lazarus (1982) states, “the full experience of emotion [which] normally 
includes three fused components: thoughts [kilesa vatta], action impulses [kamma vatta] 
and somatic disturbances [vipaka vatta], (1019)”. At a process level, Lazarus is stating 
that emotional reactions arise only when these components are associated. His notion 
validates the central Buddhist theory of Interdependent Arising. Lazarus considers that 
cognition, emotion, and motivation are interdependent conditions. In his view, 
emotional reactions can function at a pre-reflective and even on an unconscious and 
subliminal level. For Lazarus, the cognitive activity of appraisal does not imply 
anything about deliberate reflection, rationality, or awareness. In contrast, Albert Ellis’ 
Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) claims that conscious or readily accessible belief 
conditions emotions. This is Ellis’ point of departure from both Lazarus’ and the 
Buddhist views of emotion. 
 
Postmodern Treatment of Desire 
 
Western psychotherapy and philosophical tradition primarily rely on rational 
analysis to deconstruct the meaning of emotional desires or craving self-talk. In the 
latter part of the 20
th century, structural and post-structural thinkers in philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, linguistics and literary studies and feminist theories have demonstrated 
that cognitive activities alone do not accord with reality. Critical theorists like Lacan, 
Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Kristeva, Cixous, and Irigaray have highlighted the 
interdependency between desire and subjectivity, language, culture and  
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psychopathology. In short, they concur with the Buddha that desires are fundamental to 
existence, suffering, and liberation.  
In Lacan’s view desire is not only a subject to analyze but also to become part of 
the instrument and methodology of psychoanalysis. Lacan bases almost his entire theory 
of the unconscious, subjectivity, language, and culture on the issues of desire. Derrida, 
on the other hand, uses desire to understand deconstruction and employs deconstruction 
to analyze desire. Both Lacan and Derrida position desire as text, which operates within 
certain bounds. They consider reading as an act of desire thereby allowing the 
connection between the construction and deconstruction of meaning through desire. 
Applying the popular semiotics of Roland Barthes and others, “semes” are used as the 
minimal unit of meaning and its operation. However, French feminists interpret desire 
not in terms of singularity but diversity, as it affects language, the subject, power, and 
culture.  
For psychotherapy, Lacan’s articulation of Freud’s eminently abstract theory of 
drives provides them with the combination of abstract and practical application to a 
wide range of disciplines including arts, entertainment, and advertising. Lacan’s re-
reading of Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and Freud shifted him from structural 
to post-structural thinking in linguistics and post-Freudian thought. For Lacan, desire 
constitutes the essence of psychoanalysis as a discipline when he states, “The Freudian 
[suffering] world isn’t a world of things, it isn’t a world of being, [and] it is a world of 
desire as such” (Lacan, 1988, 222). Such a statement encapsulates the Buddhist causal 
theory of interdependent arising.  
Lacanian analysis spreads across literature, philosophy, history science, culture, 
linguistics and concerns itself with interpretation. It deals with what it means to signify 
and how such constructions continue to operate. Lacan ties interpretation to desire and 
desire to the essence of interpretation. “Desire, in fact, is interpretation itself” (Lacan, 
1986, 1976). He constantly uses desire to understand and make sense of other ideas and 
methodologies. In other words, each time desire is attached to concepts like language, 
subject or culture, the interpretive force of desire shifts its focus and makes sense of 
itself and the corresponding set of issues.  
The heart of the post-structural movement, which focuses on self-reflexivity to 
analyze analysis, understand understanding, and interpret interpretation, reinforces the 
Buddhist practice of reflective self-observation with a difference. The way Buddhist 
reflection differs from Lacanian analysis will become clearer as we go further into the 
latter. Lacan states: “Understanding is evoked only as an ideal relation. As soon as one  
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tries to get close to it, it becomes, properly speaking, ungraspable” (Lacan, 1993, 7). He 
does not dismiss the idea of understanding, but merely says that it is an evoked idea in 
relational context to others. Because it is an ideal, which conveys a sense of ‘truth’ but 
forgetting in the Nietzschean sense that it is ideal (derived from conceptual notion) 
rather than actuality? The key word in his statement is the “ungraspable” nature of 
understanding. This notion of understanding and the indefinable and self-reflexive 
nature of understanding parallels Lacan’s conceptual frame of desire. For Lacan, desire 
defines subjectivity and is constitutive of subjectivity while it explains its own operation 
and actions in individual, socio-cultural, and linguistic terms.  
Following Saussure, Lacan accepts that language, including craving self-talk, as 
a structure that pre-exists the individual and is not under the control of the individual 
but is the one that determines the individual’s possibilities. Lacan elaborates Saussure’s 
terms into metaphor and metonymy. The former is the replacement of one idea with 
another or the collapsing of two such images or ideas together, e.g. as in the phrase, 
‘Achilles is a lion in battle’. The latter associates with contiguity. That is, the whole 
standing for the part or the part standing for the whole, e.g. as in the phrase ‘a thousand 
sails set out to sea’. In Lacan’s usage of the term metonymy, contiguity between two 
ideas includes the connection by rhyme, sound or even free association. This re-reading 
of Saussure makes the function of the language poetic rather than literal. Lacan 
observes the unity between the two poles of the language, metaphor (the collapsing of 
two or more items) and metonymy (the contiguity of two or more items), and the two 
processes of the unconscious – condensation and displacement. A common example of 
condensation can be found in dreams where a number of wish-laden images are 
collapsed into one image and are thereby unrecognizable to the dreamer. The 
unconscious displacement can also be observed where a wish is deflected from its 
original forbidden object onto another whose relation to the first is unrecognized by the 
subject, such as Freud’s example of a woman who burns her lunch on the stove while 
reading a “Dear Jane” letter from her fiancé, (a contiguous connection between two 
events) and thereafter the smell of burnt food causes her panic attack.  Hence, his 
famous assertion: The unconscious is structured like a language.  
Lacan also adopts Saussure’s vocabulary of the signs - “signifier” and 
“signified”. Saussure states that a signifier can be what it is only in contrast with other 
signifiers. When looking at the meaning of a sign, Saussure saw the relationship 
between the signifier (word or sound image) and the signified (concept). However,  
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Lacan looks for the meaning of signifiers in relation to other signifiers. A signifier, for 
Lacan, signifies another signifier. 
Desire and subjectivity are inseparable. Desire creates the subject, as Lacan 
asserts that the subject exists for the signifier (word or sound image, e.g. man), not the 
other way round. Lacan argues that signifiers pre-exist us. We enter into the Symbolic 
social world of language and culture, which is already constituted by the signifier. This 
is comparable to the Buddhists assertion of a desire to extend pleasant experiences and 
to avoid unpleasant ones, both of which co-arise or co-create the desire for existence of 
durable self that is in control.  
We are compelled to engage in the realm of the signifier because of the 
operation of language, the desire for others, the desire for “the other”, the need to be, 
and so on. Uncertainty, fragmentation, and alienation mark our entry into the Symbolic 
and continued existence within it; the subject desires to posses the signifier from which 
he is always alienated. This quintessential notion of desire by Lacan validates the 
Buddhist notion of an illusive self or the lack of an eternal ego. 
For Lacan, human beings are born prematurely. Unlike other animals in the 
evolutionary chain, they cannot walk or talk at birth. They only have very partial 
mastery of their motor functions. An infants’ response to his prematuration, according 
to Lacan, is through the “mirror stage” or the mimicry, which certain animals do by 
copying the insignia and colouring of their environment to protect themselves against 
predators, e.g. the stick insect. However, many investigators have found that those 
camouflaged insects were just as likely to be eaten as non-camouflaged ones. Knowing 
that evolutionary biology does not provide an answer to mimetism, Lacan builds his 
mirror stage by combining it with observation from child psychology and social theory. 
The child identifies with an image outside of itself, be it a real mirror image, the image 
of another child or an adult mother. When another child is struck, he will cry, when 
another child wants something, he will want something as well because he is in another 
child’s place. He is trapped in an image (“the imaginary” register) fundamentally alien 
to himself. He demonstrates this alienation in the image corresponds with the ego. 
Driven by the desire, the child subsequently enters the “symbolic stage” where 
satisfaction can never be met. He is alienated from the signifier, including all systems of 
representation and articulation, especially language and becomes split within himself 
and desire becomes even more pronounced and problematic. At this stage, the point 
becomes clearer that the signifier pre-exists the subject and so too symbolic desire. The 
processes of this desire are culturally defined reactive desires, which are often distinct  
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from unconscious desires. Lacan distinguishes between the Other (Autre) which defines 
the operation of the unconscious and desire. Each small transitory object we mistake for 
the Other is called an objet petit a – object little ‘a’ (from autre). This refers to another 
sort of other, which is so inconsequential that it is not worth writing with a capital letter. 
What he is referring to is that the motivation that fuels and guides our everyday lives are 
each one in pursuit of one objet petit a after another. These objects are mere substitutes 
of the unconquerable Other beckoning us as the ultimate object of desire which would 
stabilize our complete and meaningful selfhood. It is this dream of the Other that would 
restore the subject’s unity that explains the religious belief in a patriarchal God and its 
purity, completion and totality. 
Regarding unconscious desire, Lacan takes pains to point out the mistranslation 
of Freud’s term Trieb. It has been rendered as “instinct” whereas “drive” seems more 
appropriate. Lacan argues for the French term pulsion, which connotes a stronger sense 
of compulsion while avoiding the cultural notion of “instinct”. Freud continues to 
define the drive in terms of force, the need for satisfaction and origin from within. 
Freud’s theory of drives and Lacan’s theories of desire can be viewed as linked 
processes by the omnipresence of both pulsion and drive. For Lacan, unless desire is 
accounted for, culture, sexuality, the unconscious and ultimately meaning and 
signification cannot be understood. Lacan argues that desire is endosomatically in the 
unconscious of the alienated or split subject which is the key idea in the formation and 
operation of subjectivity: the manqué-a-etre (‘want to be’, although manque also carries 
with it the sense of lack, Fuery, 1995). Desire is the reason for both the initial want or 
lack or both and subsequent split. The true aim of desire is the desire for the Other, that 
is, the desire to be recognised by the Other. Hence, desire cannot be satisfied because of 
its otherness. Here, Lacan’s elaboration of desire signifies the mental concomitants that 
Buddha has delineated in social context and social ethics. The relational context gives 
rise to Lacan’s assertion that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. That is, we 
cannot locate the unconscious within a form of culturally based Symbolic language 
because of its otherness. This is in keeping with Freud’s repressed (unconscious) desire 
which is translated into forms such as dreams acceptable to conscious social or 
symbolic context.  
It is not so much the pleasure or pain of desire and desiring but the sense of 
being, existence, and identity in relation to the other. Lacan’s emphasis of being in the 
Sartrean sense (Fuery, 1995) validates the Buddhist understanding of craving for 
becoming (bhavatanha). The Buddhists would also confirm the ‘tragic’ plot of  
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European psychoanalysis and existential traditions that desire is unfulfillable and 
insatiable. However, the Buddhists claim a possible ‘romantic’ ending to subjectivity, 
desire, and power to control by the subject. Buddhists would integrate the Western 
notions of self and other together, while simultaneously letting go of both by non-
textualising these objects of desire. The development of experiential insight and 
realization of non-self liberates the individual from the stricture of the everyday 
linguistic world. Put in Buddhist terms: the realization of non-self is the dissolution of 
the ego and its addiction to sensuality, greed, and hatred.  
Lacan’s second answer to what we desire is not only the sense of being that the 
other recognizes and the control of the signifier, but the desire to know. At one level, 
psychoanalysis means knowledge of the unconscious. At a further level, the sense of a 
lack of knowledge always conducts such analysis. Dream analysis is a typical example 
of such situations where something is known but something else is still needed to be 
constructed as part of the foundation of psychoanalysis as a method. Hence, Lacan 
warns us to beware of those who say to you that they understand because such a 
statement always sends you somewhere else than where the question is going. 
Such caution derives from the power relationship between the conscious and 
unconscious mind of the individual, the relationship between client and clinician 
(transference between the analyst and the analysand) or the individual and the social or 
cultural institution, which portray the position of the feminine in the masculine world.   
Lacan’s usage of transference points to subjectivity and the desire based on 
knowledge and its lack. Lacan argues that as soon as the subject constructs an 
impossible subject who is supposed to know (sujet suppose savior), there is 
transference. Lacan uses savior to mean a conceptual field of knowledge closely linked 
to a cultural or symbolic register.    
The complexity of the subject’s inability to recognize (meconnaissance) the 
function of desire represents a defining principle of subjectivity. It corresponds with the 
Buddhist notion of ignorance (avijja) when Lacan speaks of how the subject seeks 
pleasure without knowledge through a desire that is motivated in the symbolic (Lacan, 
1992, 12). According to this, we may act and continue to act in pursuit of the object of 
desire or pleasure or both without realizing from where the motivation for this comes. 
Our behaviour is determined through the unconscious operation of desire, which defines 
our subjectivity, our culture, and histories. Hence, desire is metonymy, being is 
determined through desire and therefore being itself is in a state of lack.    
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Lacan’s third answer to what it is that we desire when we desire embodies his 
interpretation of the concept of jouissance – an untranslatable term for a pleasure that is 
orgasmic, pure, excessive, and therefore revolutionary. For Lacan, without a 
transgression of the Law (elaborated below) there is no jouissance. The prohibition of 
the Law is a structural force determining the super-ego. It is part of the “other” that 
cultural operations and practices help restrict the desire. Jouissance is also paradoxical 
because it contains extreme pleasure and enjoyment stemming from the transgression of 
the moral code thereby producing guilt. In jouissance, we experience something beyond 
pleasure, a form of pure desire that must ‘trample sacred laws underfoot’ (Lacan, 1992, 
195). However, Lacan cannot answer the question of feminine jouissance, which is 
beyond the phallocentric symbolic order. ‘Phallus’ in this context is not the biological 
penis but the signifier of such things as power and control, articulation in the symbolic, 
the assertion of subjectivity. He deals with it by comparing jouissance to religious 
mysticism. For example, he describes The Ecstasy of Saint Teresa as revealing a 
mystical jouissance, which transgresses any equivalent phallic experience. Secondly, he 
argues that feminine jouissance must be located in terms of knowledge unknowable to 
men.  
From the Buddhist perspective, Lacan’s attempt to explain the interdependent 
and holistic aspect of jouissance, desire, subjectivity, and another symbolic order is 
trapped in the transgression of the Law of the Other and negativity. Feelings, desire, 
intention, emotion, and subjectivity co-arise with the mental concomitants (cetasikas) 
that give meaning to the mind. However, the Buddhists differentiate between 
wholesome desires and unwholesome desires where the former leads to liberation and 
the latter recycles back to rounds of suffering (samsara). Lacan conflates desire and 
pleasure to explain jouissance as it operates within a cultural frame of morality and 
ethics. He positions the operation of desire and its lack of expression as the cause of the 
subject’s crises. This is because we cannot act in conformity with our desire (thus, 
assuming that all desires are negative) that there is repression, guilt, and 
misunderstanding. His solution to this is the methodology of psychoanalysis in order to 
understand how desire and its suppression or management operates. Psychoanalysis 
seeks to explain the hidden agenda of the desire.  
On the other hand, Derrida deconstructs desire to help understand the concept 
and the variability of its meaning. One of the key elements in any deconstructionist 
analysis is an analytic pleasure derived from desire. Derrida contends that differance 
and desire are both the effects of temporalization, as neither, by definition, can be  
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satisfied and the play of differences because desire is based on the differences of the 
subject from the other. Differance demonstrates Derrida’s play on French words 
between difference and deferral as he argues that meaning is not due to differences 
between signs, but because meaning is always deferred. Differance allows for the 
performance of desire, not as satisfaction but rather as deferral. Derrida states: To 
“differ” in this sense is to temporalize, to resort, consciously or unconsciously, to the 
temporal and temporalizing mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or 
fulfillment of  “desire” or “will” , or carries desire or will out in a way that annuls or 
tempers their effect’ (Derrida, 1973: 136). The important point is that differance is part 
of the effect of desire rather than desire itself. The duality of differance as desire and as 
part of the effects of desire is in keeping with the concept itself. Differance as an 
analytic tool of deconstruction functions the same way as desire. The pleasure of the 
deconstructionist text enables us to read it as a form of critical jouissance.  
One can understand desire by employing the method of deconstruction. In The 
Post Card, Derrida develops a recurring metaphor to deconstruct the meaning of a 
letter. Sending letters as signs, the sense of being and the acts of love enmeshed in the 
operation and the function of desire as it is desire that informs and evokes the author’s 
action and thoughts. Derrida explores how the sending of the sign is determined through 
temporality. The text constantly plays with the idea of delay, lack of synchronicity and 
even simple misunderstandings about time differences and postal addresses. The act of 
reading is an act of desire. The desire by the sender of the letter is to be read in a certain 
way, and the desire to be able to read in a certain way. Of course, one reason for the 
non-arrival of a letter is the ‘sliding’ glissement of desires. Non-arrival does not 
necessarily mean the literal non-arrival of the compound letter or sign, but rather the 
non-arrival of the desired (intended) meaning. Desire in the act of production and 
reception is the desire to read and write and the desire to be read.  
The connection between desire and reading is invested partly in the status of the 
author of the signs. It is a well-known phrase in post-structuralism that the author is 
dead (Barthes, 1996). Derrida reveals the complicity of a dead author and his or her 
desire in the construction of the sign.  
Lacan says that understanding love or at least attempting to understand it is 
crucial to psychoanalysis. In the Post Card, Derrida shows that love is closely aligned 
to desire and almost as a consequence of this to subjectivity and meaning. Derrida’s 
conflation of love and desire is a questioning of the process of naming. Desire, thus, is a 
construction. Mental concomitants (cetasikas) of the Buddhists concur with this notion.   
  162 
Derrida, Barthes, and Lacan consider that our contact with reality once language 
is acquired, are only signs, not things. Derrida has gone so far as to say that from the 
moment that there is meaning there is nothing but signs. We think only in signs. There 
is nothing outside of the text. Here, the Buddhists would differ from Derrida; for the 
Buddhist meaning is derived from embodied experience and conceptualization through 
the five interdependent groups of grasping. 
Barthes sees that the text, the act of reading and the formation and operation of 
culture, can only be understood in terms of desire and pleasure. The key to the post-
structural theorizing of desire is the interdependence of the sign and the production of 
meaning or signification. Such activities include the examination and interpretation of 
the desire for meaning in Western metaphysics (Derrida), the desire to possess the sign 
and therefore control signification (Lacan), the desire for the power of the sign and 
speech (Foucault, Irigaray), and the operation of desire as a discourse (Foucault). Signs 
of desire have become part of the desire for signs and signification. Barthes argues that 
by the time the text is formulated and engaged with, desire has already been at work. It 
is impossible to have a text without some interplay with desire, for the text is desire. 
The act of reading and the desire to read are strongly connected with the desire to 
produce texts. Barthes’ work, Mythologies, investigates how ideologies and desires 
become naturalized for a culture through the production of texts.  
For Barthes, pleasure and desire are distinct not simply in terms of how they are 
prescribed culturally, theoretically and historically but how desire becomes an essential 
methodology of the analytic process. Among different types of desire and pleasure, the 
formation of jouissance lies in its relationship to the Law. Actions that locate the object 
as a ‘work’ rather than a text form the epistemic desire. Beyond such desires lies the 
trangressive desire of jouissance. If certain desires are different from pleasure, the 
question of how they differ and what features they share can only be answered by 
bringing in the act of reading. It is in the interaction between text and reader that the 
distinction and the combination of desire and pleasure can be seen. Within this dialectic 
process, the reader ‘creates’ the text (words) by making sense of it, thus signalling the 
‘death’ of the author while the reader (the subject) is given birth by the text in this 
process. Put simply, when the words are said or read, the subject or the reader is born. 
Lacan’s formula of desire for the “other” and the need to be desired by the “other” 
informs Barthes’ model of the text and reading, where the “other” takes on textual 
dimensions. Thus, the act of reading is the act of desire.   
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The act of reading is much the same as the act of speaking where the reader or 
the speaker constantly has to fill in gaps and absences in the text or words that are being 
read or said. In this sense, the post-structural model of the act of reading illustrates the 
Buddhist notion of creating the subject “I” (atta), via the act (kamma) of self-talking 
and desiring for the “other” (kamachanda).  
For Barthes, three points form the nexus of meaning and desire: 
 
 
•  Desire destroys meaning; 
•  Desire, in its darkness, ends up illuminating meaning [in 
Buddhism, unhealthy desires may alert the need for healthy ones 
and enlightenment]; 
•  Meaning is impossible without some recourse to desire. 
 
 
The notion that desire destroys meaning complicates the implicit drive of the 
desire for knowledge (Lacan). This desire for knowledge equals enlightenment to 
Western thinkers though Buddhist enlightenment means something beyond intellectual 
knowing. Desire is meaningless and a challenge to meaning because it continues to 
operate outside the structure of the social law which constructs the meaning. The idea of 
desire as negative and unacceptable by social ethics validates Govinda’s (1969) 
contention that the term ‘desire’ has lost its neutral character (in a moral sense) in the 
West. In European translation of Buddhist literature, ‘desire’ has become an equivalent 
for unhealthy craving (tanha). A very important aspect of desire is our need to have a 
unique individual I-dentity that has a strong link with our concept of the self, which 
derives from three forms of unwholesome craving. At best, this law can only operate as 
a Marxist hegemonic rule or a Freudian repression and management of the drives of 
desire. Desire makes knowledge impossible and yet there is always the desire for 
knowledge, i.e. to have knowledge and to have the knowledge of desire. One of 
Barthes’ metaphors for desire is darkness, but a darkness that illuminates. This 
unknowable nature of desire – a nightmare of ignorance to Western thought since 
Aristotle – questions the status of knowledge. Only when the darkness of the systems of 
knowledge is recognized and deconstructed can there be any sense of illumination.  
For Barthes, finding meaning without desire is impossible because his theory of 
the text locates both meaning and desire at the same level within the same frame. He 
aims to undo the repression of desire in order to create the critical practice of desire 
without considering the possibility of positive desires. Buddha teaches the way to  
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release the repression of desire by revealing healthy, unhealthy, and neutral mental 
concomitants of the desire to his disciples. However, he advocates an experiential 
method of meditation rather than a textual technique to deconstruct the repression of 
desire. 
 
Feminists’ Treatment of Desire  
 
From a causal theory perspective, the feminist interpretations of desire differ 
significantly from those proposed by men like Lacan, Derrida, and Barthes. In 
particular, Cixous calls for the need to go beyond the phallic and logocentric order 
named by Derrida as ‘phallogocentric’, which is based on the binary processes inherent 
in a masculine-dominated system. ‘Phallus’ here is the signifier of power and of a 
particular discourse regardless of biological determinants. In dismantling the patriarchy, 
Cixous uses three critical energies or ‘strategies’ (Fuery, 1995):  notes on desiring 
differently, an attempt to articulate ‘women’ as a category both inside and outside 
certain cultural systems, and the re-inscription of women’s pleasure. Cixous speaks of 
feminine desire and its jouissance as an instinctual economy that a man or the masculine 
economy cannot identify. Here, it is relevant to note that Freud bases his idea of cure on 
the psychic economy. Her answer to the question ‘what does a woman want’ explains 
how women have little room for expression of their desire in society that they do not 
know what to do even if they had it.  
Cixous and Lacan contend that jouissance ties itself to knowledge and because it 
asks the question outside the masculine economy, it draws attention to the need for 
different discourses. Cixous articulates that desire needs ‘space’ in society and if society 
denies it such a space, it will continue to be unknowable. Cixous sees feminine 
jouissance as sliding between the body and the unconscious. For Cixous, it is not only 
the masculinized or feminized body alone but also the unconscious, which determines 
this type of jouissance. Foucault raises similar issue of the eroticized body rather than 
being in itself an erotic, desiring site. Cixous deals with the feminine as a mode of 
subjectivity and identification, which exists outside the anatomy, which also enables 
male authors to write about feminine issues. From her perspective, she is able to devise 
the idea of ecriture feminine, a woman’s writing that operate against the 
phallogocentrism and not just as a gender issue of the masculine and feminine.  
Cixous uses one of Freud’s famous case studies, Dora’s trangressive desires of 
the social and analytic world order defines the feminine. Consciously acknowledging  
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her different desires questions the masculine reading of woman as ‘lack’ and redefines 
her desires in opposition to the masculine. For Cixous, Dora represents a force against 
the Symbolic. Desire does not diminish nor is manageable. The hegemonic order of the 
Symbolic constructs a particular space for certain desiring practices, which it classifies 
as abnormal. Hysteric desires expose the inadequacies of such a phallogocentric order.  
Desire is that which cannot be oppressed (Cixous & Clement, 1986, 157). It is a 
social catalyst, which is the means to a different production and economy. Cixous and 
Clement merge it with the issue of class struggle, the process that attempts to suppress 
feminine jouissance. The hysteric’s desire not only challenges the existing systems of 
knowledge but also an alternative knowledge. As knowledge breaks away from notions 
of truth and authenticity, it leads recognition as a construction. Cixous counters the 
desire of the body with a multiplicity of voices and discourses, none of which 
dominates, which destroy the Grand Narrative and through the proliferation of many 
narratives (Lyotard, 1985).  
Cixous reinscribes woman’s pleasure through desire. She reverses the idea that 
woman exists before desire. It supports both the post-structuralists and the Buddhist 
interpretation that desire creates the subject. For Cixous, woman’s desire is enacted 
upon by a bisexual “other” i.e. the unconscious and its jouissance. She requires women 
to write themselves (ecriture feminine) through their bodies. The unconscious and 
jouissance inscribed on the body forms a signification. Both Foucault and Cixous argue 
that because the body is the site of a struggle for power, it is a site of power.  
Luce Iragary also challenges the established ways of thinking, speaking and 
writing by theorizing the feminine discourse – parler femme. Iragary argues that 
Lacan’s theory is concerned with the politics of feminine desire and how the terms 
‘lack’ and ‘otherness’ portray the perception of women. While Lacan considers phallus 
as the signifier of desire, he fails to critique it. Thus, he inhibits the exploration of 
feminine desire. Iragary sees psychoanalysis as having the potential to develop an 
economy of the feminine. Although parler femme and ecriture feminine are not the 
same concepts, they share the goal of opening up the ‘space’ in which woman 
represents her desire. Iragary wants to develop knowledge so that women can know 
what they want and have a language in which to express it. Her strategies include the 
dismantling of masculine psychoanalysis and philosophy and developing a discourse 
where women enjoy their bodies and speak of their desires in a different language, She 
calls that enjoyment ‘self-affection’ which derives from being physically different from 
men. Iragary argues that men experience physical pleasure always through an  
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intermediary, but women’s desire and pleasure is something continuously generated 
through their bodies. She speaks of the analogy between women’s sex and speech, the 
connection being the lips as labia. The lips of speech link with the lips of woman’s 
genital. Both are necessary for desire, and both are sites of power, control, and 
rebellion.  
It appears that feminine desire and speech point to the central issue of 
subjectivity and desire of being which masculine ideology defines, controls, and 
oppresses. Kristeva consistently argues that desire and subjectivity interweaves so 
tightly together that we cannot think of one without the other. She contends that both 
desire and subjectivity present analysts with a particular difficulty, since both constitute 
an active sense of becoming. Here, Kristeva supports the Buddhists by saying that the 
subject is constantly in a state of being formed which she calls the ‘subject-in-process’. 
This is not only due to the unstable site on which subjectivity is constructed, but also it 
results from the continuous operation of forces such as cultural, temporal, psychic, 
political and so on. Hence, her scheme allows desire to belong to both a type of emotion 
as well as a class of individual. Central to her theory, like Lacan, is the desire for the 
signifier (the drive to be in the symbolic) who makes desire to be part of the social 
fabric. What it amounts to in this argument is Heidegger’s notion of Being (Dasein), 
instead of a fearful state of ‘lack’ (Loy, 1988), and the consequent Dasein’s Being 
expressing itself as care (cura). In fact, Heidegger insists that ‘wish’ (Freud’s Wunsch) 
and ‘urge’ (Lancan’s pulsion) are derivatives of cura. Kristeva, in turn, argues that 
desire is the praxis of cura (Kristeva, 1984:132). Furthermore, because the signifier can 
never be possessed, Kristeva argues that desire is a process of negativity. In Buddhism, 
however, unwholesome or unhealthy desires co-exist with their counterparts wholesome 
or healthy desires such as generosity (alobha), friendliness (adosa) and wisdom (vijja). 
From the Buddhist perspective, unwholesome desire or the process of negative desire in 
the psychoanalytic sense disintegrates and dissolves as the symbolic ‘I’ experientially 
realizes its own nature of being as ‘subject-in-process’. Nevertheless, Kristeva’s subject 
of desire, who lives at the expense of her drives, is ever in search of her lacking object. 
The sole source of this praxis is this quest of lack, death and language (Kristeva, 
1984:132). The key feature of Kristeva’s definition of desire is the split subject, which 
can be both masculine and feminine. This fragmented subject operates in terms of 
paranoia and desire: ‘The subject is a paranoid subject constituted by the impulse of 
Desire that sublimates and unifies the schizoid rupture’ (Kristeva, 1984:134). The 
subject type is determined through the interplay of fear, loss and revulsion. Relationship  
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to desire defines the subject of abjection. What we desire in abjection is the collapse of 
meaning rather than the stabilization of some signifying practice. Kristeva calls it chora, 
the site of the instability of meaning and signification. She argues that the desire is the 
manifestation of the repressed chora and contends that the text offers the space to 
include jouissance that goes beyond desire and social repression. 
For Kristeva, desire unsettles meaning, disrupts the complacency of knowledge, 
and forcefully confronts the subject with questions of the self. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
remarks support what she has brought back to the fore that validates the Buddhist 
notions of desire and non-self:  
 
 
Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are 
derived from desire; they are counterproducts within the real that desire 
produces. 
If desire produces, its product is real… Desire does not lack anything; it 
does not lack its object. It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire 
or desire that lacks a fixed subject… Desire and repression operate in 
society as it is, and are affected by its every changing phase. 
Surely reason is to be found, first and foremost, at the core of maddest 
desire! (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983). 
 
 
To conclude, post-structural deconstructionists, psychoanalysts and feminists 
validate the Buddhist notion that desire causes existence, suffering and ceasing of 
suffering. However, the Western deconstruction of desire is based on linguistic and 
conceptual reasoning, with an exception of feminist embodiment of desire, as opposed 
to integration between bodily feeling and conceptual thinking like the Buddhists. 
Western tradition endeavours to modify emotional and moral issues through rational 
thought. Emotion as embodying intentional logic has been ignored. As discussed in 
chapter 1, psychotherapy as a moral enterprise (Margolis, 1966) deals with the moral 
dilemma of emotional desires. Therefore, its major task of dealing with ethical issues in 
personal and social relationships cannot be ignored. 
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Desires and ‘Ignorance’ of Ethics in 
Psychotherapy 
 
Although the Western concept of “the desire for the “other”  and “care” 
propounded by Lacan and the Poststructuralists concurs with the Buddhist notion that 
desires play an integral part of suffering, psychotherapy does not see desires as moral 
issues that need addressing directly. Scientific psychotherapy only deals directly with 
distorted Cognition (e.g. Cognitive Therapies), maladaptive Behaviour (e.g. 
Behavioural Therapies) and irrational affect (e.g. Body-oriented therapies) in that order, 
rather than the reverse or an integrated three. 
In Western tradition, a biological theory of causation explains that human 
suffering is due to the structure and function of the brain, a neurotransmitter 
abnormality or genetic inheritance. A corollary to this approach is that when we reach 
the highest state of evolution we will have acquired enough knowledge and technology 
to overcome suffering and manipulate the existence itself as we like it. Psychosocial 
approaches follow along the same line of thinking in attempting to lessen pain and 
increase pleasure through further knowledge.  
In particular, psychological theories frame suffering in terms of an inability to 
fulfill emotional desires and the needs which are in conflict (the Conflict Model), 
inconsistent or incongruent (the Consistency Model), and unfulfilled or naturalized (the 
Fulfillment Model).  Although these models build their structures within the social 
framework of the society, their treatment of the desire is structural and rational but not a 
direct treatment of their meaning and function. 
Psychodynamic approaches focus on the tension-reduction (the pleasure 
principle) of desire and the interplay between respective expression and inhibition of the 
life and death instincts constituting the main processes of personality. In Freudian 
psychoanalysis, the abnormal behaviour is caused by unconscious conflicts between the 
three parts of the psyche — the id, ego and superego. Freud believes that primitive 
urges from the id, or overwhelming feelings of guilt from the superego, cause the ego to 
develop elaborate defense mechanisms and compulsive or self-defeating behaviours. 
Freud’s concerns revolve around uncovering repression, guilt and so on rather than 
building up a practical theory based on morality, focus (concentration) and 
understanding.  
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Besides the theorists who emphasize ‘psychosocial conflict’ between the self 
and society such as Freud, Henry Murray, Erik Erikson, the Object Relation theorists 
like Heinz Kohut’s self psychology and Eric Berne’s Transactional Analysis, other 
theorists like Otto Rank, Carl Jung, and Fritz Perls, have emphasized ‘intrapsychic 
conflict’ (conflict within the self) as a causal model of abnormal behaviour. For 
example, Fritz Perls views the cause of intrapsychic conflict as not taking responsibility, 
and conformism as the expression in adulthood of not having learned courage in early 
development. The conformist feels worthless and insecure because of the build-up of 
ontological guilt through frequent choices of the past rather than the future. 
European Existential therapists also follow the conflict model of causation by 
focusing on the concerns that are rooted in the individual’s existence. They come closer 
to dealing with emotions and values directly. The dynamics of our movement and 
emotions relate to what we value in things and people we approve or disapprove. The 
more we value something, the more we are willing to give up other things. Values 
motivate and guide our actions and attitudes. According to the value we attach to 
something, we are willing to expend more or less energy. Values are what determine the 
dynamics of our existence. They are the key principle of onto-dynamics (Duerzen-
Smith, 1988). 
American Existential therapists, on the other hand, simply state the four 
dimensions of death, freedom, existential isolation and meaninglessness as the “givens” 
in existence. The “givens” of existence are certain ultimate concerns, certain intrinsic 
properties that are an inescapable part of a human being’s existence in the world. These 
givens correspond with Anglo-European concerns of physical, social, personal and 
spiritual dimensions of existence. The individual’s confrontation with each of these 
facts of life constitutes the content of the existential dynamic conflict. Existential 
psychodynamics refers to these four ultimate concerns, and to the conscious and 
unconscious fears and motives spawned by each. The dynamic existential approach 
retains Freud’s dynamic structure, but exchanges the content of “drive, anxiety, defense 
mechanism” sequence to “awareness of ultimate concern, anxiety and defense 
mechanism” format. However, both formulas assume anxiety as the fuel of 
psychopathology. Psychic operations, some conscious and some unconscious, evolve to 
deal with anxiety and these psychic operations or defense mechanisms constitute 
psychopathology. Although these mechanisms provide safety, they invariably restrict 
growth and experience. The difference between Freud and existential dynamics is that 
the former begins with “drive” and the latter with awareness and fear. Existential  
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therapists see the client primarily as a fearful, suffering individual rather than as an 
instinctually driven one. Unlike Freud, existential therapists consider that the 
individual’s earliest experiences, though undeniably important in life, do not provide an 
answer to the fundamental question which undercuts one’s personal history, situates 
human predicament and presents us with the question, “what are the most fundamental 
sources of dread?” (Yalom, 1980).  
Existential approaches are comparable to the Buddhist notion of suffering 
(dukkha). However, the Buddhists focus on the emotions of craving and clinging as the 
origin of existential angst, rather than suffering as a given condition. When the 
Buddhists say to be born is to suffer, they refer to a causal consequence resulting in 
‘rebirth’ and subsequent actions (kamma) causing further suffering rather than an 
existentially predetermined fate. 
On the other hand, George Kelly (1955) propounded cognitive dissonance as the 
cause of abnormality. The Personal Construct Theory describes the tendency of the 
personality to predict and control the events one experiences. Personal construct theory 
reminds us of the Buddhist notion of construction of mental formations, including the 
concept of the self, emotional and motivational constructs. The cognitive dissonance 
model of Leon Festinger (1957) is to minimize large discrepancies between expectation 
and occurrence while maximizing small discrepancies between them.  
The Fulfillment and Actualization models, such as Carl Rogers’ (1965) client-
centered therapy, represent an attempt to help the client to actualize their inherent 
potentialities. These models view the blockage of normal growth potential as the cause 
of suffering. Similarly, Abraham Maslow (1968) focuses on the push toward the 
actualization of inherent potentialities and the push to satisfy needs ensuring physical 
and psychological survival. Others, like Eric Fromm (1947) and Alfred Adler (1927) 
strive toward the expression of one’s human nature and perfection respectively. Costa 
and McRae (1980), on the other hand, consider personality as biological striving to 
express behaviour in thoughts, feelings and actions that best reflect one’s inherent 
pattern of the five personality factors. Gordon Allport (1968) views it as functioning in 
a manner expressive of the self to satisfy biological survival needs.  
In Albert Ellis’s RET, very little causal theorization is available, except that it 
focuses on the core tendency of personality to think irrationally and harm oneself, then 
to gain understanding of one’s folly before training oneself to change from self-
destructive ways. This is not a conflict position because the second tendency corrects  
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the first for fulfillment. Aaron Beck’s Cognitive therapy similarly views the cause as the 
result of faulty thinking. 
For radical Behaviourists, maladaptive behaviours learned through respondent 
and operant conditioning, and modelling cause personality problems, although moderate 
Behaviourists still believe in the tension-reduction principles.  
Systemically oriented family therapies view the suffering of the identified 
patient (IP) and the family as caused by faulty family dynamics. Encounter group 
therapies see it as the result of blocked personal growth and life crises, and Support 
group therapies consider it as due to self-destructive behaviours and new life challenges. 
All of these therapies focus on the resolution of conflict, inconsistency and non-
fulfillment of cognitive or affective concepts at interpretive, behavioural and 
transactional levels, rather than at the observation of 1
st person level of experience, 
understanding and the extinction of unhealthy desires. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, this chapter examines the different emphasis on thinking and 
feeling between psychotherapy and Buddhism in treating unhealthy desires. Though 
Western tradition acknowledges both feeling and thinking, only after the works of 
Darwin, James and Freud, emotions became a more acceptable subject of study. 
However, James’ emphasis on bodily sensations and ignorance of the cognitive aspect 
on emotion leaves the gap in understanding the interdependent arising of sensations, 
perception, conception and consciousness of emotional desire and suffering. 
Psychotherapy including psychoanalysis still treats desire with rationalized concepts or 
conceptualized reasons rather than treat desire directly and from its interdependent 
experiential arising.      
This chapter elaborates on cognitive theories of emotions that connect 
knowledge, emotion and evaluation that contribute to the meaning of emotional desire. 
It also compares similarities and differences between realistic and unrealistic 
evaluations between Western and Buddhist traditions.   
In addition, this chapter discusses Western textual deconstruction of desire from 
poststructural and feminine perspectives as conceptual disassembling of emotions rather 
than uprooting the cause to cease the suffering. Poststructuralists define desire as text or  
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concept based on differences between the self and the desired other. They also construe 
reading as an act of desire to construct or deconstruct its meaning. Sending texts or 
letters as signs of desire is a deferral because there is time delay between sending and 
receiving of the text and its arrival and non-arrival of the desired or intended meaning. 
Poststructuralists postulate so far as to say that our contact with reality, once we 
acquired language, is through nothing but signs and we can think nothing outside of the 
text.  
Feminists, on the other hand, see that as a masculine discourse that oppresses, 
controls and limits the ‘space’ for females to speak or write about their pleasure and 
desires. Accordingly, women generate desire and pleasure continuously through their 
bodies as the lips of speech link to the labia of women’s sex. Both represent necessary 
sites of desire for power, control and rebellion. Feminists reverse the idea that women 
exist before desire. Feminists support the Buddhist notion of non-self by saying that the 
subject is in a constant state of being formed; desire does not lack its object but it lacks 
its fixed subject and the desire is affected by every changing phase of the society.  
Finally, this chapter highlights the ignorance and neglect of Western psychology 
in not integrating desire with personal virtue and social ethics into therapy that the 
Buddhist psychology considers a vital component in liberating the self from suffering. 
Psychotherapy does not see desires as moral issues that need addressing directly. In 
particular, this chapter points out the difficulties of Western theorizing on ‘the cause 
and the cure’ of psychological suffering by well-known therapies. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Desire as the Cause of Suffering 
 
The previous chapter discussed desire as the cause of existence, suffering, and 
the clue to cessation of suffering from Western and Buddhist perspectives. The present 
chapter elaborates on the details of mental concomitants (cetasikas) or self-talks that 
accompany the mind to arise as emotional desires. Though the colouring made by 
mental concomitants to the mind manifests in wholesome, neutral, or unwholesome 
desires, this chapter elaborates only on unwholesome desires that are immediately 
relevant to psychotherapy by drawing a comparison between a Buddhist view and the 
Aristotelian table of vices of deficiency and excess. Aristotle considers the mean 
between deficiency and excess as the virtue to change an incontinent (akratic) man into 
a happy (eudaimonic) one.   
For the Buddha, human beings possess desires that are more wholesome in 
general than unwholesome. Thus, the Mahayana Buddhist tradition makes a statement 
about everybody as having a ‘Buddha nature’. The Western notion of having to break 
the law to fulfill the pleasure of repressed desire only corresponds to the Buddhist 
mental concomitants of unwholesome or unhealthy desires (akusala cetasikas). From 
the Buddhist perspective, taking action with wholesome desires (kusala cetasikas) and 
purifying one’s mind with meditation leads the way to attain peace and happiness of 
nibbana.  
 
Feeling and the Formation of Desire  
 
Before forming any kind of desire, the body has to experience sensations when it 
encounters sense objects. As all sensations contain hedonic tones, we usually approach 
pleasant feelings and avoid unpleasant ones. Since we think with objects of  
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consciousness such as images, ideas and concepts, we silently talk to ourselves to create 
meaning by attributing positive, negative, or neutral value to these feelings. Thus, these 
evaluated feelings come to be known as emotions that move us into action within social 
and environmental contexts. As written language developed, we added scripts to the 
sounds to evoke emotions and continued to invoke relationships with others and the 
environment in different ways since Homeric times. This section discusses how 
sensations or feelings labelled by language concepts create craving self-talks or desires. 
Psychotherapy analyses craving self-talks within the contexts of social and 
environmental functioning through therapeutic conversations. However, psychotherapy 
processes the self-talk from a perspective different to the Buddhists. As stated earlier, 
while psychotherapy focuses on the cognitive aspect, the Buddhists emphasize both 
affective and cognitive aspects. 
The Buddha summarizes craving self-talks as mental factors of delusion 
(moha), greed (lobha), and hatred (dosa). Each individual makes these self-referent 
verbalizations within an interdependent context of self, other, and environment. The 
Buddha calls these verbal fabrications as mental formations or mental activities 
(sankhara) in naming the experience of the other four aggregates - body (rupa), 
sensation (vedana), perception (sanna) and consciousness (vinnana) and setting 
preconditions for speech (Thanissaro, 2002). Not only delusion but also greed and 
hatred form part of the verbal fabrications that are involved in referring to the self 
against the background of others and environments both natural and social. Moreover, 
these three main categories of desires stand interdependently as I-dentification of 
feelings and confirmation of Self-authority within a larger context of the self-other-
environment matrix. 
The Visuddhimagga (XVII, 234-236), one of the most often quoted Buddhist 
commentary texts, classifies these cravings into 108 kinds of self-talk. Six kinds of 
craving account for the objects experienced through the six sense doors (sight, sound, 
smell, taste, touch, and thought). Each of these six sense doors multiplies threefold 
according to its mode of happening: craving for sense objects (kama tanha), craving for 
becoming (bhava tanha) and craving for non-becoming (vibhava tanha).  
The six sense doors and their accompanying mental factors, cetasikas, crave 
for sense objects (kama tanha). We cling not only to visible objects or sounds but also 
to sensory modes of seeing and hearing. Wrong view (miccha ditthi) may or may not 
accompany such sensuous craving. On craving for becoming (bhava tanha), the eternity 
view (sassati ditthi), - wanting the pleasant experience to last forever - can arise with  
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what is experienced through each of the six doors. On craving for non-becoming 
(vibhava tanha), the annihilation view (uccheda ditthi) can arise due to the changing 
nature of things with what is experienced through each of the six doors.  
The Buddha explains 18 craving-verbalizations dependent on what is internal 
to his disciples:  
 
“And which are the 18 craving-verbalizations dependent on what is 
internal? There being ‘I am’, there comes to be ‘I am here’, there comes 
to be ‘I am like this’ ... ‘I am otherwise’ ... ‘I am bad’ ... ‘I am good’ ... ‘I 
might be’ ... ‘I might be here’ ... ‘I might be like this’ ... ‘I might be 
otherwise’ ... ‘May I be’ ... ‘May I be here’ ... ‘May I be like this’ ... 
‘May I be otherwise’ ... ‘I will be’ ... ‘I will be here’ ... ‘I will be like 
this’ ... ‘I will be otherwise.’ These are the 18 craving-verbalizations 
dependent on what is internal”. (AN 4:199) 
 
These internal dialogues show the desire of a person to see himself to be and to 
evaluate, to intend, to wish and to will himself to be in the future.  
The Buddha also proffers 18 other craving-verbalizations dependent on what is 
external, which provide the reasons to express intention, wish and the existence of an 
“I”: 
 
“And which are the 18 craving-verbalizations dependent on what is 
external? There being ‘I am because of this (or by means of this) ’, there 
comes to be ‘I am here because of this’, there comes to be ‘I am like this 
because of this’ ... ‘I am otherwise because of this’ ... ‘I am bad because 
of this’ ... ‘I am good because of this’ ... ‘I might be because of this’ ... ‘I 
might be here because of this’ ... ‘I might be like this because of this’ ... 
‘I might be otherwise because of this’ ... ‘May I be because of this’ ... 
‘May I be here because of this’ ... ‘May I be like this because of this’ ... 
‘May I be otherwise because of this’ ... ‘I will be because of this’ ... ‘I 
will be here because of this’ ... ‘I will be like this because of this’ ... ‘I 
will be otherwise because of this’. These are the 18 craving-
verbalizations dependent on what is external” (AN 4:199) 
   
Using external conditions as reasons, these expressions validate one’s desire to 
be and to evaluate as well as to intend, to wish, and to will oneself to be in the future.  
Further, the Buddha clarifies each of the 36 craving-verbalizations within the timeframe 
of the past, the present, and the future. Thus, the 36 craving self-talks in the past, the 36 
in the present, and the 36 in the future make up 108 verbalizations.  
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The Buddha makes it clear that though these internally (self) referenced talks 
and externally (other) referenced talks stand for all self-talks that shuttle back-and-forth 
between the past, present, and future time frames, they do not free the person from 
suffering. Instead, when the frequency, intensity, and duration of these craving-
verbalizations become severe, one develops clinging (upadana) to them to eternalize or 
annihilate their existence and experience. ‘Clinging’, according to Vism XVII, is an 
intensified degree of craving (tanha). The four kinds of clinging are: sensuous clinging 
(kamupadana), clinging to views (ditthupadana), clinging to mere rules and ritual 
(sílabbatupadana), clinging to the personality-belief (atta-vadupadana). 
Like the Buddha, psychotherapy also refers to self-talk as the cause of internal 
and external inconsistency, conflicts, and the non-fulfillment of desires. However, the 
way psychotherapy treats this self-talk differs from the Buddhist approach. 
Psychotherapy considers that faulty cognition or irrational thinking causes emotional 
problems and it reverse-engineers the self-talk. The Buddha, on the other hand, does not 
see faulty labelling of feelings or illogical thinking as the cause of emotional problems. 
The Buddha views contact with sense objects that already contain a hedonic tone as 
creating craving. Our desire for sense objects (including thoughts that are the objects of 
thinking) ranges from minor interest to the greatest greed. Conversely, it varies from a 
minor annoyance to the greatest hatred. These opposing ranges of emotions develop due 
to our ignorance (avijja) of knowledge in the changing nature (anicca) of things as they 
are. Thus, we develop our belief and desire to seek sensuous pleasure, to eternalize, or 
to annihilate our self-existence. This is reminiscent of Freud’s psychosexual 
development, and the pleasure principle of the life instinct (eros) and the death instinct 
(thanatos). However, the Buddhist treatment directly accesses the source at the feeling 
level.  
In sum, all healthy and unhealthy self-talks occur in mental formations 
(sankhara) which gives birth to consciousness (vinnana). Consciousness alone does not 
know that it is healthy or wholesome (kusala) or has unhealthy or unwholesome 
(akusala) concomitants. Consciousness only knows its objects. The simile of colourless 
water compares itself to the non-judgmental quality of the mind (citta) until feeling, 
perception and conceptual self-talk (cetasikas) – red, yellow, blue or black dye – of 
mental formations (sankhara) are added to the water. Then, consciousness becomes 
wholesome or unwholesome. Unwholesome self-talks or desires influence and direct the 
mind to perform unwholesome thought, speech, and action that lead to suffering.   
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Mental Factors as Co-conditioners of the 
Meaning of Desires 
 
The previous section discusses how craving self-talks begin at contact 
sensations, which through the interdependent process with other four aggregates 
manifest in identifiable speech and action to fulfill one’s desires. Subsequently, the 
discussion has also elaborated on the divide in emphasis between feeling and thinking 
where psychotherapy focuses its treatment on verbal concepts and thoughts while the 
Buddhists pay attention to feeling within an interdependent context of the five 
aggregates. At this point, it is pertinent to bring in the details of these self-talks that 
arise with concomitant mental factors (cetasikas) which accompany the mind (citta). In 
other words, they give meaning to the mind to co-create or co-arise as it desires.  
Mental factors or mental concomitants that arise and perish together with the 
mind influence the mind to be bad, good, or neutral as they arise. These factors make 
meaning for the mind to evaluate the situation and take action. While modern and 
postmodern thinkers debate the meaning and deconstruction of the desire conceptually, 
the Buddha who existed over 2500 years ago – approximately 100 years before Socrates 
and Plato - did not dichotomize the desires as rational or irrational. He places them 
within the context of personal virtues and social ethics. On the other hand, Nussbaum 
(1994) comments that Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (Irwin, 1985) [which appeared 
approximately 200 years after the Buddha] inconsistently calls emotions irrational. 
Other authors such as Herdsman (1992) and Burnet (1980) argue that Aristotle’s notion 
of acacia or acrasia (moral incontinence) – feeling (such as sexual appetite) 
overpowers reason - was misunderstood. Whether the akratics are asleep, drunk, mad, 
or ignorant of conflicts between desires and knowledge, appetite and correct reasoning 
with universal and particular premises or beliefs, they fail to act or ignore what they 
know as good without full appreciation or understanding. An example of an actor or a 
young learner who can recite verses without fully grasping their meaning, illustrate this 
point. Burnyeat (1980) argues that for the developmental stages of virtuous acts we 
should teach the child not only to perform but also to accept them as something people 
do. However, his method of assimilation falls short of Aristotle’s desire for the child to 
“grow into” the virtuous behaviour. Burnyeat’s method entirely depends on repetitive 
association or conditioning.  
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Aristotle’s list of 12 virtues and vices
21 appears somewhat comparable to the 
Buddha’s (52)
22 mental concomitants (cetasikas) that accompany the mind (citta). 
However, while Aristotle’s ethical theory places great emphasis on external factors in 
one’s life, particularly good luck in terms of family and friends, health and so on, 
Buddha deconstructs the distinction between internal and external factors for moral 
development by placing emphasis on interdependence between them. Aristotle’s final 
cause, which he maintains as final, is eudaimonia – happiness or “…actualized the 
potentials that define human…” (Tabensky, 1998, v).  
Aristotle believes that the human soul has an irrational element, which we 
share with animals, and a rational element that is distinctly human. The most primitive 
irrational element is the vegetative faculty, which is responsible for nutrition and 
growth. An organism, which does this well has a nutritional virtue. The second tier of 
the soul – the appetitive faculty – is responsible for our emotions and desires. 
 
  Calculative -- Intellectual Virtue 
Rational   
  Appetitive -- Moral Virtue 
Irrational   
  Vegetative -- Nutritional Virtue 
Table 7.1  Aristotle’s Divisions of the Soul 
 
This faculty is both rational and irrational in that only humans as opposed to 
animals have a distinct ability to control these desires. He considers that the purely 
rational part of the soul, the calculative, which has the mastery of these abilities called 
intellectual virtue.  
  The differences between Aristotle and Buddha are threefold: First, definition and 
derivation of desires versus mental concomitants. Second, fixed duality of virtues and 
vices versus an open paradigm for the development of what Arieti (1976) called the 
third-order emotions (discussed in chapter 9). Third, the method of arithmetic mean to 
happiness versus the middle path of supreme and pure state of wisdom and compassion, 
which surpasses all mundane conditions.  
Aristotle’s successors believe that happiness flows from a reduced attachment to 
unstable elements of the world by extirpation of passion. This is what the ancients 
called ataraxia
23, peace of mind or emotional tranquility.    
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Aristotle’s virtues appear to be ideas and concepts for the person to take training 
in, whereas the Buddhist virtues integrate an interdependent practice of virtuous ethical 
behaviour and related development of meditative concentration and reflective wisdom 
of understanding.  
  Aristotle defines that the ability to regulate desires is not instinctive, but the 
result of training and practice. He also thinks that if we regulate our desires too much or 
too little, then we have problems, e.g. excess, or deficiency of gymnastic exercise is 
fatal to strength. He believes that these desire-regulating virtues are character traits not 
to be confused with emotions or mental faculties. Buddha, on the other hand, considers 
that they are mental concomitants that embody both affective and cognitive elements; 
they are one of many mental formations (sankhara) including emotions, desires, and 
beliefs. Buddha identifies 52 mental concomitants that consist of  13 neutral, 14 
unwholesome (vices) and 25 wholesome (virtues) factors that colour our mind in 
making meaning and decision to act. Of  13 neutrals, 7 factors constantly accompany all 
states of consciousness and 6 others variably appear with some conscious states. 
Though 25 wholesome factors counteract 14 unwholesome ones like Aristotle’s table of 
virtues and vices, the Buddhist virtues do not operate on the Aristotelian principle of the 
mean between excesses and deficiencies. Aristotle is quick to point out that the virtuous 
mean is not a strict mathematical mean between the two extremes. It depends on the 
merit of the situation that is rationally determined. However, he admits that  it is 
difficult to find the mean between the extremes. On the other hand, Buddha does not 
agree that unwholesome desires are part of the appetitive faculty of the soul. They are 
delusion or ignorance related desires that veil us from realizing our true potential to be 
wise and compassionate -  the Buddha Nature. The Aristotelian final cause, on the 
contrary, is to realize our highest faculty, that is, of reason. 
Comparison between the 14 unhealthy mental factors outlined by the Buddha 
and Aristotle’s 12 excesses and deficiencies illustrates the cognitive-affective nature of 
the Buddhist goal.   
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The 14 factors belong to four groups of interrelated concomitants - delusion, 
greed, hatred, and laziness and doubt:  
 
 
I -     Delusion - moha - leads the first group: 
1. Delusion, ignorance, dullness – moha – avijja   
2. Shamelessness, impudence – ahirika 
3. Recklessness, lack of moral dread – anottappa   
4. Restlessness, unrest, distraction – uddhacca. 
 
II -    Greed – lobha - heads the second group: 
5. Greed, attachment, sensuous desire – lobha – raga – tanha   
6. Wrong view, wrong opinion – miccha 7. Pride, conceit – Mana   
 
III -  Hatred – dosa - explains the third group: 
8. Hatred, anger, aversion – dosa – patigha   
9. Envy, jealousy – issa   
10. Stinginess, avarice, selfishness – macchariya   
11. Regret, scruples – kukkucca   
 
IV -  Laziness and doubt – vicikiccha - capture the last group: 
12. Sloth, idleness – thina   
13. Torpor, lethargy – middha   
14. Sceptical doubt, perplexity – vicikiccha. 
 
 
1. Delusion (moha)  
 
Aristotle does not have a separate category for delusion as a vice. Unveiling 
delusion takes a unique position in Buddhist practice. Developing the right view gets a 
prominent mention as the first one in the Eightfold Path practice (discussed in chapter 
9) although all eight strands strengthen interdependently. As stated previously, contact 
experience with sense objects defines the delusion of craving for existence or non-
existence of the self. Sensuous craving led by the desire for more pleasant sensations 
wishes an eternalist view, which craves for becoming. However, sensuous craving led 
by rejection of unpleasant sensations desires an annihilationist belief, which craves for 
non-becoming. Therefore, craving for existence and non-existence are products of one’s 
own conceptual construction arising together with perception of contact with sense 
objects.  
Liberating oneself from such delusion requires experiential dissolution rather 
than conceptual deconstruction or book learning. Delusion compares itself to the  
  181
director of a modern day movie; it directs everything, but the viewer only sees the 
product, not usually the director. The deluded self also leads to the lack of ethical or 
social shamelessness, recklessness, and restlessness as discussed below. 
 
2. Shamelessness (ahirika) 
 
Aristotle mentions shamelessness as a vice of deficiency. As with most of his 
virtues and vices, they allude to external focus. Buddha elaborates on the lack of social 
or ethical shame in committing unwholesome thought, speech, and action to a village 
swine that does not feel loathsome in eating night soil (Puggala-pannatti, 59). 
Similarly, a shameless person regards doing unwholesome deeds as not 
embarrassing or shameful even though they commit such acts intentionally. In fact, the 
shameless considers the deed as something in which to take pride. For instance, 
criminals think that doing crime and doing time is a perfectly fine thing to be proud of. 
From a psychotherapeutic perspective, Nathanson (1992) has expounded how shame 
and pride shape our sense of self. In addition, Braithwaite (1989) argues that when 
shaming is done within a cultural context of respect for the offender it can be an 
extraordinarily powerful form of social control. These ideas have been incorporated into 
a current practice of “Restorative Justice” originated in Australia and New Zealand 
(Watchel, 1997). 
 
3. Recklessness (anottappa) 
 
Aristotle categorizes recklessness as the vice of excess in rashness - doing things 
in haste without having fear or dread of social or ethical consequences. For Aristotle, 
even the virtuous mean of courage is only really worthy when done from a love of 
honour and duty. Throughout the list, Aristotle insists on the autonomy of the will as 
indispensable to virtue. However, in Buddhist meditation, letting go dissolves the will 
of ego control. The Buddha compares recklessness to a moth, which is unaware of the 
consequences, flies into the fire, and plunges into it. 
Recklessness also arises due to shamelessness and delusion, which 
clouds the mind from seeing the results of bad deeds. In doing bad deeds, the 
reckless person does not fear the impending consequences:   
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Fear of blaming or accusing oneself (Attanuvada-bhaya) of having no 
self-respect and losing self-esteem. Such a person feels oppressed by the 
thought, “Though many people think I am a virtuous gentleman, I know myself: 
I am not a virtuous man as they think. I am a wicked man who does bad deeds 
stealthily”. (atta oneself + anuvada blame, accuse) 
Fear of being blamed, being accused by others (Paranuvada-bhaya) in 
this way, “You are a wicked person, doing unwholesome, bad deeds”. (para by 
others; anuvada blame, accuse) 
Fear of suffering and punishment (Danda-bhaya) such as being killed by 
others for having committed murder; being beaten by the owner for having 
stolen his property; being killed for committing adultery; being imprisoned for 
various criminal acts. 
Fear of suffering from great remorse (Duggati-bhaya) over one’s bad deeds on 
his deathbed and the prospect of being reborn in the four woeful abodes in the next 
existence. 
 
4. Restlessness, Distraction, Wavering (uddhacca) 
 
Aristotle does not have an equivalent vice or virtue of restlessness. Restlessness 
means an inability to concentrate on any object steadfastly. Being distracted, one’s mind 
wanders from this object to that object.  
A wholesome opposite to restlessness in Buddhism is mindfulness (sati) as 
restlessness and distraction waver on the mind. Like minute particles of ash that fly 
about when a stone hits a heap of ash, the mind cannot settle quickly on an object but 
flits about from object to object. When overpowered by distraction, one can become a 
drifter, a floater, a loafer, or an aimless person. 
 
5. Greed, attachment, sensuous desire (lobha)  
 
Aristotle’s vice of excess such as intemperance would come under the Buddhist 
construction of greed as attachment for sensuous objects. Pleasant feelings may 
accompany greed. When accompanied by pleasant feelings, they become objects of 
attachment. . The intrinsic nature of desiring does not give up, no matter how much one  
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can acquire even happiness in meditative concentration (jhana). It always looks for 
something more or new. Attachment leads to ignorance, shamelessness, recklessness, 
and restlessness. Ignorance does not see the true nature of the object of clinging; it does 
not see that it is only a conditioned reality, which does not last. Shamelessness does not 
feel shame, recklessness does not feel fear for others, and restlessness does not know 
concentration. 
Different degrees of greed attach to different kinds of objects. Other names, such 
as lust (raga), covetousness (avijja) and craving (tanha) apply to greed. Greed can be 
coarse or subtle, such as hoping or expecting. A coarse greed motivates an 
unwholesome course of action through body, speech and mind, e.g. stealing, sexual 
misbehaviour, lying, slandering and idle talk. However, if one merely wishes to have 
someone else’s property but does not plan to take it away, greed does not qualify an 
unwholesome course of action. Only when one really plans to take away someone else’s 
property does it qualify as an unwholesome course of action through the mind. 
All degrees of greed court suffering. Even when it does no harm to others, greed 
clings to the pleasant object such as sight or sound and takes it as happiness. When the 
pleasant object is absence, aversion arises.  
Greed-rooted consciousness has both delusion (moha) and greed as its roots. 
This kind of attachment likens itself to the monkey catching glue
24 (V, Maha-vagga, 
Book III, Chapter 1, 7).  
The true characteristic of greed only appears when one performs an act of 
generosity, as many moments of greed appear in between the moments of true 
generosity. For example, a “do-gooder” may conceal his need to be needed by others.  
However, knowledge about the dangers of wanting pleasant things, possessions, 
and attachment to others does not eradicate greed. It does not mean that one has to give 
up what one has, but to develop an understanding that whatever arises does so because 
certain conditions prevail. For example, greed also stands for pema, tanha, raga, or 
samyojana. The term pema means the love exchanged between sons and daughters, 
brothers and sisters, husbands and wives or members of the family and relatives. 
Therefore, pema equates sincere love. This kind of sincere love also refers to 
samyojana, which means binding one person to another like strings bound together to 
form a rope. Attachment for each other does not have to lead to the world of misery if 
one has the support of wholesome deeds. Hence, the metaphor: ‘a stone sinks in water, 
but will float if carried on a boat’.    
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Together with its two great followers – wrong view (ditthi) and conceit (mana), 
greed extends the life cycle of suffering or the round of rebirth known as samsara. 
Because of this, all three collectively acquire the name worldliness (papanca dhamma). 
 
6. Wrong View (ditthi)  
 
‘Wrong view’ leads a gateway to delusion, confusion, and ignorance. Aristotle 
does not list wrong view as a vice. From the Buddhist perspective, the wrong view 
produces all excesses and deficiencies listed by Aristotle. The ‘wrong view’ provides a 
clear example of how craving-verbalizations take hold of one’s thinking and belief 
systems. The thinking part of our mind summarizes or translates our contact experience 
with the world into concepts and words. Once concepts translate themselves into action, 
and the resultant experience from such action confirms the concepts, they establish a 
belief system. Depending on the belief system, one may distort the view of realities and 
misinterpret an event. For example, when we hear something we cling to the self
25 that 
hears rather than the element. We do not take it as a sound, but we take it as a person or 
a voice or a car.  
One tends to cling to an idea of the self that coordinates all different types of 
experience. We may think that we can look at someone and listen to his words at the 
same time. When hearing appears, there can be an awareness of its characteristic so that 
right understanding can know it as it is: as only a type of mind, not a self, which hears. 
We may have doubts about the difference between the characteristic of hearing and 
paying attention to the meaning of the sound. Extremely fast input of experiences from 
all the six doorways may confuse us. Nonetheless, hearing does not experience the 
object of thinking.  
‘Wrong view’ may take a wrong understanding of permanence for what is 
impermanent or self what is not self. The ‘wrong view’ may lead to a wrong path and 
wrong practice. In the time of the Buddha, some people behaved like a dog or like a 
cow because they thought that such practices would lead to purification. 
There are many other kinds of ‘wrong view’ such as eternalism that believes in 
a permanent self and annihilationism, which believes in annihilation of the self after 
death. On the other hand, one may hold a “semi-eternalistic view” which believes that 
some phenomena are eternal while others are not, or sometimes one may vacillate 
between the eternalistic view and the annihilistic view.   
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‘Wrong views’ on action (kamma)
26 taught at the time of the Buddha include 
that: 
 
 
•  There is no result of cause and effect (natthika-ditthi) 
•  There are no causes (in any happening, ahetuka-ditthi)  
•  There is no such thing as cause and effect (akiriya-ditthi). 
 
 
Although these three views are distinct from each other, they are related. When 
one does not see action as cause, one does not see its result either, and when one does 
not see the result of action, one does not see action as cause either.  
We may think that we have to follow rigid disciplinary action to eliminate 
unhealthy self-talks. However, accepting unwholesome mental factors has an 
advantage. Unless we get to know them, we will not be able to understand their 
characteristics and eradicate them. Very often, there is forgetfulness in everyday 
realities but sometimes mindfulness may arise and then we can learn the difference. 
Nevertheless, those who have tendencies to ‘wrong view’ lean towards environments 
and people who have ‘wrong view’ and thus they accumulate more and more ‘wrong 
views’
27.  
‘Wrong view’ and greed-rooted (greed-based) mind can be reciprocally 
reinforcing
28. Many other ‘wrong views’ base their theories on speculative concepts
29.  
When we think of concepts such as people and things, it is not necessarily a 
‘wrong view’. This is conventional reality as opposed to the ultimate one, which holds 
the view that everything is insubstantial. An ordinary person, who has not eradicated 
‘wrong view’ still, has the conditions to neglect social ethics - he still has the conditions 
for killing, stealing, sexual misbehaviour, lying and so on. 
In conclusion, theoretical understanding cannot eradicate ‘wrong view’. 
Although a conceptual understanding of realities can condition the arising of 
mindfulness, we are forgetful (not mindful) of the realities of the object. For example, 
when we feel hot, we have aversion and then we are forgetful of realities such as heat, 
feeling, or aversion. However, it needs to be emphasized that a lack of particular 
knowledge is different from ‘wrong view’ or self-delusion.        
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7. Pride, Conceit (mana)  
 
Aristotle sees over-ambition and vanity as vices of excess and lack of courage 
and undue humility as vices of deficiency. He considers proper ambition or pride and 
magnanimity as the virtuous means. The Buddhist notion of loving-kindness (karuna) 
resembles magnanimity. However, the Buddha views pride or conceit as unhealthy 
mental concomitants. Conceit may occur in someone who feels actually superior, equal, 
or inferior to others. Even when we do not compare ourselves with others, we may find 
ourselves important and then there is conceit. Conceit always goes together with 
attachment, with clinging. The greed-rooted mind without ‘wrong view’ may sometimes 
be accompanied by conceit, and sometimes not. The Buddhist non-greed (alobha) 
represents healthy mental concomitant that counteracts pride or conceit. 
The “Book of Analysis” (881) classifies conceit in many different ways to 
show its different aspects. For example, when someone has a self-disdain or a self-
contempt, he still upholds himself with self-disrespect conceit (omana). An over-
estimating conceit (adhimana), for instance, shows our desire to prove our value to 
others, for example, in the field of knowledge even though education is something one 
has learnt from others and is not an extraordinary achievement. We like to be somebody 
who is esteemed, honoured, and praised. Our actions, speech, and thoughts are often 
motivated by an idea of competition; we may not want others to be better than we are, 
even with regard to wholesome deeds (kusala kamma) and right understanding (panna). 
Conceit is a conditioned phenomenon (sankhara dhamma). There is ignorance 
shamelessness, recklessness, and restlessness in conceit. Even those who have 
eradicated the ‘wrong view’ of self may still cling to mind and body with conceit. Only 
the emancipated (arahat) is said to be able to eradicate conceit completely. 
 
8. Hatred, anger, aversion (dosa) 
 
Aristotle lists irascibility and righteous indignation as a vice and a virtue 
respectively. However, Buddha considers the latter as an unwholesome desire – an 
aversion common to anger and hatred that bring suffering. Hatred arises with an 
unpleasant feeling. When an unpleasant object impinges on the body sense, body 
consciousness experiences painful feeling of that object. Shortly after this process, 
hatred-rooted minds arise to experience that object with aversion.   
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There are degrees of hatred. It may be a slight aversion or it may be stronger 
from moodiness to bad temper and anger or hate. When hatred is strong, one may speak 
harsh words or throw things around. One may feel desperate enough to hit others, 
commit suicide or even homicide (van Gorkam, 2001).  
All degrees of hatred are dangerous, as hatred accumulates and finds its object 
without the person realizing it. Hatred motivates unwholesome courses of action 
through body, speech, and mind: through one’s body, hatred kills and steals when one 
wants to harm others; through one’s speech, one harms others by lying, slandering and 
idle talk or rude speech; through one’s mind one harms others via ill will. Hatred may 
cause sleeplessness, the loss of friends, and the loss of one’s reputation, prosperity and 
wealth (Gorkam, 2001).  
Hatred also blocks tolerance, consideration for the feeling of others and loving-
kindness. The Buddha likens anger and hatred to an open sore. An open sore hurts at the 
slightest touch, it is foul and unpleasant to look at. Hatred may manifest its opposite - 
fear of people, situations, sickness, old age and death.  
Numerous causes for hatred seem to come from outside of ourselves such as 
other people’s actions or an unfortunate external event. Hatred often arises because of 
what others are doing or saying to us or to someone else. Even a good deed done to 
someone else can be a reason for annoyance if we dislike that person. However, the real 
cause, the Buddhists believe, comes from within us – very strong attachment conditions 
hatred. Loyalty kills. 
Our rational mind thinks that hatred or aversion is so obvious that we should be 
able to control or eradicate it easily. Nevertheless, only right understanding can 
overcome such a state of mental rigidity. Aversive feeling or emotion of hate blinds our 
reasons from letting go of what we think of as “my hatred” and of realizing that it is 
only a kind of mind, which arises because of certain conditions. Buddha teaches that so 
long as we cling to the pleasant worldly conditions (lokadhammas) of gain, fame, 
praise, and pleasure, we are bound to have aversion and suffering when they change. 
There may be intellectual understanding of worldly realities, but this 
understanding cannot eradicate hatred and unhealthy mental factors. The development 
of calm may temporarily eliminated them. However, only experiential understanding 
developed through meditative practice in vipassana, meaning “seeing things as they 
really are”, can eradicate them. In addition, so much of our aversion about aversion and 
unpleasant feeling (aversion) which accompanies it lead us to believe that we cannot be 
mindful of the reality of the present moment.   
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Sometimes, we may think that we do not have hatred or anger, but this does not 
mean that we have eradicated hatred. The latent tendency of hatred gives rise to anger 
when conditions are right
30.  
 
9. Jealousy, Envy (issa) 
 
Righteous indignation in Aristotle’s list of vices of excess comes close to the 
Buddhist idea of callousness and envy. Regardless of current connotative differences 
between these words they make hatred-rooted meaning in personal and social contexts. 
A particular word may fit a particular context better.  
Envy or jealousy may arise when someone else receives a pleasant object and 
we do not. An unpleasant feeling always accompanies envy, because it dislikes the 
object
31. 
Strong envy motivates an unhealthy course of action and it can even kill. 
Sympathetic joy (mudita) cannot eradicate envy, even if we have many moments of it. 
Only right understanding (panna) of mind and body can eventually eradicate envy. 
 
10. Stinginess, avarice, selfishness (macchariya) 
 
Aristotle listed deficiency of meanness, which accords with the Buddhist notion 
of stinginess or avarice (meanness) that does not arise with every hatred-rooted mind. 
Sometimes stinginess
32 refers to selfishness. When there is stinginess, we experienced 
aversion towards the object at that moment and the feeling is unpleasant.  
We may be stingy not only with regard to things
33, but also with regard to words 
of praise to ourselves and to others. Praising someone’s virtues is an act of generosity, 
which leaves no room for stinginess. There are many different ways to be wholesome in 
our daily life; there are opportunities right at hand for one kind of wholesomeness or 
other, no matter whether we are alone or with other people. We may even be stingy to 
share Dhamma
34 with others because we are afraid that they will acquire the same 
amount of knowledge as we
35 have.  
We should remember that the characteristic of stinginess is the concealing of 
one’s property because one does not want to share it. Clinging to possessions makes us 
difficult to detach from the self.   
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11. Regret, scruples (kukkucca) 
 
Aristotle does not appear to include regret as a deficiency in his scheme of 
virtues. However, Buddha considers regret
36 as unwholesome as it always involves 
aversion towards the object that is experienced and arises together with unpleasant 
feeling.  
The proximate causes of regret are unwholesome action (kamma) through body, 
speech, and mind
37 that has been committed and wholesome action has been omitted.  
Regret is one of the hindrances (nivaranas) that forms a pair with restlessness 
(uddhacca). The hindrances are unwholesome mental factors that hinder the performing 
of wholesome ones. Regret does not arise with wholesomeness. The mind filled with 
regret is not free. It is enslaved and it arises without peace and happiness.  
 
12 & 13. Sloth
 or Idleness (thina), Torpor or Lethargy 
(middha)  
 
Aristotle’s list does not include sloth and torpor or idleness and lethargy. They 
apply uniquely to the Buddhist path and always arise together as a pair. Arising of sloth 
and torpor points to having no energy and the inability to strive, unwieldiness, stiffness, 
and rigidity of the mind, sinking and shrinking of mental associations. This is a form of 
mental sleepiness associated with a random state of mind, which cannot arouse itself 
from laziness and discontent
38 to wholesomeness.  
Sloth and torpor may arise together with greed-rooted states of ‘wrong view’ 
(ditthi) and conceit (mana) accompanied by a pleasant feeling or an indifferent feeling. 
They may also arise together with hatred-rooted mind of envy, stinginess, or regret 
accompanied by an unpleasant feeling. 
Only the emancipated has eradicated sloth and torpor completely. The Buddha 
told the monks to be moderate in eating and warned them not to be attached to the “ease 
of bed”, because such attachments give rise to mental sickness of sloth and torpor that 
destroy energy for wholesome act.  
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14. Sceptical doubt, perplexity (vicikiccha) 
 
Aristotle does not include doubt on his list of vices. Buddha teaches that 
delusion-rooted mind accompanies sceptical doubt or perplexity about realities such as 
mind and body (materiality and mentality), cause and effect, the four noble truths and 
the principle of interdependent arising.  
When there is doubt one wavers or wonders about realities and becomes 
uncertain to grasp (Dhammasangani 425), unable to come to a decision as to the object 
and unsure whether reality is permanent or impermanent.  
Doubt differs from ignorance (moha), which refers to the ignorance of realities. 
However, doubt co-arises with delusion, which accompanies all unhealthy phenomena. 
When doubt accompanies the unhealthy mind, there cannot be determination 
(adhimokkha) which is to be sure about the object, neither can there be a wish-to-do 
(chanda) which searches for the object and wants it. The proximal cause of doubt is 
unwise attention to the object, which is experienced at that moment.  
The object of attention may be a doubt about whether there is nibbana or 
supreme happiness that can be attained by ordinary people or doubt may pertain to the 
past, the present, the future and the possible development of right understanding 
(panna). Doubt poses danger to mental development, and thinking cannot eliminate 
doubt. Only by mindfulness of doubt as an object of observation can doubt be 
eradicated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In summary, two traditions – Buddhist and Western or the two ancients – 
Buddha and Aristotle are comparable at certain levels. Parallels exist between 
Aristotle’s list of 12 vices and the Buddha’s 14 unwholesome mental concomitants that 
lead to deluded action and suffering. While Aristotle’s virtues find a solution at the 
mean between vices of excess and deficiency, Buddha’s 38 wholesome factors purify 
the unwholesome mind with an interdependent development of universals and particular 
wholesome factors that evolve beyond dissolution of unwholesome ones. The  
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wholesome factors lead to the practice of virtuous and empathic ethics (sila), as part of 
a tripartite development together with absorption in concentrated clarity and calm 
(samadhi) and insightful understanding (panna) through reflection. Buddha primarily 
bases his approach on meditative observation of the unwholesome desires from the 
neutral space-in-between to understand the nature of change (anicca) of all things while 
virtuous ethical practices enhance the purification of the mind by letting go of 
permanent ego-self through realization of the non-self (anatta) and thus liberate the 
selfless being from suffering (dukkha).  
At the core level of difference, Aristotle advocates the practice of an arithmetic 
mean between the dichotomy of vices and virtues for happiness whereas Buddha 
encourages the letting go of interdependent mental factors such as unhealthy, healthy, 
and neutral states to liberate the self from intrapersonal, interpersonal, and 
environmental suffering. In addition, while Aristotle considers the calculative faculty of 
intellectual virtue as the most important and rational for happiness, Buddha would 
regard all three – vegetative, moral, and intellectual virtues – as interdependent and 
equally important.  As elaborated earlier, however, letting go of unwholesome mental 
states constitutes only part of the Buddhist practice to alleviate suffering.  
The next chapter addresses the questions of how Western and Buddhist 
approaches deal with desires. It also criticizes the Western attempt to integrate with the 
Buddhist mindfulness for the survival of self-authority and a variety of Western 
treatment formulations. After elaborating on the Buddhist and Western models in 
therapeutic contexts, the chapter presents an integrated hypothesis between the Buddhist 
and Western approaches to the cessation of suffering.     
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Chapter 8 
 
The Cessation of Suffering: An Integrated 
Hypothesis 
 
This chapter discusses the differences between Western and Buddhist 
approaches in the formulation of treatment hypotheses to end the suffering of the self. 
The first section discusses the assumptions related to differences in meanings between 
the words “cessation” and “annihilation”, and the connected question for extirpation of 
desires or learning to live with them. As all these questions and actions attempt to 
resolve the powerful control of unhealthy desires, formulation of a protective plan by 
any individual or psychotherapy would involve building the shield of psychological 
defense mechanisms and other armaments. In recent times, even the Buddhist 
meditation of mindfulness has been ‘adjuncted’ to Western treatment formulas to 
propagate the ego-control and independent self-authority, which is antithetical to the 
Buddhist path. The second section explores the Buddhist practice of the Middle Path 
from its neutral space-in-between to demonstrate how to overcome the Western 
conundrum of duality. The practice also suggests how Buddhist psychologists may 
conduct therapy by using both the space-in-between and shared space within the client-
clinician-therapeutic environment context. Drawing from a reflexive model of 
consciousness and Buddhist meditation, I put forward a hypothesis to liberate one from 
being a victim of ego-control to a victor of egoless self-authorization.  
 
Cessation or Annihilation of Unhealthy Desires? 
 
While both Western and Buddhist traditions agree on the importance of 
understanding desire in overcoming suffering, there is confusion about the word 
“cessation” used by the Buddhists. It started from Freud’s misunderstanding of  
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Buddhist nibbana
39, which he thought was annihilation, to explain his theory of the 
death instinct.  
Although extinction or nibbana (Sanskrit: nirvana; to cease blowing, become 
extinct) refers to the extinction of literal birth, death and rebirth, the Buddha meant it in 
two related aspects: the Extinction of Impurities (kilesa parinibbana) and the Extinction 
of the Five Groups of Grasping (khandha parinibbana). In psychotherapy, we are 
concerned with the extinction of impurities. Discourses of the Buddha describe 
attainment of nibbana in this lifetime as saupadisesa nibbana. Nibbana represents 
nirodha, which also means cessation, emptiness, and non-attachment. 
Cessation also stands opposite to annihilation, which means the desire to get rid 
of something. Cessation occurs by letting go; renouncement or abandonment avoids the 
connotation of ‘nihilism’, which is based on the psychiatric delusion that the world or 
one’s mind, body, or self does not exist. On the other hand, Buddhists are not 
encouraged to get rid of suffering by avoidance but through facing fear, anger, anxiety, 
depression, and so on and letting them fade away into extinction. The words often used 
to describe the process of extinction are ‘unformedness’ or an ‘unconditioned state of 
affairs’ (asankhata), ‘detachment’ or ‘seclusion’ (viveka), or ‘escape’ (nisarana), as 
opposed to ‘escapism’. Speaking in terms of Behaviourism, it is a process of 
extinguishing craving for the pleasurable, the delightful or other desires through 
extinction. It is a realization that desired things in the world are impermanent (anicca), 
unsatisfactory (dukkha) and without eternal self-soul (anatta).  
Moreover, the intended actions of “cessation” and “annihilation” need further 
clarification. The verb form of cessation means ‘to cease’, ‘to stop’, whereas the verb 
form of annihilation means ‘to destroy’. These meanings have two different emotional 
“loadings”; hence, the volition behind the actions differs. Metaphorically, cessation uses 
the Aikido approach to stop the force of the desire, whereas annihilation uses the Karate 
approach to exterminate. Again, while the former dances with forces, so to speak, until 
they lose their power, the latter fights with the counter-force to gain immediate control. 
Thus, Western methods directly apply contingent negative reinforcement or no 
reinforcement, whereas the Buddhist methods use no reinforcement on the object and 
lets the object of desire extinguish. Although one may argue, however, that the result 
equals or amounts to the same extinction, a qualitative difference between the two 
approaches are significant.  
The Buddhists of the current scientific era reason that letting go works like the 
right brain, which processes information in a holistic manner, as opposed to the left- 
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brain, that analyses information in a logical fashion. In addition, letting go, by the 
process of modelling by the clinician, calms the client’s mind instead of creating stress 
and anxiety to resolve conflict, inconsistency, and the non-fulfillment of desires. All of 
this boils down to, according to one approach, is a belief in the concept of self that 
desires eternal control and according to the other, a realization in impermanence and 
non-self that lets go. 
 
Let Go or Learn to Live with Desires? 
 
Both Western and Buddhist traditions realize that desires establish themselves as 
entrenched habits, which do not extinguish themselves easily. They hide behind socially 
reinforced expectations and social protocols. We are expected and accepted to be self-
assertive, proud, strongly attached to possessions, persons and ideology, and strongly 
reactive to things that do not agree with our desires. Therefore, we can never satisfy our 
desires, nor do we wish to extinguish them.  
Cognitive theorists like Piaget (1965), see desires as a habitual set of cognitive 
assimilations or schemata. For example, unless the perceptual motor coordination of eye 
muscles (e.g. a child notices the light), and cognitive coordination of awareness is 
involved, the baby cannot attend to the light nor does he develop eye-hand coordination 
and voluntary practices to reach a rattle or feed himself. Although Piaget provides a 
notion of equilibration to balance between accommodation and assimilation, he gives 
only a cognitive answer to the problem that involves affect and behaviour as well. 
Similarly, Kelly (1955) sees habit as tightened cognitive constructs requiring one to 
loosen them. 
On the other hand, Lacan, the French poststructural psychoanalyst, provides an 
illustration of four discourses of desire as what we desire but seldom achieve (see figure 
8.1).   
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Figure 8.1 Lacan’s four discourses of desire (modified after Ivey, 1988) 
 
This diagram represents Lacan’s four stages of desires as interpreted by Allen 
Ivey (1988). Ivey contends that desire can flow in either direction and can even flow to 
non-adjoining discourses at times. Each stage or discourse contains within it aspects of 
other stages or discourses just like the Buddhist notion of Interdependent Arising. The 
hysteric, out of control, desires mastery. The master desires knowledge, which is 
contained metaphorically in the University. The University in turn desires something 
beyond knowledge, the ability to know desire itself. The analyst, who has supposedly 
mastered all the earlier stages, seeks to know the hysterical subject. Neurosis or 
psychosis occurs when an individual, family, group, or society is immobilized or 
“stuck”. Therapy or analysis becomes terminally interminable (to borrow Freud’s 
famous statement) because a new desire always springs up after each cognitive, 
affective and behavioural truce. Here, Lacan supports the Buddha’s metaphoric notion 
of the unquenchable “thirst” (tanha) of a deluded person who incessantly drinks salty 
ocean water.  
Paradoxically, Lacan maintains that not wanting to desire and desiring are the 
same. Just as there are the life instinct and the death instinct, so are there the Buddhist 
equivalents of the desire to exist and not to exist. Each experience requires the 
simultaneous desire of seeking and letting go. He elaborated that the trinity of desires  
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for attachment, separation, and balance (homeostasis) can only be fulfilled temporarily. 
These notions validate the Buddhist notion of changeableness (anicca) in everything.  
From a psychoanalytic perspective, desires as habits are the repetition that 
repeats the structure of thought and behaviour, although content may be different. 
Hence, an obsessive-compulsive may repeat the desire to control in many different 
situations though his assimilated obsessive pattern is habitual. To break the pattern he 
has to be open to a new accommodation. In relating to others, we respond with the 
memories of the past that trigger habitual response patterns within the present context. 
We subconsciously tend to react to the present context with the past pattern. Although it 
seems natural to reason that we cannot operate without the past, we are not always 
conscious of the past pattern and the present situation in order to assimilate an 
appropriate response.  
However, Lacan advises, “Never give up your desire”, for to do so is death or 
emotional illness. Such a statement suggests that he sees both benefits and costs of 
desires, and chooses to help the client discover that life is more complicated and 
contradictory than it appears. Lacan smiles cynically at the ego psychology of the 
American psychoanalytic establishment, which assumes that an individual is free and 
capable of making a decision outside the dialectic of social conditions and personal-
cultural history.  
Thus, we may conclude from cognitive and psychoanalytic perspectives that 
desires are something that clients and clinicians have to learn to balance or adjust to 
understand the complexity of life. On the contrary, the Buddha emphatically 
recommends the reinforcement of healthy desires and the extinction of unhealthy ones. 
 
In Search of Self-Authority 
 
The Buddha’s recommendation goes beyond upholding the moral rules to glue 
the society together. He sees the human clinging to self-delusion and sensuous desires 
for existence and non-existence as the cycle of suffering. Lacan’s advice seems realistic, 
if we heed to Freud’s resignation that we can only help people to be less neurotic, but 
cannot completely cure them as the desire seizes authority and authorizes the self. The 
self wants to exist and not only to control its own life, but the existence or non- 
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existence of others and environments depending on whether they agree or disagree with 
the self’s ‘greedy’ desires. 
The severity of such suffering as schizophrenia manifests itself through non-
partially representational or non-perspectively organized form of art that is impossible 
for the bicameral man to create. Wilkinson (1999) construes this as a bizarre form of 
seeking self-authorization by schizophrenics. He considers that this kind of 
development gives psychotherapists an opportunity to reconstruct the account of 
schizophrenic experience at his own grounding system of being and the framework of 
reference as a whole, and his own authorization structure of functioning. Unless 
changes happen at the ground level, such a structure cannot be affected by an alteration 
of detail within the system because bicameral man and conscious man draw from the 
same basic matrix (Wilkinson, 1999). Wilkinson calls it the ‘Matrix of the Ground’, 
which cannot be explained within frameworks of our (the others) construing because we 
are inferring some continuity between one framework and the next. This is not the 
‘continuity’ of our time concepts, which is one of our own frameworks of construing. 
When a common experience misses its full significance by being concretized, 
the client experiences a moment of creative indeterminacy, and the psychotherapist 
touches the grounding causation: 
 
 
This is the fertile void of which Gestalt speaks, or sunyata, the emptiness 
of forms of Buddhism. It may be associated with a limbo or (in [Tibetan] 
Buddhism) bardo experience, and with a strong upsurge in the imaginal 
realm. We have a window of creating. It is often associated with silence, 
with encountering beneath or beyond words [or text, Italics, my 
emphasis], and we can relate it to Stern’s work with infant-mother primal 
rhythms [“affect attunement” or sharing of affect such as synchrony of 
movements, vocalization and expressions of pleasure between two 
month old infants and their mothers] (Stern, 1985; Wilkinson, 1999, 8). 
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Wilkinson considers that by not denying their schizophrenic experience 
and its protective wisdom but integrating it, alteration of their entire being-in-
the-world can be achieved. Thus, total Gestalt of the ground is changed without 
altering the content, although he agrees that reconfiguration in another sense 
does alter the content when we see the duck instead of the rabbit in the famous 
illustration of Gestalt perceptual organization. According to Wilkinson, this 
Matrix of the Ground enables us to relate to religious experience, mini-
schizophrenias of the sessions without resulting in psychosis due to the level of 
‘ground support’ the client receives through the ‘normalization’ process. He 
compares such experience with philosophical and religious transformations. 
Socrates heard his bicameral corrective voice counterbalance his extremes of 
reason. Buddha experienced his enlightenment process in his encounter with 
Mara, the tempter, and Jesus with the devil, and his ‘abba’ father.  
The implication is that working at the ground level shifts the core authorization 
structure without external help, but only by the space, the gap, and the window in the 
wordless silence of meditation. Buddha was both not the same person and the same 
person after and before his enlightenment experience. There was no authorization from 
outside. The space, the gap or the window associated with the wordless silence of 
meditation had experientially brought about his transformation and understanding. 
In Piagetian terms, the schemata of the individual have shifted to a new Gestalt 
when enough experience of the previous stage has been assimilated through varied 
repetition. This also relates to Freud’s insistence on ‘working through’ (Freud, 1957). 
Likewise, Lacan’s desire for equilibration between accommodation and assimilation or 
separation and attachment, represents our desire for self-knowledge. Similarly, Jaynes 
(1976) argues that our narrative time sense, our capacity to specialize inner experience 
and to locate the point of view, our ability to distinguish ‘me’ which may be observed in 
our mind’s eye, our ability to make parts stands for the whole and our ability to 
overview and conciliate our disparate experiences into a meaningful whole, constitutes 
self-reflexivity. 
However, Jaynes’ bicameral mind transcends Foucault’s observation of 
psychiatry (in ‘Ship of Fools’) and Laing’s notion of anti-psychiatry. The bicameral 
breakdown replaces them with the central desire to self-authorize, to hang on to 
consciousness, the sense of my “I”. Conscious choices of solutions now replace 
bicamerality in situations of stress. When Nietzsche (1974) claims that God is dead, he  
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signals the freedom from all God(s) to self- authorization. Paradoxically, the Buddha’s 
declaration of non-self awakening represents an ultimate form of self- authorization. 
Thus, input towards suffering is the same but the structure of the experience can 
be changed and the characteristics of calm can prevail. Wilkinson’s notion of “the 
Matrix of the Ground” opens the way for a more pluralistic, less sequential Hegelian or 
Wilberian model (1986) of a developmental succession of change in thought and 
civilization.  
 
Defenses for the Survival of Self-Authority 
 
Self-authorization, nevertheless expresses itself in one form or another, and 
sometimes through defenses with which we shields ourselves for ‘self’ survival. These 
defensive expressions parallel the Buddhist unhealthy mental concomitants discussed in 
the last chapter and they do not always work in our favour. They can be used in excess 
so that they stop good things from coming to mind, or they can be inadequate and fail to 
prevent disruptive things from dominating our attention.  
For example, Bach (1994) illustrates one particular defense, which represents a 
form of rationalization or reasoning called Exclusionary Category. By excluding “the 
other”, we pays attention only to the feeling of contrast to survive the “ego self”. It is a 
way of classifying an actual or potential target of attention in a way that justifies not 
attending to it, or if we are already attending to it, not attending to it any further. Bach’s 
illustration validates the post-bicameral men’s use of “linguistic armour” to gain self-
control: (see Table 8.1)  
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Class  Exclusionary category 
Epistemic  absurd, baseless, hopeless, impossible, 
incoherent, insignificant, irrational, ridiculous, 
superstitious, unreal 
Psychological  bigoted, crackpot, crazy, hateful, imaginary, 
inconceivable, misguided, unthinkable 
Social  embarrassing, forbidden, offensive, outrageous, 
taboo, unspeakable 
Evaluative  dangerous, filthy, hostile, incompetent, inferior, 
intolerable, obscene, perverted, selfish, shameful, 
stupid, unhealthy, unimportant, wicked, 
worthless 
Ideological  blasphemous, communist, diabolical, extremist, 
fascist, irreligious, racist, sexist, sinful, 
subversive, un-American 
         
Table 8.1 Defensive Exclusionary Categories 
 
However, evaluating or classifying people with exclusionary categories is not a 
guarantee method of mental health for the client. Both insufficient use (under-
defensiveness) and excessive use (over-defensiveness) may cause emotional problems. 
Exclusionary categories are continuous with other categories in classifying and 
evaluating people, objects, events, possibilities, and courses of action. They play key 
roles in constructing the thinking system that makes up our overall theoretical and 
practical view of the world. They do not guarantee that we will be able to keep 
something out of our mind even when we put it under an exclusionary category. On the 
other hand, there are some positive categories, such as Attractiveness, Friendliness, 
Pleasure, Productiveness, and Sensibleness. Some individuals use them for self-
defeating purposes leading to emotional disorders. Bach maintains that people make use 
of exclusionary categories to sustain what he called a psychologically basic proposition, 
that is, the need to believe that one is competent, important, attractive, and well-liked, 
that one’s projects and goals are worthwhile, and that the world is safe and hospitable.  
When one is unable to sustain such an “existential a priori” proposition (Needleman 
1968), one may develop chronic and debilitating feelings of inferiority, insecurity, 
rejection, instability or worthlessness. On the opposite end of the scale, people  
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perpetuate negative thoughts by perversely using exclusionary categories to keep 
themselves from thinking anything positive about them. Then we may have to use an 
elaborate scheme to push excluded objects away from entering the mind. Unfortunately, 
this kind of scheme has side effects. For example, if someone is trying to exclude sex as 
dirty, the person may end up not only avoiding the thought of sex but may shy away 
from social contact altogether.  
Such limits of effectiveness in using defense mechanisms may have instigated 
the adjunction of Buddhist Mindfulness meditation psychotherapy as Bach (1994) 
indicates that emotional disorders contain attentional and motivational components such 
as worry, fear, suspicion, resentment, guilt, shame, and confidence. He contends that the 
strength of an emotion is proportional to its attentional import, but in disorders, there is 
a gross and chronic disparity between the amount of attention something deserves and 
the amount it receives. A sensitive subject matter may capture one’s attention to an 
inordinate degree and, by its persistent and often ill-timed intrusion into one’s 
experience, impose unreasonable demands and disrupt one’s activities. This may lead to 
a vicious cycle of anxiety, distress, irrationality and loss of control. At the other 
extreme, a subject may be too touchy for focused consideration or even conscious 
awareness, and thereby chronically escape the attention it deserves. Although not every 
loss of attentional control constitutes emotional disorder, unwanted thoughts are not 
mere distractions or nuisances but can be seriously disruptive. Effective attention 
management requires habits, skills, and strategies that enable one to get things done and 
to further one’s aims without being blind to new possibilities. Depending on how one 
feels at a given situation, he may use or abuse the exclusionary categories. Therefore, it 
is not the amount of attention a particular problem gets, but the intentional application 
of attention to the problem. However, even if the intention is good, the emotional upset 
that precedes it would constantly nag at the intention for non-fulfillment of desires 
immediately. Therefore, alternative strategies are required. From the Buddhist 
perspective, this amounts to the process of paying attention to and letting go of the 
craving self-talks or emotional desires of Greed, Hatred and Delusion discussed earlier. 
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Western Adjunction of Buddhist Mindfulness 
 
Psychotherapies that base their research on behavioural, cognitive, social 
constructionist or postmodern deconstructionist traditions to provide alternative 
treatments have incorporated the Buddhist mindfulness practice as an adjunct therapy of 
‘Mindfulness’ or ‘Attentional Control Training’. For example, Teasdale et al. (1995) 
construct Attentional Control (mindfulness) Training on a structural framework of 
Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS) for the treatment and the relapse prevention of 
depression. The model proposes four levels of qualitatively different information or 
mental codes: Sensory codes, Intermediate codes, Morphonolexical codes, Propositional 
codes and Implicational codes. 
This is an information processing account of mindfulness where the subject 
makes use of empirical input of sensory data, models of schematic description and 
specific meaning. This generic level of meaning supposedly links to the depressive 
emotions. Combined with Cognitive therapy (Beck, et al., 1979) mindfulness training 
describes itself as:  
 
 
…states of mindful awareness [that] are associated with integrated 
processing of information related to the same topic over many 
transformation processes and subsystems, including the subsystems 
dealing with meaning. By contrast, ‘multi-tasking’ configurations in 
which several, unrelated, data streams are being processed throughout 
the total systems will be associated with the more diffuse awareness of 
‘mindlessness’ (35).  
 
 
Langer (1989) has compared the difference between mindfulness and 
mindlessness. Teasdale et al. (1995) illustrate this with an example of ‘automatic-pilot’ 
driving and ‘mindful driving’ where automatic pilot driving and thinking completely 
insulate from each other. ‘The lack of involvement of either of the subsystems handling 
meaning in the ‘automatic pilot’ configuration means that quite literally, the person will 
not have the sense of ‘knowing what they are doing’ as far as driving is concerned (36)’. 
The ‘Mindful driving’ configuration illustrates the cycle of interaction between 
representations of specific and generic meanings (the ‘central engine’ of cognition) that 
are involved in driving. “Several subsystems will be continuously integrated on the  
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single topic of driving. Consequently, one will be ‘mindfully’ highly aware of driving, 
with a definite sense of ‘knowing what one is doing (36)”.  
Teasdale et al. (1995) misunderstand mindfulness and theorize a four-level 
hierarchy of information processing call a ‘central engine’ which make schemas and 
meaning with mindfulness. In contrast, the Buddhist account essentially refers to a pre-
epistemic level of knowing at a sensation level rather than conscious information 
processing by the ‘controlling’ self. In other words, it is a driverless car (Brahmavamso, 
2000) being driven by the changing conditions of the Five Groups of Grasping 
(pancakhandha). Gunaratana (1993) explains mindfulness quite plainly: the meditator is 
mindful when he first notices the fleeting instant of pure awareness just before 
identifying or conceptualizing a thing. It is a short-lived state of awareness, which takes 
place just before our thinking objectifies and distinguishes it from the rest of existence, 
e.g. “Oh, it’s a cup.” Gunaratana (1993) makes a distinction between memory, 
mindfulness and remembering, “If you are remembering your second-grade teacher that 
is memory. When you then become aware that you are remembering your second-grade 
teacher, which is mindfulness. If you then conceptualize the process and say to yourself, 
“Oh, I am remembering”, that is thinking.” In the first instance, one is absorbed in 
remembering the teacher. At the second stage, adhesion to remembering becomes 
detached and one knows that it has happened. Thirdly, one thinks about what has 
happened. More specifically, mindfulness is the awareness of feelings or sensations 
(vedana) before perceptual discrimination of the object becomes fully established. 
Another example in adjunctive use of Mindfulness is in Linehan's (1993) 
cognitive-behavioral treatment of borderline personality disorder. Her Dialectical 
Behaviour Therapy follows a similar route where mindfulness training takes place as a 
control skill where the intellectual mind and the emotional mind overlap. Schema-
focused Therapy, and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy also use mindfulness 
training. Beside a cursory mention of mindfulness as part of Eastern meditation 
practice, the therapies neither concur with the original teachings of the Buddha and its 
commentaries nor do they analyze or rationalize why they use mindfulness as a “mind-
controlling” method in theory building. In addition, they have no interest to explore and 
understand the complexity of how mindfulness evolves interdependently from the 
practice of all other conditions according to the Principle of Interdependent Arising. 
Hence, mindfulness-based therapies use mindfulness as a cognitive control method 
adjunct to the main cognitive, behavioural or constructivist formulations, rather than  
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integrated theory and practice. Current popularity of Buddhism in the West may have 
contributed to this phenomenon. 
 
Varieties of Treatment Formulations 
 
One of many factors contributed to this desperate search for a comprehensive 
treatment formulation by therapies is the stubbornness of unhealthy self-talk or desires 
and their manifest symptoms of chronic anxiety, depression, and other neurotic, 
psychotic, and psychopathic disorders.  Hence, researchers look for an explanation of 
the symptoms and their treatment hypotheses ranging from biological to bio-
psychosocial perspectives. Some witness the effect of pharmacological treatment on 
certain conditions and backward engineer a hypothesis to proof that depletion or 
deficiency of certain biochemical causes the condition. For instance, Attention Deficit 
and Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), still maintains its controversial status among 
researchers and treatment providers. As some positive responses to biochemical 
treatment in children were observed, it has been extrapolated to adult treatment 
associated with Conduct Disorder, Anxiety, Depression, Substance Abuse (of 
Amphetamines in particular), Schizophrenia and Psychopathy. This follows the pattern 
of a backward engineering in hypotheses generation. In reality, the broad-spectrum 
effect of pharmacotherapy shows some symptomatic improvement of a condition does 
not mean that the lack of such chemicals is the cause of problems (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, 2002). Others may focus on multifactorial genetic and life 
experiences causation
40, for example, of schizophrenia. Here, I shall highlight only on 
psychological formulations of disorders such as schizophrenia (expanded and elaborated 
in chapter 10) within the contexts biopsychosocial conditions.       
For instance, cognitive and information processing models, whilst recognizing 
the biological basis of such severe psychological conditions, propose the problems of 
“faulty filter”, other issues of limbic system to “gate-in and “gate-out” the bombardment 
of stimuli, “openness” and “closeness” to the environment or “pigeon-holing” the 
stimuli. For example, studies based on Broadbent’s work on schizophrenics (1958, 
1971, 1977) argue that attentional deficiencies in schizophrenics are due to a “faulty-
filter” that cannot restrict the range of a client’s processing, therefore he is flooded by 
sensory impressions from all quarters. Hence, schizophrenics become aware of stimuli  
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which normal individuals are not conscious of (Frith, 1979). “It has been hypothesized 
that the deficiency involves those parts of the limbic system that act in a reciprocal 
fashion to “gate-in” and “gate-out” stimuli. This idea corresponds to a psychological 
level of a person’s “openness” or “closeness” to the environment” (Venables, 1973). 
For schizophrenics, this gate seems to be permanently switched to the open mode 
(Hollandsworth, 1990). Presumably, the space or the gap opens too wide and the 
individual receives bombardment of external and internal stimuli, and his state of mind 
becomes agitated. Others have argued that the problem is not so much a problem of 
filtering but what schizophrenics do with the perceived information. Hemsley (1975) 
has proposed that schizophrenics display an inability to organize stimuli at the second or 
“pigeon-holing” stage. This may lead to misinterpretations or a faulty attribution 
characteristic of the more delusional aspects of the disorder. These information-
processing models also recognize the possibility of a biological basis for these deficits. 
More psychologically, John Muller (1985) presents the idea of a gap in the 
dialectic. He pointed out that the gap or the eye of consciousness between the dual 
oppositions must be open for the movement of the dialectic. If the gap is closed, it 
cannot accommodate new data and the client’s old assimilations will predominate. If the 
gap is “blown” or opened too wide, too much accommodation and new data may come 
in. In “worst-case scenarios”, the client may fail to distinguish between the inner and 
the outer world in psychosis, and a pulsation of the gap seems necessary.  
On the other hand, George Kelly’s (1955) personal construct psychology views 
emotional disorders as the result of the individual’s construal of emotional categories 
(though Kellyans may interpret them as cognitive) which becomes disintegrated and 
loose, hence life becomes unmanageable. For instance, the loosened constructs are the 
primary signs of schizophrenic thought disorder and the Kellyans attempt to tighten 
them through validation.  
In addition, David Olsen’s (1988) Circumplex Model also conceptualizes the 
spatial relationships and maintenance of the self within the family. In family therapy, 
the therapist helps the sel(ves) moderate their relationships of disengagement and 
enmeshment towards connectedness on one dimension and temper the polarities of rigid 
and chaotic structure towards structured relationships on the other. In such a faulty 
family relationship, the client usually finds himself to be the identified patient (IP).  
These assumptions of how we relate to others and the world as mental objects 
(as objects of consciousness), and how much we filter or let the gap widen and flood our 
consciousness, loosen or tighten our concepts and scurry between emotional spaces,  
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reveal our desperate desire to relate to and be recognized by “the other”. The object 
relation theory similarly elaborates on such psychodynamics.  
In real life, acceptance and approval by others come to us in an unpredictable 
fashion. Bach (1994) maintains that people use defensive exclusionary categories to 
sustain what he calls a psychologically basic proposition that is a need to believe that 
“the self” is competent, important, attractive, and well liked, that one’s projects and 
goals are worthwhile, and that the world is safe and hospitable. When “the self” is 
unable to sustain such an “existential a priori” proposition (Needleman 1968), we may 
develop chronic and debilitating feelings of inferiority, insecurity, rejection, instability 
or worthlessness.  
Among schizophrenics, something else replaces these capacities. They 
experience a desperate loss and disorientation in the world. However, hallucination is 
still compatible with holding on to our sense of an ‘I’. Paradoxically, spiritual 
experience, meditation and spiritual emergency (Grof, 1984) take people into similar 
territory when they make a real attempt to witness and transform the schizophrenic 
process. 
Unfortunately, schizophrenic thinking is thought of as a loss of conscious 
modes, and therefore of nature and creativity. However, the bizarreness of the 
schizophrenic thought process is not a reversal from the bicameral but a creative 
compromise between the bicameral and consciousness thinking. Thus, schizophrenic 
thinking illustrates a fusion of consciousness and bicameral modes. This is why 
Wilber’s (1996) description of the ‘pre-personal’ and ‘transpersonal’ in his book “A 
Brief History of Everything” does not explain this kind of suffering. In fact, thinking in 
the schizophrenic does not normally breakdown. Yet, this sense of being in danger, ‘off 
the wall,’ seems to be the reason why a significant number of schizoid people join 
religious communities for consensual support. In my opinion, the whole schizophrenic 
experience appears to embody not only hyporeflective thinking but also hypersensitive 
feeling (elaborated in chapter 10). 
To conclude, the notions of the filter, defensive exclusionary categories, 
loosened constructs, the gap, the gate and extreme forms of object relations seem to 
suggest treatments that bring back schizophrenic experience to the middle norm. 
Although the Western notion of a midway or an Aristotelian average between the two 
extremes seems the same as the Buddhist idea, the Buddha’s middle path means 
observing and understanding the experience from a neutral space-in-between. 
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Buddhist Middle Path of Neutral Space-In-
Between 
 
The process of accommodation and assimilation in therapy has a transitional 
space called attention, which enhances cognition and experience connected with 
memory and feeling respectively. This experience parallels the meditator’s dwelling in 
the transitional space of attention where he accommodates and observes his feelings and 
thoughts without prejudice for insightful understanding before taking any action. 
If the meditator does not allow things to unfold and cease naturally, but instead 
tries to make them cease, he creates new kamma (action) and reinforces his habitual 
desires. For instance, if the meditator begins to feel memories or obsessive fears coming 
up in meditation, he needs to accommodate them into consciousness rather than being 
upset or frustrated by them. In order to accomplish that, the meditator has to develop a 
quiescent space in his mind first through a simple meditative device, which does not 
create any cognitive or affective distractions. In most cases, ‘breath’ as a meditative 
object suffices as an effective device to create a quiet space in the mind. As tranquillity 
develops, the meditator can observe these thoughts and emotions from that space to 
understand their true nature as they unfold.  
Focusing on the neutral space-in-between serves as a metaphor for having a 
space to shuttle between accommodation (of the external) and assimilation (with 
internal representation) in the therapeutic relationship. In terms of mindfulness 
meditation, accommodation means a concentrated observation in shared space without 
evaluative judgement and assimilation a reflective understanding after a “pause” at the 
space-in-between. The space also serves as a “pause” for emergence of insight (a leap 
beyond assimilation or synthesis) accompanied by verbal labels or conceptual 
conclusions.    
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Figure. 8.2 The Shuttle between the "space-in-between" and the "shared space" in 
Therapeutic Conversation 
 
 
Creating the “shared space” and the “space-in-between” space between the 
client and the clinician also avoids fusion and transference between two people. The 
neutral space-in-between provides a stance for unconditional regard and non-judgmental 
attitude towards “the self” and “the other”. In addition, the process of learning and 
sharing between two parties requires stepping in-and-out of each other’s ‘shoes’. A 
clinician who busily interprets a client’s responses misses what it means to the client. 
Adjusting the “right gap”, both spatial and temporal, provides an opportunity or a pause 
for an embodied experience, observation of its unfolding and reflection. The right gap 
also applies to the client.   
Adjusting the “right gap” between the two for both parties is the critical factor, 
which can emerge only when the mind is calm (samadhi), insightful (panna), ethical 
(sila) and not desiring to manipulate the subject of the conversation or each other.  
The Buddhists claim that if the individual accommodates the data with 
mindfulness within the space of the conscious present where short-term memory (STM) 
exists (refer to Figure 8.3 below), then what information theorists and cognitivists 
consider the impossible task to attend to every stimulus becomes possible. 
The task of therapy aims at travelling between accommodation (shared space) 
and reflection as opposed to assimilating the data into pre-existing beliefs (therapeutic 
templates) in the first instance. Mindful reflection in Buddhist practice means letting the 
concepts emerge only after the absorptive experience of accommodation, rather than  
  210 
prior cogitating or logically synthesizing disparate thoughts and feelings together. It is 
an emergent process of a conceptual self-discovery aftermath of non-conceptual 
absorption. The non-conceptual part of the practice accommodates the client’s sense 
data (both verbal and non-verbal) with “equanimity” in the background. In this way, the 
Buddhist process differs from Rogerian “empathy”. Placing the mind in the neutral 
space-in-between shows how knowing with feeling and thinking with thoughts 
differentiates as well as connects the two with clarity in a fully present mind. The 
emptied and fully present mind shows how feeling and thinking separate and integrate. 
The Buddhist 5 aggregates of clinging (khandhas) and deluded self (moha) 
remind us of Freud who considers that perception is not a purely passive process. The 
ego “I” sends out a small amount of emotion into the perceptual system. This immediate 
consciousness is also labelled as “absolute judgement span” (Blumenthal 1977), where 
the individual sees that an external stimulus matches up with an internal representation 
(assimilation).  
   According to Freud’s formulation, the individual encounters so many stimuli 
and events in his mental life that he must negate or repress some and accept others. To 
say ‘yes’ to one stimulus, he has to say ‘no’ to long-term memory assimilations and 
other stimuli present. If he has to attend everything, he will be physiologically and 
psychologically “jammed”. Long-term memory assimilations roughly correspond with 
Freudian preconscious and unconscious – some are easily accessible and others are not. 
An interesting parallel exists between Freud and Buddha about mindfulness. When 
Freud talks about “evenly suspended attention”, he is inadvertently validating the 
Buddhist practice of paying attention to ‘objects’ from the space in between. 
We think that our thinking is continuous, but there is a space in between. If we 
are aware and attentive to that space which means mindfulness, we can make ‘choices’ 
in how we interact with what goes on within and outside our skin. Thus, we may create 
an opportunity for an embodied observation. Sumedho (1995) succinctly states, "…be 
aware and attentive to the space before you think it; then think it and notice the space 
that follows". 
The space in between alerts us to be mindful rather than being judgmental as any 
evaluation is an integral part of forming emotion. This does not imply that Buddhists 
consider emotions as bad. ‘Watch this space’ is a good reminder to reflection just before 
thinking with concepts. Reflection implies that any mental object that cannot penetrate 
the still surface bounces back without judgement.   
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Ivey (1988) bases attention in his person-environment transaction model of 
information processing on the studies of Blumenthal (1977), Anderson (1985) and 
Ericsson and Simon (1984).  
The following model modified after Ivey explains the Buddhist approach to 
psychotherapy in the following ways:  
 
 
•  The dialectical portrayal of two people in therapy (self and other) 
which indicates the moral base for human conduct.  
•  The integration of Piagetian constructs of assimilation and 
accommodation to explain attentional memory process which 
helps explore the element of memory in sati (mindfulness), and  
•  It allows immediate consciousness to have access to long-term 
memory  
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Transactions in the Client-Clinician-Therapeutic Environment Context 
 
 
In a therapeutic context, each has a dual relation with the other. Both the 
clinician and the client have immediate perceptions and long-term constructions of 
memory. This conscious present (C in the Figure) has been defined by researchers as 
“rapid attentional integration”, the “conscious present” or a “buffer period” varying in 
duration from 50 to 750 milliseconds with an average of 100 milliseconds (Blumenthal, 
1977; Bekesy, 1931; Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971). Depending on the individual, this 
period can range from 500 milliseconds to 2 seconds where he can hold seven plus or 
minus two bits or chunks of information in his mind (the time for taking one item into 
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short-term memory (STM) varies from 50 to 250 milliseconds with 100 milliseconds 
being an approximate average). On the other hand, long-term memory may take only 
the 100-millisecond period. Lacan (1977) argues that cultural and social history is very 
much in the present even though we may not be consciously aware of its presence. 
When seeing, one does not see but rather sees images of the past. Thus, the clinician 
may also represent a parent or an authority figure to the client.  
 
Tranquillity-Insight Mental Development Model  
 
From the Buddhist perspective, the space between sensation (vedana) and 
consciousness (vinnana) contains perception (sanna) and mental formation (sankhara) 
of craving self-talks or desires that co-condition within the context of biopsychosocial 
and cultural history of the individual. However, the development of mental calm or 
tranquility meditation only requires paying bare attention to sense impression (vedana) 
while habitual reactive tendencies are suspended; thereby clarity of consciousness or 
clear comprehension (sampajanna) gradually emerges. The development of insight 
yokes together with tranquillity; one cannot be without the other. Without developing 
deeper concentration (samadhi), one does not let go of unhealthy desires, as one can 
only see their true nature in mental quietude. Thus, socially unethical behaviours clearly 
stand out as distraction to mindfulness and something to let go into cessation while 
allowing ethical behaviour (sila) to develop. In addition, one needs to progress through 
three kinds of knowledge by learning from discourses (sutta-maya-panna), rational 
thinking (cinta-maya-panna), and experiential understanding (bavana-maya-panna).   
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The Tranquillity-Insight Mental Development Model may be unfolded in steps as:  
 
 
A.  Attend to sensation or feeling of one’s own breath at a fixed point 
on the body (vedana), 
B.  Become mindful (sati) of the transient nature of feelings and 
thoughts, and movements of the “monkey mind”, 
C.  Concentrate deeper (samadhi) via letting go, thus suspending 
habitual   judgments and desires of the mind,  
D.  Dissolve or de-automatize dispositional emotions or mental 
formations (sankhara,) through continued letting go, 
E.  Engage in ethically virtuous physical, vocal and mental activities 
(sila), 
F.  Feedback to A, 
G. Gain experiential understanding with clarity (sampajanna) into 
the nature of things and freedom from the prison of one’s own 
mind  
H. Happiness of equanimity emerges from tranquility (samatha) and 
insight (panna). 
 
 
The model runs from A to H successively as well as simultaneously as each 
component has an element of the others that interdepends and loops back and forth by 
following the Principle of Interdependent Arising.  
In the process of attentive watching or mindfulness, one sees ideas, thoughts, 
images, and emotions arising, staying for a while, and passing away in the space–time 
continuum. As one experientially witnesses their nature, letting go of rigid assimilations 
in dealing with the world begins to flow. However, a balance between such an 
accommodation and assimilation is not what the Buddhists refer to as the path to 
freedom from suffering.  
To enter such a path of freedom from suffering, one needs to develop 
concentration to experience inner peace and insight to see things as they are 
(vipassana). Most contemplative traditions share concentration whereas the Buddha 
claims insight development as his unique discovery, as he considers this the essential 
key to liberation. Common stages for the development of concentration and insight 
called absorptions (jhanas) “burn up” unhealthy desires and affix one’s attention 
completely on the object of contemplation. In the first absorptive stage the meditator 
burns up unwholesome mental states of sensual desire, ill will, sloth and torpor and 
worry and doubt by applying opposing mental states of applied thought, sustained 
though, rapture, happiness and one-pointedness. In the second stage of absorption, the  
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meditator lets go of the coarser applied thinking. Subsequently, he lets go of sustained 
thinking or reflective thinking in the third stage, rapture in the fourth stage and 
happiness in the fifth stage happiness, and thus a neutral state (upekkha) of pure 
concentration emerges. In the discourses, the second and third stages compact together 
to make four stages of absorption or the four fine material absorptions (rupajhana). 
Beyond these four absorptions, another four sets of higher meditative states 
further deepen the state of tranquility. These attainments are the base of boundless 
space, the base of boundless consciousness, the base of nothingness, and the base of 
neither-perception-nor-non-perception. They bare the name of four immaterial 
absorptions (arupajhana). The combined eight attainments set the base of concentration 
needed for a profound insight to arise. 
A layperson can achieve these attainments without becoming a monk. Scriptural 
sources quote the emancipation of even a murderer, a prostitute, and a psychiatrically ill 
under the guidance of the Buddha. This does not mean that if we teach a schizophrenic 
to go into absorption stages he will be free from his illness. In fact, an acute 
symptomatic schizophrenic requires “uncommon therapy” (Haley, 1993) within the 
Matrix of the ground (Wilkinson, 2006) before one contemplates teaching him 
meditation. A report by a recovered schizophrenic who was a Buddhist monk told the 
story of how meditation precipitated his breakdown, as well as recovery from it (Cheah, 
2004). The report narrates that only when the client realized the impermanent (anicca) 
nature of schizophrenia did he begin to recover from his illness.   
The Buddhists consider that recovery from any suffering amounts to seeing “the 
three characteristics” of: transitoriness (anicca), unsatisfactoriness (dukkha), and the 
non-enduring ego (anatta) in human existence that is free from attachment (lobha), 
aversion (dosa) and self-delusion (moha). Only when the individual has direct 
experience (Varela, F. J. & Shear, J., 1999) gained through right effort and 
concentration, and dissolution of unhealthy desires and reflection, is he able to see 
things as they really are, that is, the battle between sense data and conceptual 
manipulation by desires.  
Interestingly, a Reflexive Model of Consciousness (Velmans, 1990, 1996, 2000) 
appears to resemble the direct experience of vipassana without necessarily having the 
same goals of “seeing things as they are” and understanding “the three characteristics”. 
Thus, the client would need to integrate with the process of Theravada treatment 
proposed here to free himself from conceptual and emotional quagmire so that he may  
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clarify and further develop of personal value and meaning. The final liberation from the 
Buddhist perspective, however, represents the transformation of the individual who 
embodies compassionate heart and wise understanding through calm mindfulness.  
A simple illustrative example unfolds a bridging point as Velmans (1990, 1996 
& 2000) compares how a dualist, a reductionist and the reflexive subject (S) and the 
experimenter (E) see a cat. (See Figure. 8.4. Next Page) 
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Dualist 
 
Reductionist 
 
Reflexivist 
 
 
Light rays from a cat (as-perceived 
by an Experimenter) impinge on 
the Subject’s eye. Impulses 
travelling up the central nervous 
system and produce a neural 
representation of the cat within S’s 
central nervous system. 
Information within this neural 
representation is incorporated 
within an “ “e ex xp pe er ri ie en nt ti ia al l   m mo od de el l” ” of 
the cat produced by the brain in the 
form of a cat as-perceived by S. 
This is ‘projected’ by the brain to 
the judged location of the initiating 
stimulus, out-there in the world.  
In the D Du ua al li is st t and R Re ed du uc ct ti io on ni is st t 
models, the neural representation of 
a c ca at t   i in n   S S’ ’s s   b br ra ai in n   i is s   s se ep pa ar ra at te e   f fr ro om m   
t th he e   c ca at t   ( (a as s- -p pe er rc ce ei iv ve ed d   b by y   E E) )   out 
there in the world.  
Dualist sees the percept (of a 
cat) in S’s mind is quite separate 
both from the neural representation 
(of a cat) in S’s brain and the cat 
(as-perceived by E) out-there in the 
world.  
Reductionist sees the percept of 
the cat in S’s mind as nothing more 
than a state or function of the brain. 
In the R Re ef fl le ex xi iv vi is st t model, 
however, S’s percept    of a cat and 
the cat as-perceived (by S) are one 
and the same. Indeed w wh ha at t   S S   
e ex xp pe er ri ie en nc ce es s   i is s   s si im mi il la ar r   t to o   w wh ha at t   E E   
e ex xp pe er ri ie en nc ce es s, viz. a cat out there in 
the world, but viewed from S’s [1 1s st t   
p pe er rs so on n] perspective rather than 
from the [3 3r rd d   p pe er rs so on n] perspective 
of E.   
 
Figure. 8.4 Comparison of Dualist, Reductionist and Reflexivist Models of 
Consciousness 
 
Therefore, a full story of what is going on has to combine what E observes with 
what S experiences (see discussion on mixed-perspective explanations in Velmans,  
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1990, 1996, 2000).  If we combine E’s observations with those of S’s, an entity in the 
world (the initiating stimulus) once processed, is consciously experienced to be an 
entity in the world (a cat), making the entire process “reflexive.”  
The Reflexivist Model supports a scientific framework to study the tranquility-
insight practice in a psychotherapeutic context from two perspectives. First, it enables 
the psychotherapist to view the world from the client’s perspective with equanimity 
(upekkha), and second, it allows both the client and the therapist to focus fully on the 
observation of the client’s experience as it unfolds without the interference from pre-
existing theories of both individuals. The model allows both parties to attend from the 
neutral space-in-between to their thoughts and feelings for reflection and insightful 
understanding rather than re-act as soon as they sense the stimuli. 
 
An Integrated Hypothesis 
 
Thus, the treatment hypothesis for the cessation of suffering requires more than 
the Western therapist’s (E’s) interpretation of meaning, confrontation of discrepancies 
to reflect inconsistency, synthesis of disparate parts, perturbation of existing cognitive 
schemas and emotional patterns and attentional training. These methods no longer hold 
the key to creativity and change automatically without the Buddhist components of 
compassionate behaviours, mindful observation and reflective understanding. The new 
cognitive constructions on top of the old emotional problems through interpretation, 
confrontation, perturbation and attentional education on their own may bring about 
more conflict and suffering.  
It requires the aforementioned self-other-environment matrix, i.e. therapist and 
client as two researchers observing the phenomena together non-judgmentally as well as 
reflectively in a therapeutic context.  For an integration of Buddhist and Western 
psychologies to occur, the Buddhist practices need translation within the context of 
Western psychological language and therapy respectively.  
Such a hypothesis would allow independent pursuits of both Buddhist and 
Western knowledge within an interdependent framework that would cease or extinguish 
the fire of unhealthy desire. The Buddhist principle of Interdependent Arising already  
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provides such a framework where the Western studies of desire, for example, of textual 
construction and deconstruction can integrate with the Buddhist practice of cessation 
through non-judgmental observation and letting go. Within the framework of 
Interdependent Arising, Buddhist and Western research may conjointly study body and 
brain, sensation or feeling, perception, conception and consciousness as interdependent 
components of psychophysical personality (the Five Group of Grasping). For example, 
the Western study of consciousness is pertinent to understanding mindfulness 
meditation. Perhaps, one of the most important aspects to this would be the Western 
openness to integrate with the Buddhist approach on textual learning (sutta-maya-
panna), rational discussion (cinta-maya-panna) and experiential awakening (bavana-
maya-panna) of knowledge discussed earlier. Psychoanalysis, poststructural thought 
and feminist writings have shown, in their own ways, the readiness to integrate with 
embodied thinking and learning.  
An example of the Buddhist three-way development of knowledge has also 
emerged in current thinking amongst cognitive neuroscientists. For example, the 
Reflexive Model mentioned above in particular has not only exposed the traps of the 
“nothing but” reductionists’ physicalization of the phenomenology of consciousness 
experience, perceptual reality, and dualists’ reliance on verbalization of embodies 
experience but has also taken an open and sensible approach to rational research. 
Descartes’ “I think therefore I am” only manifests consciousness in verbal thought or 
phonemic imagery – inner speech or self-talk. While the Buddha describes them as 
‘craving verbalizations’, he does not refer to them as the total experience of desire. This 
approach brings together ancient wisdom and modern science. However, a scientific 
application of rational research to ancient wisdom differs greatly from a “scientistic” 
application of methods used in the natural sciences to understand the psychology of 
human mind. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In conclusion, an integrated hypothesis for the cessation of suffering comes from 
an approach rather than from an adjunction of Buddhist methods to Western  
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psychotherapy. This approach offers a framework for a true integration of Buddhist and 
Western theory and practice systematically.  
For example, unlike putting ‘textual construction and deconstruction of 
suffering’ side by side with ‘observation and letting go’, there has to be a theoretic 
integration of text as a signifier of embodied experience that follows the principle of 
impermanence. Such integration would give us a clear perception of whether we should 
‘cease’ or ‘annihilate’ certain desires or ‘let go’ or ‘live with’ them.  
Similarly, a circular problem – the client desires to master his desires, the master 
desires the knowledge, the knowledge desires the (metaphoric) University, the 
University desires the desires again – supposedly mastered by the clinician who needs 
to realize the interdependence of desires between greed, hatred and the delusion of self-
authority as taught by the Buddha. 
In addition, such realization would show the desire’s core objectives to exercise 
power and control upon the self, others and environment(s). It would also reveal how 
the self, in its desperate search for authority, had lost the continuity of perceptual 
organization and sequential frames of reference. Then, the self slowly stops and 
becomes concretized, and suffers such experience as schizophrenia after losing the 
effective use of all defenses, e.g. exclusionary categories. 
‘Psychotherapy as schizoid selves’ has only limited success (as discussed in 
chapter 3) that attempts to formulate biopsychosocial hypotheses including the 
adjunction of Buddhist Mindfulness meditation. The approach I suggest here is that we 
take the Buddhist stance of the neutral space-in-between to treatment where the 
clinician models and shares with the client how to be ‘present’ in the ‘shared space’ and 
the ‘space-in-between’ to develop tranquility of the mind and to emerge from a “stuck” 
position and attain insight into his suffering. What the Buddhist approach advocates 
here is to accept (accommodate) and understand the suffering to take wise action rather 
than attack the phenomenon at hand with a sledgehammer, i.e. normalizing and working 
with the processes of the ground structure rather than the content of perceptual 
organization in schizophrenia.   
For instance, an earlier example of a cognitive neuroscience model – the 
Reflexivist Model of consciousness presumably uses the ‘shared space’ to see what the 
client sees, to develop a relationship and to explore the phenomenon of suffering – 
needs to explore the Buddhist framework to scientifically enhance the understanding of 
“see things as they are” that shifts the meaning for the client from a “stuck” to a  
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“solved” position. This framework also suggests the Western (linear) research methods 
to integrate with the Buddhist (simultaneous and successive) principle of Interdependent 
Arising, which enable both independent and conjoint treatment research to use sensible 
and rational methods. The next chapter elaborates how the Buddhist approach may 
integrate with Western psychotherapy in practice.   
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Chapter 9 
 
The Path to Freedom: Liberating the Self 
from Conditionality 
 
The last chapter briefly reviews the Western construal and adjunction of 
Buddhist mindfulness meditation as attentional training and a mind control skill, which 
do not fit with what psychotherapy aspires to achieve, that is, to help the individual 
actualize his potentials, and find meaning towards peace and happiness in life. This 
chapter further clarifies misapprehension and misapplication of mindfulness meditation 
to psychotherapy and elaborates on mindfulness as a tripartite practice of social 
morality (sila), concentration (samadhi) and wisdom (panna) through exercising the 
Eight-fold path that is known as the Middle Path. It also elucidates the confusion 
between tranquility and insight meditation. Finally, it discusses how the Buddhist 
principles and practices may be put together and applied in psychotherapy. 
 
Misapprehensions and Misapplications 
  
Integration of meditation principles to psychotherapy practice differs 
significantly from using Buddhist meditation as an adjunct to psychotherapy or having 
an intellectual discussion with the client on the Buddhist notion of ‘emptiness’. 
Buddhist therapy aims at silencing the mind so that one can let go of ‘intellectual 
noises’ or the proliferation of concepts and confusion caused by them, and thus 
allowing the mind to develop clear vision (sampajanna) of the phenomenon.   
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The second misunderstanding comes from the speaker or the listener who cannot 
develop clear perception to allow the emergence of conceptual understanding free from 
doubt and confusion. The so-called therapeutic conversation does not necessarily 
provide a sufficient condition to therapy as the signifier’s (speaker’s) emotions 
invariably interact with the signified (object of thought). The signifier-signified 
interaction can play out within one person, between client and clinician or between 
groups of people. The perpetual reinforcement of conditioned views of either the client 
or the clinician can become dominant theme of the conversation. Even a compromised 
interpretation of beliefs held by both parties may not lead to a lessening of suffering for, 
at least, one individual. The process can become an appropriation of a power 
relationship discussed earlier. The clinician needs to step out of his own worldview 
through mindfulness in order to step into the client’s experiential meaning before he can 
reflect upon them.  
Thirdly, mindfulness resembles the Rogerian unconditional regard and Freud’s 
notion of “evenly suspended attention”. However, the qualitative difference of 
mindfulness demands the therapist to see the client’s desires, beliefs and behaviours, as 
they are (yoniso manasikara) and to alternate this with his reflection and understanding 
of the client’s experience and meaning making. Usually, the client signals his agreement 
with the clinician’s understanding of his situation when the clinician levels or paces 
with him. The clinician stimulates the client’s inspiration and ability to explore his own 
problem by positively connoting his hidden strengths and talents, and asking the client 
“what” and “how” questions. This process departs from a sharing of the clinician’s 
interpretation in psychoanalysis and techniques of “reframing” commonly used in 
cognitive, systemic and behavioural therapies. Nevertheless, a mindful dialogue 
between them does not follow a completely unstructured approach. The Noble Eightfold 
Path that facilitates the client to develop a concentrated focus provides the framework 
for self-discovery in the background.  
A fourth misunderstanding that prevents Buddhist therapy from merging with 
psychotherapy comes from Western scholars’ construal of the Buddhist Middle Way as 
an Aristotelian moderate way (discussed in chapter 7) to wisdom (Hartshorne, 1987).  
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Aranavibhanga Sutta in the Majjhima Nikaya explains clearly, what the Buddha 
means by the “Middle Way”: 
 
 
One should not pursue sensual pleasure, which is low, vulgar, coarse, 
ignoble and unbeneficial; and one should not pursue self-mortification, 
which is painful, ignoble and unbeneficial… bhikkhu enters upon and 
abides in the first jhana [meditative absorption]…the fourth jhana… I 
say of this kind of pleasure [italics my emphasis] that it should be 
pursued… it is a state without suffering… therefore this is a state without 
conflict [of duality]. (MN 139) 
 
 
The Buddha clearly means the pleasure of meditative states [at different levels in 
daily activities] experienced by the practitioner. Brahmavamso (2000) elaborates that 
when one lets go of the pursuit of extreme sensual pleasures or pain connected to the 
five senses, it opens the door to the pleasures of the sixth sense, the mind. These are 
superior pleasures, the pleasures of the Middle Way born of meditation. 
Finally, another misunderstanding springs from the construal of conventional 
truth and ultimate truth in Buddhism as non-dual thought, which the Buddha never 
declared. He only claimed himself to be an experientialist
41 (discussed in chapter 3). 
Buddhist therapy does not assert feelings or thinking as a single cause of suffering. 
However, it claims feeling and thinking as two sides of the same suffering in an 
inclusive description of what I call a “non-dual duality”.   
Thus, this study shows how cognitive control methods common in 
psychotherapy may be systematically integrated with the Buddhist approach that deals 
directly with feelings, emotional desires, and social ethics. In so doing, psychotherapy 
may shift itself from “stuckness” to “solution” and be free from its own conditioning.   
 
The Middle Path 
 
The majority of clinicians and therapy models that uses the Buddhist concept of 
emptiness (sunnata) and mindfulness (sati) does so as a step towards intellectual 
voidness of the self in context and mindfulness as a method of attentional control and  
  224 
acceptance. Although it is true that Buddha discovered the experience of emptiness and 
the realization of [non-enduring] non-self (anatta) as opposed to the Hindu concept of 
eternal Self (atta), his experience of emptiness and non-self emerges from moral and 
mindful letting go of the self, which co-arises with insightful understanding. There were 
varieties of interpretation in morality, meditation and wisdom practice at the time of 
Buddha. However, the Buddha claimed that his “middle path” penetrated the insight, 
which stood against the level reached by Hindu and other spiritual practices. 
The Buddha proclaims that the practice involves the path (magga) and the fruit 
(phala), that is, entry to the spiritual stream and fruition of the stream entry. The ‘Path’ 
consists of a single moment of entering an attainment. Fruition means those moments of 
consciousness, which follow immediately thereafter (Nyanatiloka, 1980). The 
realization of enlightenment, the Buddha declares, can be reached by following the 
Middle Way, which avoids the two extremes. The first act of the newly enlightened 
Buddha was to teach his former five companions the Middle Way, even before the Four 
Noble Truths.  
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The Middle path to liberation comprises the Noble Eightfold Path, which may 
be illustrated as three integrated modules (see Figure below). 
 
Wisdom (panna)  Morality (sila)  Concentration (samadhi) 
1. Right View (samma 
ditthi) 
3. Right Speech (samma 
vaca) 
6. Right Effort (samma 
vayama) 
2. Right Thought (samma 
sankappa) 
4. Right Action (samma 
kammanta) 
7. Right Mindfulness 
(samma sati) 
  5.Right Livelihood (samma 
ajiva) 
8. Right Concentration 
(samma samadhi 
 
Figure 9.1 The Middle Way or The Eightfold Path 
 
 
Although it appears that the Buddha talks about the Wisdom module first to 
show that having a particular world view and thought connects the beginning, the 
middle and the end of suffering, all three modules interdepends and support each other 
like a tripod in practice. The Wisdom module refers to intention, aspiration, and the 
understanding aspect. The Morality module represents grounding social-ecological 
factors that stabilize the cognitive practice of Wisdom and Concentration. Some 
consider that morality flows on from wisdom (Sumedho, 1992), while others emphasize  
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morality as the basis of concentration (Nyanatiloka, 1980) and wisdom. Although moral 
practice may be easier for the monks and the non-returners (anagami), lay people find 
themselves, at least initially, practising the eight elements in a higgledy-piggledy 
fashion. Metaphorically, the eight-step practice resembles a cable with eight strands 
divided and fused into three interconnected cores, reminding us of “all-in-one-and-one-
in-all” description of “Interdependent Arising”. Contrary to apparent cognitive 
appearance, the last three elements of right effort, right mindfulness and right 
concentration interface their practice on feelings
42.      
Whether wisdom leads the practitioner to morality through concentration, or 
concentration leads him to morality, is not an important matter. What matters is that 
wisdom and morality depend upon each other like a yoke as in tranquillity and insight 
meditation. The Buddha likens wisdom and morality to an act of washing one's hands 
where they simultaneously interdepend upon each other to make them clean. The steps 
of the Noble Eightfold Path discussed below are imbued with such interactive activities 
between the heart, the head, and the ethical acts applicable to psychotherapy.  
 
Right View (samma ditthi) 
 
Right view or understanding contributes to gaining insight into the human 
condition of suffering, the conditions causing suffering, the cessation of suffering and 
the path leading to the cessation of suffering, the four noble truths. In brief, it amounts 
to understanding that “All that is subject to arising is subject to ceasing”. This is the 
first realization that leads to walking on the path to liberation, and it sounds rather easy 
to understand. Everyone knows that everything that exists is bound to change or cease 
to exist. In any case, the question may also be asked that if the ‘right view’ is the final 
goal, why one needs to start with the right view. Here, the Buddha alludes to the 
recognition of a worldview, which leads to suffering as a starting point to gain insight or 
understanding. Such an insight does not arise from ideas but from “tacit” knowledge or 
experiential understanding. Such an insight erases doubts, and one experientially comes 
to know that all that arises is subject to ceasing, which thus validates impermanence. 
Being mindful and reflective opens up the right view to overcome ‘ignorance’ (avijja) 
and gain ‘wisdom’ (vijja).  
  227
However, reflective practices in psychotherapy are based on metaphysics, which 
refer to the theory of knowledge (epistemology) of reality gained by conceptual 
reasoning, as opposed to the Buddhist observation of separation between sensory 
awareness and conceptual reasoning. Using the traditional definition of metaphysics
43 
that is common to the pre-modern traditions of both East and West brings us much 
closer to the Buddhist notion of right understanding and right thought through 
contemplation on feeling and reflection. Here, the Buddhist tradition alludes to the 
ethical flavour of balance between feeling and thinking. 
 
Right Thought (samma sankappa) 
 
The second aspect of wisdom in the development of right thought also reflects 
on the same orientation of wholesomeness as opposed to unwholesome or unhealthy 
thought. Right thought contains a dynamic quality of ‘intention,’ ‘attitude,’ and 
‘aspiration’ towards oneself and others. Right thought derives from social aspiration of 
overcoming unhealthy desires such as Shamelessness (hiri) and Recklessness (ottappa) 
that have direct reference to rebalancing social ecology, whereas the Western notion of 
guilt refers to an internalized conceptual control of social expectation. Aspiration, here, 
incorporates wholesome desire, motivation and virtue.  
As the ‘wisdom’ module of the Eightfold Path highlights the importance of 
having the ‘right view’ and the ‘right thought’, the following sections elaborate on the 
unique evolution of human virtues and argue against the generalizations based on 
genetic and animal heritage grounds. It also discusses the connection between the 
sympathetic physiology and virtues, and issues involved with the concept of self-esteem 
that many psychotherapists consider an important factor to mental health.     
 
Fear, Shame and Guilt 
 
The development of virtuous thought has an evolutionary beginning connected 
to biological survival. As Kagan (1998b) argues, over the course of evolution the central 
nucleus of the amygdala - an important structure in the acquisition of fear - became 
progressively smaller, while the basolateral nucleus and prefrontal cortex became larger 
and the connection between them elaborated. As these evolutionary changes in brain  
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anatomy occurred and language concepts developed, fear of attack and physical harm 
that seem to be primary states for hominids became subordinated to shame or guilt. 
Subsequently, humans seek the opposite feeling of virtue. An appreciation of right and 
wrong and its attendant feelings appear to have a distant origin in the monkey’s 
continual vigilance toward the actions, expressions, and vocal calls of others. Although 
human beings share a gene pool with their ape ancestors, the development of conceptual 
language in humans has provided them with a qualitatively different ability to process 
feelings.  
Biologically, virtues begin with physiological feelings. The process involves 
activities in the ‘heart, muscle, arteries, gut and skin’ that the Buddhists calls sensations 
(vedana) and are transmitted from body to brain. The sensory information generated by 
these bodily targets passes first through the medulla where neurons with opioid 
receptors can mute the intensity of the signal. This information is sent to the amygdala 
and from there to a part of the frontal lobe called the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. If 
the information pierces consciousness, it motivates an interpretation of the change in 
feeling. When the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is damaged or removed for medical 
reasons, the ‘heart’ no longer informs the ‘head’ of its moral imperatives and behaviour 
may lose its prior civility. In addition, the right hemisphere is said to be more sensitive 
to this bodily information than the left. Therefore, anxious adults are more accurate than 
most in detecting the number of heart beats in a given time interval (Damasio, 1994; 
Wittling, 1995; Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Rouse, et al. 1988). This phenomenon refers to 
a high sympathetic tone and emotional reaction.  
This shows up clearly among children. For example, a child who is born with a 
high sympathetic tone often displays extreme emotional reactions when criticized by 
parents for minor misbehaviour. Similarly, many inhibited children who avoid 
unfamiliar people and situations reported that as adolescents their greatest fear was to be 
criticized by others. A good example is the late 20
th century philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, who as a shy child experienced almost pathological tension in 
uncongenial settings, became a melancholic adult and tried unsuccessfully to get rid of 
intense dysphoria. Guilt over his inability to conquer this mood through will power 
alone, shame over his family denial of a Jewish relative, doubt over his intellectual 
talent, and regret over the fact that he struck one of his pupils seems to have motivated 
him to give away most of the money inherited from his affluent family. Science,  
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however, still does not understand the complexity of why siblings have different 
sympathetic tones. 
Feelings of shame and guilt may escalate when one identifies with a family or 
social group. For instance, a child may identify with a parent’s bad behaviour and think 
himself as bad. A black child may identify with a black sports hero and experience a 
moment of pride. However, the publicity of a brutal black murderer may affect a black 
child’s virtue negatively. Adam Smith (1959) considers that worry over other people’s 
evaluations remains the foundation of adult morality. When the feeling of uncertainty 
pierces the awareness, the symbolic label the child uses is very close to the adult 
meaning of the word “bad”. 
Nevertheless, elegant discoveries in genetics and molecular biology have 
persuaded evolutionary biologists to think that if the survival of one’s gene pool is the 
seminal feature of adaptation, then maximizing the number of offspring in the next 
generation is the correct criteria to apply. Kagan (1998b) points out a misleading error 
in ignoring the proximal cause in preference for an evolutionary one. Richard Dawkins’ 
(1976) notions of the “selfish gene” and “inclusive fitness” fail, if we take the poignant 
example of 18-year-old Thai “streetwalker” who sends her earnings to the parents who 
sold her into prostitution. She does not do so to maximize the reproductive fitness of 
those who share her genes. However, evolutionary biologists fail to recognize that 
humans are not only capable of shame and guilt but also of having empathy or 
compassion, sympathetic joy, loving-kindness and other positive emotions. 
Language signifies a strong reason to feel the guilt. Humans interpret change in 
complex, symbolic ways but animals do not. No animals calculate whether the change is 
good or bad for them or someone they care for. The Serbians who murdered Creations 
cannot be compared to hungry tigers killing gazelles. Humans kill because they feel that 
their virtues have been threatened. Virtue runs through everything that identifies the self 
as good.  
Guilt over hurting others has become an essential part of the human repertoire, 
perhaps because humans are one of the few species able to kill large numbers of their 
own kind at any time in a year. Grossman (1995) contends that the killer must suppress 
any dissonant thought that he has done anything wrong and that his mental health is 
totally invested in believing that what he has done is good and right. When killing 
occurs out of sight or at a distance, such as artillery bombardment or high altitude 
carpet-bombing, soldiers are protected from seeing their victims and, as a result, feel  
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less guilt. Kagan (1998b) argued that if Hitler had witnessed the killing of every Jew, 
his mental state would have been in a worse state than it had been portrayed in the post-
war analyses. I would argue, however, that his deluded self (moha), greed (loba) for 
power and hatred (dosa) of Jews were as such that psychological defence mechanisms 
would have dominated his sensibility and would have justified his actions. Nonetheless, 
the fact remains that wartime post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is less often 
stimulated by the fear of being killed than guilt over being disloyal to comrades, 
surviving a battle in which friends died, participating in or observing an atrocity, or 
killing an enemy whose face one can see. Similarly, rape victims are more vulnerable to 
guilt than the ones who are robbed, attacked by animals, or who are passengers in car 
accidents. 
The duality of selfishness and generosity, aloofness and empathy, hatefulness 
and loving, dishonesty and honesty, disloyalty and loyalty, cruelty and kindness, 
arrogance and humility is unique to human development. When selfishness or greed 
(loba), overwhelms one, guilt and depression can result. Only a trusting therapeutic 
relationship may uproot the cause of suffering. Matt Ridley (1996) contends that trust is 
the foundation of virtue. However, the feeling (vedana) on the body (rupa) with its 
formation of emotional values may be culturally conditioned, and sometimes one may 
be traumatized depending on how one’s perception (sanna) and mental formations 
(sankhara) of the five groups of grasping (khandha) are involved in experiencing the 
event. Traumatized emotions need working through at all levels of the five groups of 
grasping as trauma is considered single trial conditioning leaving an indelible mark on 
an individual’s memory. If “rational” conscious thoughts (vinnana) alone can control 
human behaviour, as in Rational Emotive Therapy or Cognitive therapies, we would 
have reduced human suffering from the most anti-social acts. What most therapies try to 
do is to de-condition the effect or to help let go of the impact so that the individual can 
maintain a peaceful mind rather than re-live the trauma every time triggering events 
reoccur. 
In summary, since the amygdala in the human brain that is responsible for 
fearful reactions has been growing smaller and the prefrontal cortex has been growing 
bigger with its conceptual ability, humans find themselves seeking out what is right and 
good. Beside this structural base, hypotheses about selfish genes or their beastly past 
(Dawkins, 1976) bear no justified relation to the development of virtues and vices. 
Human beings have developed a unique psychological adaptation to life such as  
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empathy and guilt. Humans interpret and value situations in complex and symbolic 
ways and have feelings of guilt, shame, and the desire to feel good and virtuous, which 
are qualities not present in animals.   
 
Fact, Value and Virtue 
 
The natural world does not in itself, manifest value and purpose. However, 
human inhabitants of the world have desires and needs that generate values. David 
Hume (1740) had claimed, 150 years before Nietzsche declared that there were no 
moral facts, that there were neither facts nor real existence except passions, motives, 
volitions and thoughts. 
Science always wanted to separate fact from value, and psychology in pursuit of 
scientific status embraced this approach. Cognitive science has already asserted that 
perception is from its inception value-laden, a statement that concurs with the Buddhist 
notion of psycho-ethical practice. On the other hand, the Hindu solution to fact versus 
value dichotomy is the fusion of atma and brahma into one non-dual (advaya) reality. 
Buddhist epistemology is neither dual nor non-dual but it highlights the importance of 
sense experience. Some sensations end up as obsessive desires. In the Middle Length 
Sayings, Buddha says: “Depending upon the visual sense and the visible object, O 
brethren, arises visual consciousness; the coming together of these three is contact; 
depending upon contact arises feeling;  What one feels one perceives; what one 
perceives one reasons about. What one reasons about, one is obsessed with; Due to such 
obsessions, a person is assailed by obsessed perceptions and concepts in regard to 
visible objects cognisable by the visual sense, belonging to the past, the future and the 
present” (MN 18). These obsessions are the result of rationalization about the objects 
cognized by the senses and that belong to the past, the present, and the future. In other 
words, it is not cognition that leads to the obsessions but reasoning about them. From 
the Buddhist perspective, the feelings (vedana) of the body (rupa) may be described in 
passive terms. On the other hand, perception (sanna), in Sanskrit literally means, 
“putting together and knowing”. Conception is then referred to as sankha (Sanskrit. 
samkhya), meaning “putting together and speaking” (Kalupahana, 1995), hence the 
“craving self-talks” discussed earlier. Thus, a seemingly passive description of feelings 
begins to change into an active mode as it moves towards and goes through a “linguistic  
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turn”, and the process of selecting and choosing with interest (sankhara) which 
consciousness (vinnana) resorts to speaking. This does not mean that facts and values 
are the same or that they should be fused together. 
What the Buddha has pointed out is that facts cannot be divorced from human 
knowledge and understanding, and they are partly subjective. Values, because they 
affect the facts, are objective in a pragmatic sense. The abandoning of both the 
absolutist and essentialist positions of truth helps resolve the related “is-ought” 
problem.  
Values form a part of virtuous actions. Although virtues themselves are not 
sufficient to attain wisdom, they are important nuclei of moral life. The Buddha 
admonishes monks to be virtuous (silava) but not to be made of virtues (silamaya), and 
makes clear the need to avoid any vacuous (deontological) practices of virtuous or 
moral life.  
 
Virtue, Moral and Self-esteem 
 
Virtues represent the beginning of the moral thought to life, which intends to 
bring about social harmony, while the morals are more comprehensive in that they are 
concerned with ultimate health, both physical and mental, and the welfare of oneself 
and others. However, the fruits of the virtuous life and the moral life need not be 
identical. The Buddha does not accept the concept of permanence or the eternal self as a 
reason for living a moral life. If the self is eternal, there is no point in practising 
morality. On the other hand, if the self ends in the demise of the body, there is no 
motivation to live a moral life. Both views are deterministic
44.  
Although clinicians must observe ethical standards in conducting 
psychotherapy with his client, psychotherapy has not directly addressed the 
effect of the client’s ethical behaviour that leads to his own suffering. The 
client’s ethical views and thoughts are regarded as private matters. Freud, on the 
other hand, considers a sense of morality as an internalized superego, the 
external constraint of civilization. In his writings, morality wears a negative and 
repressive aura. Humanistic-Existential theory, with its foundation in Existential 
philosophy and the Heideggerian concept of authenticity and care, actively 
encourages the exploration of moral reflection and self-understanding.  
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Unfortunately, the situated attributes of Dasein (being there)
45 often led through 
a Sartrean path of freedom and ended up in narcissistic forms of humanistic-
existential therapies typically illustrated in Fritz Perls’ Gestalt prayer:  
 
I do my thing, and you do your thing. 
I am not in this world to live up to your expectation 
And you are not in this world to live up to mine. 
You are you and I am I, 
And if by chance we find each other, it is beautiful 
If not, it can’t be helped. 
 
Such therapies view “self as an isolated individual in a morally neutral, objectified 
universe. Psychotherapy based on such views, risks perpetuating rather than 
ameliorating such problems”. (Guignon, 1993, 236, cited in Watson, 1998)  
Nevertheless, elegant discoveries in genetics and molecular biology persuaded 
evolutionary psychologists to think that human virtues and moral behaviours can be 
found in our primate ancestors. The fact that two monkeys behave as if they are 
cooperative because both animals benefit from the interaction, does not equate with 
human cooperation where the individual is simultaneously aware of both the needs of 
the other and his ability and obligation to help.  
For instance, a frog’s legs that biologically derived from the pectoral fins of a 
fish differ in structure and function of its predecessor. The same is true for the human 
conscience. Human moral sense, like frog legs, so dramatically different from the 
phylogenetically older competence that it would be an error to regard one as an obvious 
derivative of the other. 
Kagan (1998b) argues that evolutionary biologists who freely borrow terms 
intended for human behaviour and apply them to animals would surely object if 
students of human behaviour called a rhesus female who has copulated with four males 
in an hour unfaithful.  
Thus, Researchers may be divided into two categories: ‘splitters’ who prefer 
analysis and ‘lumpers’ who seek unity. Aristotle, who was fascinated by the uniqueness 
he observed in the living world, was a splitter; Galileo, who searched successfully for 
universal laws in the physical world, was a ‘lumper’. 
In humans, intentional view or thinking make important meanings; take the case 
of a husband throwing a knife at his wife and compare it with a 6-month-old infant 
throwing the same object at his mother, for example. Human moral motives are  
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qualitatively distinct because they contain symbolic and emotional elements that are not 
present in any primate. For instance, evolutionary biology does not demand that every 
feature, which defines a particular phylum, order, family, genus or species have a 
homologous structure or function. The chick embryo provides a unique insight into 
embryological development that is not possible through the study of frog larvae (Levi-
Montalcini, 1987). Echolocation in bats has no strict homologue in a beaver colony; and 
the construction of spider webs has no homologue in crabs. 
The ratio of antisocial acts, Kagan (1998b) argues, to the total opportunities in 
the world decreases every day. This should not breed complacency to a species with a 
frontal lobe so large that it permits a person to harbour resentment, envy, jealousy and 
hostility for a long time after acute anger has passed. On the contrary, the 11/9/2001 
bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York proves the effect of slow anger. 
Hence, it is incorrect and dangerous to deny the unique moral emotions that chance 
mutation had made possible between 100,000 and 200,000 years ago. Human moral 
sense is “not a thin layer that covers a beastly and selfish makeup” (De Waal, 1996, 
218). The human moral sense, like the spider’s construction of its web, is a unique 
product of evolution that has been maintained because it ensures the survival of the 
human species. 
Pop-psychology misreads Darwin’s writings and views the human need for 
power, fame, sex, property as natural. The single-minded pursuit of power, prestige, 
wealth, and sexual delight currently admired by Western society would be viewed by 
the Buddha as unwholesome. The Buddha would not consider anger, jealousy, self-
interest and competitiveness and such popular sayings “greed is good”- a popular 
statement from the movie Wall Street – as human virtues. 
 
Unwholesome views and thoughts have been exposed as part of our animal 
heritage by a link between animal behaviour for any ethical message (Kagan, 1998b): 
 
 
•  that the sanctity of the institution of marriage, one can point to 
the bonding of gibbons;  
•  that infidelity is more naturally sociable, one can point to the 
chimpanzee; 
•  that humans are naturally sociable, one can point to baboons; 
•  that humans are solitary, one can point to orangutans;  
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•  that sex should replace fighting, one can point to rhesus 
monkeys; 
•  that surrogate care is closer to nature, one can point to lionesses; 
•  that men should dominate harems of beautiful women, one can 
point to elephant seals and 
•  that women should be in positions of dominance, one can point to 
elephants. 
 
 
Nature has enough diversity to suit almost any ethical taste. What is biologically 
special about a human is that he holds qualitatively different views and thoughts from 
his animal ancestors to choose one comparable action over another. He chooses to attain 
a consonance between a chosen conscious sense of pleasure – a standard, and his 
chosen action. There is no word in English that accurately describes this feeling; 
‘virtue’ comes close (Kagan, 1998b). From the Buddhist perspective, his chosen action 
represents him as having “right view” and “right thought” towards the ecology of self, 
other and environment.  
A related concept to virtue popularized by Maslow (1968) called self-esteem 
also translates to having “right view” and “right thought”. It implies that each individual 
unconsciously computes an average of the distance between each of his or her important 
qualities and the associated ideal. Self-esteem is supposed to represent that average.  
Humans are the only species that apply a symbolic evaluation of good or bad to 
actions, thoughts, feelings, and personal characteristics and try continually to choose 
acts that make them feel that the self is good. Ridley (1996) who followed Darwin 
insists that no individual acts unless he stands to gain some external prize. However, the 
symbolic private assurance that one is virtuous – given by the self to the self – is an 
attractive prize that humans seek which is absent in the most cooperative non-human 
species. Therefore, it is a serious conceptual error to claim that humans are driven by a 
unitary desire to maximize pleasure.  
The evolution of Homo sapiens is marked by the emergence, between the 2
nd 
and 3
rd birthdays, of an appreciation of the symbolic categories good and bad to 
interpret the self’s actions, thoughts and feelings
46. Unlike other animals, humans 
constantly evaluate the moral implications of their views, thoughts and behaviours. 
Even the cleverest ape cannot be conditioned to react with anger upon seeing one 
animal steal food from another; surprise or fear may be possible but anger or guilt is  
  236 
not. In an experiment, while a chimpanzee has a difficult time learning a novel rule, a 3-
year-old can figure it out in one or two minutes (Povinelli, 1996). 
Nevertheless, Freud and the behaviourists insist that the human desire to perfect 
a talent does not require any process that is not present in animals. In any case, the ideas 
of ego, superego, defence, repression, and oral-anal-phallic fixations have no obvious 
analogues in monkeys. There can be no mouse model for human pride, shame, or guilt. 
Interestingly, most psychologists who pay homage to the continuist premise implicit in 
Darwinian theory write about characteristics absent in animals like deductive reasoning, 
long-term planning, learning disorders, extroversion, obsessions, schizophrenia, and 
anorexia. 
In summary, all of these dualities: mind and nature, biology and psychology, 
self and society, facts and (moral) values, moral virtues and ethics, ethics and emotions, 
are interdependently connected and embedded within one another. As Bateson (1972, 
461) pointed out, “… when you separate mind from the structure in which it is 
immanent, such as human relationship, the human society or ecosystem [italics, my 
emphasis] , you thereby embark, I believe on a fundamental error, which in the end will 
surely hurt you.” The next section examines the commonality of values and converging 
thoughts between Buddhism and psychotherapy.  
 
Converging Thoughts in Psychotherapy and 
Buddhism 
 
At a philosophical level, the parallels and commonalities between Buddhist 
principles and Western thought show the signs of convergence for an integrated 
practice. Transpersonal psychotherapy, eco-psychology and postmodern thought 
emphasize what the Buddhists call “Interdependent Arising”. Levinas (1986), for 
instance, states that his ethics of ‘meontology’ (opposite of ontology) affirms the 
meaning beyond being or a primary mode of non-being (me-on) and echoes what I refer 
to as “the neutral space-in-between”, egolessness (anatta) or emptiness (sunnatta). 
Similarly, Bakhtin (1993) considers that the foundation of ethics lies in the concrete 
experiential actuality of the relationship between the individual and the world.  
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Bakhtin’s dialogic position allows the other to remain another consciousness or another 
centre beyond total integration or reduction of the difference.   
Likewise, “ethical of relatedness” (responsibility) is the basis of women’s view 
on morality rather than the “ethics of principal” [sic] (rights) (Gilligan, 1993, 74). In her 
view, the individual participates in both differentiation as well as integration. Gilligan’s 
research on women’s responses to abortion illustrates what she terms the “ethic of 
care”. She describes the three-stage sequence of development towards moral problems: 
initial emphasis on caring for the survival of the self, leads to a critical judgement of 
being selfish, which turns into a view of caring for others. I see selfcare as a preparatory 
counterpart to care for others at the same time. Final stage forges the middle way 
between selfishness and responsibility through an insight of interconnections and 
interdependence between the self and the other.  
System theory and the enactive approach of Varela et al (1991), also hold an 
interconnected view of the relationship between the individual and the world, 
emphasizing the moral nature of knowing itself [“the self”] and defining ethics as a state 
of adaptation of natural and cognitive systems in a relational mode. Means no longer 
separates from ends but a mutually interdependent feedback spiral within an open-ended 
system. As stated in Buddhist ethics, “From morality comes wisdom and from wisdom 
comes morality (DN ii, 124)”. Varela argues that truly ethical behaviour comes from 
personal transformation rather than from moral judgement. Varela’s notion of an 
ethically responsible way of acting p its position on situated “know-how” rather than on 
a set of fixed rules, echoes what Gestalt therapy talks about as response-ability. From 
within cognitive science, Mark Johnson (1993) in his work on the moral imagination 
argues that we are beings whose identities emerge and develop in an ongoing process of 
interactions within our physical, interpersonal and cultural environments (253). 
From an ecological perspective, David Abram (1996) argues that environmental 
ethics that not only respect our lives and heed our fellow human beings but also the life 
and well-being of the rest of nature will come not through new philosophical principles 
and legislature but through renewed attentiveness to perceptual dimensions that underlie 
all our logic, through a rejuvenation of our carnal, sensorial empathy with the living 
land that sustains us (69). He believes that such an embodied perception can lead to an 
appreciation and understanding of the interconnection of perceiver and perceived. 
This is comparable to the client-clinician relationship I have suggested earlier. 
Abram’s suggestion brings us closer to the Buddhist notion of the five groups of  
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grasping (pancakhandhas) and meditation on feelings (vedana). Meditation on feelings 
interfaces with meditations on body, mind, and mental objects. The focus on feelings, 
prior to the formation of linguistic thoughts and conscious labelling of emotions, helps 
us understand how perception evolves and differentiates between the perceiver and the 
perceived. If we are able to stay with the feelings of what we sense, ethical choices from 
that experience will unfold before us, without having to cogitate or construct ethical 
principles that are not embodied.  
Lucas (1996) argues that emotion (when feeling (vedana) dominantly presents 
itself in the five groups of grasping) precedes thought and is prior to ethical thought 
processes. According to Lucas, in any ethical situation we act first and think later. 
Emotions are a ‘higher level’ of passion on an evolutionary par with reasoning, akin to 
the primitive reflex of a rabbit that triggers the paralyzing hormones when it is caught in 
the car's headlights. Emotions, in an evolutionary sense, link to what may be labelled 
our desire for existence that in turn motivates other emotions, e.g. love, anger, jealousy 
and so on. Altruistic emotions of human beings, on the other hand, are arguably unique 
to Homo Sapiens’ evolutionary development.  
In Lucas’ argument, the utilitarian act for the greatest good and a “rule book” 
application to humane ethics does not work, because there is no way one can be sure of 
the best action in the universe, and “the Ten Commandments” rules also depend very 
much on certain conditions. For example, a Christian police officer may shoot a terrorist 
who is about to kill 20 children. In this respect, his argument is in line with the Buddhist 
notion of interdependent conditionality. Ethical decisions in Buddhist practice depend 
on prevailing conditions. Each decision depends on a given context and surrounding 
circumstances. Therefore, one cannot apply rigid rational analysis or a fixed rule. Lucas 
bases his “Evolutionary Model” of ethics on human tendencies to fight, flight, submit or 
freeze reactions in threatened situations (Hiteler, 1990). Through our evolutionary 
process, we learn to adopt social empathy from an age as young as 9 months (Lucas, 
1996, 1) and yet occasionally we fall back on primitive drives and their physiological 
consequences.  
Kagan (1998b) proposes four guiding principles to liberate psychotherapy as the 
client, as well as the client of psychotherapy from the imprisonment of certain beliefs: 
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•  Unless scientists state in more detail than they have, re: the 
specific form of the association between the past and the present, 
it is important to question the general claim that early events 
must have some future consequences. 
•  Assumptions about habits, feelings and the contents of the mind 
through others’ verbal reports and behavioural observation may 
be coherent but differs from the description by the observed (see 
Velmans, 1990 on Models of Consciousness in chapter 8) and the 
measurement of central and peripheral physiology. The mental 
event will always retain some ontological independence from its 
neurological base, just as headaches and the mood following the 
exercise are not totally explained by the underlying physiology, 
no matter how complete the physiological description.  
•  Qualitative categories that represent individuals at the extremes 
of a personality dimension or those who possess a particular 
combination of traits should not be viewed as quantitative 
variations that fall on a continuum, such as low to high 
sociability, low to high aggression or low to high impulsivity.  
•  Acknowledge the mind that interprets personal experience 
usually aroused by discrepancy or relative difference rather than 
by a specific event defined absolutely. For example, feelings of 
hunger occur when blood sugar levels change, not at any 
particular concentration of blood sugar. The appearance of a rose 
on a screen produces a specific brainwave called the P300, only 
when it is preceded by many pictures of objects other than roses 
does it create a contrast. Similarly, spanking a child for grabbing 
a sibling’s dessert has good or bad consequences depending on 
how the child interprets punishment as fair or unjust. 
 
 
Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood (samma 
vaca, samma kammanta, samma ajiva) 
 
The Buddhist goals of right speech, right action, and right livelihood is what 
Western psychotherapy desires as results but neglects to encourage the client to practise 
these behaviours ethically. It is assumed that the client is unable to practise these 
behaviours, which is why he is in therapy. Hence, they end up as a guide to initial, 
intermediate, and final goals to be achieved by the client at the end of therapy. From the 
Buddhist perspective, they are interdependent factors that help realize the ultimate goal 
of freedom and liberation from suffering or the means to realizing it. Postmodern 
thought has somewhat brought them into line with the Buddhist practice.   
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For the Buddhists, morality (sila) is another necessary condition for the 
development of insight. Right speech and Right Action mean taking responsibility for 
one’s own speech and being mindful of what we do with our bodies. When we are 
mindful and aware, we act in a way that is appropriate to time and place. When we do 
things to impress others or to gain something from others it reinforces our sense of ego 
self. When we do good works, out of mindfulness and wisdom rather than out of 
ignorance, they are skilful dhamma without personal kamma. Speech habits are difficult 
to break but can be improved. For lay people as opposed to monks, right livelihood is 
something that is developed as we become of our intention and action. We can avoid 
deliberately harming others, including animals and the environment, and in earning our 
living. We may avoid a livelihood, which endangers the ecological balance of nature. 
Basic moral virtues for the Buddhists include refraining from killing, stealing, 
unlawful sexual misconduct, lying and the ingestion of intoxicants. Practising moral 
virtues (sila), works in harmony with concentration and wisdom. The Discourse of 
Brahma’s Net elaborates what is known as the minor virtues. These virtues embody the 
welfare of oneself (attahita) and the welfare of others (parahita) through refraining 
from certain physical and vocal activities such as taking life, stealing, living a lower 
form of life (attachment to vulgar sensuality), using confusing speech, malicious 
speech, harsh speech and frivolous talk.  
 There are at least four types of virtues mentioned in the above sutta: of the 
forest (arannaka), of the household (gehasita), of attraction to humans (manussakanta), 
and of attraction to the worthy ones (ariyakanta). The first refers to the behaviour of 
animals in the forest which behaviourists would consider applicable to humans and 
most natural. Behaviourists hold ethical relativism and definition of “good” as that 
which promotes survival of the species or culture. The second refers to the virtues of the 
household, the obligations of the members of the family and the third belongs to a 
broader scope encompassing members of the human family. While rationality plays a 
role in determining the virtues of the human family, but human welfare not rationality 
that serves as the criteria for the final determination that is meaningful and obligatory. 
The fourth represents the virtues of the “Noble One” (ariya) that validates the notion of 
non-self. If the idea of self is considered unchanging, one does not need to be virtuous 
or moral. The same conclusion also applies to the opposite notion, which believes in the 
annihilation of the self when the body dies. The Buddhists take the middle path that 
does not follow the views of the eternalist or the annihilationist.   
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A virtuous person is said to enjoy unblemished subjective happiness (MN 1. 80, 
269, 346) without terror or fear (uttasa) and trepidation (chambhitatta) (SN 5. 386-387). 
Even negatively stated virtues such as refraining from killing, are said to give the 
practitioner freedom from fear (abhaya), from hatred (avera) and from injury. From a 
common sense viewpoint, when one does not harm others, one enjoys the freedom of 
having no enemies to be fearful of or having to hold hatred to counteract the hatred of 
others. Those who are non-virtuous attack such a virtuous person who is said to be 
without remorse or regret. The Buddha enumerated the consequences of such a virtuous 
person as having delight (pamujja), joy (piti), happiness (sukha), concentration 
(samadhi), knowledge and insight into freedom (vimuttinanadassana). This 
psychological and intellectual transformation is said to be natural (dhammata) and to be 
differentiated from the Behaviourists’ notion of the virtue of the forest. The naturalness 
of a virtuous person does not require an effort to be non-remorseful or non-regretful. 
The Buddha spoke of four types of persons who are totally or partially devoted 
to the welfare and cultivation of virtues: one who is devoted to the development of the 
self (attahita) to the neglect of others, one who neglects oneself and is devoted to the 
development of others, one who neglects both the self and others and the one who is 
devoted to both the self and others [italics, my emphasis] (AN 2. 98 – 99). Needless to 
say, a virtuous person (upasaka) falls into the last category.  
The Buddhist conception of virtue ethics is not only confined to humans but also 
inclusive of all living beings. In addition, a virtuous person is to live a noble way of life 
(brahmavihara) by means of friendliness (metta), compassion (karuna), sympathetic 
joy in the happiness of others (mudita) and equanimity (upekkha). Virtuous behaviour 
even extends to those who preserve the forest where [they live in] one can enjoy peace 
and solitude.  
The point about devotion to welfare and the development of virtues in others 
resolves the dispute between the Theravada and Mahayana schools of Buddhism. The 
former emphasizes personal freedom while the latter insists on social relevance. This 
kind of dichotomy between the individualist and the socialist or particular versus 
universal concepts cannot be applied to the discourses taught by the Buddha. The 
concept of freedom is interdependently embodied in both. Public or private emotions 
determine social exchange and power relations. Hence, appraisal and value judgments 
are part of relating to the self and the other together. A sense of value occurs only 
through comparing and contrasting. One does not know the difference if there is nothing  
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to compare. A personal sense of right and wrong also follows the same principle. Unless 
one has been conditioned in some way to recognize different feelings and their meaning 
from social evaluation, one will not be able to build a second-order meaning from the 
first order experience. 
Value judgments form the norm of emotion-based action as virtuous or non-
virtuous. Thus, morality is the key to the wellbeing of self and others. The Buddha 
inculcates morality, concentration and wisdom as an integrated practice. As emotion can 
be learned and cultivated to manipulate others at least for a short-term gain, it can also 
be cultivated and practiced with the intention of helping others to help oneself. 
Kalupahana (1995) contends that the Buddha does not assume freedom as being beyond 
this world but considers it as part of the social experience. The middle path between the 
so-called Theravada and Mahayana in which the extremes of individualism and 
socialism are renounced [let go]. That renunciation can come only after a proper 
understanding of the nature of existence, namely, interdependent arising, which is the 
foundation of the Buddha’s conception of freedom. With that understanding, it is not 
possible for a person to attain freedom without affecting the society, for to follow the 
virtues and the eightfold path is to affect the society in a radical way (Kalupahana, 
1995, 87). 
Kalupahana (1995) argues that even the Buddha who had attained enlightenment 
and freedom had to continue treading the moral path, as it is not a static or absolute 
state. The main point here is that one has to continually readjust one’s responses to 
conditionally arisen physical, social, economic and political worlds. The only thing an 
enlightened one knows for sure is not to allow himself to be overridden by Mara, the 
embodiment of temptation. Thus, even the Buddha has to be vigilant.   
 
Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, Right Concentration 
(samma vayama, samma sati, samma samadhi) 
 
The third aspect of the path to enlightenment - right effort, right mindfulness and 
right concentration, refers to the spirit or our heart. Hence, the Eightfold path can be 
thought of as a kind of body-chart: wisdom (the head), morality (the body), and 
concentration (the heart).  They work together in unison supporting each other without 
dominating or rejecting each other. Peace and serenity is a flow on from balanced and  
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equanimous emotions supporting each other. There is a perfect harmony between the 
intellect, the instinct and the emotions.  
  Sumedho writes: 
 
They are no longer conflicting or taking us to extremes and, because of 
that, we begin to feel a tremendous peacefulness in our minds. There is a 
sense of ease and fearlessness coming from the Eightfold path – a sense 
of equanimity and emotional balance. We feel at ease rather than that 
sense of anxiety, that tension and emotional conflict. There is clarity; 
there is peacefulness, stillness, knowing [italics, my emphasis] … We 
use the word bhavana to signify development (1992, 62). 
 
 
The purification of the mind through right speech, right action and right 
livelihood (sila) serves as a basis for right effort, right mindfulness and right 
concentration (Samadhi) leading to insight and wisdom (panna), a primary tool for 
freedom and deliverance. A simile of three children stacking up on top of each other to 
pick fruits from a tree illustrates the interdependence of these three factors.  
 
Right Effort (samma vayama) 
 
The energy (viriya) behind an effort may generate such unwholesome states 
(akusala dhamma), as desire, aggression and violence on the one hand, or wholesome 
states (kusala dhamma) such as generosity, self-discipline, kindness, concentration and 
understanding on the other. Right effort is guided by right intention (samma sankappa) 
and right view toward the goal of liberation. The Buddha has stressed the need for 
effort, diligence, exertion and unflagging perseverance, as each person has to work out 
his own salvation. In this regard, four “great endeavours” have been suggested by the 
Buddha:  
 
 
•  to prevent the arising of unarisen unwholesome states,  
•  to let go of unwholesome states that have already arisen,  
•  to arouse wholesome states and  
•  to maintain wholesome states already arisen.       
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  As they are important in cultivating the mind through meditation, they require 
some elaboration.  
 
Preventing Unwholesome States 
 
Unarisen unwholesome states are known as the “five hindrances” 
(pancanivarana):  
 
 
•  Sensual desire representing greed and lust (lobha-raga) 
•  Ill-will representing aversion or hatred (byapada-dosa).  
•  Dullness and drowsiness (thina-middha)  
•  Restlessness and worry (uddhacca-kukkucca) 
•  Doubt representing delusion (vicikiccha).  
 
 
The first hindrance, sensual desire, refers to the five senses i.e. agreeable sights, 
sounds, smells, tastes and touches. Sometimes a broader interpretation including 
craving for wealth, power, position and fame is also given. The second hindrance covers 
hatred of any object – self, others or situations. The third hindrance shares a common 
feature of mental unwieldiness and manifests itself as mental inertia, mental sinking, 
and heaviness of mind or excessive inclination to sleep. At the opposite extreme is the 
fourth hindrance. Restlessness displays itself as agitation and excitement, which drives 
the mind from thought to thought with speed and frenzy. Worry shows itself as remorse 
over past mistakes and anxiety about their possible undesirable consequences. The fifth 
hindrance, doubt, signifies a chronic indecisiveness and lack of resolution. It is not the 
lack of critical intelligence encouraged by the Buddha but a persistent inability to 
commit oneself to mental training due to lingering doubt about the teacher (Buddha or 
in the case of psychotherapy, the therapist), teachings and the method.  
The effort to hold hindrances in check is imperative both at the start of 
meditation training and throughout the course of its development. Hindrances originate 
from within, distracting attention and darkening the clarity of awareness and calm. 
Thus, restraining the senses should begin at the initial stages of a mental process when 
the mind becomes aware of sensation before it goes to its registry for retrieval, 
discrimination, evaluation and response. Mindfulness holds the hindrances in check by  
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keeping the mind at the level of what it senses and prevents it from embellishing the 
data with ideas, images and emotions born of greed, hatred and delusion.  
 
Letting go of Unwholesome States 
 
Despite the effort to restrain the senses, unwholesome thoughts and emotions can 
surface from the depths. Buddha provided methods to counter these hindrances.  
The first is to expel the defiled thought with a wholesome thought, which is its 
exact opposite. For desire in general, a remedy is meditation on impermanence. However, 
for sensual lust the potent antidote is the contemplation of the unattractive nature of the 
body. Ill will is remedied by meditation on loving-kindness. To dispel dullness and 
drowsiness, visualization of a brilliant ball of light, getting up and doing a period of brisk 
walking meditation, reflection on death, or simply making a firm determination to continue. 
Restlessness and worry are countered by turning the mind to a simple object of attention; 
for example, mindfulness of breathing is practiced by paying attention to the in-and-out 
flow of the breath. Doubt is abandoned by inquiry and the study of the teachings.     
The second method uses social tools of shame (hiri) and moral dread (ottappa) to 
abandon the unwanted thought applying undesirable consequences until an inner revulsion 
sets in and drives away the thought.  
The third method involves redirecting attention to something else from 
unwholesome thoughts. 
The fourth method confronts the unwanted thought by scrutinizing and investigating 
its source.  
The fifth method is used as a last resort: pushing out the unwanted thought using the 
power of the will.   
 
Arousing Wholesome States 
 
When the defilements are removed, right effort reinforces the development of 
wholesome states not yet arisen and the maturation of wholesome states already arisen. 
Although wholesome states can be stated in various ways as serenity and insight, the 
four foundations of mindfulness and the Noble Eightfold Path, the Buddha summarizes 
them as the "seven factors of enlightenment": mindfulness, the investigation of 
phenomena, energy, rapture, tranquillity, concentration, and equanimity. These factors  
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lie on the path to enlightenment and remain as its components after enlightenment is 
achieved:  
 
•  Mindfulness brings to light the phenomena in the now, the 
present moment, stripping away subjective interpretations and 
projections. When the bare phenomena are brought into focus, 
investigation steps in to probe, analyze and dissect to uncover the 
structure of phenomena.  
•  Investigation uses energy to shake off lethargy and arouse 
enthusiasm. As energy gathers its momentum in contemplation, it 
propels perseverance. Finally, energy overpowers hindrances and 
drives contemplation forward.  
•  As energy increases, rapture and bliss run through the body and 
the mind glows with joy.  
•  However, it has a flaw, turning excitement into agitation and 
restlessness.  
•  With further practice, rapture is subdued and tranquillity arises.  
•  Tranquillity brings about one-pointed unification of mind.  
•  With the deepening of concentration, equanimity arises 
characterized by inner poise and balance without the dual 
hindrances of excitement and inertia. The mind of equanimity is 
compared to the driver of a chariot when the horses are moving at 
a steady pace. He does not need to pull back or urge them 
forward, but just sit and watch the scenery go by. Equanimity has 
such an “on-looking” quality. With the other factors in balance, 
the mind remains poised watching the play of phenomena. 
 
 
Maintaining Wholesome States 
 
This last of the four right efforts called “endeavour to maintain” aims at 
guarding the object of concentration. In doing so, the seven enlightenment factors 
increase their stability and gradually increase in strength until they give birth to 
liberating realization.  
 
Right Mindfulness (samma sati) 
 
The second aspect of the wisdom component consists of bringing the field of 
experience into focus and making it accessible to insight through “mindfulness”. 
Mindfulness is presence of mind, attentiveness or awareness. It is different from the  
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kind of awareness at work in our usual mode of consciousness, a sense of a knowing or 
the experiencing of an object. In mindfulness, the mind keeps at the level of bare 
attention, a detached observation of what is happening within and around us in the 
present moment. It is a “choiceless observation” without “picking and choosing” and 
without becoming entangled with discriminating thoughts. In the practice of right 
mindfulness, the mind is trained to remain in the present space open, quiet, and alert. 
All judgments and interpretations are suspended or if they occur, are acknowledged and 
abandoned. It is the practice of staying in the present or staying in the here-and-now 
without slipping away. In ordinary consciousness, the mind does not stay with some 
given impression of stimuli but uses it as a springboard to build mental constructs; it 
removes itself from the facticity of the data and interprets it. The mind perceives its 
object free from conceptualization only briefly. In the end, the layers of ideas and views 
cloud original direct experience of the object.   
The Buddha calls this process of mental construction papanca, “elaboration”, 
“embellishment,” or “conceptual proliferation”. When it is an abstract concept, 
elaboration (Booth, 1988), blocks out the immediacy of the phenomena and presents the 
object “at a distance”, (parallel to Derrida’s notion of spatiotemporal deferral or 
differance) not as it really is (Bodhi, 1984). Behind this process of fabrication, latent 
defilements create the embellishment, projecting them outward in an attempt to surface, 
and cause further distortion (parallel to a cognitive therapist’s notion of cognitive 
distortion). The practice of mindfulness is to undo this by not thinking, not judging, not 
associating, not planning, not imagining and not wishing. Thus, there is no room for 
clinging or burdening things with our desires. Although its task is to observe, to non-
verbally note and to discern the phenomena until their fundamental characteristics are 
brought to light, mindfulness can facilitate both tranquillity and insight.  
Right mindfulness is cultivated through a practice called “the four foundations 
of mindfulness”. As the Buddha explains: And what monks, is right mindfulness? 
Herein, a monk dwells contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly 
comprehending and mindful, having put away covetousness and grief concerning the 
world. He dwells contemplating feelings in feelings… states of mind in states of 
mind… phenomena in phenomena, ardent clearly comprehending and mindful, having 
put away covetousness and grief concerning the world.  
The Buddha says that the four foundations of mindfulness form “the way that 
leads only to the attainment of purity, to the overcoming of sorrow and lamentation, to  
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the end of pain and grief, to the entering upon the right path and the realization of 
nibbana”. They are called “The only way”, (ekayano maggo) which is not to be 
confused with dogmatism but to indicate that the attainment requires penetrating 
contemplation in the practice of right mindfulness, which is the one and only way to 
nibbana.  
 
Right Concentration (samma samadhi) 
 
Stillness of the mind is referred to as emotional balance, which arises from 
concentration (samatha) and mindfulness (sati) practice. Concentration represents one-
pointedness of the mind, which ensures that the mind takes one and only one object at 
any given moment. A cat may totally concentrate on its prey, but it is not going be 
enlightened as it does not constitute right concentration. Right concentration represents 
a ‘wholesome’ one-pointedness, featuring an unbroken attentiveness on an object and 
the consequent tranquillity of mental functions that ensues. Unlike mindfulness practice, 
the exercise of concentration discourages reflective thought. With the emphasis on the 
mental fixation of the object, the less thought the better. Such an undistracted state is 
known to enhance memory and the experience of perceptual-emotional spaciousness 
particularly of boundless positive emotions such as loving-kindness (metta), 
compassion (karuna), sympathetic joy (mudita) and equanimity (upekkha).  
In this state, the meditator is supposed to have already countered and overcome 
dullness and drowsiness by the initial application of the mind (vitakka). The sustained 
application of the mind (vicara) has also driven away doubt. Rapture (piti) has shut out 
ill will, happiness (sukha) has excluded restlessness and worry, and one-pointedness 
(ekaggata) has let go of desire. With such strengthening of absorption, hindrances 
subside and fade out, though they are not completely eradicated. They have been 
reduced to a state of quiescence where they cannot disrupt the forward movement of 
concentration. 
With the strengthening of concentration, the original object of concentration 
gives rise to a mental object called the “learning sign” (uggaha nimitta). For the breath, 
it will be a reflex image arising from the touch sensation of the air current moving 
around the nostrils. In due course, another brighter and clearer mental object called 
“counter sign” (patibhaga nimitta) will appear signalling the entry into “access  
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concentration” (upacara samadhi). Although absorption factors are present, access 
concentration lacks strength and steadiness like a child who has just learnt to walk.  
A brief description of these concentrative absorptions is necessary to understand 
the nature of Buddhist therapy and to show how it differs from other cognitive therapies 
and hypnosis. Stages of absorption are divided into eight levels. The first four form the 
material absorptions (rupa jhana) and the second four the immaterial absorption (arupa 
jhana). These absorptive states are distinguished by their absorptive factors: initial 
application of mind, sustained application of mind, rapture, happiness, and one-
pointedness. For instance, immaterial states transcend the mind beyond the subtlest 
perception of visual images that persist in earlier stages. The immaterial states are 
attained by not refining absorptive factors but by the process of letting go of grosser 
objects for the subtler ones. Four immaterial attainments are named after their 
respective objects: infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and neither-
perception–nor-non-perception. These states reached by tranquillity meditation are so 
subtle that they elude verbal description. Yet, they still lack wisdom and insight for 
liberation without a yoked practice of mindfulness one cannot attain insight.  
This is an important aspect of the application of Buddhist principles to 
psychotherapy. Psychotherapy while trying to encompass many aspects ends up 
emphasizing a single aspect such as rationality, behaviour or cathartic resolution. When 
rationality is emphasized, the emotions are despised. The mind relishes what is logical 
and controllable, but the emotions are not neat or precise and are often illogical and 
volatile. Culture conditioned us to be embarrassed by emotions, so we have worked 
everything out rationally, but when we are faced with inevitable emotions, we do not 
know what to do. We are not prepared to expect the unexpected. Worse still, we have 
the attitude that does not prepare us to accept the unexpected. Emotions do not respond 
to logic but react to it. Emotions appear to have their own logic. We are supposed to act 
maturely, but not expected to be mature emotionally. Our unresolved emotions are 
suppressed rather than developed into maturity. The Buddhist notion of emotional 
maturity comprises right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. It is about 
being in the present and not being caught up in the vicissitudes of life, to achieve a state 
where the individual has balance and clarity and is able to be receptive and sensitive. 
Right effort can be construed as cool acceptance rather than the usual panic that comes 
from thinking that it is up to the individual to set things straight. Doing the best we can 
rather than pushing ourselves to do things perfectly. The RET would agree with this  
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notion. Perfection is a value that exists only contextually. Sometimes situations in life 
have to be just this way. It is the development of patience and forbearance rather than 
egotistically trying to correct everything. Sensitivity is a double-edged sword; it may 
help us or harm us depending on how we handle things. Having emotional balance or 
equanimity (upekkha) does not mean that one should not feel, but be able to respond to 
someone who pushes our “buttons” with emotional strength and balance. This brings up 
the parallel between the serenity prayer: God grants me to change things I can and 
accept things I can’t and the wisdom to know the difference” (Anonymous) and the 
Buddhist practice of tranquillity (samatha) and insight (vipassana) meditation. In a 
tranquil or serene state, the individual can mindfully or wisely let things to go by rather 
than react to them, by responding to what can be changed and accepting what cannot be 
changed.  
In the worldly activity of psychotherapy, the Buddhist eightfold path indicates a 
combined practice of behavioural, cognitive and affective therapies represented by the 
practices of ethical behaviour (sila), absorptive letting go (samadhi) of cognition and 
mindfulness of affect. These practices, though individually identified are interdependent 
and supposed to be practiced in an integrated way. Emotional maturity and spiritual 
development grow spirally in stages. The Eightfold path gradually turns into an 
instrument of discovery by insight to see things as they really are (vipassana-panna). 
Thus, the right view born of direct experience replaces conceptual views, and the right 
intention or thought born of deep understanding renunciates or lets go of defilements or 
negative emotions.  
While concentration provides stillness of the mind it does not liberate deeply 
rooted beliefs and emotions. The most deeply grounded habit pattern is the first level of 
latent tendency (anusaya) where defilements lay dormant without displaying any 
activity. At the second level, defilements manifest (pariyutthana) unwholesome 
thoughts, emotions and volition when instigated by a certain stimulus. At the third level, 
defilements transgress (vitikama) beyond mental manifestation to motivate an 
unwholesome body activity and speech. The three modules of the Eightfold Path check 
against this threefold layering of the defilements. Ethical behaviour prevents 
unwholesome bodily and verbal activities from transgression while concentration 
provides the safeguard against manifestation. Under the calm of concentration, wisdom 
develops a penetrating insight of phenomena.   
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Wisdom overcomes the ignorance of unknowing, although ignorance itself is 
not factually negative. It is just the lack of right knowledge. However, ignorance 
infiltrates our perceptions, thoughts, emotions and views leading us to misconstrue our 
experience that multiplies the layers of delusions. Prominent among these delusions are 
those of seeing permanence in the impermanent, of seeing satisfaction in 
unsatisfactoriness and of seeing a Self in the non-self. The most deeply rooted and 
resistant delusion or distortion of all is the delusion of “Self”. The view of “Self” is 
developed in a contrastive duality to “I” and “not I” and “mine” and “not mine”.  
The realization of not having an entity of “Self” or a controller within requires 
more than intellectual or conceptual analysis. It requires an experiential examination of 
factors individually or in combination that we take them as “Self”. We get confused 
between functional unity with substantial unity. Experience does provide a sense of 
psychological continuity (Parfit, 1984) - an irreducible unity, but it is functional rather 
than substantial, like the parts of a car. It does not require postulating a unifying 
separate “Self”, as it is a constantly changing discreet state of flux. A typical example 
would be a neon sign with moving configurations.  
Again, an intensive experiential analysis of the five groups of grasping 
(Pancakhandhas) leads to seeing the phenomena (dhamma) as they are. The body 
(rupa) feels sensations (vedana) that lead to perceptual discriminations (sanna) and 
mental formations (sankhara) of thoughts, emotions and consciousness (vinnana) of 
what Charles Taylor calls 'second-order motivations'. This form of processing requires 
intensive mindfulness contemplation on the experiential factors of existence 
(dhammanupassana). The Buddha says: “The disciple dwells in contemplation of 
phenomena, namely, of five aggregates of clinging. He knows what material form is, 
how it arises, how it passes away; knows what feeling is, how it arises, how it passes 
away; knows what perception is, how it arises, how it passes away; knows what mental 
formations are, how they arise, how they pass away; knows what consciousness is, how 
it arises, how it passes away” (Nyanatiloka, 1981, 71-72). 
Another method of examination to lessen the Self-view is by seeing the 
relational structure of factors in existence. The aggregates exist solely in dependence on 
conditions. Whatever phenomena in a body-mind complex there are, they arise 
interdependently. They tie to a net of events extending beyond themselves temporally 
and spatially.   
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These two methods of examination help unglue the intellectual idea of “Self”. 
However, the ingrained subtle perception of ego clinging requires deep contemplation 
on impermanence (anicca), unsatisfactoriness (dukkha) and selflessness (anatta).  
When insight meditation reaches its climax, it fully comprehends these universal 
marks of existence. The mind breaks through the conditioned and realizes the 
unconditioned nibbana (Sanskrit: nirvana). It sees nibbana with direct vision, and 
makes it an object of immediate realization.  
This is an intuitive understanding as opposed to a conceptual one. In actual 
realization, developing the eightfold path is an experience in the moment. It is all in 
one. All parts are working as one strong development. We think in linear terms because 
we can only think one thought at a time. Thus, the vision of four noble truths as they 
present is complete at one moment. They are seen simultaneously. To see one truth with 
the path is to see them all. They are not understood sequentially as in a stage of 
reflection when thought is the instrument of understanding.  
This ability of the mind to comprehend suffering, its cause, cessation and the 
path leading to cessation in one moment, is compared to a candle’s ability to 
simultaneously burn the wick, consume the wax, dispel darkness, and give light. The 
Buddhist practice is said to lead immediately to the here-and-now, looking at the way 
things are. The present moment is what we can actually observe. We cannot observe 
tomorrow and can only remember yesterday. The teaching is one of being enlightened 
rather than becoming enlightened. Becoming is a condition dependent upon other 
conditions, therefore it is not really enlightenment but a belief or a perception of 
enlightenment.  
 
Calmness and Clarity in Concentration 
 
When there is right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration one is 
fearless and doubtless. The body, emotions and the intellect become calm and clear. 
Without tranquility and clarity, instinct can run riot with our desires.  
When we are not attentive, we can fall into a conditioned comfort state. On the 
other hand, we can be in an opposite, tense state when we are reacting against or trying 
hard to overcome comfortable, habitual ways of thinking, feeling and behaving. When 
we are in an attentive, mindful state, we are relaxed but alert and attentive to whatever  
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is going on. However, this mindful state is not a “be all and end all” state in establishing 
and maintaining a new way of living. In other words, a meditative (mindful) state is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for better living. One needs to have a clear 
comprehension (sampajanna) as well to gain insight and right worldview. Wise 
reflection that is ethically based on empathic feelings and understanding of experiential 
phenomena is equally important in peaceful and harmonious living. Intelligence can 
cheat, lie and manipulate but wisdom and concentration can guide our living without 
having to suppress our emotions.  
The practice of mindfulness meditation (satipatthana) allows the mind to be 
receptive and open so that when we concentrate on a point our mind is no longer 
reflective. It absorbs itself into the quality of that object (samadhi). Although we might 
become attracted to that object, attractiveness diminishes and we find ourselves absorb 
into something else. The way out of suffering is not through getting out of our human 
experience by continually refining the object of our state of consciousness, but by 
observing the totality of all good and bad states through mindfulness. The Buddha 
points out a total realization rather than a temporary escape through refinement and 
beauty.  
Tranquillity or Insight meditations? 
 
As stated above, tranquillity or serenity meditation is a “becoming” process. 
What you become, you can only become temporarily because becoming is a changing 
process. Therefore, whatever you become, you will be “unbecoming”. It is not ultimate 
reality. No matter how high you might go into concentration, it will always be an 
unsatisfactory condition. It takes you to some very high and radiant experiences in your 
mind, but they all end.  
  However, insight meditation allows us to be mindful and let go of everything 
and accept uncertainty, silence and the cessation of conditions. The result is the 
experience of peace, rather than tranquillity. In short, mindfulness reinforces 
tranquillity, and tranquillity in turn reinforces mindfulness. 
If we develop only tranquillity through refinement of meditative objects in our 
concentrated state and we become conditioned to refinement and beauty, without 
acceptance and letting go, we can become very frustrated and frightened when things in 
life no longer present themselves to us in the way we expect.     
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Putting it Altogether 
 
As the Buddhist Eightfold path practice integrates with Western psychotherapy, 
there is a need for both reflexive-hermeneutical dialogue as well as silent absorption in 
order to gain “insight”. This insight is not only a conceptual leap but also an 
experiential awakening. A pause (a gap or a neutral space-in-between) between mental 
calm and reflective talk is an important ingredient for both parties in the therapeutic 
process. Put simply, there is a need for a space between linguistic interpretation and 
proto-linguistic absorption.   
The neutral space in between two blips of thought is free of distortions, 
distractions and disturbing emotions. It connects mind-body with the rest of the world. 
The mind then is not busily differentiating itself from the rest of existence. There is 
neither identification nor differentiation, but just “being”. This period is a state of peace, 
just like the bhavanga state mentioned in the Abhidhamma.  
This state of egoless emptiness does not mean that nothing is there, but that 
there is nobody who owns this mind and body. The “interpreter” (to borrow 
Gazzaniga’s term), is absent. This is what Watson (1998) calls “empty fullness”. I 
understand such a state of mind as “empty of conceptual explanations but full of 
experiential understanding”.  
One of many ways to silence the interpreter and engage the active participation 
of the client in the counselling and psychotherapy process is by helping him to empty 
his mind, to experience the present and reflect on the persistent life issues of past and 
future “as it is”. This is different from the traditional clinician-client interpretive 
consultation. 
In an integrated Buddhist psychotherapy, the clinician listens to the client with 
an emptied mind and responds to him with an embodied compassionate mind. The 
content and process of Buddhist orientation to therapy resembles the joke about “The 
Buddhist Pizza” – being at one with everything. As an accommodating therapy in 
getting the client’s frame of reference, it is Rogerian; as an assimilative therapy in 
instigating the client to take wholesome actions (sila), it is behavioural; as an 
observational therapy for the discovery of emotions and desires, it is psychodynamic; as  
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an experiential therapy for understanding one’s own mind it is transpersonal. In 
practice, the clinician being a meditator of established practice who learns, shares and 
walks on the path with clients to lead them towards peace and harmony. Here, meditator 
means an individual who engages in mental development (bhavana) practice as opposed 
to thinking or cogitation of religious objects or philosophical thoughts. The task of the 
clinician is to empty his mind so that experiential listening with the client becomes the 
object of his meditation. Together with the act of mirroring, the clinician sees the rising, 
the falling, and the entrenched or “stuck” patterns of the client’s emotions and desires 
without being caught up in them. From this learning, the clinician models and 
demonstrate his acceptance of the client’s loss of control. This process, if genuinely 
expressed, may instigate the client’s acceptance of his own loss and grief. The process 
may evolve into further exploration and understanding of unhealthy thoughts, feelings 
and behaviours in contexts that help create the client’s current conflict, confusion and 
dilemma. Then, the clinician may help him discover these issues from different 
perspectives and levels of understanding. The actual strategies and practices may 
involve sharing and showing him how to let go of unhealthy desires via meditative 
mindfulness and develop healthy incompatible emotions, thoughts and actions at the 
same time. This is both a linear and concurrent process of learning and sharing between 
two people. For the client, the process of acceptance, exploring, understanding and 
taking action may be a spiralling evolution over an extended period to bring about 
change in his worldview – a gradual awakening instead of a sudden one. This is a 
gradual process of change for both parties in ethics, concentration, and wise 
understanding. Having done so, the clinician also needs to let go of his attachment to the 
therapy and the client. 
In the final analysis, an integrated Buddhist psychotherapist lets go of 
attachments to any particular “-ism” – such as scientism, personal construct-ivism, 
social constructionism and hermeneutical interpretivism – but integrates Western 
knowledge into an open framework of Interdependent Arising and practices the method 
of “critical experientialist” propounded in the Kalama Sutta (see the opening quote in 
chapter 3). In this way, the framework provides further exploration and understanding 
of psychological and psychiatric disorders from an inclusive perspective that is 
elaborated in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 10 
 
Implications for Understanding and 
Treatment of Self Disorders 
 
The last chapter encourages the subject (meditator or the practitioner of 
concentration) to walk on the path to liberation by engaging in a tripartite practice of 
right understanding, virtuous ethical behaviours, mindfulness and concentration. The 
emphasis on the requirement of these three factors in interfaces with psychotherapy. 
However, available studies have not explored the interface between the Buddhist 
framework and the Western system of classifying psychopathology, e.g. DSM IV 
classification, to integrate the two systems for treating disorders of the self. This chapter 
proposes an assessment and treatment framework to understand certain symptoms that 
bear psychiatric labels and to target the treatment from three perspectives. First, the 
framework integrates the dual aspects of body (rupa) and mind (citta) including 
sensations (vedana) or feelings of the body and thinking or consciousness (vinnana), 
perception (sanna) and conception (sankhara) of the mind. Second, the proposed 
framework does not assume either continuous or discreet categories to explore the 
feeling and thinking functions of the mind. Third, the framework focuses on the 
involvement of feeling and thinking in the core issues of a disordered or deluded Self. 
“Self as Ecological Awareness” discussed in chapter 5 explains “natural 
dualism” where infants intentionally differentiate between self and the environment 
through bodily sensations or feelings where symbolic representation of a permanent-self 
concept is not yet developed. This phenomenon of embodied awareness and action prior 
to conceptual thought is known as an ecological feeling self. The lack or ignor-ance 
(avijja) of the sensible or feeling self in keeping an ecological balance between self, 
others and the environment is proposed here as the basis for understanding and 
treatment of neurotic, psychotic and psychopathic disorders. The feeling self and its 
primary level of sensibilities have been named protoemotions or first-order emotions: 
tension, appetite, fear, rage, and satisfaction (Arieti, 1976, 31-43). On the other hand,  
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second-order emotions such as anxiety, anger, wishing and liking, and security (Arieti, 
1976, 70-78) are more complex. They are not elicited by a direct threat or impending 
attack on an organism but by cognitive processes, the simplest form of which are 
images, symbols, or higher constructs. When simple language and logic begin to 
develop, the temporal directions of the past and the future become more significantly 
involved, the third-order emotions like depression, hate, love and joy evolved to exist in 
the rudimentary form at the second level of images(Arieti 1976, 115-120). Although a 
number of theories of emotion have been proposed since William James, Arieti’s 
account focuses on the self by explaining the levels of emotional developmental more 
succinctly in support of Buddhism.    
 
Feeling Self and Psychopathology 
 
Mindful observation (sati) of these emotions and the dissolution of their 
entanglement through concentration (samadhi) reveal the need to maintain the feeling 
self as one lets go of the conceptual self to attain wise understanding and freedom from 
pathological suffering. When the Buddha talks about the notion of non-self, he is not 
denying the conventional usage of a conceptual self, but only rejecting the independent 
“ghost in the machine” who lives permanently inside a person and controls his actions. 
He acknowledges the interdependent experience of a grounded feeling self but not the 
independent existence of a conceptual self, which normals, neurotics, psychotics and 
psychopaths are trying to grapple with. While they are struggling with their problems of 
having “no self-esteem”, the Buddhist practice encourages the “no-self esteem” 
(Ramaswamy, 2000) to maintain an ecological feeling self.  
The core of consciousness evolution is the usage of conceptual language to 
differentiate ourselves from others, as elaborated in chapter 2 by Jaynes (1976). The 
“splitting” of personality among neurotics, psychopaths and psychotics is fundamentally 
to do with what I call the “stuckness” to the concept of self. Personality as a whole 
entity and the sense of self in neurotics and psychopaths is generally preserved whereas 
psychotics have mostly lost the sense of self. Neurotic splitting, elaborated below, is the 
division or incongruity between the neurotic symptoms and the healthy parts of the  
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psyche – a division generally well recognized by the patient (Arieti, 1976). The splitting 
of psychopaths is mainly between their (self) need for immediate gratification and the 
lack of virtue ethics or reflective empathy towards the suffering of their victims 
(others). The psychotic splitting on the other hand, is primarily the lost sense of oneself 
where one’s thought and feelings are perceived as being split up by others, e. g. the 
patient feels that his thoughts were inserted by unscrupulous others (in fact, that is non-
differentiated fusion between self and other).  The following section explores the 
symptoms, their dynamics, and a possible theoretical framework to enhance the 
treatment of these conditions. No attempt is made to offer an alternative classification of 
psychiatric syndromes nor a developmental theory as Buddhism does not concern itself 
with them.  
Arieti (1976) holds the view that although the terminology and mechanisms 
involved in painting various clinical pictures are derived from classical psychoanalysis, 
psychopathology in general forms the point of view of determinism, adaptation, 
purposefulness, and preservation of the self. While such mechanisms as arrest, reversal 
of motivation, regression, fixation, postponement, inhibition, short-circuiting and 
detoured circuiting show temporal quality and their relevance to the concept of 
developmental order, disintegration, somatization, psychodysplasia, deviation, 
introjection, projection, and repression also demonstrate their necessary connection 
with a developmental sequence. [For a brief description and the details of each 
mechanism, see the Glossary and The Intrapsychic Self (Arieti, 1976, 218-224)]. 
Though developmental notions are important in structuring psychopathological 
formulations, such defense mechanisms do not appear to play a major role in 
psychosomatic and manic-depressive disorders.  
In any case, mechanistic interpretations merely explain antecedent factors such 
as organic brain injuries or psychological disintegration like anxiety. These factors 
bring about basic repair, defenses or compromises desired by the client rather than 
purposeful human behaviours such as making ethical choices. Arieti (1976) illustrates 
this with an allegorical example of a ship. If the ship engine ceases, the crew will use 
the sails, thus the ship “regresses” to the level of a sailboat. If the sails are destroyed by 
the storm, the crew will have to resort to using oars thus turning it into a rowboat. Two 
factors illustrated in this example are: (1) the deterministic causal factors of a ceased 
engine and the broken sails which drive the boat to its disintegration and (2) the  
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teleologic behaviours of the crew to navigate the ship by any available means explains 
its regression.  
Similarly, in a biological allegory, fever occurs as a reaction to the invasion of 
foreign proteins. This can be interpreted deterministically. However, fever also seems to 
have a teleologic behaviour of combating the invasion of foreign proteins, handed down 
by the species’ phylogenetic history. Arieti (1976) offers the three types of 
psychological development: 1. phylogenetic or unfolding of a psychological mechanism 
through evolution of the species; 2. ontogenetic or unfolding of a mechanism through 
the maturation of the individual; 3. microgenetic or unfolding of phenomena, i.e. the 
sequence of the necessary steps inherent in the occurrence of a psychological process. 
The two aspects of the psyche – the organization of forms (a logical order) and the 
threefold development (a temporal order) – are equally important as one tends to 
permanence, the other to change, the double functionality results that is a main 
characteristic of the psyche. These primitive psychological forms become available 
again in many conditions of psychopathology and creativity (5-6). 
Moreover, when it comes to explaining psychopathological process, higher-level 
secondary processes (in Buddhist term, cetasikas) of the human mind in the evolution 
of language and culture make it harder to understand. Arieti (1976) gives an example of 
an amnesic man who cannot remember his name and address on his way home from 
work one day. This could be interpreted, deterministically, as a regression of his 
volitional system to a lower level. Because of psychological injury, his system no 
longer operates, but his wish or desire determines the symptom. To experience a wish 
is, teleologically, to acquire a purpose. The general adaptation property of all biological 
forms is, at a certain point in their phylogenetic history, reinforced by the motivational 
mechanism of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. The patient has reverted to the level 
of wishes and gratified his wish by the mechanism of repression. Arieti (1976) casts 
doubt on the necessity of a deterministic interpretation. It is possible that the highest 
levels of his psyche are not impaired but they choose, according to the law of 
parsimony, to operate at a lower level. Thus, when anxiety, conflict, an attack on self-
esteem, or other adverse conditions occur in the human psyche, defenses may be 
mobilized to protect the concept of self among neurotics and psychopaths. In severe 
cases of schizophrenia, the individual loses the sense of self as an entity, a person and a 
centre of consciousness.   
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The Buddhist approach to mental health may be used to deal with neurotic to 
psychotic suffering from two fronts: ethical or emotional and cognitive. Ethical aspects 
of neurotics and psychopaths stand out more in a society, as their behaviours are visible 
and have a strong negative impact on the relative functioning of a social system. On the 
other hand, psychotic behaviours, from the period of the discovery of consciousness and 
the breakdown of the bicameral mind (Jaynes, 1976) to the present day, have demanded 
the treatment of their severe cognitive symptoms. Brazier (1995) classifies, according to 
the Buddhist notion of “ignorance”, neurosis and hysteria as rooted in greed (lobha) and 
hatred (dosa) while he considers psychosis as the result of the delusion (moha) [of the 
self]. Greed (in craving) and hatred (in aversion) parallel the prominent tendencies of 
biological beings to seek pleasure and avoid pain and their accompanying perceptual 
experiences, which interface with higher-order emotions have not been thoroughly 
worked out. It appears that theoreticians and practitioners get caught up in defining and 
categorizing consciousness and the experience of “I”. In addition, they become more 
involved in separating out what affective and cognitive components are while 
measuring behavioural concomitants that are relatively visible to the objective observer.  
 
Self and Schizophrenia 
 
Among mental illnesses, schizophrenic illness stands out as a major therapeutic 
concern amongst mental health professionals even though pharmacotherapies of 
psychoses have become popular. Therefore, the relevance of the Buddhist therapeutic 
framework needs to be explored within the context of symptoms and their 
developmental process. The Buddha never taught the theory of child development or 
classification of mental disorders. He was only concerned with mental development 
(bhavana) and inclusivity of suffering that emanates from the human mind of young and 
old. As stated earlier, his concerns were of a pragmatic nature, rather than a theoretical 
one; Buddha says that he teaches only suffering and the way out of it. Interestingly, one 
can draw a parallel between four periods of schizophrenic development with four stages 
of mental development through meditative absorption where both schizophrenics and 
meditators cross a similar symptomatic path. A 5
th century A D Buddhist psychology 
and meditation text called Visuddhimagga, or the “Path to Purification” (Nanamoli, 
trans. 1964), explains a detailed procedure of meditation in purifying ones mind from  
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symptomatic defilements. Unlike the meditator, however, proto-schizophrenics who go 
through four stages of symptomatic transformation do not come out symptom free at the 
fourth period as described below: 
 
First Period: the child finds himself in a family where he cannot receive trust 
and security. Early interpersonal relations are fraught with extreme anxiety, devastating 
hostility or false detachment blocking his development. He would interpret the world 
with his immature cognitive processes with what Arieti (1976) calls paleosymbols, 
endocepts and paleologic modalities. These processes require a small explanation. 
“Paleosymbol” is a cognitive construct, which stands for something, that exists 
in external reality. It has a symbolic and private value that cannot be shared with others, 
e.g. Teddy bear. Paleosymbols are precursors to second-order emotions of anxiety, 
anger, wishing, liking and security. In schizophrenia, higher levels of symbolism tend to 
revert to the paleosymbolic type, which Bleuler (1913) calls autism. 
“Endocepts” are intermediary constructs that cannot be represented by actions, 
words, images or clear-cut emotions. It is an atmosphere or holistic experience, which 
does not reach the verbal level – similar to what Freud called oceanic feeling. In terms 
of ontogenetic and microgenetic development, endocepts are important concepts as they 
form the stages towards full conceptual forms. They also tend to fuse with conceptual 
life, only to return to the original level when focal attention becomes defective. 
Empathy is, to a large extent, a primitive understanding of another’s endocepts. 
Individuals, who operate at a predominantly endoceptual level, experience strong 
empathy for others like sensitive people who are born with high sympathetic tone 
(discussed in chapter 9). Endocepts appear to be objectless and unmotivated because 
they have difficulty in experiencing images or attachment to external or internal 
representational objects. They may disclose only the forms of diffuse intentionality or 
affective tone mentioned above. In creative moments, endocepts get converted into 
intuition or inspiration (such as painting or verbalization) which appear unmediated, as 
the subject is unaware of its antecedent microgenetic stages. Arieti (1976) believes that 
intuitive knowledge, which Spinoza and Bergson refer to as endoceptual knowledge, 
gets promptly translated into a conceptual form. Thus, some endocepts are unconscious 
and some are preconscious. Unlike an ordinary person who intermittently reverts back 
to the endocept level from a conceptual level, most schizophrenics remain at the 
endoceptual level.  
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“Paleologic” (archaic logic), though illogical by Aristotelian standards, is 
neither senseless nor prelogic but has a parsimonious ‘logic’ of class formation. Arieti 
(1976) observes that children aged from 1.5 to 3.5 years, even 4 have a propensity to 
use paleologic. Children around 2 years of age will say “Daddy” or “Mummy” to 
pictures, no matter what gender the pictures represent. A girl of 3 years and 9 months 
old, after seeing two nuns dressed alike, calls out “look at the twins”. The confusion 
between similarity and identity was first pronounced by Von Domarus (1944): 
“Whereas in mature (or secondary process) thinking identity is accepted only upon the 
basis of identical subjects, in paleologic or (primary process) thinking identity is 
accepted upon the basis of identical predicates” (p. 110). When man reaches the level of 
primitive language and paleologic cognition, evolutionary changes occur in his 
emotional life as well. Protoemotions and simple emotions exist side by side with some 
transformations imparted by language processes. For instance, anxiety and wish are no 
longer stimulated by images, but by simple words. Such words as “Fire!” or “The 
enemy is here” may evoke a gamut of second- and first-order emotions. As stated 
previously, language plays a greater role in representing the temporal dimension of both 
the past and the future in third-order emotions such as love, hate, joy, and depression 
that already exist in rudimentary form at the level of images. Paleologic occurs when 
microgenetic development is arrested. For example, the patient’s answer to the question 
on the capital of France as London is wrong but not haphazard because he has 
constructed the category of capitals or European capitals. His thought is arrested at this 
level before all the capitals are microgenetically scanned and the right one selected. 
Paleologic infers Freud’s primary process (primary class) and Aristotelian logic 
corresponds with Freud’s secondary process (secondary class).  
In meditation practice, as with counselling, the ultimate aim is to shuttle between 
secondary process and endocepts by crossing and deconstructing paleosymbols and 
paleologic. Thus, the meditator or therapist stays in touch with the endoceptive feeling 
self to attain empathy or appreciate the embodied experience before letting the 
secondary process emerge for reflective thinking and understanding. In meditation, 
going towards purification of mental defilement, the meditator skillfully applies his 
initial thinking (vitakka) on a meditative object. However, meditative stages are in sync 
with schizophrenic stages in a particular order, as symptoms in both practices are only 
arbitrarily classified into stages. Symptoms in stages are usually mixed with a particular 
distinguishing characteristic within each period. For instance, paleosymbols (primary  
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symbols) would be prominent before the first absorption (jhana) is established. On the 
other hand, endocepts would only occur in higher jhanas. 
 
Second Period: Inhibition mechanisms develop automatically to stop most 
primary processes and allow secondary processes to take their place. The self is 
preserved by adopting a prepsychotic personality. The child manages to construct some 
kind of shaky identity; a superficial self-image though he harbours serious doubts about 
his personal significance and self-worth.  
This period would be similar to the stage where the meditator would be 
wavering between initial absorption (vitakka) and a reflection or sustained absorption 
(vicara) where doubts about self and meditation become less frequent. The meditator is 
reminded of unstable (anicca) conditions in nature.   
 
Third Period: The defenses he has built up in period two begins to crumble. 
Previously, he could comfort himself and acquire self-esteem by visualizing a fulfilling 
future life. Now, his regard is injured (Sullivan, 1953). Mechanisms to keep unpleasant 
memories in repression have failed. He remembers now that he had occasionally 
undergone unverbalizable experiences (endocepts). He sees himself totally defeated. 
Only one defense is available to his psyche now, which is to dissolve the secondary 
process.  
For the meditator, he starts to let go of the self (secondary process) as he begins 
to establish skillfully initial and sustained absorptions on the meditative object. 
 
Fourth Period: The dissolution of the secondary process and re-emergence of 
the primary process bring about the schizophrenic breakdown.  
While the breakdown of the self in schizophrenia is a worst case scenario, the 
dissolution of the (deluded) self in meditation is the best possible transformation to 
become a feeling self who operates with and without concepts in wisdom and 
compassion and thus transcends the dialectical opposition between self and others, 
analysis, synthesis, monism and pluralism.   
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Self and Schizophrenic symptoms 
 
Symptomatic manifestation of delusion, hallucination, paleologic, perceptual 
alteration, language and connotation and bizarre utterances in schizophrenia is usually 
explained in Anglo-American psychiatry in terms of varied theories on thought, affect, 
and behaviour. I would argue that the German concept of “Ichs-torungen” (“I-disorder”) 
is the core of schizophrenic manifestation (Karl Jasper, 1973; Kurt Schneider, 1980 
quoted in Spitzer, 1988 & Christian Scharfetter, 1996). In particular, Spitzer (1990) 
argues that Kant’s theory of the transcendental subject provides a framework that is 
useful for understanding a variety of otherwise unrelated schizophrenic phenomena. 
These disturbances refer to changes in the schizophrenics’ experience, but they cannot 
be philosophically regarded as “object” and “independent reality”. 
Delusion: As the primary process emerges, schizophrenics feel the world as 
hostile. Prior to the outbreak of psychosis, he externalizes abstract conceptual feelings. 
In a psychosis state, feeling concepts are not only projected but they become specific 
and concrete as well. He may still believe in teleologic causality of cause-effect 
relationship as a normal person does, but to him the effect is caused by the volition of 
others. Such projection and reduction of complexes to concrete representations seem to 
give him an easier way to cope with a situation. For instance, a projected accusation by 
others of being a spy or a murderer seems worse than the prepsychotic experience of 
being a failure, but it is not injurious to his self-esteem. In contrast, he experiences a rise 
in self-esteem, often accompanied by a feeling of martyrdom. Arieti (1976) contends 
that the schizophrenic is still capable of conceiving the abstract but actively not 
sustaining it, because the abstract is too anxiety provoking or too disintegrating.  
Again, the Buddhist understanding is validated by Arieti’s formulation that 
schizophrenics use these symptoms as an attempt to stabilize and solidify the 
continuously changing phenomena of what the Buddha calls the five groups of grasping 
which constitute the concept of the deluded self. Reports of temporary paranoid 
delusion and solidity of physical experience are not an uncommon experience in a 
meditation retreat where dedicated meditative practice begins to deconstruct the sense 
of ‘solid’ self, while desires of the deluded self struggle to maintain concrete 
representation.  
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Concretization in schizophrenics may reach a degree even further removed from 
abstract thinking. As these regressive forms of paleologic thinking become available, he 
becomes more fascinated with a new way of interpreting the world, which is conducive 
to satisfaction. In many cases, this new “understanding” occurs as a sudden 
illumination, which has been called “psychotic insight” (Arieti, 1974). Now, the patient 
puts “two and two together” using a paleologic based on Von Domarus’ principle. The 
person who thinks paleologically accepts identity not on the basis of identical subjects 
(or wholes), but on the basis of identical predicates (or parts). This process works the 
same as the condensation of two predicates into one or metonymy (Lacan, 1986) of 
referring to parts for the whole. For instance, a patient reached a delusional conclusion 
of being the “Virgin Mary”; because the identity of two predicates (being virgin) made 
her accept the identity of two subjects (the Virgin Mary and herself). She had a great 
need to identify with the perfect feminine figure that she felt close to and deny her 
feeling of unworthiness and inadequacy. Her inability to abstract a part from the whole 
increased her tendency to identify the wholes, which she has in part in common with the 
Virgin Mary.  
Language and Connotation: As the patient becomes more involved in 
paleologic thinking, his use of language suffers the reduction of connotation power 
while elaborating on denotation and verbalization. For example, he may not use the 
word “dog” in relation to the canine genus, but a specific dog sitting in the corner. This 
restriction to concreteness prevents him from giving a metaphorical meaning of the 
proverb when asked to explain the phrase, “When the cat’s away, the mice will play”, 
he may answer, “Mice are devoured by a cat”. Sometimes, he may be so involved in 
verbalization that he may find puns and associations of words not in terms of their 
meaning but their phonetic quality of similar sounding or according to his delusional 
framework.  
On the other hand, as the meditator enters jhana states, linguistic association 
begins to dissipate. In deeper absorptions, the meditator cannot think at all. Only when 
he comes out of jhana is he able to think in conceptual terms. 
Hallucinations:  As the illness progresses, he may express concepts in concrete 
language, which consists of perceptual forms. Perceptualization of concepts is one of 
the three prominent characteristics of hallucination. The other two include the 
projection of inner experiences into the external world and have extreme difficulty in 
correcting the erroneous experience.   
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For example, thoughts turn into perceptions and images in every sense without 
external stimuli, but predominantly auditory. He may believe that he is a rotten person 
and concretizes into a hallucination that a rotten odour emanates from his or her body. 
By reducing concepts to percepts, he restricts his or her anxiety to a smaller ideation 
and disturbance. 
The patient may project subjective experience to the external world by believing 
that the action of the dream takes place in the external world. Finally, it is almost 
impossible for him to recognize that the hallucinatory experience does not correspond to 
external reality.  
Perceptualization of concepts has not been commonly reported in Theravada 
Buddhist Meditation retreats. However, externalization of subjective experiences is not 
uncommon occurrences. As the meditator’s mind becomes subtle, distorted experiences 
of senses become exaggerated. For instance, the meditator believes that his spine is 
crooked or his arm swollen. However, when he opens his eyes to check the evidence, 
the opposite turns out to be true.   
Adulaism: As hallucinations confuse the patient with external reality, the illness 
progresses through to a severe stage where the events of his inner life and of the 
external reality become parts of one and the same reality. This phenomenon of adualism 
is very common in various stages of schizophrenia even in the earlier stages. 
Visualizing what does not exist becomes absolute reality for him so that his belief turns 
into an undeniable conviction. 
This symptom should not be confused with the Mahayana Buddhist notion of 
non-duality. In Theravada meditation of absorption and reflection both the non-dual and 
dual aspect of the mind are involved in gaining insight. As soon as the meditator begins 
to reflect as he comes out of deep absorption, he is using dualistic thinking.  
Perceptual Alterations: At the onset of some acute schizophrenia, colour and 
sound perception of external objects seems so accentuated that patients cannot bear 
what they perceive as bright colours and loud noises. In addition, much regressed and 
acutely ill patients are unable to perceive wholes, the phenomenon known as aholism 
because they divide complex wholes into smaller pregestalt stage units much like in 
infancy. During infancy, perceptual background may consist not only of 
undifferentiated parts (such as mother is not seen as a whole, but as a breast (Klien, 
1948), but also of parts which have not been organized to form wholes. These parts may 
appear to adults as fragments. It is doubtful that a sense of self as a whole entity is  
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present at this point. At the last (terminal) stage of the illness, patients who develop 
partial or total anesthesia to pain and temperature are able to endure surgery without 
anesthesia. However, sensations are not really lost, as there is retention of some 
reflexes; only perceptual elaborations of sensations are altered.  
At this advanced stage of regression, his conceptual and preconception parts of 
the inner objects are almost completely dissipated and transformed into endocept. 
Images and paleosymbols exist but they cannot be communicated. He starts collecting 
objects like sticks, stones, spoons and so on as a desperate attempt to reestablish object 
relations. As the illness advances, patients start to deposit small objects in their body 
cavities, e.g. males place cotton balls in ears or noses, females place objects in their 
vaginas. At the final stage, patients put small objects indiscriminately in their mouth, 
reverting back to the most primitive form of object relation. This is their final attempt to 
recapture a sense of self by regressing to the level of a primitive, sensorimotor 
organism.  
For the meditator, after he has maintained a fully sustained attention on the 
meditation object such as breath, the “doing” or “doer” of the mind begins to settle and 
only the “knowing” of the mind watches the experience of the breath passively without 
the duality of discriminating “in breath” and “out breath.” Consequently, the breath 
disappears and the “sign” (nimitta) of the pure mental object representing intense 
tranquility or joy, such as a beautiful light is perceived. This is not actually seeing the 
light in perceptual alteration or hallucination, as all five senses and inner speech have 
been turned off by the absorption. It is rather the activity of perception displaying the 
pleasure of not having the physical feeling by contrasting with past memories. While 
the closing down of the physical feeling of the meditator is perceived as pleasure 
because of its intense tranquility or ecstasy, a partial or total anesthesia of pain and 
temperature in schizophrenics born of the abstract-concrete split, however, is a total 
“stuckness”.  
Thus, a schizophrenic’ struggles to maintain a good feeling about himself 
(virtues) and self as an enduring entity (conceptual permanent self) breaks down when 
his feeling self cannot sustain the balance between self, other and environment. As his 
secondary process of linguistic competence deteriorates, he regressively attempts to 
concretize his identity by putting objects into his body cavities but fails and finally loses 
sensation and the self altogether.    
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Self and Psychopath 
 
Perhaps, exploring the processes of psychopaths and neurotics who have a clear 
sense of “I” may point to enhancing a possible treatment framework. From an affective 
and cognitive perspective, psychopaths and neurotics can be differentiated in terms of 
how they fulfill their desire in a short-circuited way and a long-circuited way 
respectively. A psychopath cannot delay his gratification. Even complex psychopaths 
who use a long-circuited mechanism do so in the service of a short-term gain. They, 
generally, lack anxiety or guilt over their past or future actions and are unable to learn 
from experience of self-defeating antisocial behaviour. Their tolerance to temporal 
delay is short and their behaviour consciously motivated, with the exception of 
pseudopsychopaths whose conscious actions (e.g. the desire to possess stolen objects) 
are superimposed on unconscious motivation (for instance, defiance of parents). They 
live emotionally in the present and disregard tomorrow as opposed to neurotics whose 
anxiety is based on anticipation of the future. Psychopaths know that the future exists 
and that he could obtain his aims in ways that are acceptable to society. However, when 
they are under the pressure of their desire, they revert back to the level of integration, 
which permits quick gratification with short-circuited actions. The Buddhists interpret 
such excitation as greed. Even their ‘insight’ to get quick gratification, eventually 
becomes repetitive, stereotyped responses.  
It is also hypothesized that the future psychopathic child did not go through the 
transition from gratification to postponement. He did not learn to expect approval and 
love, experience hope and anticipate fulfillment of a promise. Frustration remains a very 
unpleasant, even unbearable experience. His neuronal circuit may be patterned to the 
present and quick responses. Not having learned to obtain abstract values and wait for 
future gratification, he concentrates on what he can get immediately and gives up the 
higher levels of motivation. For him, gratification is only possible at a low level. 
However, if the person has the ability to sustain a sufficient amount of anxiety, he is not 
likely to become a psychopath. In a parent-child relationship, had the child been 
threatened with future punishment by the parents who then carried out the punishment 
at a certain interval after his misbehaviour, then the child is less likely to become a 
psychopath (Arieti, 1976). In very strict and severely punishing families, children 
experience immediate fear and pain but no anxiety about the future. However,  
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psychopaths’ cognitive and conative (volitional) powers still operate at high levels until 
tension builds up to fulfill his desire immediately. Psychopaths are motivated by 
primary emotions, as previously explained, called protoemotions or first-order emotions 
that are precursors to exocepts, which are the preconceptual inner representation of 
sensorimotor constructs (Piaget, 1952). One of the characteristics of protoemotions 
called appetite has the characteristics of immediate and compelling desire for 
possession, including the attempted possession of the will or the whole physical entity 
of others. However, complex psychopaths such as unscrupulous leaders resolve their 
moral conflicts by believing that they deserve a particular gratification. For them, the 
end justifies the means.  
Sociopaths, on the other hand, replace normal conscience (superego, parental 
identification or the socialized level of motivation) with the ideology or the laws of their 
own group. This kind of displacement may be contributed to by not receiving parental 
approval and recognition. In addition, in their early life other sociocultural and 
historical factors, which also allow them to use the sociopathic groups to gain 
immediate gratification. 
Similarly, paranoiac psychopaths use a systematized delusion (unlike delusion 
and hallucination of paranoid schizophrenics) to act out and justify their actions. Adolf 
Hitler as a political troublemaker is the classic example of a paranoiac psychopath who 
needed a systematized delusion to act out. However, some paranoiac psychopaths “act 
in” (self-inflict) as well. Some alcoholics, drug addicts or surgery addicts also use a 
long-circuited mechanism in the service of a short-circuited gain. Although drug addicts 
settle for satisfaction of primary needs and protoemotions (Wikler, 1953; Nyswander, 
1956), they are aware of their anxiety, unstable childhood and shaky self-esteem. The 
anxiety of interpersonal-symbolic needs of their psyche that they cannot fulfill creates 
tension in their bodies. They remove the tension and pain by escaping into a pleasant 
unreality without resorting to a psychotic state. Conversely, psychotics who were 
treated with large doses of opiates never took such an escape and became drug addicts 
(Lindesmith, 1947).  
Psychopaths as a general group appear to fit in with Brazier’s diagnostic 
classification. Their desire of excessive greed (lobha) has to be met immediately. Even 
though they have the ability to experience anxiety when in crisis or when troubled, it 
seems to be a short-lived anxiety. Violent and aggressive acts that seem to emanate 
from anger and hatred (dosa) deeply rooted in fears (bhaya), which they have displaced  
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upon their victims. However, their lack of anxiety points to the inability of their psyche 
to have a sustained feeling (sensibility) of karmic consequences (cause-effect actions) in 
real time. 
Here, I would propose a treatment formulation model of self disorders, which 
would explain why the two interdependent factors of embodied self feeling and 
reflective conceptual thinking abilities of the client’s psyche have not fully integrated 
developmentally (see figure 9.1). Simple psychopath falls in the bottom left quadrant 
where Concrete Thinking (hyporeflective) and Dull Self Feeling (hyposensitive feeling) 
dimensions intersect and Complex Psychopath in the top left quadrant where Abstract 
Thinking and Dull Self Feeling (hyposensitive feeling) dimensions intersect. Their 
protoemotions have not fully evolved into empathy or if they did, they split away from 
thinking in conceptual projection of time, i.e. hyperreflective thinking. Hence, the 
psyche regresses to use paleologic (archaic logic). In contrast, the Buddhist notions of 
developing patience and tolerance (khanti parami), compassion (karuna) and 
sympathetic joy (mudita) for example, are temporally integrated emotions indicating the 
area for the development of treatment templates.  
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Figure 10.1  A Treatment Formulation Model of Self Disorders 
 
 
There are case examples of various afflictions treated by the Buddha during his 
lifetime. One of many well-known individuals treated by the Buddha was a serial killer, 
Angulimala.  We do not know the exact transaction between the Buddha and 
Angulimala, but variations of the story can be summarized as follows. Angulimala 
commanded the Buddha to run because he wanted the pleasure of chasing and killing 
him. However, either the Buddha did not run or he could not catch Him because the 
Buddha eluded him with his supernormal powers. He asked the Buddha to stop and the 
Buddha replied that he had stopped but asked him in return why he did not stop. 
Angulimala was taken aback and realized that he had been running away from the 
ignorance of self-delusion. The conversation continued and Angulimala turned into a 
follower of the Buddha and later became enlightened.  
This is an incredible single session of psychotherapy by the Buddha where the 
clinician, the client and the therapeutic environment including interaction between right 
time, place, readiness of perception, and the right pause – “the space in between” 
therapist and client, and thoughts and feelings of the client – triggered an insight. The 
conversation between Angulimala and the Buddha is not dissimilar to Zen practice 
where the practitioner’s rational conceptualization is temporarily diffused and defused 
by the 'koans' to gain an insight. Thus, it makes way for the mind to access feeling. 
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Self and Neurotic Split 
  
In neurosis, the sense of self and personality as a whole entity, like psychopaths, 
is preserved. According to the treatment model proposed above, neurotics take the 
position in the top right quadrant where hyperreflective thinking and hypersensitive 
feeling intersect as opposed to schizophrenics who occupy the lower right quadrant 
where hypersensitive feeling and hyporeflective thinking intersect. Unlike psychotic 
splitting, however, neurotic split is the division between the neurotic symptoms and the 
healthy parts of the psyche – a division well recognized by the patient. Neuroses have 
been classified in many ways. However, I shall only comment on anxiety reaction, 
phobic conditions, obsessive-compulsive syndrome and conversion reactions.   
 One of the most common phenomena that occur among neurotics and to some 
degree in healthy individuals is called parataxic distortion (Thompson, 1950), which is 
a reaction pattern taken from the past and applied indiscriminately to the present 
situation where it is not suitable. It is an attitude toward another person based on fantasy 
or identification of him with the original figure. Identification in this context means 
responding to the way the patient responded to the original situation called a “releasing 
element”. Although cognitive capacity of parataxic distortion is not arrested at the 
paleologic level in schizophrenics, the patient responds in the same way to any member 
of a primary class. For instance, a patient does not know why he feels angry toward 
elderly red-haired women. The splitting between intellectual and emotional-motor 
response is connected to his early trauma inflicted by his red-haired aunt. The 
unmastered emotion remained connected not with a whole (the aunt), but with some 
characteristics or parts (elderly woman and red-haired). These characteristics became 
releasing elements or parts around which primary class was formed. This example 
illustrates Lacan’s notion of Metonymy where parts represent the whole discussed in 
chapters 2 and 6.  
The formation of the primary class or identification (or reaction to a releasing 
element) is not known to the patient, that is, the connection between the present 
behaviour and the origin of the behaviour. Even though the patient has knowledge of 
such connection and the secondary gain of the symptom, the symptoms will not 
disappear, because the patient understands his symptom intellectually, but not 
emotionally. The symptom is not lost, as its repetitive occurrence is not based on  
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repression but on the formation of a primary class. The primitive mechanism is like a 
conditioned reflex and occurs when the releasing element is present. To overcome the 
power of the releasing element in order to free himself from the symptom, he has to 
observe mindfully elderly red-haired women on their own one by one until anxiety is 
dissipated and defensive anger quelled. Only this way, will he be able to stop the 
propensity to behave in accordance with primary-process mechanisms. 
 
Anxiety and Phobia 
 
In anxiety reaction, the source of anxiety is an enlarging primary class of 
stimuli, whereas in phobias the noxious stimuli remain to be specific. The experience of 
anxiety is a fearful anticipation of danger in the future. Although an ordinary person 
may not anticipate every future situation as danger, for the anxiety neurotics it becomes 
so. Hence, an increasing number of harmless situations trigger a primary response with 
excessive anxiety. When these stimuli are not easily perceived by the subject, as they 
are endocepts and remain to be subliminal, the patient experiences a generalized “free-
floating” anxiety. On the other hand, phobics’ general sense of anxiety and insecurity 
are channelled into one or few specific fears or phobias. For instance, it is easier for the 
patient to admit that he is fearful of walking on the crack of the pavement than to say 
that he is afraid of making excursion into life [A Hollywood movie “As good as it gets” 
illustrates this syndrome well]. This phobia becomes the common pathway to many 
anxiety situations. In anxiety, an emotional reaction to something is not necessarily 
present, but in phobia, the object is present. Only one member of the primary class 
becomes a paleosymbol to generate an abnormal response to phobia. Here, a teleologic 
or purposeful concretization occurs through the transformation of an abstract concept or 
interpersonal relationship into a concrete “I – It” relationship. As in delusions, the 
stimulus in phobia, e.g. the horse, becomes a paleosymbol. The phobogenic meaning 
exists only for the patient as if an animistic special power is attributed to particular 
situations whether they are animate or inanimate objects.  
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Obsessive-compulsive Condition 
 
Obsessions are emotionally laden thoughts and sometimes images that cannot be 
removed voluntarily as a rule. The patient can recognize his illogical attachments but he 
cannot get rid of them. They are like “a stuck tune in the head” occurring repeatedly and 
usually contain distressing content. For instance, a young mother is obsessed with an 
idea that she is going to kill her child. 
Compulsions are actions driven by inner urges, which seem irresistible. The 
individual feels that he must behave in a particular way in order to prevent certain 
events from happening or to promote the occurrence of other events. He will carry them 
out with reluctance and conflict for he is aware of their abnormal nature. For instance, a 
woman may have an obsession that her child is going to die, but if she washes her hands 
a certain number of times, the child will survive. It is easy to see that the obsession she 
carries is more important than the conflict she wants to deny. The fear of killing one’s 
own child is a concretization of a chain of worries such as uncertainty about being a 
good mother, a good wife, an adequate person and so on. Obsessions, like phobias, 
become the common pathway to anxiety provoking situations. In phobias, the person is 
overcome by an external threat. For an obsessive-compulsive person, the internal 
pressure of a compulsive order comes from his inner self. Guilt feelings play an 
important role in this disorder and the ritual is an atonement, which reassures him that 
the outcome will be favourable. Although obsessions are usually restricted to the 
present, the person can have a future oriented obsession such as an obsession that 
something terrible is going to happen in a number of years from now. In such cases, the 
idea itself not only exists now but also tortures the person here and now. Compulsions, 
on the other hand, have a clearer concretization than obsessions. They have to be 
performed in a particular way, not just mental representations, in order to be effective. 
For example, by washing her hands, a mother will wash away her sins; thereby her son 
will not be killed as retribution. In some cases, however, the connection between an 
anxiety-provoking situation and the compulsive behaviour that is supposed to relieve it, 
cannot be retrieved as there can be multiple compulsions connected to form complicated 
rituals. Sometimes, compulsions may develop from temporal contiguity or simultaneity 
of events, which are anxiety provoking or anxiety relieving. 
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Conversion Reactions 
 
Conversion reactions, classically described by Freud and Charcot as hysterical 
symptoms, have become strikingly less frequent in modern times. Perhaps, Freud’s 
teachings, which have spread throughout most cultures, may have hastened its decrease. 
In many cases, hysterical and other neurotic symptoms are found mixed together.  
The syndrome of conversion hysteria is generally characterized by the loss of 
some function like walking, talking, hearing, or seeing in spite of its lack of an organic 
cause. A psychological disturbance is converted into a physical one which Bruer and 
Freud call conversion of a forgotten trauma. However, the symptoms appear to be based 
on a paleologic form of concretization, which refers to the functions of the soma: 
imitation of or similarity with body impairment becomes equivalent to body 
impairment. This is a double mechanism of concretization. Not only is the 
psychological symptom transformed into a physical one, but also the imitated symptom 
is as distressing as a real physical one. For example, the paraplegic hysterical patient is 
indeed unable to walk. The symptom does not become an imitation or sign of 
impairment, but it becomes the impairment itself.  
 
Possible Integrative Treatment Framework 
 
To reverse such acute psychological and emotional suffering may require 
multiple treatment conditions coming together. Multi-factorial models such as the 
Biopsychosocial approach has been proposed in general and family medicine (Engel, 
1980). However, such approaches usually follow the cycle of thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis sequences of treatment by disparate disciplines without seeking 
commonalities in theoretical and practical integration.  
On the other hand, the Buddhist model shares the core commonalities in dealing 
with desires, self, other, environment and morality with its Western counterpart and 
offers an integrative approach to understand and treat both body and mind in human 
experiential suffering. In particular, Jhana states of samatha-vipassana mentioned above 
show the way to go beyond the stages of “regression” and back while language and  
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cultural conditioning are, at least temporarily suspended if not completely let go. When 
Buddha urged his disciples to purify their minds he was referring to letting go of such 
language and culture based emotional impurities. They are commonly known as 
“psychic irritants” or five hindrances (Gunaratana, 1991, 158). Other  impurities include 
three poisons, eight worldly conditions, ten fetters of imprisonment and four taints of 
corruption (Ching,  1995).When individuals cleanse such impurities, they attain 
enlightenment in this very life. 
The enlightened person still uses language labels the same as everyone else but 
his mental, verbal and physical behaviours are founded on compassion and wise 
understanding. Attaining such states of mind seems almost impossible in the treatment 
of psychotic suffering. However, psychotics’ attempt to reconnect with the world 
through picking up predicates to identify them as objects and concretizing the abstract 
self (by depositing objects in the body) may be initially quelled by a strategic method to 
bring his mind to focus and concentrate on a simple task such as an uncommon therapy 
used by Milton H. Erickson (1993).  
Such therapy may be a creative way to begin an invigorating development of 
concordant behaviours (sila), mindful focus (samadhi) and reflective understanding 
(panna) for all levels of suffering. Development of these three components is the core to 
the Buddhist Eightfold Path. As one practices the eight interdependent steps, one 
realizes that unhealthy desires of the deluded self (anatta) that do not see the 
transitoriness (anicca) of things in nature causes these symptomatic suffering (dukkha). 
Seeing “the three characteristics of things as they really are” helps him awaken the 
third-order emotions of loving kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity. 
They are the conditions for the emergence of a non-self or selfless person who operates 
from an ecological feeling self. Such a feeling self leads to a mindful observation of any 
event without discrimination, evaluation or judgment of any kind. As he sees the nature 
of things as they unfold at both preverbal and conceptual levels, no conflict develops 
between self, other and environment. Arising from such a concentrated calm and quiet 
observation, a conceptual clarity naturally emerges in one’s mind in order to take an 
affirmative action with full awareness.   
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Chapter 11 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
The present author argues for an ecological integration of Buddhist mindfulness 
(awareness) and a reflective understanding of emotional suffering with the Western 
concepts of classification, developmental psychology, and rational analysis as an 
approach to the development of theory and practice in psychotherapy. Integration does 
not mean that the Buddhist and Western approaches become identical to one another. 
Commonalities, parallels and differences will always exist when two approaches treat 
the subject, the notion of “self” for example, in opposite ways. While the Western 
approach diagnoses the problem as having “no self-esteem”, the Buddhists approach 
identifies the goal as having “no-self esteem”. Thus, this integrative study not only 
explores the seemingly opposite focuses on self in psychotherapy and Buddhism, but 
also shows how the two goals integrate within the same framework of psychotherapy. A 
common link between the two is the ecological “feeling self” that enhances the balance 
between self, other and environment, and thus enhances self-esteem in Western therapy, 
while the feeling self improves the empathic virtues of the individual to become a 
selfless person who liberates himself from suffering in the Buddhist approach.  
The present study proposes the integration between the two approaches for 
several reasons.  Besides sharing the common purpose of dealing with human suffering, 
psychotherapy encounters paradoxical difficulties at both theoretical and practical 
levels. It cannot resolve the dualities, such as those of mind and body, self and other, 
thought and feeling, the abstract and the concrete, and free will and determinism. The 
very purpose of psychotherapy is to exercise freedom of choice and change. In practice, 
it usually ends up explaining the phenomena of the mind from a predominant causal 
perspective or a “nothing but” reductionism. In addition, psychotherapy’s pursuit of the 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis cycle demonstrates only a linear and cumulative cause of 
phenomena, instead of a simultaneous and successive causal understanding and  
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explanation of an event. In earnestly promoting the Scientist-Practitioner Model in 
clinical psychology, psychotherapy deliberately ignores the 1
st person direct experience 
in preference for a 3
rd person conceptual explanation.  This model consequently 
generates foundational beliefs about the human mind and behaviour while discouraging 
the critical questioning of their validity among psychologists and psychotherapists. The 
split between 1
st person direct-experience and 3
rd person conceptual-explanation 
alienates direct awareness of the feeling self. 
  This split also leads to psychotherapy’s “stuckness” in the treatment mode of 
using either cognitive or affective strategies. When one mode is treated, the related 
other is assumed to be automatically resolved. Moreover, both modern and postmodern 
therapies that attempt to change a client’s meaning in order to lessen his suffering also 
miss the point that the client is not only or necessarily searching for causal 
interpretation, but also for an e-valu-ative meaning that transforms him from feeling bad 
to feeling good (virtuous) about himself. Hence, the present study has investigated the 
approach and practices of Theravada Buddhism, whose primary task is to develop social 
ethics or moral virtues through meditative and reflective practices.  
Thus, psychotherapy’s deluded craving for a “scientific” self psychology and the 
prestige of physical sciences has led the discipline to certain concerns mainly with the 
nature of man (ontological issue) and the theory of knowledge (epistemological issue). 
Psychotherapy ignores the questions of how he takes his intentional actions from e-
valu-ative interpretations and related moral virtues (a moral issue) within the context of 
social ecology that will keep him healthy and feeling good about himself in adapting to 
others and the environment. 
The intentional action became more prevalent since the differentiation between 
emotion and thought became more prominent since the Greek antiquity. The oral culture 
in ancient Greece evolved into a literal one and consciousness changed from an 
emotional connection with gods to an internal reflexivity with concepts. This 
bicamerality of the mind parallels the duality in nature.  
Subsequently, consciousness builds up the reservoir of a vocabulary using 
metaphors or analogues of behaviour from the physical world. Thus, the analogue “I” 
sees the solution to a problem in one’s “mind space”. Nevertheless, the analogue “I”, 
that is, the feeling self, should not be confused with the articulated or deluded (in 
Buddhist sense) self concept, which becomes the object of consciousness. In every stage  
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of meditation, such an object of consciousness (e.g. nimitta) exists until one reaches the 
final stage of extinction of consciousness. 
The present study illustrates how the bicameral split of the mind allows 
consciousness to define, think, and reason with concepts and perceive them as being 
identical to experience. In particular, as the rationalization of madness and 
psychotherapy of reason have developed through language, this study examines the 
issues of the interpretation and deconstruction of texts or spoken words in therapy; it 
traces the history of dichotomy between rationality and madness from Greek antiquity 
to the present.  
In Plato’s The Republic, there appeared for the first time the independent self or 
soul, capable of thinking about timeless abstract objects, in place of the time-
conditioned concrete object (hero) of the epic of oral tradition that the audience totally 
identified with.  
Before individuality articulated itself as ‘the self’, there appeared to have been 
no labelling of madness regardless of strong emotional pain. Both the Odyssey and 
Hesiod display a lack of concern with madness. The notion of madness came into being 
when the philosopher began to define the irrational in contrast to the purely rational. In 
the excessively rational worldview of Plato, irrationality became the responsibility of an 
individual. Subsequently, the individual and madness began to appear in Greek 
literature. Among these works, Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex is most familiar to 
psychologists.  
As language became an integral part of rationality from medieval times, 
interpreting the meaning of the written text took on the systematic art form of 
hermeneutics. Medieval hermeneutics ascribed to interpreting the meanings of the 
Bible. However, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) expanded hermeneutics beyond the 
Biblical exegesis in the modern period.  
In the modern and postmodern periods, structuralists and poststructuralists are of 
the view that human intention and desire manifest through the structure of language. 
They believe that reality is not in things but in relationships. They deconstruct the 
essentialist’s notion of the essence, and view reality as a construction of a relationship 
between things, as constructed by words or text. Structuralism strongly influenced 
Freud even though psychoanalysis is historical and opposes ahistorical structuralism. 
Structuralists replace the notion of reality known by the human mind with a system of 
concepts generated by the arbitrary structure of language.   
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However, when original signs get expropriated and alienated from their user the 
construction of language and the structural interpretation of its meaning come to be 
deconstructed. The most relevant “text” to psychotherapy comes from “the death of the 
author” (Barthes, 1977), which leads to “the birth of the reader”, where the reader is 
encouraged to make meaning for himself. A text (a book, a film or any material) is 
actually something that remains open. The resultant concept of intertextuality implies 
that meaning is brought to a cultural object by its audience and it does not intrinsically 
reside in the object. The irony is that the author in the client’s head survives and 
continues to interpret experience. This is how madness maintains its power. 
Lacan (1901-1981), a psychoanalyst and structuralist, further challenges the 
presumed stability of linguistic structures by pointing out the slippage into either the 
plurality of all meaning or a lack of any meaning at all, which means that one becomes 
a psychotic. What makes the chain of signifiers slide and alienate the subject are the 
“real”, the “imagined” and the “symbolic” registers of subjectivity. He uses the notions 
of metaphor and metonymy (like Freud’s displacement and condensation) to explain the 
unconscious. Metaphor replaces one thing for another while metonymy refers to parts 
for the whole. He sees metaphor and metonymy as two main poles of language structure 
like the unconscious. Hence, his famous expression states that the unconscious is 
structured like a language. Lacan explains madness as being the result of being 
overwhelmed by the total control of a linguistic regime, and the resistance against it in 
order to gain one’s freedom. The signifier generates a whole symbolic register of 
insatiable desires that are always in a state of lack. Desire is the desire of the other, 
meaning that to desire is to desire to be desired by the other. Lack is not the lack of a 
penis, as in Freud, but the lack of the wholeness and power that the child and the mother 
desire. 
The power and control of language is exposed by Foucault (1926-1984), who 
points out that discourse is desire and power in action. Madness was associated with 
animality and passion, which gives out images to use language and logic to act on. For 
instance, if someone imagines that he is made of glass and therefore he is fragile and 
should not make contact with anyone but should remain motionless, he makes a logical 
deduction in the same way as the logicians. Foucault claims that the ultimate language 
of madness is that of reason. 
The power of reason created by language is deconstructed by Derrida (1930-
2004). Derrida demonstrates that privileging the spoken sound over script has no basis.  
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Both have no original essence. Both are signs, repeatable, relational and partially 
present and absent whether a word is thought, spoken or written. When Derrida goes so 
far as to say that from the moment there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We only 
think in signs, i.e. signifiers slide into other signifiers without reaching a signified or 
any sort of reality. He sounds as if he is talking about the sign (nimitta) in Buddhist 
meditation from an intellectual perspective.  
Moreover, Deluze and Guattari go one step further to state that language never 
closes up upon itself, but decentres into other dimensions and other registers, not only 
linguistic but also perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive acts. They use the 
metaphor of the tree (vertical) to illustrate how dominant Western thought is believed to 
have developed (the tree of knowledge), as opposed to the rhizome (horizontal) to 
demonstrate how knowledge has spread in the Western world. For Deluze and Guattari, 
“becoming”, is a crucial theme of the rhizome. Nothing is permanent, but constantly in 
a state of transformation, interpenetration, cross-cutting and turning into something else, 
a parallel to the Buddhist concept of interdependence arising (paticcasamuppada) and 
impermanence (anicca). Their interpretation of desire differs from the psychoanalytic 
notion of lacking an object. Instead, desire does not lack its object, but it lacks, as the 
Buddhists contend, a fixed subject. Desire is a flow, a process, a constantly becoming, 
and an opening to infinite possibilities. Deluze and Guattari validate the Buddhist 
notion of insatiable desire.   
Deleuze and Guattari also emphasize the way in which psychoanalysis and 
linguistics have strengthened their position in the world and in people’s minds by 
dominating people’s conscious and unconscious from the early stages of their lives. 
They use their theory of the map (contextual) as a reaction to tracing (historical) in their 
attack on psychoanalysis and linguistics. Tracing constructs while the unconscious and 
language close up on themselves. 
Thus, the power of language has split the self from the other and has driven us 
‘insane’, ready to join a “ship of fools” through our ‘stuckness’ within the binary 
opposites of ‘signifiers’ and ‘signifieds’, and ‘reason’ and ‘unreason.’ Even the 
‘deconstruction’ of language by poststructuralists like Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and 
Guattari appears to be “stuck” as well in their reactions, i.e. the opposite extreme of 
binary opposites.  
The development of consciousness to think with rational concepts has important 
implications for the 21
st century psychologists who hold diverse views on basic mental  
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phenomena such as consciousness, mental illness, self-esteem, virtue, personality and 
many other matters. Although practitioners do not hold the same theories of personality 
and mental illness, they all share a deeper set of underlying assumptions called 
“foundational beliefs”.  
These beliefs derived, paradoxically, from a passion for abstraction that seeks 
Plato’s pure form of rational explanation rather than a passion for direct experience of 
feeling and understanding. Psychotherapy has not specifically addressed the conflict 
between abstract rationality and experiential understanding of existence (ontology), 
knowledge (epistemology) and moral values (morality). These are the philosophical 
problems of psychotherapy. In fact, psychotherapy as a whole with its own conflicting 
theories and treatment methods both within and without, suffers from a hyper-reflective 
“neurotic split” with obsessive features and accompanying dilemmas and unresolved 
conflicts. 
Such a neurotic split causes confusion in psychology between theory and 
method. Conflict in dealing with the “basic stuff”(such as subjectivities of embodied 
experience, behaviour, social systems, unconscious forces and even brain cells and so 
on) is not caused by adopting the scientific method, because it contains the elements of 
both empiricism and rationalism. The scientific method is NOT the problem; the 
conceptualization of “causality” or causal mechanism is the problem, which confuses 
epistemological issues. 
For example, what causes the person to learn and retain a liked item rather than 
a disliked item (Dependent Variable DV) does not come from an efficient manipulation 
of Independent Variables (IV) but from the subject’s voluntary, intentional and freely 
willed preference that influences his retention. In psychotherapy, it is necessary to “step 
into the client’s shoes” to experience, understand and formulate a formal and final 
cause. This does not preclude the use of mechanistic behavioural therapies but the 
explanation does not have to be in terms of mechanistic efficient causation. The main 
epistemological problem is the conceptualization of causality that relates to how people 
choose what to do when faced with tough choices and moral dilemmas. This is the 
morally related question of free will and determinism.   
Theorists as opposite as Freud (1933/1965) and Skinner (1974) have argued the 
nature of morality itself and the fact-value dichotomy. The moral character of clinical 
practice and the moral conception of mental illness relate to the political character of the 
practice as well. If human behaviour can be predicted and determined by cognitive  
  285
principles, there will be no such thing as free will. No free will means that there is no 
point in holding someone responsible for his or her behaviour at all.  
Another problem with the rational search for an objective fact is the issue of 
subjectivity in psychotherapy, where both the client and the therapist construct meaning. 
Erwin (2000) argues that it is not the client’s meaning and interpretation which poses 
problems for an objective study or which lacks a truth value, but it is the 
postmodernists’ notion of interpretation, which is the problem. What postmodernists 
mean is not a general interpretation, but an e-valu-ative interpretation. The clients not 
only make causal interpretations of what has happened to them, but they also interpret 
with moral value to some life experiences as good and others as bad, hence moral 
emotions and reasoning become involved. The role values play in originating and 
maintaining the client’s problem as well as in the therapist’s causal assumption is 
amenable to empirical investigation. Values are accessible to an objective study of 
outcome.  
Erwin’s (2000) ‘theory of defective desire’ offers an objective study of values as 
outcome.  A desire becomes defective when its fulfillment provides little, nothing or 
only transitory benefit to the client. Hence, neither the problem posed by the client’s 
meanings nor the problem of evaluating therapeutic outcomes prevents the development 
of an evidence-based psychotherapy. 
Desires that emanate from sensation construct the linguistic self-concept that 
represents the so-called stable personality and moral responsibility. Although almost 
everyone has rejected  the Cartesian split between ‘material stuff’ and ‘mind stuff’, 
most neuroscientists and psychologists still believe in a command centre of self from 
where decisions and instructions are sent out. While psychotherapy considers the 
dualistic split that differentiates the self from others as an enduring entity, neuroscience 
alludes to this as a “blindness to change” (Blackmore, 2001) in a “Cartesian Theater” 
(Dennett, 1991). The Buddhists, on the other hand, view the enduring entity as a 
“delusion”. The construction of such an enduring ego self also splits itself from the 
ecology of the ‘inner knowing’ proprioceptive perception of the self. Furthermore, the 
splitting of such a deluded self from others and environment not only disrupts the 
ecological balance between the three but also sets the stage for a power struggle, control 
and conflict.  
While psychotherapy continues with its atomistic analysis and construction of a 
command centre that is fabricated as a single, multiple or hierarchical self, mounting  
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evidence from clinical and neuroscience research disembodies, divides and deconstructs 
the notion of a unified rational self. ‘The Disembodied Lady’ of Oliver Sack (1985) and 
Gazzaniga’s split-brain patient prove the point of duality. A more convincing piece of 
evidence on the disunity of self comes from the studies of newly born infants. Infants 
are born with ecological and interpersonal perception for survival and adaptation to the 
environment. Against Piaget’s notion of adualism, early infants possess natural dualism 
and demonstrate more than a rudimentary differentiation between the self and the 
physical environment. The action system used by infants has basic intentionality. It is 
not merely a mechanical reflex. Newborns also show “innate intersubjectivity” and they 
distinguish between the self and the other from the outset. Murray and Trevarthen 
(1985) have showed sharing of affect, called “affect attunement” between two-month 
old infants and their mother. It may be relatively easy to fake the cognitive aspects of 
interpersonal coordination, but more than cognition determines whether one engages 
with another human being. Feelings make a human self not just a ghost in the body of a 
machine. 
Findings of the mirror self- recognition test with children of different ages 
(where children recognize and remove an offending red dot from their face) contested 
the self as an enduring entity. Thus, while the cognitive reflective self can be 
understood as a symbolic or conceptual aspect of the self, the ecological self requires a 
constant interplay between the feeling self (me as I am now) and the symbolic, 
remembered aspects of self (Edelman, 1989). This is why the symbolic self can choose 
to ignore its own embodiment. Our belief in a permanent self or the relative stability of 
the personality also derives from our own “ignorance” of embodied changes and 
interdependence. 
The Buddha explains how ignorance leads to the cycle of suffering and how to 
end this suffering by understanding the principle of “Interdependent Arising” 
(paticcasamuppada) and the theory of Conditional Relations (Patthana). Briefly, the 
principle explains how the twelve conditions interdepend and co-condition one another 
in a cyclical production of suffering; mindful observation of feeling (vedanaupassana), 
for example, provides the means of stopping and exiting from such suffering. He 
elaborates on twenty-four conditional relations of motivating forces or energy between 
these conditions contained within the Interdependent Arising.  
On the other hand, psychology follows a unidirectional research design to 
validate a theory by manipulating an independent variable (IV) to affect the dependent  
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variable (DV). Thus, manipulation of the efficient cause totally obscures the “final 
causation” of ‘intention’ in theory testing.  
The principle of Interdependent Arising follows the reciprocal cause and effect 
of interdependent conditions that gives rise to a phenomenon and makes a shift not only 
from an unidirectional cause to a reciprocal one, but it also clears up the confusion 
between the method and the theory for conceptualizing causality. Thus, the principle of 
Interdependent Arising gives a background to explaining unhealthy desires (greed, 
hatred and self delusion) and their concomitant conscious action (craving-verbalization 
or self-talk) as the cause of suffering. Desires always involve observing or not 
observing social ethics and feeling good (virtuous) about oneself when one chooses to 
act from desires. I argue for the development of a balance between self, other, and 
environment in maintaining one’s own mental health. Western thought considers desire 
as the cause of emotional pain as well as the key to freedom from suffering. However, 
word or textual deconstruction of desire in the Western intellectual tradition only works 
at the cognitive level but not at the level of emotion. Reports of clients who received 
currently popular Cognitive Behaviour Therapy with an adjunct of Mindfulness 
meditation reveal that their anxiety and depression were covered up by rational self-
talks rather than embodied resolution. 
From the Buddhist perspective, easing and ceasing of emotional pain requires 
not only the calming of the mind and self-talk, but also ‘understanding’ the true nature 
of unhealthy desires ‘as they are’ and ‘letting go’ of them. On the other hand, the 
Western notion of extinction involves intentional control and manipulation of variables 
to gain the desired result. In fact, the desire that originally constructs the (ego) self 
manipulates and controls the variables to gain the desired result. What is happening here 
is that the desire does not lack the object it requires for satisfaction. It is the subject that 
is missing desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject (Deluze & Guattari, 1972, 1983). 
As one realizes the unstable state of the self, and the desires in a state of flux, one can 
let go of attachment to them and to become a selfless person. Such a state of non-self is 
an ultimate claim of self-authority.  
However, the use of exclusionary defenses, Attention Control Training, or the 
variety of treatment formulations that derive their goals from conflict, inconsistency, or 
non-fulfillment of desire for self-esteem cannot fulfill the “non-self” claim of self-
authority. Mindful focus on the Middle Path or the neutral space-in-between the arising, 
existing and passing away of feelings and craving conceptual thoughts within and  
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between individuals is a natural way to discover the cessation of emotional suffering. 
The Middle Path model integrates the development of tranquillity and insight through 
direct experience.  
On the other hand, most Western trained psychotherapists misunderstand the 
Middle Path as a moderated mixture of two extreme practices rather than a practice that 
calmly observes mental phenomena from “the neutral space-in-between”. The Western 
therapists also misapply the Middle Path practice by creating an intellectual discussion 
with clients on emptiness (sunnatta) (Epstein, 1995) and mindfulness meditation by 
rationalizing that the practice should not involve the cultural baggage of social or moral 
ethics. Their search for purity of method overlooks unhealthy mental concomitants and 
the formation of unwholesome consciousness that leads to ethically non-virtuous 
actions. Even in the ritual-rich practices of Tibetan Buddhism (vajrayana), each activity 
represents a sign and trains the mind symbolically, metaphorically and experientially 
towards liberation. The paradox of the Middle Path practice is that if one is obsessed 
with meditation or enlightenment one is “stuck” with imprisonment of obsession to 
control. The "Right Effort" (samma vayama) of the Noble Eightfold Path guides the 
right attitude and action. The subtle aspect of the Path is to understand experientially the 
"Non-dual-Duality" in nature and shuttle between the two within an appropriate 
framework. One cannot practice the Buddha’s eight interdependent steps constitute the 
three pillars of Moral Ethics, Concentration, and Wisdom separately. If one practices 
separately one runs the risk of becoming either a fundamentalist assuming that one is 
stuck with rigid moral principles; a “stone Buddha”, if one is so calm without Wisdom 
and Compassion or a supercomputer, if one is full of knowledge but lacking in Wisdom. 
Such a practitioner is unlikely to discover the transitoriness (anicca), the 
unsatisfactoriness (dukkha) and the non-self (anatta) characteristic in nature, and is 
unlikely to shift himself from the “stuckness” of suffering. Therefore, he needs to 
practice the steps with the experiential understanding that they are interconnected and 
mutually dependent. The application of these steps to psychotherapy does not require 
belonging to a religion or a rigid practice of them, but discovering the causality of 
interdependent arising and conditional relations of phenomena in nature. As 
psychotherapy always confuses method and theory in its conceptualization of causality, 
a systematic integration between psychotherapy, and the Buddhist theory and practice 
described above would greatly benefit psychotherapy. Such benefits not only 
encompass theoretical consistency and inclusivity of diverse cultural conditions but also  
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create an open approach to the study and treatment of human consciousness and 
suffering.         
In addition, the open framework offers implications for further development in 
theoretical understanding and treatment models of psychopathology classified under 
Western nomenclature. For example, I propose a treatment formulation model for some 
psychological disorders of the self that interfaces thinking and feeling functions of the 
mind in the production of neurotic, schizophrenic, simple and complex psychopathic 
behaviours. The model places Simple Psychopaths in the bottom left quadrant where 
Hyporeflective Thinking (less than normal thinking) and Hyposensitive Feeling (less 
than normal feeling) dimensions intersect. Complex Psychopaths take the position in the 
top left quadrant where Hyperreflective Thinking (more than normal thinking) and 
Hyposensitive Feeling (less than normal feeling) dimensions intersect. On the other 
side, Neurotics take the position in the top right quadrant where Hyperreflective 
Thinking (more than normal thinking) and Hypersensitive Feeling (more than normal 
self feeling) intersect while Schizophrenics occupy the lower right quadrant where 
Hyporeflective Thinking (less than normal thinking) and Hypersensitive Feeling (more 
than normal self feeling) intersect. 
In the final analysis, a 3
rd person’s conceptualized analysis deployed in 
psychotherapy by the clinician, of the 1
st person’s direct experience embodied by the 
client, requires more than an unconditional regard and empathy. The Buddhist tripartite 
practice of developing concentration (samadhi), virtuous actions (sila) and reflective 
understanding (panna) provides a 2
nd person’s neutral space-in-between to “see things 
as they are” prior to an emergence of insightful understanding of a client’s suffering. 
This is not a method to manipulate the suffering of the self or of the others but a 
tripartite ecological approach and attitude that maintain the harmony of the self-other-
environment matrix that governs an ecological principle of Interdependent Arising 
(paticcasamuppada). Thus, an integration of Western rational analysis to the Buddhist 
tripartite practice proves to be ecologically sustainable. 
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 References & Abbreviations of Buddhist Texts  
  For translation, interpretation and referencing of the Pali Buddhist texts, e.g. 
Anguttara Nikaya, Digha Nikaya, Majjhima Nikaya, Samyutta Nikaya & 
Visuddhimagga, I have closely followed the methods used by Pali scholars, meditating 
monks-scholars and meditators such as Bodhi (1995), Bodhi, (2000), Nyanaponika & 
Bodhi (1999), Nanamoli (1964), Tin (1923) & Walshe (1995) [see references]. 
 
AN  Anguttara Nikaya  
Cv  Cullavagga  
Dhp   Dhammapada  
DhpA  Dhammapada-atthakatha (Commentary to the Dhammapada) 
Dhs  Dhammasangani  
DN   Digha Nikaya:  
Iti   Itivuttaka 
Ja  Jataka  
Khp   Khuddakapatha  
KhpA  Khuddakapatha-atthakatha (Commentary to the Khuddakapatha)  
KN   Khuddaka Nikaya  
Miln   Milindapanha  
MN   Majjhima Nikaya 
Mv   Mahavagga  
Nd   Niddesa  
Nm   Mahaniddesa  
Nc   Culaniddesa  
Pv   Petavatthu  
Sn   Sutta Nipata  
SN   Samyutta Nikaya 
Thag   Theragatha  
ThagA Theragatha-atthakatha (Commentary to the Theragatha)  
Thig   Therigatha  
ThigA  Therigatha-atthakatha (Commentary to the Therigatha)  
Ud   Udana  
Vv   Vimanavatthu 
Vism  Visuddhimagga  
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Glossary 
 
 
  Pali and Western psychological terms and their meanings are listed together for 
the purpose of comparison and connection between the two. 
 
 
Term            Meaning       
     
 
abhidhamma (Pali, lit. Higher Doctrine)  Systematized teachings  of the Buddha into a 
third collection  
adhimana           over-estimating conceit 
adhimokkha           Determination  
adosa             Compassion  
adukkhamasukkhavedana      Indifference or equanimity 
ahirika           Ethical or social shamelessness 
akusala cetasikas   Craving self-talks or unhealthy emotional 
desires  
akusala mula           Three unwholesome roots  
alobha            Generosity  
amoha            Wisdom  
anatta            Non-self 
anicca            Impermanence 
annyamannya          Co-dependence or reciprocity  
anottappa          recklessness 
anurodha           What the individual develops to like  
anusaya           Proclivities or inclinations  
anussavaka           The traditionalists 
arahat            The emancipated  
arahat            The Worthy One  
arrest  The psyche or some of its functions do not 
unfold beyond a certain level of maturation. 
The point of arrest determines the degree of  
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immaturity relatively to the usual pattern of 
development, e.g. mental deficiency. 
arupabhava           The realm of formlessness 
asavas            Cankers  
atta             Self; the subject “I”  
attanuvada-bhaya         Fear of blaming or accusing oneself  
attavada           The belief in a self  
attavadupana           Clinging to personality belief      
avijja   Ignorance of knowledge of the way things 
are; covetousness 
ayatana           Doors  
ayoniso manasikara         Unwise attention  
bhava   Becoming is the conditions which lead to 
‘birth’  
bhava tanha           Craving for becoming  
bhavaraga           Craving for continued existence 
bhavasava           Desiring eternal existence  
bhavasava   Desire for various states of being and the 
aspiration to attain and maintain them    
byapajjati           Repulsion toward disagreeable objects  
cetana            Volitions 
cetasikas           Conceptual self-talk  
cetasikas           Mental factors 
chanda           Wish-to-do  
cittas             Mind  
danda-bhaya           Fear of suffering and punishment  
detoured circuiting   A way of avoiding reaching the goal, either 
in action or thinking, in order to escape some 
consequences; evasiveness common in 
paranoia and paranoid conditions. 
deviation  Abnormal psychophysiological mechanism 
which replaces the usual one by necessity or 
preference, e.g. sexual deviation 
dhammam abhinnaya  The experientialists who have personal 
experience of higher knowledge and the  
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Buddha says that he belongs to this group of 
thinkers 
dhatus            The elements  
disintegration  In this state, certain levels of the psyche 
become disorganized, so that their functions 
are grossly impaired, eliminated or blocked. 
ditth             Ideas and beliefs systems  
ditthasava           ‘Wrong’ view  
ditthasava           Attachment to views and beliefs  
ditthi             Cognitive distortions of speculative opinion  
ditthi             Wrong worldview  
ditthupadana           Clinging to views  
dosa             Hatred  
duggati-bhaya          Fear of suffering from great remorse 
dukkha samudaya   The cause of suffering dukkha nirodha The 
Third Noble Truth - the cessation of 
suffering  
dukkha           Suffering  
ekaggata           One-pointedness  
eros             Life instinct  
fixation  Fixation is the retention of a primary process 
or microgenetic mechanism even thought its 
original cause was removed and the rest of 
psyche has proceeded in its development.
           
indriya           Potentialities or faculties   
inhibition  In normal conditions, the restraining of a 
psychological mechanism or motor response 
often permits the elaboration at higher level 
of integration. In pathological conditions, 
inhibition occurs when conflict or the 
possibility of conflict (as engendered by 
guilt, fear, anxiety, etc.) prevents a process 
from continuing.  
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introjection  In abnormal introjection, the patient 
attributes to the self qualities, actions, and 
feelings  which belong to others or to 
fantasize others. In most pronounced forms 
of pathological projection are found in 
paranoia and the paranoid type of 
schizophrenia. 
jara, marana   Aging and Death represent the aging 
process, the fading of the faculties and death 
jati   Birth or ‘birth’ occurs with the arising of the 
aggregates and senses 
javana            An active stage of cognitive process 
jhana   Absorption. The factors that allow the mind 
to continue concentration  
jhanas            Absorbed states  
kama             Clinging and the value of sense objects  
kama tanha           Craving for sense objects  
kamabhava           The sense realm  
kamacchandha         The emotional aspects of sensuous desire  
kama-raga           Affective tendencies of sensuous greed  
kamasava   Concerned with the gratification of the 
desires of five senses  
kamasava           Sense-desire  
kamma           Actions  
kamma           Law of moral cause and effect 
kamma vatta           The Action Round action  
kammabhava           Behaviour  
kamma-bhava   Consists of Volitional Formations, becoming 
and rebirth conditioning  
kammic volition         The way of action intent  
kamupadana           Sensuous clinging  
khandha parinibbana        Extinction of the Five Groups of Grasping  
kilesa             Defilements  
kilesa vatta   The Defilement Round includes ignorance, 
Craving and clinging   
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kilesa-parinibbana         Extinction of Impurities  
kusala cetasikas         Wealthy self-talks  
kusala mula           Wholesome desire or roots  
lobha             Greed  
lokadhammas           Worldly conditions 
magga            Path  
mana             Conceit  
maya             Fraud, deceit, magic, and jugglery 
metta             Loving-kindness  
miccha ditthi           Wrong view  
moha             Delusion 
nama-rupa   Body-Mind contains feeling, perception, 
intention, contact, attention (vedana, sanna, 
cetana, phassa, manasikara) 
nibbana           The extinction of desires  
nimittavattha           Representation of volition  
nivaranas           Hindrances  
omana self          Disrespect conceit”  
paccaya           Forces of conditional relations"  
pancakhandhas         Five groups of grasping 
pancakhandhas   These conditions are known as the five 
groups of grasping, the five aggregates 
panna   Wisdom, knowledge; reflective analysis and 
understanding  
papanca   Obstacle, hindrance (to spiritual growth), 
illusion, mental proliferation 
paranuvada-bhaya   Fear of being blamed, being accused by 
others  
paticcasamuppada   Interdependent arising or dependent 
origination. Interdependent arising is a Pali 
compound of paticca, meaning dependent 
on, and samuppada, arising, origination 
dhamma conditioned states or phenomena 
patigha           anger 
patisandhi vinnana         relinking of consciousness   
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phassa   contact impingement: stimulus on eye 
contact, ear contact, nose contact, tongue 
contact, body contact and mind contact 
piti             pleasurable interest  
postponement   Postponement may be interpreted as 
temporary repression. Postponement is 
oftern a valuable mechanism, as it permits 
the subject to react more adequately when he 
has overcome the acute distress provoked by 
emotions. At other times, it is inappropriate 
and conducive to harmful responses. 
projection   In abnormal projection, as first described by 
Freud in 1896, the patient attributes to others 
feelings, actions, intentions, and ideas which 
originate in the self. 
psychodysplasia  Borrowed term from medicine, a normal 
faculty of the psyche has become so 
pervasive or so intense that it prevents the 
normal functioning of others. 
raga             Lust  
regression  The individual uses some mechanisms which 
are more typical of earlier developmental 
stages. 
repression   It is the active process of banishing 
unacceptable ideas or impulses from 
consciousness.  
reversal of motivation  The arrow of motivation points backward, 
toward the level of quick gratification. 
Though reversal motivation is often 
unconscious, in psychopathic states it 
remains conscious. 
rupa             The body experiences sensations or feelings 
rupabhava           The realm of form  
saddha           Faith or confidence  
sahajati           Co-arising   
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sakkayaditthi           Psychophysical personality belief’  
salayatana   The Six Senses includes the six senses 
through the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and 
mind 
Samadhi           Concentration  
samadhi          Absorptive focus 
samsara           Perpetual wandering  
samyojana   Binding one person to another as a rope does 
sankhara dhamma         Conditioned phenomenon  
sankhara   Dispositions; mental formations; volitional 
formations; evaluation 
sanna             Occurs through which concepts  
sarajjati           Attraction to agreeable objects 
sassati ditthi           The eternity view  
sati             Mindfulness 
satipatthana           Development of mindfulness 
satti             Motivation; positive forces 
short-circuiting  A quick or not adequately elaborated mental 
process when the situation requires a better-
integrated response, often found in organic 
conditions as well as in psychopathic states. 
sila             Ethical behaviours  
silabbatupadana         Clinging to mere rules and rituals  
silavatta models        Practices  
sobbana citasekas         Beautiful or virtuous mental factors  
somanassa           Joy  
somanassa           Pleasant feeling  
somatization  The transformation of a psychological 
difficulty or disorganisation into a 
physiologic or organic is somatization. 
sukhavedana   Pleasant feeling, dukkhavedana discomfort 
unpleasant feeling  
takki vimamsi          The rationalists and metaphysicians 
tanha             Craving  
thanatos           Death instinct   
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Theravadins          Early Buddhists 
thina-middha           Sloth, torpor  
tipitaka           The three baskets of buddhist teaching 
uccheda ditthi          The annihilation view  
uddhacca           Restlessness  
uddhacca-kukkucca         Restlessness, and worry  
upadana   Clinging - holds on to sense objects, that is, 
sight, sounds, odours, tastes and bodily 
sensations 
upapattibhava   The character and the physical and mental 
properties  
upekkha           Equanimity; indifferent feeling 
upekkhavedana         Neutral feeling or equanimous feeling 
vedana   Feelings represents the feeling of pleasure, 
pain and neutral arising from impingement 
on eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind 
vibhava tanha          Craving for non-becoming 
vicara            Sustained application or absorption  
vicikiccha           Doubt 
vinnana           Consciousness; cognition  
vipaka vatta   The Result Round comprises body and mind, 
the six senses, contact, feeling and 
consciousness 
vipassana           Seeing things as they really are  
viriya             Energy  
virodha           Dislike  
vitakka           Initial application or absorption  
vyapada           Ill-will  
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EndNotes 
 
                                                   
 
1 The Iliad is about the culture of gods and heroes at the time of the Trojan War (approximately 
1230 BC). It depicts the lives of heroes who live by the accepted norms and mores of their time. The 
norms are moral bases of society which these heroes accommodated rather than developed individually 
through psychological processes of assimilation (Piaget, 1965). Homer does not state that it is blasphemy 
to steal the daughter of a Priest of Apollo and that blasphemy will be punished by losses in battle. He 
arranges actions and happenings in series. 
 
2 The discovery of the soul or the self was a necessary condition to engage in the process of 
“thinking” and to identify the knower in relation to the known object. Reasoning becomes possible 
through the process of transformation in the Greek language. Snell (1953, 1960) observes the dimension 
of linguistic possibility, which aided the shift toward the conceptualizing “mind.” For example, the 
existence of the definite article makes it possible for the formation of abstraction as “the good.” In Latin, 
the lack of a definite article makes it harder to talk about abstraction as “the thing in itself.” In the Greek 
language, the development of the causal preposition as dia for “through” and oti for “because” makes it 
possible for logical thought (later to be known as Aristotle’s efficient causation) which can become an 
object of reflection. Snell (1953) offers a complex analysis of how simple nouns, verbs and adjectives in 
combination transformed into abstraction.  
Robbins (1988) traces the emergence of the individuality during the years between the Iliad and 
Plato’s statement about psyche. In Robbins’ view, Homeric men lived a mental life of surrender. They 
could only learn and to be reminded of the exploits of heroes through the performances by the poet. There 
were no written words to remind them as separate individuals. She considers this mental surrender to be 
“shared group consciousness” or “forced-field consciousness” as the only psychological alternative to 
individuality for Homeric Greeks. She argues that these men are wholly part of the heroic group and that 
there are no clear boundaries as to where internal forces end and external forces begin. Fraenkel (1975) 
speaks of the Iliad man as being “completely part of his world.” What a man wills is directly transformed 
into action, and his character traits immediately pass into outward expression. When he recognizes what 
must be done, he proceeds to the deed without standing hesitantly “thinking.” The behaviour of the 
Homeric man appears to reflect the moral feeling of the group to which he belongs.  
    
3 Evidence shows that the process of transition of group consciousness to a few instances of 
individual consciousness is not so prominent in the Iliad, where the hero Hektor talks about his pride and 
shame and contemplates his own death. Nevertheless, characters in the Odyssey - which was written 
about the same time as the Iliad - begin to show the awareness that “different men take delight in different 
actions” (Snell, 1960). Although the seed of individuation is sown, there is still no separation between 
external and internal values, and little capacity for self-reflection.  
Snell (1953, 1960) contends that the ability to reflect begins to appear in the works of Hesiod, 
the 7th century BC farmer poet who recollects and describes events instead of just reporting them in the 
“and then” and “then” style. Hesiod set in motion a process that revolutionized Greek thought by 
providing principles instead of narrative, that deal with concrete contexts. His work demonstrates that it is 
through strong emotions expressed in lyric poetry that individuality comes into being. These individual 
experiences are not personality traits though they represent individual rather than group experience. 
Socrates demonstrates the principle. When he asks his interlocutors to speculate on the nature of “the 
good”, he is asking them for abstracting ability, which is based on the work of the pre-Socratics. 
 
4 The character of Agave in Euripides’ The Bacchae expresses the conflict between surrender to 
the group unconscious and personal responsibility for one’s own action. Having participated in a 
Dionysian ritual in which she tore her own son apart limb by limb, Queen Agave returns to the palace 
proud of her actions. The god Dionysus spurred her on to carry out these deeds and then made her 
forgetful of them. Devereux (1970) has provided a fascinating account of what can be called the 
“psychotherapy” scene in this play. What is new in Euripides' portrayal is a powerful pull toward 
individual responsibility. Nevertheless, conflict between self and society remains under the surface, both 
in this play and in the present day Western society. In the most ancient tragedies, Oresteia, Orestes having  
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murdered his mother is haunted by the Furies who drive him from his homeland and to the extremes of 
the known world. This is clearly his process of madness which is only resolved when the matter is placed 
at the feet of Athene who resorts to the rationality of Athenian law. The Furies are renamed the 
Eumenides or well-doers and madness dissolves into rationality (Aeschylus, 1938).  
The Thebans are told by an oracle that a devastating plague will cease when the murderer of 
Laius, the former king, has been driven from the land. The play gradually reveals in the manner of 
psychoanalysis that Oedipus is the murderer, and that he is the son of Laius and Jocasta, whom he 
married after Laius’ death. He is the transgressor whereas the father, feeling threatened because he has 
been told by the oracle that he will perish at the hands of his son, instructs the mother to destroy him at 
birth. Instead, she abandoned him. The father later starts the quarrel, which ends in his death. Although 
Oedipus does not go mad in the standard sense, the play depicts a man profoundly confronting the 
conflict between the rational and irrational within. In Ajax, Sophocles dealt with madness directly. 
Athene drives Ajax mad at so that he cannot revenge himself against Odysseus. His madness causes him 
to murder his livestock, believing them to be his enemies. When he realizes what he has done, his 
confrontation with the truth leads him to suicide (Sophocles, trans. 1938). Euripides is the tragedian who 
is perhaps the most concerned with madness. In Heracles, he deals with a god-induced madness that 
causes the hero to murder his wife and children. He is later overcome with grief at his action. However, 
he finds the courage to live on having confronted himself fully (Euripides, trans. 1938). 
 
5 Derived from the Greek verb hermeneuein, which means, “to interpret,” and the noun 
hermeneutike, “the art of interpretation” and both words associated with Hermes, the messenger of the 
gods. “Regarding texts as organic or coherent wholes, than collections of disjointed parts, the Greeks 
expected a text to be consistent in grammar, style and ideas. Their interpretations found within the visible 
sign a hidden sense in agreement with the intention which they beforehand ascribed to the text. Since 
instances of this method are found for the Vedas, Homer, the Koran and other sacred writings, it seems a 
typical strategy for reconciling an enlightened or moral world-view with texts whose “outward” 
earthiness or banality seems beneath the dignity of the gods being celebrated” (Bliecher, 1980). 
6 The stories illustrated below are examples of “Minor Literature” as developed by Deleuze and 
Guattari. Textual studies of Borges’ “The Garden of the Forking Paths,” “The Library of Babel,” and The 
God’s Script,” and Calvino’s “The Distance of the Moon,” Without Colors,” and “A Sign in Space” by 
Ozlem Ogut (1994) to understand, to interpret the universe, his constant search for meaning, unity, and 
truth. At the same time, these works indicate the impossibility of arriving at a stable meaning in the 
universe as well as in the text, that is, the “Text” in the sense Barthes (1990) uses it in his “From Work to 
Text.” The stories, especially those by Calvino, display man’s attempt to construct a unified, stable self-
identity, which, however, remains unfulfilled. A stable and unified identity is characteristic of the subject 
of Lacan’s “Symbolic Order,” including the psychoanalyst himself. Although the stories in question 
indicate that it is impossible to grasp the meaning underlying the universe and to construct a stable 
identity, they do not end in frustration or failure. On the contrary, they affirm the kind of optimism we 
find in Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of desire, which is insatiable and refuses to be territorialized.   
Borges’ story “The God’s Script” revolves around a quest for an original source of signification 
or language. It is the original sentence or the God’s sentence that is being sought but cannot be found. 
The configuration of the spots of the tiger is identified as an undecipherable text, a text that cannot be 
reduced to an original signifier. In the human languages, there is no proposition that does not imply the 
entire universe. To say the tiger is to say the tigers that begot it, the deer and turtles devoured by it, the 
grass on which the deer fed, the earth that was mother to the grass, the heaven that give birth to earth. In 
the language of a god, every word would enunciate that infinite concatenation of facts, and not in an 
implicit but explicit manner, and not progressively but instantaneously. Language as well as the universe 
that it tries to define here constitutes the rhizome because it is a multiplicity opening into other 
multiplicities. At the same time, it does away with all hierarchical differences. Language is not 
referential. There are no fixed signified(s). The notion of dreams enclosed within one another to infinity 
in the story challenges the psychoanalytic claim that dreams can be interpreted according to prescribed 
patterns.  
Also in Calvino’s stories, the quest for a stable identity as well as the hope to come to terms with 
the universe through that identity remains unfulfilled because the universe is chaotic, elusive, and 
incomprehensible. In his Cosmicomics, the narrator undertakes an “elusive quest for self in the hope of 
constructing himself as a stable subject” (Calvino, 44) but finds himself lost in the process of language, 
and slipping chain of signification. In “A sign in Space”, the narrator cannot establish a point of reference 
because any point can be the point of departure, and any sign within the multiplicity can be his.   
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I realized I had lost by now even that confused notion of my sign, and I succeeded in conceiving 
only interchangeable fragments of signs, that is smaller signs within the large one, and every change of 
these signs-within-the sign changed the sign itself into a completely different one (Calvino, 34). 
This image corresponds to Deleuze and Guattari’s image of the rhizome throwing out multiple 
stems into multiplicities, and to their idea that every new line in the rhizome changes the whole structure 
of the rhizome. 
The stories of “The Distance of the Moon” and “Without Colors” also deconstruct the pre-
symbolic and symbolic orders in the Lacanian sense by dissolving the boundary between them. 
Nevertheless, this is done by working from within these systems by using elements from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in order to dismantle them. However, in “A Sign of Space,” the anxiety of the narrator 
over this loss of identity or signification also stands in contrast with the psychoanalytic notion of desire 
for the initial state of wholeness or the undifferentiated, which is associated with the desire for the mother 
as the primary object of desire. In this story, desire is not directed towards an object but to the 
establishment of one's subjectivity that, however, also becomes impossible.  
In “Without Colors” love is directed towards a female who is a part of the differentiated order 
where there are no object distinctions, no sharp contrasts, no colors but grey. Therefore, she can be seen 
as primary object of desire, desire for the pre-symbolic state of unity. This sense of loss of the primary 
object of desire is to be found at the end of the story, where the narrator enters the differentiated world. 
Nevertheless, there is the sense of loss within the undifferentiated realm itself. Ayl is the object of desire 
also within the pre-symbolic order, moreover, there is the notion of desire that is directed towards both 
the outside and the inside, and the desire to escape from the order of differentiated as well as 
undifferentiation. 
In “The Distance of the Moon” also, desire is associated with escape rather than acquisition. It is 
not static but dynamic. Ofwfg’s initial desire is directed to a female who also displays several motherly 
characteristics, which Lacan would interpret as the striving for the wholeness with the mother, which is 
characteristic of the pre-symbolic stage. Besides, it is the deaf cousin who, among all others, achieves the 
perfect reunion with the Moon, which is again identified as female. Lacan would attribute this to the fact 
that he has never entered the linguistic order. Nevertheless, the deaf one is more interested in the 
operation of desire than its acquisition of a lacking object. In fact, he prefers to distance himself from the 
Moon in order to keep desire flowing. Kathryn Hume (1984) describes his love as passionate but selfless, 
as the sensuous enjoyment of the exploration process, delight in questing. This selflessness and the 
nomadic wandering of desire are characteristic of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizo person. Desire does not 
seek acquisition or culmination but free lines of escape, passages and process. The narrator attempts to 
escape not only from the differentiating order but also from the undifferentiating one. His desire does not 
stop at either one.  
I thought only of the Earth. It was the Earth that caused each of us to be that someone he was 
than someone else; up there, wrested from the Earth, it was as if I were no longer that I, nor she that She, 
for me. I was eager to return to the Earth, and I trembled at the fear of having lost it. The fulfillment of 
my dream of live had lasted only that instant when we had been united, spinning between Earth and 
Moon; torn from the earthly soil, my love now knew only the heart-rending nostalgia for what it lacked: a 
where, a surrounding, a before, an after (Calvino, 14). 
These stories challenge the traditional notions of unity of time and space as well as the unity of 
the subject. They deconstruct the basic concepts of psychoanalysis, using elements from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, as desire, object of desire, symbolic and pre-symbolic orders. The stories dissolve the 
boundaries between these orders as well as binary oppositions. They exhibit a notion of desire directed 
not toward the acquisition of an object but towards experimentation, a constant becoming, and a process. 
The notion of universe as text in these stories is in line with Barthes’ notion of the “Text,” that is a text 
that displays indefinite intertexuality, and is therefore untraceable, inexhaustible. Barthes, contrary to 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, rejects a transcendental signifier as well as a unified meaning in the text. 
Deleuze and Guattari dispense with all kinds of structuralism and signification, the subject as well as the 
object. Their theory of schizoanalysis opens up infinite possibilities to desire. 
So far, we have seen how language has split the self from the other and driven us ‘insane’ to a 
“ship of fools” through our ‘stuckness’ in the binary opposites of ‘signifiers’ and ‘signifieds,’ and 
‘reason’ and ‘unreason.’ Even the ‘deconstruction’ of language by poststructuralists like Foucault, 
Derrida and Deleuze and Guattari appear to be “stuck” by reacting to the opposite extreme of the binary 
opposites. If we examine these developments and issues in Western thought from a Buddhist perspective, 
we may add another possibility to the understanding of our insatiable desire, for desire is the common 
problem in both Western and Buddhist search for liberation.  
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7 As there is no universally agreed scripting in romanized Pali, diacritics for Pali terms have 
been omitted to avoid confusion.   
 
8 For Plato, the objects the body perceives are only transient and imperfect copies of true, pure, 
abstract form. Plato’s reason for locating the mind in the head was based on his reflection on these 
abstract forms, rather than on observations of physiology or behaviour. He believed that the head must be 
the seat of the mind because the head resembles a sphere – a perfect abstract form. According to Plato, 
the body and mind are interactive and interdependent but are essentially different, with the mind being 
superior to the body. For Plato, one can know universal categories of experience with certainty, but 
individual empirical events are always open to doubt and question. 
 
9 Aristotle’s research is based on observing both the objects and actions performed by those 
objects. He believed that knowledge was acquired through empirical observation. For him, it is in the 
study of the particular that the universal is revealed. Since, Aristotle, natural sciences have moved closer 
towards materialism, which endorses the view that reality consists of material objects in various shapes 
and forms. Mental phenomena or ideas are thought of as epiphenomena. Consciousness is considered the 
product of the brain though it has no reciprocal effect on the brain. 
 
10 Although personal pronoun ‘he’ is used throughout the whole document, it refers to both 
sexes. 
 
11 One can define truth in terms of coherence or correspondence, but the definitions of these 
terms turn out to be metaphorical expressions rather than simple descriptions of procedures to be 
followed to ascertain the truth. These kinds of problems have led to sceptical views that knowledge is 
subjective (relative) rather than objective. On the other hand, the subjective position may mean that 
knowledge originates from ideas or consciousness, or it may mean that something may be true for one 
person but not for another. The objective position may mean that knowledge originates in the study of 
material objects rather than in consciousness, or that knowledge is intended to be universal or absolute 
and not relative to the speaker. Rationalism emphasizes the subjective aspect of knowledge when it 
claims that people find truth within their own powers of reason, but its findings are used to propose an 
objective or absolute truth, as in a mathematical formula that is true for all mathematicians. Empiricism is 
subjective in its emphasis on the experience of people’s senses, but objective in seeing this experience as 
resulting from a material world that people can sense and about which they can determine an objective 
truth. It is not an absolute truth because experience may lead people to revise their beliefs, nor is it 
relative truth because it assumes a common world as the basis of individual experience. 
 
12 Having observed this cycle of alternating popularity of empirical and rational theories of 
knowledge, Hegel (1770-1831) embraced the dilemma and elevated the cycle to a theory and truth such 
that truth always involves its own negation. Both are true in part, but they miss the essential contradictory 
nature of all truth. His dialectical logic opposes Aristotle’s law of the excluded middle or contradiction, 
i.e. something cannot be both “A” and “-A” at the same time. Existential philosophers, such as 
Kierkegaard (1813-1855), Nietzsche (1844-1900), and Heidegger (1889-1976) have rejected Hegel’s 
embracing of both sides of the dichotomy as too cognitive and unemotional. They feel that truth is more 
alive, intuitive, and passionate. For the existentialists, one feels the truth as well as knows it. On the other 
hand, Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) regarded knowledge as dependent on 
social and economic forces rather than on independent intellectual processes. The truth is empty 
abstraction, an economic necessity masquerading as an intellectual necessity. The American pragmatists 
for their part also took on a functional view of truth by saying that the truth is “what works”. 
 
13 If one is to compare the development of the theory of knowledge, the epistemological position 
of the initial phase (600-400 BC) is not clearly differentiated since the main interest lies in ontology. 
However, in Greek antiquity, Plato’s rationalism and Aristotle’s empiricism became apparent. In the 
medieval period, there was an integration or synthesis of rationalism and empiricism with Christian 
dogma. In the first half of the Middle Ages, with St. Augustine as chief protagonist, Plato’s philosophy 
dominates the synthesis, but in the latter half, it is Aristotle’s philosophy as formulated by St. Thomas 
Aquinas that dominates. In the “Modern Times” between “post-Renaissance” and “early modernity” 
(1500-1800 AD), there arises again a conflict between rationalist, metaphysical ‘system-builders’ and 
empiricist, ‘critical’ philosophers. Towards the end of the 18
th century, the opposing thinkers are once 
again integrated – this time in the form of Kant’s Critique. However, in the 19
th century this unity is  
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disrupted in the opposition between Rationalist Romanticism and Marxism on one hand and Empiricist 
Naturalism and Positivism on the other. In the 20
th century, an attempt was made to integrate these 
opposing views. Logical Empiricism and Critical Rationalism in particular attempted a direct synthesis of 
Rationalism and Empiricism. Similarly, the Frankfurt school attempted to synthesize Marxism and 
System Philosophy. 
 
14 ‘Interdependent Arising’ is the doctrine of the conditionality of all physical and psychical 
phenomena, a doctrine which, together with that of impersonality (anatta), forms the indispensable 
condition for the real understanding and realization of the teaching of the Buddha. It shows the 
conditionality and dependent nature of that uninterrupted flux of manifold physical and psychical 
phenomena of existence conventionally called the ego, man, or animal, etc. Whereas the doctrine of 
impersonality (anatta) proceeds analytically by splitting existence up into the ultimate constituent parts 
into mere empty, unsubstantial phenomena or elements, the doctrine of dependent origination, on the 
other hand proceeds synthetically by showing that all these phenomena are, in some way or other, 
conditionally related with each other. In fact, the entire Abhidhamma Pitaka, as a whole, treats really of 
nothing but just these two doctrines: phenomenality - implying impersonality and conditionality of all 
existence. The former or analytical method is applied in Dhammasangani, the first book of the 
Abhidhamma Pitaka; the latter or synthetical method, in Patthana, the last book of the Abhidhamma 
Pitaka. (Nyanatiloka, 1980, 150) 
 
15 ‘Condition’ is something on which something else, the so-called 'conditioned thing', is 
dependent and without which the latter cannot be. Manifolds are the ways in which one thing or one 
occurrence may be the condition for some other thing, or occurrence. In the Patthana, the last book of the 
Abhidhamma Pitaka (comprising 6 large vols. in the Siamese edition), these 24 modes of conditionality 
are enumerated and explained, and then applied to all conceivable mental and physical phenomena and 
occurrences, and thus their conditioned nature is demonstrated. (Nyanatiloka, 1980, 134) 
 
16 The following elaborates on each the twelve conditions to give the nature of them more fully. 
 
• Ignorance (avijja), for instance, means unknowing, or ignorance of suffering, its cause, its 
cessation and the way leading to its cessation (the Four Noble Truths). It also means that 
believing in particular actions will give birth to this very self which will be reborn in various 
states that after death there is nothing; that life is a random process in which good and evil 
actions bear no fruit; that a certain religion will ‘save’ one automatically by simply adhering 
to it; that material wealth will provide true happiness. 
• Volitional Formations (sankhara) consist of bodily formation; intentional speech; and 
mental formations, or thoughts, e.g. thinking and intending that agree with those beliefs; 
considering and planning actions (kamma) according to those intentions, some good, some 
bad and some neutral. 
• Consciousness (vinnana) involves six consciousnesses through the eye, ear, nose, tongue, 
body and mind, e.g. perceiving and being conscious of sensations that generate particular 
intention. Intention fashions mind or consciousness into specific qualities. At death, the 
momentum of volitional formations, propelled by the law of kamma, induces the relinking 
of consciousness (patisandhi vinnana) to take a realm of ‘birth’ and level of existence 
appropriate to it. 
• Body–Mind (nama-rupa) contains body, feeling, perception, intention, contact, attention 
(vedana, sanna, cetana, phassa, manasikara) or, according to the Abhidhamma, the khandha 
of feeling, perception and volitional formations; and body or materiality: the four elements 
earth, water, wind and fire, and all forms dependent on them, e.g. the process of ‘rebirth’ 
proceeds to create a life form primed to generate more kamma. As a result, there are the 
body, feeling, perception, conception aggregates in their entirety, complete with the distinct 
qualities and defects endowed in them by the fashioning influence of conditions or kamma 
and constrained by the limitations of that particular sphere of existence. 
• The Six Senses (salayatana) includes the six senses through the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body 
and mind, e.g. a sentient being must have the means to communicate and adapt to its 
environment in order to function and develop within it. Thus, supported by body and mind 
and in conformity with kammic momentum, the organism proceeds to develop the six 
senses, the sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind.  
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• Contact (phassa) impingement: s on eye contact, ear contact, nose contact, tongue contact, 
body contact and mind contact, e.g. the process of awareness operates through the contact or 
impingement of three factors. They are the internal sense doors: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body 
and mind; external sense objects: sights, sounds, odours, tastes, bodily sensations and mind 
objects, and consciousness: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, 
tongue-consciousness, tactile-consciousness and mind-consciousness.  
• Feelings (vedana) represents the feeling of pleasure, pain and neutral arising from 
impingement on eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind, e.g. the feelings or the appreciation 
of the qualities of sense contacts, be they of comfort (pleasant feeling – sukhavedana), 
discomfort (unpleasant feeling – dukkhavedana) or indifference or equanimity (neutral 
feeling – adukkhamasukkhavedana or equanimous feeling – upekkhavedana).  
• Craving (tanha) is arisen from body's contact feelings with sense objects. These includes 
craving for sights, sounds, odours, tastes, bodily sensations and mind objects, e.g. 
comfortable feelings tend to produce liking and enjoyment, desire for and seeking after 
more of the same; for stressful feelings or discomfort there is displeasure, a desire to destroy 
or get rid of them. Neutral feeling in this context is considered a subtle form of pleasant 
feeling because it does not disturb the mind and invokes a certain amount of complacency. 
• Clinging (upadana) holds on to sense objects, that is, sight, sounds, odours, tastes and bodily 
sensations; clinging to views; clinging to rules and practices; clinging to the concept of self, 
e.g. as desire intensifies, it becomes a holding onto or clinging to the object in question. As 
long as an object is yet unattained there is craving; as soon as the object is attained it is held 
fast by clinging. This refers not only to sense objects, but also to ideas and views, modes of 
practice or techniques and the feeling of self.  
• Becoming (bhava) is the conditions which lead to ‘birth’; also realms of existence: the sense 
realm (kamabhava); the realm of form (rupabhava) and the realm of formlessness 
(arupabhava). Alternative definition: the realm of action or actions which condition 
‘rebirth’, e.g. intention and deliberate action to produce and control things in accordance 
with the directives of clinging, leading to the further rotation of the whole process of 
behaviour, being good, bad or neutral depending on the qualities of the craving and clinging 
which condition them. For example, one who desires to go to ‘heaven’ will do things which 
he or she believes will lead to rebirth in heaven, thus laying the groundwork for the five 
aggregates to appear in the realm appropriate to those actions.  
• Birth (jati) or birth occurs with the arising of the aggregates and senses; the appearance or 
arising of things: this interpretation explains the Interdependent Arising cycle in one mind 
moment, e.g. beginning with the re-linking of consciousness, which is endowed with 
features contingent on its kammic momentum and connecting to a state appropriate to it, the 
five aggregates arise in a new life continuum, comprising name and form, the six senses, 
contact and feeling. 
• Aging and Death (jara, marana) represent the aging process, the fading of the faculties and 
death: the breaking up of the aggregates, the dissolution of life; alternatively, the dissipation 
and dissolution of phenomena, e.g. for the unenlightened being, these things are constantly 
threatening life in either overt or covert ways; sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair 
which all can be summed up as simply suffering. Thus, the final word on the principle of 
Dependent Arising is the arising of this whole mass of suffering.  
Sorrow, lamentation and so on are manifested in the cankers (asavas) that are 
concerned with the gratification of the desires of five senses (kamasava); attachment to views 
and beliefs (ditthasava), for example that body is the self or belonging to the self; the desire 
for various states of being and the aspiration to attain and maintain them (bhavasava) and 
ignorance of the way things are (avijjasava).  
 
 
17   
•  Ignorance (avijja) conditions Volitional Formations (sankhara). Without knowledge and 
wise reflection on experience, confused thinking, conditioned fears, beliefs and 
accumulated character traits result. This consequently conditions any decision to think, 
speak and act.  The mind proliferates and imagines like a man who believes in ghosts 
(ignorance) and is frightened (volitional impulse) by the light reflected from the eyes of 
an animal in the dark. Or, like the one who is unaware of the true nature of conditioned 
things as unstable and subject to conditions sees them as attractive and desirable, and  
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aspires to obtain and control them. As long as any trace of ignorance is still present, 
Volitional Formations or proliferation will be produced. 
•  Volitional Formations (sankhara) condition Consciousness (vinnana). With intention, 
consciousness is conditioned. We have a tendency or are conditioned to see, hear, etc., 
what background intentions influence us. Also, the context within which we see, hear 
and so on will be conditioned by those intentions that will lead the consciousness to 
repeatedly recollect and proliferate about certain events. Intention will also condition 
the basic state of mind or consciousness to assume either good or evil qualities; 
consciousness is conditioned in conformity with good or evil intentions. Without 
intention or interest, consciousness may not arise, even in a situation where it is 
possible to do so. For example, if we are absorbed in watching a TV show, we may not 
notice what goes on around us. Depending on the context of intention, we may see 
things differently. A vacant block of land may appear to a child as a playground, but an 
adult may see it as somewhere to build a home, to farm or to construct a factory. Again, 
the same object in the context of different times and different thoughts, different 
features will become prominent. With wholesome thoughts, a knife will serve as a 
constructive tool as opposed to a destructive implement when unwholesome thoughts 
arise.    
•  Consciousness (vinnana) conditions Body-Mind (nama-rupa). Consciousness, body, 
and mind are interdependent, as the venerable Sariputta said: “like two sheaves of reeds 
standing, supporting each other, with body and mind as a condition there is 
consciousness; with consciousness as a condition, body and mind. If we remove the 
first of those sheaves of reeds, the other falls down. If we remove the other sheaf, the 
first will tumble. In the same way, with the cessation of body and mind, consciousness 
ceases; with the cessation of consciousness, body and mind cease” (S. ii, 114). When 
we are conscious of any particular sensation such as seeing or hearing, it is the 
cognition of body and mind, namely body, feeling, perception and Volitional 
Formations. Consciousness recognizes the physical and mental properties that are 
apparent to the senses at an experiential level. Whenever, mental activities or Volitional 
Formations are wholesome, the consciousness resultant from them will be subsequently 
cheerful and clear and bodily gestures will be buoyant. When Volitional Formations are 
unwholesome, they lead to the cognition of sensation from a harsh and harmful 
perspective. The mental state will be negative and bodily gestures and behaviour will be 
influenced accordingly. In this state, the constituent factors, both mental and physical, 
are in a state of readiness to act in accordance with the volitional formations that 
condition consciousness. When there is a feeling of affection (volitional formations) 
there arises the consciousness of a pleasing sensation, the mind is cheerful and bright as 
are the facial expressions (body). With consciousness of anger, perception will be 
negative. The body will take on features in conformity with the hostile intention, such 
as aggressive facial expression, tensing of muscles and high blood pressure. Feeling 
will be unpleasant. When consciousness takes on any particular feature repeatedly and 
habitually, the subsequent mental and physical properties will bear the corresponding 
bodily and mental traits and character. 
•  Body-Mind (nama-rupa) condition the Six Senses (salayatana). Body-mind functions 
through consciousness of the outside world, which, together with previously acquired 
experience, is in turn used to serve the intention or Volitional Formations. The 
components of body and mind that serve as transmitter and receiver of sensations or 
sense bases are in a state of alertness to function in conformity with their determinants. 
For instance, in the case of a footballer on the field, the sense organs responsible for 
receiving the sensations directly concerned with the sport being played, will be primed 
to receive those sensations. At the same time, those senses not immediately concerned, 
such as taste and smell, will be in a state of suspension. 
•  The Six Senses (salayatana) condition Contact (phassa). Consciousness arises through 
the sense doors based on the coordination of three factors: the internal sense doors of 
the eye, ear, nose tongue, body and mind, external sense objects of sights, sounds, 
smells, tastes, bodily feelings and mental impressions, and attention to sensory 
impingements. According to Buddhism, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind 
consciousnesses are as different from each other as apples and oranges.  
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•  Contact (phassa) conditions Feeling (vedana). Wherever, there is contact, there must be 
the experience of one of the three kinds of feelings: pleasure (sukhavedana), pain 
(dukkhavedana) or indifference, neither pleasure nor pain (upekkha or adukkham-
asukhavedana).  
•  Feeling (vedana) conditions Craving (tanha). Experience of pleasant sensations leads to 
liking and attachment. This is sense craving (kama tanha). Sometimes desire is for a 
position from which it will be possible to control and indulge in those pleasant feelings. 
This is craving for being or for states of being (bhava tanha). Experiences, which 
produce feelings of discomfort or suffering usually cause thoughts of aversion and the 
desire to be rid of the source of those feelings. This is craving for non-being (vibhava 
tanha), the craving to escape from or be free of disliked objects or situations. This kind 
of craving usually expresses itself in feelings such as despair, depression, self-hatred 
and self-pity. Within neutral feeling, such as dullness or indifference, there is a subtle 
attachment, a subtle form of pleasant indifference, liable to evolve into the desire for 
more overt forms of pleasure. 
•  Craving (tanha) conditions Clinging (upadana). As desire becomes stronger, it develops 
into clinging, mental preoccupation, identification with the object of attraction. A fixed 
position is adopted; Objects of desire become objects of attachment, the more intense 
the desire, the more intense the attachment. Craving develops into specific attitudes and 
values. About unpleasant feelings, clinging shows an obsessive dislike to the object of 
that feeling and obsessive desire to seek escape from it. Any adopted position towards 
these things reinforces the four bases of clinging, i.e. clinging and the value of sense 
objects (kama), ideas and beliefs (ditthi), systems, models, practices (silavatta) and the 
belief in a self (attavada).  
•  Clinging (upadana) conditions Becoming (bhava). Clinging naturally affects life, 
behaviour (kammabhava), and the character and the physical and mental properties 
(upapattibhava). The former represents the pattern of behaviours and the latter character 
traits. Regarding the latter, clinging ties the self to, or causes it to identify with, 
particular life situations, which either fulfill desires or provide the means to escape 
from objects not desired. Desired situations naturally create contrastive opposites of 
undesired situations as well. Attachment to any life situation will produce thoughts or 
intentions that seek to either approach or avoid it. The direction and mode of clinging 
shape all of this thinking and activity. They work under the influence of accumulated 
attitudes, belief, understandings, values and likes and dislikes. For instance, desire for 
fame will produce clinging to those values and the relevant behaviour that are necessary 
to attain fame, and to the self, which is going to attain it. Thus clinging conditions the 
resultant behaviour. Similarly, desire to acquire wealth will condition the thought 
processes accordingly. Through seeking to attain an object of desire, people will either 
carry out unskillful actions and develop bad habits or perform skilful actions and 
develop virtue, depending on the nature of their belief and understanding. Such a 
pattern of behaviour explains ‘action conditioning rebirth’ (kamabhava). The life 
situation resulting from such a mode of behaviour is called a ‘state of rebirth’ 
(upapattibhava). This stage is pivotal in the development of habit and character traits. 
•  Becoming (bhava) conditions Birth (jati). Given a life state to be occupied, a being 
arises to fill it as an experiencer. There is a becoming (bhava) of self, which acts and 
reaps the result of its actions, the one who experiences the eight worldly conditions of 
loss and gain, fame and disgrace, pleasure and pain, and praise and blame. One can 
easily observe the birth of the self when a condition in which the self identified with is 
questioned or challenged.  
•  Birth (jati) conditions Ageing and Death (jara, marana). Birth into a life state 
necessarily involves the experiences of prosperity and decline within it. These include 
the imminent degeneration of that state, the experiences of adversity and ruin within it, 
and the separation from and destruction of it. There is a constant threat of danger and a 
constant need to protect and preserve the self. The inevitability of decline and 
dissolution, with the constant anxiety and effort to protect that state from them, 
combine to cause sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair, or suffering.  
 
18 “Menander descended from the Greeks of Bactria, the dominion which was founded by 
Alexander the Great corresponds to present-day Afghanistan. The Bactrian king Demetrius (189-167 BC)  
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assumed power just when the Indian Mauryan empire was on the verge of collapse. Demetrius decided to 
exploit this situation to his advantage, and in a successful military campaign, he took possession of the 
capital in Taxila. Because Demetrius preferred to focus on his military conquests, he entrusted the 
administration of his states to his viceroys, chosen from the ranks of his own family. By the year 180 BC, 
the Bactrians were in full possession of the Eastern Punjab and Avantii and even threatened the 
Magadhan capital of Pataliputra. In no long time, however, dissension erupted among Greek satraps, 
resulting in the division of the Bectrian empire into two rival kingdoms: a Western Greek kingdom, 
which comprised Bactria proper and its satellites, and an Eastern Greek kingdom comprising the Punjab, 
Gandhara, and Kapisa. Menander, who in his younger days had been the general who had laid siege to 
Pataliputra, became the ruler of the Eastern Greek kingdom following the death of the first Eastern ruler, 
Apollodotus I (167-163 BC). Menander’s dates are estimated by Lamotte to be 163-150 BC., though 
Rhys Davids dates his reign 150-110 BC, other scholars posit other figures, in the same general period.” 
(Bodhi, 1993) quoted in Mendis, N.K.G. (1993) (ed.) 
 
19 One is informed about the outstretched or bent position of one’s limb, about one’s head facing 
forward or backward, and about one’s upright posture even with one’s eyes shut. The receptors of this 
sensory system are situated in the muscles and joint capsules, and in the vestibular apparatus of the inner 
ear. The name given to these receptors, proprioceptors, indicate that they inform us about the state of our 
own body (Latin, proprius = own). Receptors in the skin also participate in signalling changes in body 
position; it is difficult to separate the touch and pressure senses from perception of body position. Not all 
elements of static and kinaesthetic information (concerning position and movements of the body, 
respectively) reach the brain. Impulses generated in the proprioceptors may activate congenital 
automatisms resulting in reflex activity that is not under cortical regulation but is controlled by either the 
medulla or midbrain, or may pass directly to the anterior horn cells of the spinal cord. Some of the 
movements connected with upright posture are automatic. Adjustment of the position of the body and 
head reaches consciousness with a certain delay or not at all. Thus, some of the phenomena occurring in 
the proprioceptive analyzer system remain unconscious, similar to the information processing in the 
visceral sensory apparatus (Adam, G, 1980).   
 
20 Behaviourists like Watson and Skinner hold the dialectic extreme that emotion is nothing 
more than engaging or being liable to engage in certain sorts of behaviour. Although Behaviourism 
provides public knowledge of emotion, it fails to acknowledge James’s notion that emotion is also private 
and concealable. 
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21 
ARISTOTLE'S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS - TABLE OF VIRTUES AND VICES   
Author: George Irbe  
  
19 March, 2000 
 
SPHERE OF ACTION OR FEELING  EXCESS  MEAN  DEFICIENCY 
 
Fear and Confidence 
 
Rashness 
 
Courage 
 
Cowardice 
Pleasure and Pain  Licentiousness/Self-indulgence  Temperance  Insensibility 
Getting and Spending 
(minor) 
Prodigality  Liberality  Illiberality/Meanness 
Getting and Spending 
(major) 
Vulgarity/Tastelessness  Magnificence  Pettiness/Niggardliness 
Honour and Dishonour 
(major) 
Vanity  Magnanimity  Pusillanimity 
Honour and Dishonour 
(minor) 
Ambition/empty vanity  Proper ambition/pride  Unambitiousness/undue humility 
Anger  Irascibility  Patience/Good temper  Lack of spirit/unirascibility 
Self-expression  Boastfulness  Truthfulness  Understatement/mock modesty 
Conversation  Buffoonery  Wittiness  Boorishness 
Social Conduct  Obsequiousness  Friendliness  Cantankerousness 
Shame  Shyness  Modesty  Shamelessness 
Indignation  Envy  Righteous indignation  Malicious enjoyment/Spitefulness 
 
Taken from p. 104 of translation by J.A.K. Tomson http://www.interlog.com/~girbe/virtuesvices.html  
 
22 Nina van Gorkom <http://www.abhidhamma.org/abhidhamma_and_practice.htm> listed the 
mental factors (cetasikas) which accompany moments of citta are of 52 different kinds.  Of these 52, they 
are subdivided according to their natures into seven classes.  
First, there are the 7 universals (sabbacittasadharana).  They accompany every single moment of 
citta and thus are called universals:  
1. Contact (phassa) 
2. Feeling (vedana) 
3. Perception (sanna) 
4. Volition or intention (cetana) 
5. One-pointedness (ekaggata) 
6. Psychic-life (jivitindriya) 
7. Attention (manasikara) 
 Then there are the 6 particular cetasikas, so called because they associate with only particular 
types of consciousness.  They associate with either the wholesome or unwholesome cittas.  They are 
called pakinnaka in Pali.  
1. Initial application (vitakka) 
2. Sustained application (vicara) 
3. Determination (adhimokkha) 
4. Effort (viriya) 
5. Interest (piti) 
6. Desire-to-do (chanda) 
Next are the 14 unwholesome cetasikas (akusala cetasikas).  They make up all the akusala 
moments of consciousness.  
1. Ignorance (moha) 
2. Lack of moral shame (ahirika) 
3. Lack of fear of unwholesomeness (anotthappa) 
4. Restlessness (uddhacca)  
  345
                                                                                                                                                     
5. Attachment (lobbha) 
6. Wrong view (ditthi) 
7. Conceit (mana) 
8. Aversion (dosa) 
9. Envy (issa) 
10. Stinginess (macchriya) 
11. Regret (kukkucca) 
12. Sloth (thina) 
13. Torpor (middha) 
14. Doubt (vicikiccha) 
Next are the 19 beautiful cetasikas (sobhanasadharana) so called because they are common to all 
morally beautiful moments of consciousness.  
1. Confidence (saddha) 
2. Mindfulness (sati) 
3. Moral shame (hiri) 
4. Fear of unwholesomeness (ottappa) 
5. Disinterestedness (alobha) 
6. Amity (adosa) 
7. Equanimity (tatramajjhattata) 
8. Composure of mental states (kayapassadhi) 
9. Composure of mind (cittapassanhi) 
10. Lightness of mental states (kaya-lahuta) 
11. Lightness of mind (citta-lahuta) 
12. Pliancy of mental states (kaya-muduta) 
13. Pliancy of mind (citta-muduta) 
14. Adaptability of mental states (kaya-kammannata) 
15. Adaptability of mind (citta-kammannuata) 
16. Proficiency of mental states (kaya-pagunnata) 
17. Proficiency of mind (citta-pagunnata) 
18. Rectitude of mental states (kaya-ujukata) 
19. Rectitude of mind (citta-ujukata). 
  
 
There are the 3 abstinences (virati cetasikas): 
 
20. Right speech (samma vaca) 
21. Right action (samma kammanta) 
22. Right livelihood (samma ajiva) 
The two cetasikas called the illimitables (appamanna), so called because their objects are without 
limit:  
23. Compassion (karuna) 
24. Sympathetic joy (mudita). 
    
And finally the last sobhana cetasika: 
 
25. Wisdom (panna). 
Thus there are 25 morally beautiful cetasikas (sobhana cetasikas) arising in various combinations in the 
wholesome states of consciousness.  In addition, all 52 different cetasikas can arise in groups with the 
citta.   
23 Interestingly, hydroxyzine hydrochloride which is prescribed both as an antipruritic and as an 
anti-anxiety agent is marketed by Roerig/Pfizer as ‘Atarax’ (Kirby, J. T. 1995). 
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24 The monkey-catcher applies sticky mess of gum on the trunks of several trees. When sunrays 
fall on the gum, spectra of various colours appear. A monkey, being curious, touches the gum with one 
paw that becomes firmly attached to the gum. In struggling to pull out this paw, the monkey pushes the 
tree with the other paw and kicks the tree with both legs. So, both paws and both legs are stuck to the 
gum. Then the monkey tries to pull itself out by pushing the tree with its head. So, the head is also stuck 
to the gum. The monkey-catcher may now come out from his hiding place and catches or kills the 
monkey easily.  
 
25 When we apprehend things as self, we do not see them as elements that we can, one at a time, 
experience through the appropriate doorway. Eye sense can experience a visible object as a kind of 
material body, it is not a person or a thing, and it falls away again. Ear sense can experience sound as a 
kind of material body, but not as a person or a thing. Each mind that arises experiences one object at a 
time through the appropriate doorway and then falls away, it is quite different from the preceding mind. 
However, we may establish wrong view by seeing, hearing or thinking as well as experiencing material 
bodies, such as hardness of visible objects at the same time. Seeing only sees, it does not hear, it does not 
think. In The Book of Analysis (Chapter 16, Analysis of Knowledge, 763) states:  
Ear-consciousness does not experience the object of eye-consciousness;  
Eye-consciousness does not experience the object of ear-consciousness either.  
Nose-consciousness does not experience the object of eye-consciousness;  
Eye-consciousness does not experience the object of nose-consciousness either.  
Tongue-consciousness does not experience the object of eye- consciousness;  
Eye-consciousness does not experience the object of tongue- consciousness either.  
Body-consciousness does not experience the object of eye-consciousness; 
Eye-consciousness does not experience the object of body-consciousness either. 
 
26 The first view taught by Ajita Kesakambali states that there is annihilation at death. The 
second taught by Makkhali believes that there is no cause for the depravity or purity of beings, that there 
is no human effort and that all living creatures are “bent by fate, chance and nature”. The third taught by 
Puraua Kassapa denies that there is unwholesome or wholesome action. The tormenting of others is not 
an evil deed according to him. (MN 77) 
 
27 The Buddha gives the example of those who do not desire not to see or having regard for the 
noble ones, because they do not understand the three characteristics of transitoriness, unsatisfactorieness 
and non-self attained by the noble ones. 
 
28 Clinging to wrong view gives rise to four types of greed-rooted mind, and of these types, two 
are accompanied by pleasant feeling (somanassa) and two by indifferent feeling (upekkha). They can be 
prompted (instigated or induced) or unprompted by self or by others. The view, which arises with a 
greed-rooted mind, always stands for wrong view (miccha-ditthi). 
 
29 In the Long Discourses of the Buddha, sixty-two kinds of wrong view are mentioned. Of these 
there are 18 speculative theories concerning the past, and 44 concerning the future. There are speculative 
theories about the world being finite or infinite, about the origin of the “soul” or the world. There are 
speculations about good, evil, and about nibbana. Nibbana is not considered annihilation, but freedom 
from the cycle of birth and death. The emancipated one has cultivated the right conditions for the 
attainment to this freedom. However, so long as one still believes in a self, one is bound to cling to 
speculative theories (DN 1). 
 
30 We read in the Majjhima Nikaya about Videhika who was calm so long as there was no 
opportunity for hatred. It seemed that she had no hatred at all. She had an excellent reputation; she 
appeared to be gentle, meek and calm. Her servant Kali wanted to test her and she came to work later 
every day. Because of this Videhika lost her temper: she hit Kali on her head with the pin used for 
securing the door bolt. (MN 21) 
 
31 The Visuddhimagga  gives a similar definition. The proximate cause of envy is someone else’s 
prosperity. When there is jealousy one cannot stand that others receive pleasant objects. At that moment 
there cannot be “sympathetic joy” (mudita). We may be jealous when someone else receives a gift, when 
he receives honour or praise because of his good qualities or his wisdom. When there is jealousy we do  
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not want someone else to be happy and we may even wish that he would lose the pleasant objects or the 
good qualities he possesses. (Vism XIV 172) 
 
32 The Visuddhimagga (XIV 173) elaborates stinginess as a cramped state of mind, where one 
cannot stretch out one’s hand in order to give a gift. The proximate cause of avarice is one’s own 
property, whereas, as we have seen, the proximate cause of envy is someone else’s prosperity. When 
there is avarice one is unable to share what one has (or will acquire) with someone else. 
 
33 We read in the commentary to the Sudhabhojana Jataka (Jat V 535) about a monk in the 
Buddha’s time that practiced the utmost generosity. The Buddha spoke about one of this monk’s former 
lives when he was the miser Kosiya. Kosiya did not keep up the tradition of almsgiving of his ancestors 
and lived as a miser. One day he had a craving for rice-porridge. When his wife suggested that she would 
cook rice-porridge not only for him but also for all the inhabitants of Varanasi, he felt “just as if he had 
been struck on the head with a stick”. Kosiya’s wife subsequently offered to cook for a single street, for 
the attendants in his house, for the family, for the two of them, but he turned down all her offers. He 
wanted her to cook porridge only for himself, in the forest, so that nobody else could see it. 
 
34 lit. the ‘bearer’, constitution (or nature of a thing), norm, law (jus.), doctrine; justice, 
righteousness; quality; thing, object of mind (ayatana) ‘phenomenon’. In all these meanings the word 
‘dhamma’ is to be met with in the texts. (http://wwe.palikanon.com) 
 
35 Conversely, the stream-enterer (sotapana) who has realized the Four Noble Truths, has 
eradicated all forms of stinginess. He wishes everyone to know and realize the Dhamma he has realized 
himself. However, there may be good reasons for not teaching Dhamma to someone who is bound to 
abuse the Dhamma and to interpret it wrongly, or to someone who will erroneously take himself for a 
noble one because of his knowledge. 
 
36 Although Visuddhimagga’s (XIV 174) definition of regret as repentance might hint at virtue, 
regretting the commission of the bad (and the omission of the good) is different from the good thinking 
about the disadvantages of the bad and the value of the good. Hence, regret is unhealthy as it arises with a 
hate-rooted mind. The term ‘worry’ does not suffice here. When we say that we worry, it may be thinking 
with aversion about an unpleasant object without there being regret. For example, we may worry about 
the way to solve a problem in the future; this kind of worry is not the reality of regret. 
 
37 When we have slandered or spoken harsh words there may be remorse about it afterwards. 
There can also be remorse about our neglectfulness of wholesome; words for example, praising someone 
who is praiseworthy. We may be stingy when there is an opportunity for praising someone who deserves 
praise. As a consequence of our omission of wholesome regret may arise. The Middle Length Sayings 
(MN 129) - Discourse on Fools and the Wise - mentions the story of a fool who has done wrong deeds 
through body, speech and mind. He experiences anguish because other people talk about his 
unwholesomeness, and thus he acquires a bad name. He fears punishment for his evil deeds and therefore 
he experiences anguish. Moreover, he has remorse because of his evil deeds and his neglectfulness as to 
wholesome acts.  
 
38 On sloth and torpor, the Atthasalini (II, Book I, Part IX, Chapter II, 255) states: “Absence of 
striving, difficulty through inability is the meaning”. The Visuddhimagga (XIV, 167) gives a similar 
definition. The Dhammasangani calls sloth (thina) indisposition, unwieldiness of mind (1156), torpor 
(middha) indisposition, and unwieldiness of mental factors (1157). When there is sloth and torpor there is 
no wieldiness of mind, which is necessary for the performing of wholesomeness. Instead, there is mental 
stiffness and rigidity, mental sickness and laziness. As we have seen, the Atthasalini states that the 
characteristic of sloth is opposite to “striving”, to energy. In addition, an unwholesome mind is 
accompanied by energy (viriya), but this is wrong effort; it is different from right effort that accompanies 
a wholesome mind. This does not mean that whenever there is a lack of mindfulness that sloth and torpor 
arise. They do not arise with all types of unwholesome mind. 
The characteristic of torpor is unwieldiness and it functions by closing the doors of 
consciousness. It obstructs the performing of wholesomeness, it “oppresses..., it injures by means of 
unwieldiness”, the Atthasalini (378) explains. The manifestation of sloth is a “sinking of associated 
states”; it causes the mind and mental factors it accompanies to decline. The manifestation of torpor is 
“shrinking in taking the object” or drowsiness. The Dhammasangani (1157) calls torpor (middha)  
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“drowsiness, sleep, slumbering, somnolence”. The Atthasalini (378) adds to drowsiness as “Drowsiness 
makes blinking of the eyelashes, etc.” The Emancipated has eradicated sloth and torpor. He can still have 
bodily tiredness and he may sleep, but he has no sloth and torpor. We may be inclined to think that sloth 
and torpor arise only when there is sleepiness, but when we study the types of mind that can be 
accompanied by sloth and torpor we will see that there can be many moments of them, also when we do 
not feel sleepy. As we have seen, the proximate cause of sloth and torpor is “unsystematic thought, in not 
arousing oneself from discontent and laziness”. When there is sloth and torpor there is “unsystematic 
thought”, that is, unwise attention (ayoniso manasikara) to the object that is experienced. At such 
moments, we do not realize that life is short and that it is urgent to develop all kinds of wholesomeness 
and in particular right understanding of realities. 
Sloth and torpor can arise only with unwholesome minds, which are prompted (sasankharika). 
Some types of minds are unprompted or not induced (asaokharika) and some types are prompted, 
instigated or induced. The inducement can be done by someone else or by oneself. According to the 
Visuddhimagga (XIV, 91), the prompted minds are sluggish and urged on. Thus, sloth and torpor, which 
cause laziness and sluggishness with regard to the performing of wholesomeness, arise only with the 
unwholesome minds, which are prompted. They can arise with the four types of greed-rooted mind, 
which are prompted and with one type of hatred-rooted mind, the type that is prompted. This does not 
mean that they arise every time the unwholesome mind is prompted; they may or may not arise with these 
five types of unwholesome mind.   
 
39 Sayadaw U Pannadipa (2000) - Kaba Aye Sayadaw, World Buddhist Meditation Institute, 
Yangon  explains: 
  All Buddhists very frequently and extensively use the word nibbana because it is the ultimate 
goal in Buddhism. Whenever a Buddhist performs any meritorious deed, he strenuously aspires to 
nibbana alone. But actually, neither by uttering words nor by praying can nibbana be attained. 
Though one can write and express the word "nibbana", yet the real meaning or sense of it cannot 
be realized until one has attained it by oneself. Nibbana is not a thing or an object that one can have, nor a 
place where one can reach, nor a sense object that one can feel, nor a happiness that one can enjoy in the 
worldly sense, but the most supreme and pure state of insight (nana) which surpasses all mundane 
conditions. 
According to the exposition of the Buddhist canonical Texts, nibbana is a Pali word, which is 
composed of two constituents, namely Ni and vana. Ni is negative particle, vana means craving, and it 
therefore means the absence of craving: In other words, craving (tanha) functions as a link between one 
life and another; but the release or absence of craving is the discnonection of chains of life-process in 
samsara. 
In Sanskrit, nibbana is written as "nirvana" which is derive from the root “va” meaning "to 
blow" and the prefix "nir" meaning "out"; therefore nibbana means "to blow out", that is to blow out the 
flame of one's craving. 
The nibbanic state is not a negative concept like nothingness, but positive. From a negative 
outlook, naturally we often come across pairs of opposites, such as, black and white, darkness and light, 
short and long; sorrow and happiness; so also life continuum (samsara) and nibbana also can be 
considered in a similar way. As samsara here means birth, old age, disease, death, sorrow, lamentation, 
grief, pain, and despair, nibbana therefore means absence of birth, absence of old age, absence old 
disease, absence of death, absence of sorrow, absence of lamentation, absence of grief, absence of pain, 
absence of despair and on the whole, absence of all suffering of life.  
Again, from the positive standpoint, nibbana is characterized as the Ultimate Liberation, 
Happiness and Peace. According to Abhidhamma (higher doctrine), there are two kinds of happiness, (1) 
happiness enjoyed by senses and (2) happiness attained and experienced in insight or supreme wisdom.  
Regarding the former, the happiness cannot be enjoyed unless there is a sense object, which is to 
be sought after. Therefore, a sense object is happiness in the worldly sense, and no sense object means on 
unhappiness. For this reason, the happiness enjoyed by the sense is only temporary and imaginary. 
But in the case of the latter, the characteristic of nibbana is supreme peace transcending sense 
experience (santi lakkhana), the essence of indestructibility (accuta rasa), and the discernment in the 
disciple's attainment which is devoid of any sign of form or shape or colour etc. (animittapaccupathana) 
So the nibbanic state is devoid of everything like the four great elements, existence, static entity, 
rebirth, death, consciousness, mind and matter (nama & rupa) and so on. It has only the phenomenal 
nature of ceasing or, extenuation of Mind and Matter, which is always grasping the desirable sense 
objects. 
Actually, Nibbana, in its true nature is single (ekameva nibbana), but it can be attained by a  
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twofold way, namely, (1) Saupadisesa Nibbana the attainment of Nibbana while still in life and (2) 
Anupadisesa nibbana = the attainment of nibbana at the moment of death. Again nibbana can also be 
treated from three aspects, namely (1) Sunnata - devoid of the existence of an Ego or Soul, (2) Animitta - 
devoid of sign of: permanent shape or from and (3) Apanihita -devoid of desire or craving.  
Nibbana, therefore, being non-conditioned by any phenomenon is a spaceless timeless and 
encased state devoid of substance. In reality, nibbana does not exist in any particular place, but it is 
attained only by going beyond the conditioned state. Therefore, one might say that the nibbanic state lies 
within the latent potentiality of everyone who actually searches for it. 
The word “nibbana” is very essential in the Texts of the Buddha's Teaching and is used in many 
different Ways. For example: (1) Sacca - the state of precise Truth, (2) Mokkha - The state of Liberation 
from defilements. (3) Siva - The state of Ultimate Peace and (4) Sukha - The, state of Happiness because 
of the release from the dangers of samsara.  
 
40 Schizophrenia has been conceptualised within a “multifactorial-polygenetic-threshold” model 
(Gottesman & Shields,1982) which hypothesises that the disorder occurs once an individual has passed 
beyond a certain threshold, determined by a combination of genetic loading and accumulated life 
experience (Claridge, 1985). More recently, investigators (e.g. Sherrington et al., 1988) have argued for a 
single-gene theory of schizophrenia. Support for this proposal, however, is uncertain given other evidence 
that points to a heterogeneous group of genetic factors that may contribute to the disorder. (Kennedy et 
at., 1988) 
 
41 In the Sangarava sutta there is a reference to three groups of thinkers: 1) the traditionalists 
(anussavaka), 2) the rationalists and metaphysicians (takki vimamsi) 3) the experientialists (dhammam 
abhinnaya) who have personal experience of higher knowledge. The Buddha says that he belongs to the 
third group. (MN100) 
 
42 They are about the heart, the heart that is liberated from self-view [italic mine] and selfishness. 
With Right Effort, Right Mindfulness and Right concentration, the heart is pure, free from taints and 
defilements. When the heart is pure, the mind is peaceful. Wisdom (panna) or Right Understanding and 
Right Aspiration, comes from a pure heart. (Sumedho, 1992, 51) 
 
43 Crawford (1993) argues that the traditional definition of metaphysics posits the existence of a 
type of knowledge, and a means of knowing, that goes beyond rational knowledge. It depends on the 
existence of a different epistemology that is almost entirely lost in the postmodern West, which limits 
itself to the epistemic domain of reason. 
 
44 This is how his notions of kamma and “rebirth” differ from Hindu ideas of karma and 
“reincarnation”. For the Buddha, karma and rebirth are interdependent conditions without strict 
determinism. Without karmic conditions, there can be no rebirth. The consequences of karma in this very 
life or in the next are conditional. It is possible that the consequences of evil actions may be reaped in this 
life without having to wait for a future life. It is also possible that a person who has done evil in the past 
may attain enlightenment and freedom in this very life. The story of Angulimala, the murderer who 
became enlightened after meeting the Buddha, illustrates this point. It is not only the action alone, but 
many other factors, such as the natural tendencies of the person and circumstances or the context under 
which the deed is done, which determine the consequence of an action. A spoonful of salt (condition) 
dissolved in a small cup of water (condition) would not be drinkable (condition). However, if the same 
amount were pored into the river Ganges (India), it would not be undrinkable. 
In the Greater Discourse on the Analysis of Action (Mahakammavibhanga Sutta), the Buddha 
says: 
A certain person who has not properly cultivated his body, behaviour, thought and 
intelligence is inferior and insignificant and his life is short and miserable; of such person … 
even a trifling evil action done leads him to hell. In the case of a person who has proper culture 
of the body, behaviour, thought and intelligence, who is superior and not insignificant, and who 
is endowed with a long life, the consequences of a similar evil action are to be experienced in 
this very life, and sometimes may not appear at all. 
  
45 Heidegger’s usage for ‘the being of man.’ Dasein is a neutral term. In contrast to Sosein 
‘essence being thus’, Dasein has no determinate essence; its being consists in its possibilities, in what it  
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can make itself be; it is not confined to a particular place (or time), it ‘transcends’ and is ‘there’ or is a 
locus of ‘being;’ without Dasein there would be beings, but being as such. (Honderich, 1995, 176) 
 
46 Even 3-year-olds are protected from the feeling of guilt that follows from the recognition that 
they could have suppressed the act that violated a personal standard, though they are aware that objects, 
actions and the self can be good or bad. 4-year-olds wish to maintain the standard they learned at home 
and avoid the subjective uncertainty that would follow if they obeyed the examiner’s request to spill juice 
on a laboratory floor, or to tear up the examiner’s favourite photograph (Kagan et al., in press). Children 
under 5 have difficulty in controlling their action to say “day” when they see the moon and say “night” 
when they see the sun. However, 6-year-olds have no difficulty in saying that (Gerstadt et al., 1994). 
Again, a 2-year-old knows that breaking a vase is wrong but has no conception that the act, which broke 
the vase, could have been avoided. 6-year-olds, however, can re-run the sequence of acts and decide 
whether the act could have been prevented. If they believe they could have avoided the accident, they are 
likely to feel guilty (Kagan, 1984). They have the cognitive sophistication that allows them to integrate 
past, present and future in a seamless fashion. This is Piaget’s notion of reversibility, and a developmental 
stage called concrete operation. 
Children evaluate separation from a parent and its relevance for their sense of virtue, as opposed 
to monkeys, whose loss of the parent does not involve symbolic evaluation and meaning. Hence, it has a 
more uniform consequence. It is obvious that any animal is a useful model for understanding human guilt 
and shame in contrast. However, Frans de Waal argues that although chimpanzees possess rules and 
punish fellow chimpanzees he concedes that he has never seen a guilty chimpanzee. Guilt requires the 
ability to infer the state of others, to reflect on a past action, to realize that a particular action that violated 
a standard could have been inhibited and to evaluate the self as a consequence of that violation. Guilt is 
not a possible state for chimpanzees. The ability to infer the intentions, thoughts and feelings of another - 
animal or human - is unique to in the hominid line and is denied to chimps, who share common ancestors 
with humans.  
  